

RISE OF THE YOUNG TURKS

**For Barbara,
for everything.**

RISE OF THE YOUNG TURKS

Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse

M. Naim Turfan

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Contents

Foreword <i>by Feroz Ahmad</i>	vii
Acknowledgements	x
Notes on Usage	xi
Prologue: Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the political aspects of Ottoman civil-military relations	xv
Part One: On military politics	1
Chapter 1. The military as a key political institution	3
Part Two: The military tradition in the Ottoman Empire	13
Chapter 2. The military seal	15
I. Stamping the military's seal on Osman <i>Gazi's</i> principality	15
II. The ratification of the military seal in the Ottoman state	23
III. The military as a modern institution – restamping the seal	49
Part Three: The influence of the military tradition upon the Young Turks	131
Preamble: The politicization of the officer corps	133
Chapter 3. From the military's intervention to its role as the political ruling group	143
I. The officer corps as regulator of domestic politics	143
II. The struggle for the political initiative	162
III. Professional ineptitude and political instability	194
IV. <i>Coup d'état</i> : the Raid on the Sublime Porte	205
Chapter 4. The military as the political ruling group	285
I. Military ratification as a requisite for government policy	285
II. Strategies for survival	302
III. Attempts at civilian control of the military	315
IV. Military supremacy, and self-control, under Enver Paşa	337
Epilogue: Continuity of the military seal from Empire to nation-state	429
Select Bibliography	445
Index	473

Foreword

I met Naim Turfan in October 1983 while I was in London on a sabbatical. My purpose in visiting London was to do research at the Public Record Office and visit various libraries in the city. But I also used the occasion to visit former teachers at the university and to read new theses of interest in the Senate House Library. One afternoon, I went to see the late Professor P. J. Yatikiotis who taught politics in the Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies. During our conversation, I asked him if he thought there were any theses I ought to read while I was in London. His face lit up as he began to talk about a thesis he had just directed by a 'Young Turk' called Mehmed Naim Turfan. He described it as a remarkable thesis, one of the best he had directed during his entire career, and he urged me to go and read it at the first opportunity. Next day I went to the Senate House and began to read Naim's thesis. It was, as Professor Yatikiotis had described it, a remarkable piece of work. It was much larger than the average Ph.D. thesis, perhaps twice or even three times as large. But what was even more striking than its size was the maturity of the work, marked by vast scholarship, a felicitous style, and historical judgment rarely found in the writing of most graduate students.

As I read the thesis, I made copious notes for use in the future. I thought that was the end of the matter. But a few days later, I had lunch with the late Albert Hourani and I mentioned that I had read this wonderful thesis on the political role of the Ottoman army and the Young Turks and remarked that it was a pity that such a work was not available as a book. Impressed by my enthusiasm, Professor Hourani asked me to write a report on the thesis and send it to a press with which he had connections. I wrote the report and posted it to the editor as Professor Maurant had suggested. The editor responded by asking for Naim's typescript which was then sent to two other readers. After some months, the two anonymous readers sent their reports to the press. They were 'very favourable' and the editors of the series for which Naim's study was being considered were 'very impressed with the work'. However, the editors wrote that the typescript was too long to be commercially viable and asked Naim to reduce it to 'not more than 100,000 words'.

Naim was unwilling to abridge his work, especially as that would mean cutting out his notes, except as sources of reference. But

Naim's notes are not merely a reference to the sources he used; they are that, but they are much more. He never utilised notes to put aside material he could not use in the text, rather he used them to tell another story, to let the reader hear many voices at the same time, while also authenticating his research. For Naim, his notes were the very heart and soul of his study and there was no question of pruning them so as to make his book commercially viable. Naim was a scholar and not a careerist, and he had faith in the quality of his work.

Naim was a political scientist by training and he had learned his craft from such eminent scholars as Richard Rose and P. J. Yatikiotis. But if he was a political scientist by training, he was a historian by instinct. Reading his thesis I was always conscious of his lively historical imagination, his enormous fertility and facility of mind, his ability to understand vividly the conditions of the past and view with sympathy the ideas and aspirations of earlier ages, especially the epoch of the Young Turks. Yet he never allowed his imagination to carry him away, or force him to take liberties with historical facts. He was a believer in the historian's obligation to get his facts right and always made a conscious effort to that end. He was particularly careful with quotations, making sure that he never misquoted a single word. The same was true whenever he translated or rather rendered foreign-language sources into English, particularly Turkish sources; he often gave words he thought were controversial in the original language so that readers could judge for themselves. He also possessed another gift historians envy, the gift of singling out an event which brought the entire period to life.

The period Naim focuses on in this book was one of transition from empire to nation. It was marked by a struggle between the men of the old order and a new generation, described as the 'Young Turks', men who were determined to drag the Ottoman empire into the twentieth century. The politics of these years are extremely complex and the sources difficult to use and analyse. Perhaps that is the reason why most historians have tended to stay away from the Young Turk decade. There is next to nothing in English on the subject and very little in Turkish. The only recent book that comes to mind is Ahmet Turan Alkon, *İkinci Mesrutiyet Devrinde Ordu ve Siyaset* ('Army and Politics during the Second Constitutional Period') published in Ankara in 1992. Though a competent study, it lacks the analytical complexity of Naim's work. Naim in his study examines the politics of the constitutional era in detail and shows that the army officers who were members of various Young Turk parties were not simply led by the civilian politicians. They

maintained their independence of thought and action at all times and often determined the outcome of events.

Naim's untimely death in January 1998 was a great personal loss. It was also a loss to the field for Naim's productive years were still ahead of him. However, we can be grateful that he left behind this important work which will remain the definitive study on the military and politics in the late Ottoman Empire for years to come.

Feroz Ahmad
Boston

Note

Naim Turfan died on 26th January 1998, after a prolonged and courageous battle against the lymph cancer, Non-Hodkin's Lymphoma. On diagnosis in November 1995, he was on the point of finishing the revision and updating of this book, based on his original Ph.D. thesis at the University of London, entitled *The Politics of Military Politics: Political Aspects of Civil-Military Relations in the Ottoman Empire, with Special Reference to the 'Young Turk' Era* (1983). He postponed the project to concentrate on getting well, intending to take up his normal life again once treatment was over – sadly, a forlorn hope. Two years later, when the lymphoma suddenly became rampant and unstoppable, he was unable to complete those final touches, even radiotherapy as “holding treatment” in order to gain a little extra time to return home and finish the book. The pain was too severe and he was too weak; he never came home.

I promised my husband that I would make sure his book was published. I have been involved with it, in its various forms and stages, since we first met as students in 1973; nobody knows the text as I do. Here, then, is the fruit of his labours and of my pledge.

Mrs. Barbara Turfan
London

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M.N.T.

Notes on Usage

ORTHOGRAPHY: I adhere broadly to the conventions of modern Turkish orthography for the transcription of Ottoman Turkish (*Osmanlıca*) irrespective of the origin or original spelling of words.

1) Personal and place names: I try to give personal and place names as nearly as possible the form that would have been used by Ottoman (*Osmanlı*) contemporaries. For example, Mahmud Şevket Paşa rather than Mahmut Şevket Paşa or Mahmoud Shawqat Pasha; Selânik rather than Salonica or Thessaloníki. For personal names, as familiarity and the reading of historical texts dictate, I tend to use either the full names of individuals or the names by which historians generally refer to them. For example, Mustafa Reşid Paşa rather than Reşid Paşa, Rıza Paşa rather than Hasan Rıza Paşa. Similarly, place names are usually accompanied on first reference by an alternative, either the native version or that by which the place is internationally known. Thenceforth, only the form I consider most fitting is given. For example, Anatolia throughout but accompanied on first reference by the native Anadolu, Selânik throughout but accompanied on first reference by the native Thessaloníki.

2) Family names: Names in brackets accompanying personal names on first reference denote family names (*soyadı*) later adopted in accordance with the Law of Family Names (*Soyadı Kanunu*), passed on 21 June 1934 (No. 2525), put into the statute books on 2 July 1934 and coming into effect six months later.

3) Military ranks: Ottoman military ranks are given in English with the vernacular supplied in brackets on the first reference. Older ranks with no ready equivalent in English are given only in the vernacular. Ottoman military ranks of the Young Turk era (especially post-1908) were more or less equivalent with those of most contemporary western European military establishments, particularly the French. Difficulty arises, however, with the rank of Lieutenant-General since the equivalent unit, the Army Corps, did not exist in the Ottoman Empire before 8 January 1911 (26 Kânunuevvel 1326). Before 1911, therefore, the Ottoman armed forces held no such rank although the equivalent, in English, of *Birinci Ferik* was specifically Lieutenant-General. Hence, I take all

Birinci Feriks prior to 1911 as Generals and subsequent appointees as Lieutenant-Generals. Further, Ottoman officers from Second-Lieutenant to Captain inclusive were called *Efendi* after their names (apart from a few courtesy titles of *Bey*), from Adjutant-Major to Colonel *Bey*, from Brigadier to Marshal *Paşa*. Hence, *Kolağası* Mustafa Kemal Bey, for example, is this officer's full contemporary appellation, with the exception of the formal *futuvvetlu* - which (equivalent) part of every military title is omitted throughout for the sake of simplicity and clarity. In Ottoman military parlance *Efendi*, *Bey* or *Paşa* was never a courtesy title.

4) Civilian titles: In the Ottoman context, civilian titles represent one of the most complex and least understood of imperial rank and honours systems. I have adhered to the basic elements only, in order to avoid further complication and confusion. It may be said that normally *Bey* would apply to a higher civilian rank such as that of a Government minister, but many of the highest-ranking ministers and civil servants would be *Paşas*. On the other hand, the religious hierarchy were all *Efendi* at whatever level. For example, the Ottoman ambassador to Italy, İbrahim Hakkı Bey, received the imperial rank of *Paşa* when he was appointed Grand *Vezir*, whereas we can only talk about *Şeyhülislâm* Cemaleddin *Efendi*.

5) Ranks and titles in general: For the sake of clarity and familiarity, *Sultan* is used throughout for the monarch although it is not strictly accurate during the whole period. Alternatives such as *Hakan*, *Han*, *Hünkâr* and *Padişah* were in use and *Padişah* was for long the accepted term. Likewise the title Grand *Vezir* in this study, although the term *Sadr-ı a'zam* (*Sadrâzam*) is more correct later, from the sixteenth century.

CONVERSION OF DATES: Throughout the study, the Gregorian calendar is taken as the basis. But for the Young Turk era, with its close attention to detail, the *Hicrî* (or else *Malî*) calendar, then in use, is observed. Conversions are provided, where necessary together with the original, in order both to facilitate the tracing of material, particularly archival, and to render the work in keeping with the times.

TRANSLATIONS: Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own. Sometimes, for accuracy or familiarity in the case of European languages, the original stands without translation. As for the *Osmanlıca*, where I consider it appropriate and valuable, parts of

the original are provided in brackets. Translations are as accurate as possible, even though this may at times conflict with style.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES: While the text of this study is intended to be self-contained, it should be read in conjunction with the Bibliographical Notes, where I often undertake a critical examination of my source material and, at times, speculate along lines of interest that, although relevant, diverge too sharply from the textual progress for inclusion there. References in the Notes are works I have consulted and do not necessarily provide a full bibliography. In the case of each published work, the *Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules* (1st edition) apply. Full bibliographic details are given on first citation in each chapter. Heavily-used works and published archival material are subsequently cited in abbreviated form, clearly indicated “[Hereafter . . .]”. Similarly, the origin of unpublished archival material, in a traceable form, is supplied once in full and subsequently in abbreviation, indicated “[Hereafter . . .]”. In view of the abundance of material cited and quoted, the conventions *ibid.*, *op.cit.* and *loc.cit.* are used only within individual notes. For consistency, İstanbul is given as the place of publication for all works published there despite the profusion of alternative names, such as Dersaadet, Konstantin(n)iye, Constantinople.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY: This is a list of works drawn from the Bibliographical Notes and containing only published material (including published archives). The works selected are those most relevant to the study as a whole while at the same time accessible to the reader, including the specialist reader. For the full bibliographical sources used in the preparation of the original study, the reader is advised to consult the Ph.D. thesis upon which this work is based (See **Prologue**, N.1).

Now shalt thou feel the force of Turkish arms

Marlowe, *Tamburlaine the Great*, Part I, III, iii, 134

Prologue

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the political aspects of Ottoman civil-military relations

One night in October 1909, we are told, an Ottoman staff-officer, Adjutant-Major (*Erkân-ı Harb Kolağası*) Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Bey, attached to the IIIrd Army, gave a speech at the second annual congress of a political society of which he was a member – *Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (known as the Committee of Union and Progress) – being convened secretly some time between 13 and 25 October in Selânîk (Thessalonîki). It seems he was there as a delegate from Trablusgarb (Ottoman Libya). In his speech, Mustafa Kemal Bey specifically commented upon what might loosely be called the political aspects of Ottoman civil-military relations. The young officer is quoted as saying:

“As long as members of the military remain in the Committee [U.P.], neither shall we set up a party nor shall we have a military [Ordu mensupları cemiyet içinde kaldıkça hem fırka kuramayacağız hem de ordumuz olmayacaktır]. The IIIrd Army, the majority of whose members are [also] members of the Committee, cannot be called a modern army

in today's meaning of the word. [Moreover] the Committee, leaning upon the military, is not able to take root in the body of the nation [. . . millet bünyesinde kök salamamaktadır]. Therefore, before everything, let us by means of resignations take out from the military those officers whose services are needed in the Committee and those members of the military who wish to remain in the Committee, and let us from now on institute statutory regulations in order to prevent the entry of officers and [other] members of the military into any political society."¹

The fundamental importance of this oft-quoted fragment of speech lies, contrary to the consensus of opinion, not so much in what this officer said or what was done after he had said it as in why he was saying it and, even more, whether or not it was appropriate for him to say it.

It is not easy to penetrate the thoughts and sentiments of a man. Yet, as the complexity of events which gave rise to such forms of thinking are studied eclectically in the course of this work, I shall try to make clear that what was significant here was a view, novel for the time, of the military as independent of the government of the day. This meant to disengage the military from partisan politics, to let the officers assume a kind of autonomous position and to give them in return a commanding role, thus allowing the military the freedom to act in concert and independently of the supposedly competitive partisan struggle for power – an aim not fulfilled then but realized fully some years afterward, not by civilians but by officers and not by Mustafa Kemal Bey but by the very officer who was at this time a member of the all-powerful *Merkez-i Umumî* (Central Committee of the Committee [U.P.]), Staff-Major (*Erkân-ı Harb Binbaşı*) Enver Bey. Mustafa Kemal Bey's turn was to come later, under different circumstances and in a radically different political process which transformed his aim into decisions, as when he had a chance to summon all his supporters to aid him in correcting and, indeed, redressing the disorder that disturbed his society.

But this synopsis, to the details of which I assign the last part (Part Three) of this book, will remain apparently paradoxical unless it is placed in its methodological and, following that, its social setting (Parts One and Two respectively). Indeed, one finds authors, too numerous to mention here, who offer the explanation that what Mustafa Kemal said was to take the military out of politics, without even bothering to define what they mean by "politics" or how relevant were "politics" in that room in Selânik in 1909. I have also read those authors who take the view that what Mustafa Kemal wanted was to civilianize the régime, conveniently forgetting that the régime of the day was a constitutional monarchy to all intents

and purposes and civilian in nature as far as régimes went in the Ottoman Empire. Last, not least but I think the most valid, is the view that Mustafa Kemal feared the undermining of the discipline and therefore fighting capacity of the armed forces should its members act in factions in order to serve their party first. Correct though such a fear later proved to be, this view, to which many scholars continue to subscribe, ignores a junior officer's concern for the formation of a political party and, more revealingly, his making it his business how this prospective party should be able ". . . to take root in the body of the nation", for it treats the quotation stripped of its historical setting.

I, on the contrary, will venture to affirm that at face value a paradox is implicit in Mustafa Kemal Bey's statement in the sense of how and by what right a serving officer came to participate, and as a delegate at that, in a secret meeting of a revolutionary society in a country under constitutional government. And the paradox appears more puzzling since, as I may remind the reader, he happened to be one of those officers who had been active in the restoration of the Constitution some fourteen months earlier and, indeed, had got himself into trouble with the previous régime for his involvement in the political activities towards that end.

Yet what appears paradoxical to us now would not have seemed so to Mustafa Kemal Bey or to the likes of him then. Nor, presumably, will it to us if we try to grasp the politics of the day as they perceived them. It is, in brief, to an analytical discussion of the many reasons for this kind of ambiguity that this book is directed.

Note

- 1 Quoted in part in Y.H. Bayur, *Atatürk: hayatı ve eseri*, I – Doğumundan Samsun'a çıkışına kadar. Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1963; p. 44, on which the present translation is based.

The source of this speech is Dr. Tevfik Rüşdü (Aras) who was the General Secretary of the 1909 Congress. His account, oral and later written, has appeared in various works. For an informative example, see: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım: milli mücadeleye gidiş*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965-1972. 8 cilt. Cilt 2, p. 508, where a slightly differently worded but substantially similar version appears. It is, again, based on the *Notes on the memoirs of Tevfik Rüştü Aras*, the related section of which ("the 1909 Congress of the Committee [U.P.]") was communicated to Bayar in a letter dated 7 December 1944. For further details, see: C. Bayar, *Atatürk'den hâtıralar*. İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955; pp. 16ff.

The events at the Congress, with particular reference to the speech, were related by Atatürk himself to Bayur and Bayar on various occasions. See: Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, p.43, N.35; and his earliest reference: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı*

tarihi. Cilt I: Giriş : Berlin Muahedesinde Trablus-Garp savaşına kadar. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.9. Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1940; p. 227; and C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, p. 507, N.2.

The only source I have been able to find for the written account of the Congress by Atatürk himself is a letter written to his close friend, Staff-Major Behiç (Erkin) Bey, from 'Ayn al-Mansur Headquarters in Dernah, Trablusgarb (Tripoli), dated 16 Temmuz 1328 (29 July 1912). I quote the relevant part:

"It is said that they [i.e., the Government] enacted a law [madde-i kanuniye yapmışlar . . .] preventing the soldiers from meddling in partisan politics. When, a couple of years ago, at a congress at which I was present by chance [. . . ben iki sene evvel hasbettesadüf bulunduğum bir kongrede . . .], I said 'Leave the soldiers alone!', I became [in their eyes] a reactionary . . ."

This letter, the original of which is in the *Türk İnkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü* Archives, was first published in a daily newspaper, *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, in 1925 and subsequently reproduced in part or in full in a number of works, the latest and I think the most reliable of which is: S. Borak, *Öyküleriyle Atatürk'ün özel mektupları*. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1980; pp. 48-49, p. 49. (Borak renders "hasbettesadüf" as "tesadüfen" for the modern Turkish reader). Cf., B. Erkin, "Atatürk'ün Selânik'teki askerlik hayatına ait hâtıralar", *Belleten*, XX:80 (Ekim) 1956, pp. 599-604, esp. pp. 599-600.

Despite a slight error as regards the date of the Congress, there is nothing one can gather from the latter, with one exception – Mustafa Kemal's accounting his presence at the Congress as being "by chance [hasbettesadüf]". I know of no source that would verify this claim. Cf., for example, R. Simon, "Beginnings of leadership: Mustafa Kemal's first visit to Libya, 1908", *Belleten*, XLIV:173 (Ocak) 1980, pp. 69-82. On the contrary, he was there as a member of the Committee (U.P.) and as a delegate, as I have indicated. Cf. esp.: E.J. Zürcher, *The Unionist factor: the role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish national movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden: Brill, 1984; pp. 42-52.

The circumstances of the then Staff-Major Mustafa Kemal Bey's presence in Trablusgarb, as well as of the "enact[ment] of a law" will be considered and evaluated later in this study. Bayar's (1955) version of the speech was later translated, loosely I would say, into English and appeared in: İ. Orga, *Phoenix ascendant: the rise of modern Turkey*. London: Robert Hale, 1958; p. 38. However, the date of the Congress and the rank of Mustafa Kemal were mistaken there and these mistakes repeated in, for example: D. Lerner and R.D. Robinson, "Swords and ploughshares: the Turkish army as a modernizing force", *World politics*, 13:1 (October) 1960, pp. 19-44, pp. 19-20; who used Orga's translation. Lerner and Robinson, in turn, constituted the source of: S.E. Finer, *The man on horseback: the role of the military in politics*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1962; p. 31. And what has by now become "received truth" creeps even into the first psychobiography of Atatürk with the words: "He urged that the military play no role in politics . . .": V.D. Volkan and N. Itzkowitz, *The immortal Atatürk: a psychobiography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; p. 66. Indeed, I have already studied the ramification of that "received truth" in respect of the First Turkish Republic and its related literature. This was an adjunct to my developing a theoretical framework for the political aspects of civil-military relations for the present work. See: M.N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics: political aspects of civil-military relations in the Ottoman Empire with special reference to the 'Young Turk' era*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983; pp. 15-18 and esp. N.25, N.37 and N.38.

As for the 1909 Congress and related documents, which were reproduced, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler, 1859-1952*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş

Yayınları, 1952; pp. 190-191 and pp. 210-212. Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*. 3 cilt. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984-89. Genişletilmiş 2. baskı Cilt I: II. Meşrutiyet dönemi (1908-1918); pp. 28-29 and pp. 80-83.

Pro-Committee, but contemporary, accounts are found in the two leading articles of *Tanin* by H. Cahid, “Askerler ve cemiyet”, 13 Teşrinievvel 1325 (26 October 1909), and “Selânik Kongresi münasebetiyle”, 25 Teşrinievvel 1325 (8 November 1909).

An informative discussion of the Congress, with special but misplaced emphasis on the speech, is provided by: S. Akşin, *100 soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980; pp. 148-150; and again repeated in: S. Akşin, “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün iktidar yolu”, pp. 49-80 in *Çağdaş düşüncenin ışığında Atatürk*. İstanbul: Dr. N.F. Eczacıbaşı Yayınları, 1983; p. 56.

Part One

On Military Politics

The military as a key political institution

I.

To me, politics in the broad sense is precisely what it was to Oswald Spengler – “life, and life is politics. Every man is willy-nilly a member of this battle-drama”; as too, logically, every military man would be. For indeed, no military is outside politics. All militaries are in them. Moreover, there never was a military institution which has remained out of politics – be it beside them, below them or, especially, above them. The Turkish Armed Forces is a current example, and a good one at that. Better still, the Ottoman armed forces offer a teleological example, and a representative one too.

There are militaries, however, and no doubt there have been, which try to remain out of the narrower day-to-day, or partisan, politics – the governmental policy-making activity itself. For instance, the national military of Turkey does try not to become obsessed with the effort and hurry of day-to-day politics; even the imperial, professional soldiery of the later Ottoman Empire at times was forced to behave thus, or did so voluntarily. Now this proposition may seem hard to credit and the difficulties it imposes upon us are undeniable, not least because the military is more than just another political institution – that is, a social institution, being a

product of human society, arising out of social conditions; it is, along with the bureaucracy and the judiciary, a key political institution.

I would argue here that we accept any organized form of human life as political, inherently affecting the society and its institutions, if and when it emanates from policy-making activity towards the recognition and reconciliation of opposing interests, or even their initial creation. In such a kind of life as this, pervading and permeating as it does all collective social activity, public and private, of all human groups, certain social institutions are key. They provide the framework inside whose boundaries political activity, actuated and sustained by disagreement and no less by agreement, takes place. Moreover, these key social institutions are political in that they are concerned with regulating the pursuit and exercise of the state's coercive power in respect of the most effective permanent components of that power: armed, administrative and judicial, whatever the form of government. Nevertheless, the key political institutions should not be construed as the product of political thought but as the premise upon which political thought rests, since ultimately they depend on the nature of individuals. So the key political institutions support a structure within which political problems and their solutions are acted out, rather than one which itself comprises the solution for any specific problem. Thus, the key political institutions are the essential pillars of the state – that overarching social institution distinguishable from the others by its supreme political authority for the regulation of the whole complex society – and are not to be confused with the more numerous dependent institutions of the state and of the society, the political executive, or government, included.

Turning now to what is perhaps an even more apt analogy, together the key political institutions form the DNA, as it were, of the body politic. Accordingly they transmit, in a kind of molecular code, the hereditary determinants of the society from generation to generation. In this way the key institutions convey social information, that is, the disposition of grades and divisions – the social order – from its primordially. I do not think it is possible to understand the nature of any society without taking into account this genetic code which determines the way in which every society develops. A key political institution – in the present case, the military – in particular offers a key to understanding not only the “metabolic processes” of the institutional life of a society but also the historical context of how and by whom violence has come to be monopolized in that society. Like a genetic code, to repeat, it carries all the relevant information that determines the nature of

the final product, the state. If we can retrieve the history of the military institution, in which the social information is embodied and transmitted, then we shall have a comprehensible living process of the state and thence of the society. Obviously, in this process, what is crucial for the military institution is not the continuation of its particular identity but rather the continuation of the kind of military that it is and, especially, of its remembered past; so that the military institution develops in relation to its internal determination, by embodying national or imperial norms and rules in its national or imperial setting and, consequently, by proffering universally accepted roles. This is what the military signifies and, accordingly, this is the way it develops. Besides, the military generates self-perpetuating power simply because by its nature it has an economic base concomitant with the power of the state, if one takes power here both as a value and as a means.

So, however one looks at it, there is no escaping the admission that the political resources available to the military are the sources of its power, in the sense that they are the means by which the military may induce support, compliance, impartiality or, at the least, indifference on the part of other political institutions in its attempts to win, maintain or expand its share of power in the society. The kinds of political resources which thus comprise means of influencing public policy are the military's expertise, popularity, legitimacy, organization, economic strength and manpower – to name but the most significant. Little wonder, then, that the resources are wont to bring the military firmly into the sphere of choice, priorities and conflict – in other words, that of governmental political activity, especially in times of weakened state control. And at all times these politics, including military politics, will thus not be seen as abstracted from the social whole.

The presupposition of this kind of philosophy of political institutions in general, and of the military institution in particular, is a radical conception in politics, but I believe it to be universally acceptable. When applied to the military, this conceptualization signifies an institution which represents organized violence and the threat of it in terms of the maintenance of the established social order from the outset, its defence against foreign aggression and, at times, its propagation and imposition over foreign populations.

In these ways, the regular military institution reflects the highest degree of social conformity and social acceptance, through which it prevails upon individuals to lend support in propping up and protecting the social order. For the leitmotiv of the social order is its desire for continuous self-preservation: the key political institutions are there to ensure that this does occur – and which

physically better placed to do so in society than the military, on behalf of the state? Kipling's admonition provides perhaps the most graphic answer:

"For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the brute!' But it's 'Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot."

It is, then, no good studying institutions only by considering their formal governmental arrangements. We need to combine the formal institutions of government with the wider social context within which, say, the military institution operates. Since political activity is a part and parcel of social activity, politics a product of society and power fundamental to politics, then political institutions like the military are indispensable to the politics of society because they embody power – that is, power over others: the principal means of affecting the behaviour of others by some sanction, such as might.

The idea of the military as one of the key political institutions diverts substantially from the narrow, orthodox, institutional approach to politics; after all, the military is the political institution that ultimately determines the distribution of political power. In so doing, it does something else besides. The military, as a political institution, directs us, the people, in those contingencies wherein the combative impulse is stimulated to act – that impulse which is embedded in and moulds human behaviour. And militaries tend to think that with their elaborate organizations they are fighting for whatever they deem it their duty to fight – the defence of their realm or an offensive to impose their realm on others, whether for the furtherance of an idea or of an ideal. All this is politics, of course, no matter how or what militaries think. For it is all to do with the breadth and depth of human endeavour, collective society; hence the totality of politics. Indeed, it is useful here to postulate that any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always political. Consequently, the decisions of any military institution of any social order intrinsically as well as extrinsically affect political and, no less, economic life. For these to alter radically in any direction, the military's behaviour must alter correspondingly. Yet I argue that short of social revolution, desired and effected by the will of the people, such change is not readily viable in a given social order; any kind of stylized behaviour, namely "institutionalized" behaviour, is by definition almost impossible to alter. It is not simply because within an institution such as the military, traditions and explicit norms prescribe a way of life – in the present case, a military life comprising normally a

coherent nexus of carefully-directed opinions and actions. Nor is it just that men are fundamentally conservative and therefore resist sudden shifts in their social stance, as the social psychologists would argue. Nor, finally, is the most important and significant function of the military, that of propping up and protecting the existing social order, sufficient to explain its obduracy. All in all, what the problem of explaining the military's position fully needs for its solution is to be approached from the standpoint of its own considerable social interests – interests that pertain to the society to which the military belongs. The military institution, perhaps more than the institutions of law and administration, will develop vested interests in stabilizing and supporting the total political process within the social order. Thus the military institution, as the leading actor, will assume a more responsible role than the other two key political institutions. However, the claim and, in fact, the assumption of responsibility, combined with its institutional coherence, is a matter of degree, partially contingent upon the varieties of social order – across the spectrum from its individualist to its collectivist form. And yet whatever the form, the institution will have potential autonomy of action because the soldiers carry arms. Now of course this is also to do with the fact that, as I have mentioned, the military institution affects the distribution of national resources which, in turn, affects the strength of the military. There is a second reason though, more interesting topically and more profound philosophically, for the high standing of the military. That the military institution and the society to which it belongs are interdependent is not merely a platitude; it is a relationship of extreme importance. For only through this interdependency is it possible to understand why the vested interest in the maintenance of a particular form of social order prevents the self-perpetuating attitude of the military from changing, because as far as the military institution is concerned there is no point in changing them. Actually, contrary to what is generally believed, the power of a political institution does not simply mean its power over the state. Now this may at first seem unlikely on general grounds; for it would appear natural that when people first think about the military and its relation to the state, they should begin by thinking of it as correlative to state and as existing only as organized violence which has a protective element as well – a view that serves to compound the power of the military institution, denoting all the ways and means of command and authority (in its *de facto* and *de jure* senses) without violence.

In addition to this view, however, a more essential conception

of the military's institutional power must be propounded – power with respect to the military. It is this power which is required to inaugurate the military as a key political institution in the first place, to guarantee its continuance and, most important of all, to enforce its norms and in this way to perpetuate its attitudes. So the suggestion I am considering is not that a conception of a purely immanent institutional power is replaced by one of a purely transcendent type, but that a conception in which immanence is emphasised gives way to one in which transcendence is emphasised. Put in Kantian terms, the *a priori* character of institutional power, presupposed in and necessary to the political process, bears a rather special sense here. My suggestion, thus qualified, falls into two parts. First, the power of the military institution in all its facets – economic, political, cultural, psychological and coercive – is its power to resist systemic change into a wholly new social order. It is almost impossible for a military that has evolved within and believes in one social order to alter itself and become compatible with a wholly different one, chiefly because the institutional power of the military – by means of recruitment and promotion, career specialization, expertise, the degree of permanence of its personnel and group solidarity based on a strict hierarchical structure; and the loyalty that these ensure – supplies stability through the inelasticity which the military maintains throughout its history. Secondly, although the passage of time and the change of circumstance necessitate continual readjustment of the structure of the military institution (even if it is the most inelastically organized), it is the institutional power of the military compounded with its political conservatism, to which I have already drawn attention, that sustain it through such transitions.

II.

Starting from the preceding universal and particular assumptions based on the principles of my own political thinking, the substance of this book has a political character not only in a general sense but also in the more precise sense that it has a political unity; it also has a definite aim. The book is my attempt to analyze the political aspects of civil-military relations in the Ottoman Empire, while paying close attention to the so-called Young Turk era. It has, moreover, a definitive historical scope of conception in that it possesses a historical unity, fortified by the full and, I trust, adroit use of the materials of history. More specifically, the purpose of my book is to ascertain the military's place in Ottoman society and,

no less important, to locate its place, temporally and spatially, within the Ottoman phase (c.1300-1922) of Turkish political history. So aimed, the analysis depends heavily on a factual and empirical interpretation of the conditions under which the Turkish military tradition was established within the Ottoman state, the role it played especially in the Young Turk era and the way it set the scene for the transformation from empire to nation-state, namely the Republic of Turkey.

This, then, is my task. In its assignment the constant emphasis on the province of politics may seem to carry the implication that identification of “political animals” is essential to the explanation of their behaviour; and so it does. It implies simply that politics, to quote Spengler once more, is “in every trait of instinct, in the inmost marrow”. Consequently, the present analysis of the political aspects of civil-military relations will almost certainly be affected in itself by the mental and moral nature of the soldiers and, equally, of the civilians; and, no less concomitantly, by the character of those native historical witnesses to my case. In this, my witnesses are typical of the society that created them – but, more importantly, so were those civilians; so, too, were the soldiers. Notice that here the extent to which the soldiers differ from the civilians may be shown by assessing the relations between the officer corps as an élite group and other élite groups. This I shall do, because for the purpose of this study, these groups are the most significant with which I can deal. I intend, therefore, to concentrate on the military élite – the professional soldiers or career officers – while the civilian élite will include all those groups appointed, selected or elected to the highest level of authoritative decision-making in conducting the affairs of state; in other words, to govern.

III.

Where was the military in Ottoman society? How is it possible to locate its place in the Ottoman period of Muslim Turkish political history while excluding the immediately preceding and succeeding periods in Anatolia with their corresponding states – the Anatolian Selçuk State (Selçuks of Rum) and the Turkish Republic? Does not the exclusion of other Turkish states in Anatolia and elsewhere prevent me from adjudicating on the role in day-to-day politics that the Ottoman military had undertaken to perform? If such questions are to be answered, and answered satisfactorily, and if objections have to be met, a unique approach is needed.

In this work my approach is that of an attempt to seek the

military element, which I regard in a manner of speaking as a contributory part of the DNA by which military hereditary characteristics are transmitted. Thus, I positively refuse to feel hampered by the past; rather, I welcome the past in the hope that I may thereby reflect upon the present, profit by the future. Indeed, I need to be a social evolutionist here, for I probe the past not just for the past's sake but in order to locate the past of the present. In its essence, my approach aims ultimately at establishing the existence of a living military tradition in the Turkish Republic, reaching back, within the chronological and textual limits necessarily imposed in this study, at least as far as the foundation of the Ottoman polity. Valuable as this kind of method may be, it is justifiable only *a posteriori* when applied to an accepted but unexamined phenomenon. As a principle of research, however, this approach should not narrow the researcher's perspective even though it axiomatically presupposes the concept of evolution, whereas it is this concept itself which ought to be substantiated only as a result of the research.

In this approach, I try to keep the military's role in the Ottoman body politic in a living relationship with that of preceding Turkish states, in accordance with general evolutionist thinking. But, as in all evolutionary process, the development of the Ottoman polity contained change and mutation generated within the society itself. To appreciate this fully is to seek the conceptual autonomy of the Ottoman Empire only. What I have in mind is to use the heuristic method. For this, I do not approach the military element from a fixed system of conceptual references in order to find the extent to which the Empire can be related to it; by so doing I could only find in my object what I already had within my own perspective. Rather, the political aspects of Ottoman civil-military relations must be derived from those relations themselves. In this way, by first identifying the autonomous concepts applicable to the case and then using them in the reconstitution of history, it comes about that both what is being related and what it is being related to attain greater clarity and become more understandable.

Within this general domain of thought, I attempt to offer an explanation by the connection with the past of the object under study. For in this attempt to distil politics from history I try not to lose sight of the history, in order, mainly, to keep the argument from becoming abstract. So considered, the book therefore is by no means a work of history but a reflection about history. After all, human history, like biography, is about chaps; reflection about history not so much reflection about the chaps as about their politics – thence military politics, or the politics of military chaps.

IV.

Before addressing myself directly to the substance of the politics of Ottoman military politics, a few remarks about method and related concepts may be in order.

For me, the whole intricate question of method resolves itself not into formulae but into E.M. Forster's power of the writer to bounce the reader into accepting what he says – a power which I too shall employ in the attempt to take a synoptic view of the Ottoman centuries as a whole and to extract the essence of the political out of the social discourse. Only so, I believe, is it possible to combine generalizations with the description of events. More important still and no less significant, only so is it possible to represent the situation globally, where all militaries are in politics, and to prove the point thereof.

In support of the method chosen, I shall try in this study to make consistent use of specific terms – terms like form, stimuli, control and politicization, all to do with the conscious political acts of the Ottoman military: briefly, the forms of them, the major stimuli which motivated them, the control of them and, most fundamentally, the essence of them. All these terms, representing my autonomous concepts, will, I hope, help to mould upon an orderly pattern the diverse materials of this book. I shall blend the shorthand terms into the text, introducing them as they naturally arise, with explanations or definitions as required, mainly to help me focus my argument and the reader's attention upon facts. And I shall do so not necessarily sitting as I ought, like Humpty Dumpty "with his legs crossed like a Turk", but asserting, like him, that "when I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less". Further, I shall use the words to indicate rather than to excite, for I do not want to replace their logical significance with latent effusiveness. That is to say, I do not want to review the historical facts through the distorting medium of my own political enthusiasms – precisely because to do so would nullify the validity of my general propositions, seeing that they draw their support from statements about the past.

To emphasise such a connection is to confirm the guidance of history for politics. The harmony between the two will be perfect if I manage to transform the argument over my proposed scope and terms into disagreements about my factual details. Indeed, I claim the right to fallibility in these and welcome any constructive criticism.

No more remains to be said about method, except to draw the attention of the reader to its application in the Parts to

follow – Parts so relevant to the modern Turks of Turkey. But I will assert more: the politics of Ottoman military politics were omnipresent among the peoples of the Empire for the underlying reason that, like its predecessor the Eastern Roman Empire (commonly known as the Byzantine) and unlike its contemporary the British Empire, in the Ottoman case the empire was the state – a basically Turkic, definitely dynastic, professedly Islamic and, appropriately, “universalistic” kind of state. Each of its institutions had been geared to specific imperial needs; needs that were chiefly concerned with expansion through conquest, rule from strength, might into right. This required, above all, a stable conservative unity in which the military was omnipotent. Consequently, the repercussions of its politics were significant long after the conquests had ceased, the imperial rule diminished and the state withered away following its crushing defeat in the First World War. Yet despite all that had happened, not all the imperial officers, depleted though they were in numbers and quality, remained on the battlefield, inactive. Nor did all those who survived the battlefield remain out of the activity of politics; most of them did, some did not. It is explaining the activities of the latter that is germane to this study. The essence of this explanation in terms of the conjunction of military politics is that given the antecedents of Ottoman social conditions, subsequent events, as I have just outlined, were unlikely to have resulted other than as they did. Yet it is important to be clear in what sense this is true.

Military politics were significant to different degrees say, for the Greeks, for the Serbs, for the Bulgarians, during the creation of their own nation-states and the ensuing political developments. But these politics were of the utmost significance for the Arabs, especially the Muslim Arabs of Syria, Iraq and the surrounding regions, for one often overlooked reason – that their Founding Fathers were former Ottoman officers.

Hence, the Ottoman military variable was independent; change in it affected the changes in others. Changes in the politics of military politics, then, affected the social changes – economic, political, psychological lives of the Ottoman peoples. National states emerged at various times as heirs to the Ottoman social tradition. Only the emergence of the Turks of the Ottoman Empire and their state, the Republic of Turkey, needs fully to be appreciated for my purpose here.

That said, the Part on military politics will now be succeeded by a discourse on Ottoman Turkish political history, for the subject of study and the study itself will reveal themselves as one.

Part Two

The Military Tradition in The Ottoman Empire

The Military Seal

I. Stamping the military's seal on Osman Gazi's principality

I.

The military,¹ itself a political institution, has always constituted the vital component in the conventional, spontaneous, living traditions influencing the development of Turkish political structures and their functions. From this standpoint, the most important historical aspect of civil-military relations in, say, the Turkish Republic is the extent to which the management of force and violence has been analogous to the process of its institutionalization on the creation of this state out of the ruins of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. An understanding of this process of the acquisition and retention or destruction of political power requires an appreciation of the linked changes which circumstances over the centuries demanded – changes in various social institutions, especially the military as the chief agent of coercion. I argue, therefore, that for an understanding of Ottoman statecraft at the end of empire, the historical antecedents must be studied. For this, it will be necessary to go back at least as far as the foundation of the Ottoman state as a small principality at the turn of the fourteenth century “. . . from the fortunes of war on the troubled frontiers of Asia Minor”² – more accurately, Turkia (Turquia or Turchia) as it had become universally known since the twelfth-century Selçuk hegemony.

The dominant characteristics of the Ottoman state, inherited from its Selçuk parentage, were present in embryonic form at its birth. Among these, the skilful employment of physical force and the dependence on the powerful unifying force of religion were the

main political determinants for the state's foundation.³ The juxtaposition of these two forces provided a stimulus for petty lords, local and nomadic chiefs and family heads – along with their followers – to form a ruling group of military nobles. It must also have influenced, among others, Osman I (d.1326), to organize a small frontier principality (*uç beyliği*) as a principality-in-arms.

The emergence of Osman I's principality in about 1300 among the many other Turkish principalities in Anatolia (Anadolu) may be traced to the demands and practices of war and policy because, contrary to Clausewitz's dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other means, in this case policy was the continuation of war. That is, the will of the "state" was tacitly assumed to be directed towards continually increasing its power in relation to other "states". The unification or separation of the religious and military forces corresponded to the external pressures, the political, economic and demographic developments of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolia.⁴ These developments called for the most tactical deployment of the two forces in the continuous struggle among the predominantly Turkish frontier principalities of western Anatolia. The winner did not eliminate but assimilated the losers,⁵ be it by coercion or by cooperation, having proved himself the most able manipulator and the best representative of those forces. The process led to the development of Osman I's principality from a minor *beylik* into a true "Frontier Empire",⁶ seeking, throughout, its legitimation in the ideal of *gaza*. Nevertheless, the amalgamation of physical and religious forces comprising *gaza* had yet to evolve in sophistication from the popular folk tradition of heroic exploits into the learned orthodox Islamic doctrine of continuous expansion through the religious duty of holy war.⁷

With the Turco-Mongol invasions of the Muslim Middle East in the 1220s and their occupation of the Selçuk Sultanate, the already turbulent Anatolia sank into deeper turmoil for another two hundred years, causing the considerable migration of nomadic Muslim Turkish tribes (*aşirets*) towards the western edge of the Anatolian plateau, the frontier region where "Muslim East" mingled with "Christian West" (Eastern Roman Empire). Concomitantly, increasing population pressure on the inhabitants and the immigrants led to the frontier region becoming a place of refuge for troops, religious and political figures, townsmen, villagers, merchants and craftsmen, including those *ahis* and *baba'îs* who provided political, economic and spiritual centres for the migrants.⁸ The migrants were all looking for new lands in which to live,

cultivate and trade, or simply to find a livelihood, and at the same time they were all prepared to pay the price for this, whatever that price might be.

Thus, during the formation of independent frontier communities which grew up in the disintegrated body of the Anatolian Selçuk state, war, but war of an offensive character, became the chief priority of the increasing population. Without exception they were geared to gaining and settling land, whether at one another's expense or, more frequently, from a different and little-known enemy who was particularly alien to the migrating Turks in terms of culture and, more importantly, religion.

The realization of these differences must have accelerated the establishment of principalities, independent but inspired by the same warrior ideology, along the Muslim-Christian frontier in Anatolia.⁹ Their common attitude was stimulated by their concept of *gaza* which, combined with the latitudinarian cultural pattern and syncretic lifestyle inherited from the past,¹⁰ fostered the expansion of the frontier communities by making them conform to a particular pattern, suited to the waging of wars. A "class" of warrior Turks gathered around chiefs who organized principalities in western Anatolia under the overall command of the Selçuk Sultanate, itself a vassal of the İlhanlı Empire after 1243, and from the 1260s onward incited one another to make raids into the lands of the "infidel". One of the chiefs fighting on the frontier, Osman I, with his territory situated furthest to the north and closest to Byzantium and the Balkans,¹¹ won a major victory over the Christians in 1287/88. This, so invented Ottoman tradition would have us believe, resulted in Osman's receiving the title of *Uç Beyi* (Frontier Lord) from the Selçuk Sultan, Gıyasuddin Mesud II (1284–1297, 1302–1318).¹² Whether selected or, more probably, elected to chiefship – and reliable evidence supports the latter – still Osman Bey, holding such a land-base, had to create a common sentiment among all other principalities by generating the unity and dynamism which could animate and maintain a state.¹³ His famous victory over the Byzantine forces in 1302 at the battle of Baphaion (Koyunhisar?) was instrumental in consolidating his political power among the other principalities. It was through the continuation of war, therefore, that Osman Bey's name came to be associated with the state, incorporating its two most basic functions, unification and protection.

One of the requirements of political independence was the clear definition of the ruler as the leader of the state. This definition is again represented by an Ottoman tradition of the legitimation of authority through Islâm. Thus, the proclamation of authority by

the traditional means of a sermon following the Friday prayer is generally taken to have been read in Osman Bey's name as Osman Gazi after the battle of Baphaion.¹⁴ Such a sermon, apocryphal though it sounds, may be perceived as an expression of what I call the personality principle in the Ottoman state concept.

The personality principle is so important an element in Ottoman-Turkish political theory as well as practice that it deserves fuller consideration. I regard the personality principle as deriving from the concept of order (*nizam*), the direct consequence of the desire for an established harmony among people living in a society. In order to accomplish this aspiration, the writers on Ottoman statecraft occupied themselves with the problem of, at first, the achievement and, in later periods, the maintenance of the dominant influence of the Ruler. Their basic premise seems to have been born from a simple formula: if there are men they must have some beliefs and, if so, these belief-holders should be convinced that some form of social order is a prerequisite, especially "on the troubled frontiers of Asia Minor" where they now happened to be living. The solution, for the mainstream Muslim-Turkish political literature, was founded upon the axiomatic nature of statecraft. That is, for men, who are in need of harmonious subjugation, a kind of statecraft which would keep each man in his proper place as determined not by his ethnicity but strictly by his ability to consecrate himself to and serve the policy and aims of the Ruler. To this end, the running of the state had to be sanctioned by the authority and power of the Ruler and the Ruler had to be sanctioned by Islâm within the purview of eternal tradition (*kanun-u kadim*). It was deduced from this argument that the Ruler had precedence over the rules. Indeed, the authority of the Ruler consisted in his supreme qualification and in his consequent ability to bind the people together in a harmonious whole. The Ruler's power thus referred to the execution of that which authority had laid down. The power and authority of the Ruler lay in the common perception of him as vicegerent of Allah on earth (*zillu'llâh*: Shadow of Allah on earth) whose decisions were therefore taken to be those of Allah. His absolutism permeated the realm, since obedience was considered to be an obligation (*fard-ı 'ayn*: individual obligation) for each of his subjects.¹⁵

I maintain that the personality principle was instrumental right from the start in gaining the loyalty of warriors, as well as other subjects, of every description, creed and credence; from first to last, it served to incarnate rulership in the ruler's name, like Osmanlı – as has tended to be the case in Muslim Turkish history. Subsequently, it was this very principle that would, in turn, give

rise to a higher loyalty from among local chiefs and, further, from rulers of neighbouring principalities. At each stage the principle synthesized the sustenance of the economic and political expansion already stimulated by the frontier.

After the establishment of Osman Bey's principality, expansionist policy was more purposeful, and therefore more constant, and directed to the maintenance of interests that were not incompatible in the eyes of the frontier warriors because they were all capable of subordination to the interests of the warrior ideology – a manner of thinking characteristic of the frontier society's atavistic superstitions, religious beliefs and agnatic loyalties. To me, the historical origins of warrior ideology subserving *gaza* in Turkish Islâm are still obscure and do not concern us here; but its efficacy does, and satisfactorily so. For as a result of expansionist policy encouraged by the warrior ideology, Osman Bey's frontier principality was able to dispose of proportionately large forces which then increased the principality's dynamism.¹⁶ The dominant features of this dynamic force were thus elevated by the social élite which may be called a ruling aristocracy – usually a ruling body of mounted warriors who were conscious of status and eager to gain and maintain it.

II.

I hold that the origins of the politics of Ottoman military politics must be sought in the history of the military aristocracy who generated them. These politics were the outcome of the patrician and militant moral habit of society, and their logical expression in terms of military aristocracy simply augmented the dichotomy between the *beys* and the populace since, during these formative years of the Ottoman state and its immediate expansion, the main burden was carried on by these "warrior knights"¹⁷ as the *beys* are aptly called. The military competence of the state, therefore, had become the very expression of the Ottoman polity by creating an élite of the "men of the sword", which was based on the requirements of belonging solely to the military profession. In fact, in the case of this military aristocratic "class", membership was not based on tribal kinship or any genealogical ground.¹⁸ It was, however, deemed a service which itself was a privilege rather than an obligation, from the point of view of a system of belief generated by the ideal of continuous *gaza* and imbued with the premise of the extension of *Dar-ül-Islâm* – the domain of Islâm. Besides, there were of course, as I have intimated, material benefits.¹⁹ Hence, the military profession

was from the start closely connected with the positions of power in the society.²⁰ They owed their situation to "... the concept of frontier gazâ – the empire's fundamental and unchanging principle ..." ²¹ which obliged the members of this "class" to lead a life of which fighting was the leitmotiv. The immediate outcome was that the obligation of leading an active military life entitled *beys* and their followers to a place in the forefront of society. It inspired governance; it facilitated dominance; but for long it retarded the development among the populace of self-reliance. Nonetheless, a manner of life evolved in which the employment of coercion became valuable and those who could employ it necessary to the society. These characteristics incorporated the ancient Turco-Mongolian traditions of state which had developed in and were adapted to life in the Central Asian steppe and persisted in the organized, sedentary Turkish states of the Middle Ages. From this bifurcation²² between the *beys* and the "people" derives the division between the *askerî* and the *reaya*, the "rulers" and the "ruled", which was the basic structural characteristic of Ottoman society.²³

The classical Ottoman *nizam* was composed of these two major estates, the *askerî* (lit., the military) and the *reaya* (tax-paying subjects). The *askerî*, comprising the *seyfiye* (men of the sword; armed forces), *kalemiye* (men of the pen; bureaucracy) and *ilmiye* (men of learning; *ulema*; judiciary) were paid by the Sultan and were exempt from taxation. They were not a class in the hereditary sense nor did they normally have historically-established rights independent of the Sultan, membership being contingent solely upon the Sultan's will which consistently chose to leave its ranks open to suitable newcomers. While members of the *askerî* were obliged to profess Islâm – indeed the *ulema* were naturally always recruited from among the Muslim-born population – and it was in the convert's interest to appear zealous in his new faith, motives for conversion and degree of faith were of less significance than was personal merit in attaining promotion and distinction. Such tolerance and *largesse d'esprit* was important in an extensive and heterogeneous empire, not only for non-Muslim subjects but also for the *reaya*. The latter could not normally be admitted into the *askerî* but it was possible for an individual to be so elevated in reward for some outstanding military deed. Thus, while it was in the interest of the state to maintain the order and harmony of society by ensuring that each individual remained in his own "class", the opportunity for individual "upward mobility" through merit alone provided the incentive for personal endeavour and loyalty to the Sultan. In this way, the constant admittance of new

and capable elements into the *askerî* assured the vigorous survival of the society and thus of the Empire itself until the beginning of the seventeenth century.

In the 1350s, the principality of Osman Gazi, however prominent, was no more than one among many frontier-principalities.²⁴ Within the period 1299–1350, the structure of such a principality was that of a relatively small but conquering polity with a military organization consisting of what may generically be termed *beys* with their own forces, mostly mounted and usually raised from their own territories. The central authority functioned as the commander-in-the-field and political head of state but was dependent on the cooperation of the *beys* for the carrying out of both functions and thus represented – in sociological theory – the apex of the social hierarchy in a society based on patrilineal descent.²⁵ Hence, two broad strata came into being – the chief *bey* with his subordinate *beys*, and the populace.

Against this social background, since *gaza* and colonization were the dynamic elements of the Ottoman conquests,²⁶ they resulted among other things in the *seyfiye* functioning in the beginning as the original source of organic government and later as an important element which always played the major part in the formation of government administration.

Like the structures of every other state, the structures of the Ottoman state and their functions were subject to transformations under external and internal stimuli and changed with the differing circumstances of its history. This study assumes that the internal structures of the respective periods determined the organization and use of military force and thus the external behaviour of the state generally. Yet despite change, the main function of one basic structure, the *askerî*, remained constant and so retained its continuity; that is, the preservation of an élite with its exclusive function of ruling.

In the light of this general assumption, there would seem to be good reason to believe that the profession of arms has been among the highest callings of the ruling élite. Consequently, what I propose to call a military seal was impressed from the beginning on the conduct of the affairs of the Ottoman state and on the organization at the highest level of its administration. This was so to such an extent that the leading members of the “men of the sword”, and later “men of the gun”, occupied a dominant position in the determination of its policy. The military seal was never entirely lost in the continuous stream of Ottoman history. Indeed, it has managed to survive as a traditional constituent into the modern period leading to the Turkish Republic.²⁷

The foregoing argument suggests that the main characteristics of the traditional constituent necessitate a further analysis for the better understanding of the modern period. This may be said to have begun in the last decade of the sixteenth century, resulting from both foreign and domestic pressures on the Ottoman Empire – the economic and military impact of its rivals in Europe and simultaneous social changes within. And the inherent structural weaknesses of the Empire were related intimately to its institutional failure effectively to respond to new problems, thus ultimately permitting thorough penetration by foreign economies and no choice for the Ottomans but to occupy the peripheral place allocated them in the world economy – incorporation in the new world system but as a dependent, not on their own terms. After all, one of the prerequisites for sound economic development is a strong state in terms of political institutions, particularly bureaucracy. Fundamental realignment at the start of the modern period was, of course, to provoke a radical transformation of the Empire, and of the profession of arms, in the mid-seventeenth century and was the main impetus in the creation of the major historical phases that followed.

In the historical literature, the periods of Ottoman history are generally characterized by means of military successes and failures. Historians tend to write about, and thus divide, the periods of the Ottoman Empire into certain years, based largely on the sequence of political events of which the armed struggle was unavoidably the major component. It follows that the constitution of the military has been *pari passu* the means to political ends. Thus, by looking closely at the state's central authority and its relation to one of the key political institutions, the profession of arms, we may be able to assess Ottoman history from a fresh standpoint. It is my contention in this study that historical experience evokes a series of responses which give a society its distinctive character. Hence, as in this example, the military seal, although it may become faint at times, exerts a continuous influence and even provides data for predictions about future paths – and indeed was to do so in the case of the Turkish Republic.

To sum up the discussion so far, the military, along with the religious, dynamics of political developments inspired the two main allegiances of the Ottoman state; the former, which most concerns us here, also provided the sentiment which sustained the prominence of military force in the political hierarchy. Indeed, the resolution towards Ottoman expansion and the corresponding cohesiveness that provided the stability of the state could not be made general without immediately either consolidating the power

of the *bey* or imposing an imperial mould. We may now look at the political outcome in somewhat more concrete detail.

II. The ratification of the military seal in the Ottoman state

I.

The picture of the impression of the military seal on the conduct of affairs and on the top level of the organization of the Ottoman state will be limited to the extent that I shall consider only the régime at the centre. This, however, will not impair the validity of my conclusions because of the predominance of the connection between the ruler and one functional category involving the élite elements, that of war and statecraft (*seyfiye*). Everything within this category demonstrates with utmost clarity the ever-increasing privilege, prestige and pride of the members of the ruler's household as through time they came to comprise the main division of the ruling stratum. For, to employ Ottoman terminology, among the *askerî*²⁸ the *kapikulus*²⁹ (lit., servants of the door) were long to stand highest in matters of war and statecraft. The inclusion of the *kul* system in the Ottoman body politic is important in many respects, but supremely so as far as the present subject is concerned. Indeed, what may be described as the two strands of the *kul* system – which provides its basic structure – could be untwisted, so to speak, not so much to find any structural defects as to assess its composite strength through the analysis of each of its elements. As far as I can see, each strand follows its own course, military and political respectively.

For the first, assuming the role of the only effective *gazi* state necessitated continuous conquest and maintenance of *gaza*, which made the state's military potential always wider than its actual boundaries despite the rapid growth of the latter from the earliest times of the principality.³⁰ During the reign of Osman Gazi's son, Orhan Bey (1326–1362), the Ottomans expanded at the expense of their Muslim and Christian neighbours, mainly by means of siege warfare, and gained a foothold in Europe.³¹ Subsequently, fostered by the geographical conditions³² and facilitated as much by economic as by political conditions in the Balkans,³³ it became possible for them further to extend their borders.³⁴ Yet this crossing into Europe continually increased the requirements of a regular, standing, military force,³⁵ especially with the relative reduction of the Turkish so-called "conquering race"³⁶ – already becoming

exhausted from bearing the weight of an increasing number of incessant wars. Hence, military reasons for the introduction of the *kul* system were imperative.

As for the second, political, strand, the establishment and maintenance of central authority over the powerful frontier lords – the mainly Muslim *beys* of the *gaza* frontiers in Europe³⁷ – who were more independent of the central government than those closer to the centre, necessitated the formation of salaried and regular corps under the direct command of the ruler himself. So the practice of employing the “men of the Sultan” for this purpose naturally required able men whose interests could be more closely identified with those of the central government than could those of the powerful *gazi* aristocracy. Such a need was satisfied through a gradual increase in the size and, more especially, in the area of activity of the imperial *kul* household in which the Sultan – Murad I (1362–1389)³⁸ – represented the executive power; in fact he became the essential instrument for its exercise.³⁹ Thus, initiation of the *kul* system into the body politic was politically expedient and, I venture to aver, vitally important.

All told, the point to be made here is that in the sphere of war, even the vernacular name *kapıkulu*, which extended to the foremost professional corps of Europe under the direct command of the Sultan – the *yeniçeri ocağı* (janissary corps; lit., corps of new soldiery),⁴⁰ as it came to be known – during the reign of Murad I, most clearly shows the intention of the Sultan to secure a body of men under his own political control.⁴¹ By the 1370s, in contrast with the earlier period, there was a continuous tension between the frontier *beys*, who were always eager and ready to engage in offensive wars for the expansion of their own power and land-holdings, and the central authority, which was determined to preserve the rule of the “House of Osman”. The “House” was, in consequence, ready to employ any means as a “counterpoise”⁴² to the forces of the frontier *beys*, forces mainly consisting of *sipahis*, the numerous “feudal” horsemen in the provinces.⁴³

Through this complex of related changes, the Ottoman state acquired its characteristic structure in which the military-administrative group, under the Sultan, held the political power. The *kul* system provided the basis of this structure through its role in war and statecraft. After all, the two spheres of the structures and functions of the military and the government were synonymous in certain ways, for instance in that the commanders of the new corps had extensive administrative duties.

The years between 1354 and 1402 can indeed be taken as the period of formation, when this structure proved itself efficacious in

the development of the Ottoman state “from frontier principality to empire”.⁴⁴ For example, Murad I utilized his *kul*-origin statesman and dedicated warrior, Lala Şahin Paşa – the first *beylerberi* (governor-general) of the Ottoman state, in Rumelia (Rumeli)⁴⁵ – to establish supremacy over Gazi Evrenos Bey, a powerful frontier *bey* holding large tracts of land around the Vardar River.⁴⁶ And by routing the last major Crusade, although not the Crusader mentality, in Nicopolis (Niğbolu) in 1396, the victorious Sultan Bayezid I (1389–1402) enhanced his existing prestige as the *Sultan al-Rum* – the Sultan of the (Eastern) Roman lands.⁴⁷ He not only expanded the size of his standing army in order to curtail the independence of the local Anatolian and Rumelian dynasties, but also increased the number of *kuls* in the palace and the administration, further assisting in the creation of a centralized and integrated empire by 1398.⁴⁸ The parallel between the policies of the two successive Sultans may indicate that the rulers intended to consolidate their authority and influence over the most important instruments of force – *timarlı sipahis* vis-à-vis their immediate *timar*-holding overlords – by using their own *kuls*, *yeniçeris* and statesmen of *yeniçeri* origin as a counterweight.⁴⁹

The development and expansion of the *kul* system were to be realized by the practice of *devşirme*⁵⁰ – the special recruitment system – and its elaborations during the reign of Mehmed II (1451–1481), who ensured that nearly all the high *seyfiye* and *kalemiye* appointments went to his *kuls*.⁵¹ Such a practice indeed, following the 1402–1453 era of interregnum and recovery, as it has come to be known, facilitated the use of the *kul* system and, in particular, the *yeniçeri* corps as the most powerful instrument for the centralization of political power. Here, it is opportune to note that Mehmed II, historically conscious as he was, must have appreciated the significance of the first major Ottoman defeat, at Ankara in 1402, whereby Bayezid I lost more than simply the almost fratricidal struggle for dominance against Emir Timur (Aksak Temir Bek, 1336–1405).⁵² He had first lost the crucial support of the disloyal Anatolian *sipahis* when, in mid-battle, they abandoned him *en masse* in favour of their former Anatolian *beys* who were eager to regain their autonomy and had looked to Timur Bey for protection.⁵³

The resulting near-disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was exacerbated by a contest for succession among Bayezid I's sons, who had retained some Ottoman territory in western Anatolia and Rumelia during Timur Bey's suzerainty but on his departure eastward in 1403 fought over its control⁵⁴ – against one another and the re-established *beys*. These *beys*, it seems clear, were intent

on, and for some years succeeded in, preventing any revival of Ottoman centralized power to their own detriment by playing off each brother against the other.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the Empire managed to survive and recover despite the internal and external disruptions in the form of succession crises, civil wars and threats, be they actual or potential, from Christendom.⁵⁶

Among the causes of recovery was that force which had been continuously active since the foundation of the Ottoman state. The concept of *gaza*, combining as it did religious authority and temporal opportunity, was, moreover, closely linked to the strategic importance of Anatolia as a secure landbase for Ottoman initiative to the Christian west and north. All this contributed to the prestige and credibility that made the conciliatory policies of Çelebi Mehmed I (1413–1421) possible.

Moreover, the *kul* system, and especially its emergent integral part the *yeniçeri* corps, having already given Çelebi Mehmed I superiority over his rivals during the struggle for the throne, helped him to consolidate his authority. He thus established his rule over the provinces, annexed between 1413 and 1421, by using *kuls* he had created; for example, employing *yeniçeris* in 1416 to suppress a dangerous revolt that erupted in a number of locations in western Anatolia and on the Rumelian frontier, headed by Şeyh Bedreddin Efendi. The significance of this movement for the present subject lies in its political, economic and cultural aspects. Şeyh Bedreddin, a religious scholar and mystic, had been appointed *Kadiasker* (*Kazasker*; high-ranking judicial dignitary) in Rumelia by Çelebi Musa and rallied the support of the people – Christian and Muslim alike. In fact, Şeyh Bedreddin's latitudinarian and esoteric interpretation of Islâm enabled him to unite former *sipahis* who had been dispossessed of their *timars*, as well as disaffected Muslim and Christian peasants in an era initiated by the rout of 1402; that is, when orthodox Islâm faced the heretical religious movements that flourished on the collapse of the centralized Ottoman polity. Şeyh Bedreddin's revolt, indeed, was the reflection of this in the sphere of social and, more specifically, political activity. It was only suppressed by the autonomous military structure of Çelebi Mehmed I who projected himself in this period as the defender of orthodox Islâm, claiming that he attacked principalities, in what is considered to be the process of consolidation of his power, solely because they prevented his waging *gaza*.⁵⁷

The main result of such manipulation of the *kul* system by Çelebi Mehmed I was the increasing importance of the support given to the ruler by the imperial troops. Events proved that in the Ottoman Empire after 1421, in practice although not in theory,

the support of the *yeniçeris* became the most crucial element in securing accession or succession to the throne. For example, after the death of Çelebi Mehmed I, his son, Murad II (1421–1444; 1446–1451) came to the throne in the capital, Bursa, with the support of the *yeniçeris* and the *ulema*,⁵⁸ and applied the same method in his struggle against external and internal rivals.⁵⁹ But he also saw a revolt of the *yeniçeris* engineered by Çandarlı Halil Paşa, the powerful Grand *Vezir* of *ulema* origin, during the reign of his young son, Mehmed II, for whom he had voluntarily abdicated in 1444.⁶⁰ The removal of Mehmed II and his *kul*-origin advisers,⁶¹ together with the external pressure of further Crusader attacks, brought Murad II back to the throne in 1446. His second reign gave him the opportunity to open new *gazas* in the Balkans and to reconstruct the strong state which, in the years following the conquest of Constantinople (İstanbul) by Mehmed II in 1453, came to be established definitively as the Ottoman Empire.⁶²

It follows, then, that the increasing deployment of and dependence upon *kapıkulus* was inherent in the development of the central Ottoman government during the reign of Mehmed II (1451–1481). For the interregnum and its aftermath right up to his own rule proper, had served to condition this progress through a series of changes, each nomologically linked to and explained by its predecessor, towards the absolute consolidation of imperial power at the centre.

Mehmed II, as the first historically-known Sultan to enact two sets of basic laws, *Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman* and *Kanun-ı Pâdişahî*, was clearly pursuing two objectives: first, the provision of a fundamental administrative structure in which the concept of the ruler as the apex of government and sole source of authority was coupled with the hierarchical system based upon degree of proximity to the ruler; and secondly, the systematization and implementation of a body of laws which was, in fact, to survive until the nineteenth century.⁶³

Yet Murad II, during his two periods of rule, had already outlined the policies subsequently followed by his son. In particular, the role of Mehmed II's advisers, Zaganos and Şehabeddin Paşas, in countering the power of the influential Çandarlı family, must have nudged the Sultan towards the idea of absolute imperial power and its realization and retention through the development and the efficiency of the *kul* system.⁶⁴ Significantly, although on Mehmed II's accession Çandarlı Halil Paşa remained in office as Grand *Vezir*, he had lost ground to the loyal *kul*-origin Zaganos Paşa who, at the head of the "war party", actually organized and initiated the final assault on Constantinople on 29 May 1453.⁶⁵

As the *kul* system was conceived, *kuls* were attached to and solely dependent upon the Sultan in a relationship of parton/client (*cliens*) mutual obligation, having been detached from their origins and with no agnatic or cognatic ties to society. They thus formed an organ of state in the sense of being the prop of Sultanic power rather than a sharer in it, holding political privileges rather than rights. And the policy of ruling through *kuls* was essential for the Sultan if he were to become an absolute ruler, holding in his hands the authority of the state in its entirety and ruling the whole Empire from his capital. Accordingly, he either eliminated or transformed the elements which could resist him. Here, again, one may see the usual pattern of reliance upon certain methods. Not only did he have his Grand *Vezir*, Çandarlı Halil Paşa, executed,⁶⁶ most probably in order to break the hold of old and influential families in the administration of the state;⁶⁷ he also simultaneously dealt with the *yeniçeris* by suppressing the rebellious amongst them, expelling many and forming new units from the Palace huntsmen (*sekban*),⁶⁸ improving their training and pay and increasing their numerical strength from 5,000 to 10,000.⁶⁹ Indeed, starting from Mehmed II's reign, the *yeniçeri* corps became the "nucleus"⁷⁰ of the Ottoman military force, to the extent that the central authority established its supremacy through the expansion of the corps, the Sultan choosing the commanders personally. To the same end, Mehmed II established *yeniçeri* garrisons in newly-conquered provinces to support the representatives of the central government. These garrisons, again, were subordinate neither to the local governor nor to any other local authority, but took orders direct from the capital,⁷¹ İstanbul, as the channel through which the central authority was effectively extended.

Moreover, as I have noted, the *kuls* were assured administrative as well as military appointments. With the expansion of the *kul* system, Mehmed II created the classical type of Ottoman Grand *Vezir* by selecting them from among his *kuls* and entrusting them as his personal deputies with an elevated position in the state. Indeed, of the Grand *Vezirs* who served under him after the execution of Çandarlı Halil Paşa all except the last, Karamanî Mehmed Paşa, had a *kul* background,⁷² and among them Rum Mehmed Paşa and Mahmud Paşa were executed for the purpose of suppressing any opposition, even if it came from those highest in authority after the Sultan.⁷³

Underlying successive Sultans' policies was always the idea of the enhancement of military power, not for its own sake but for the conquest of new territories and hence acquisition of new sources of income. This found public expression by Mehmed II, prior to the

conquest of Constantinople, in the combined logic of physical and spiritual *raison d'être*: "The *gaza* is our basic duty as it was in the case of our fathers."⁷⁴ As the Sultan's authority increased on his filling the *askerî* class with *kuls*, or "men of the Sultan", and as his conquests surpassed those of all other contemporary Muslim sovereigns, he came to be regarded by the Ottomans as the greatest Muslim ruler "since the first four Caliphs"⁷⁵ He, in fact, considered himself and his state as the fighting force and protector of all the Muslims:

"For we have the sword of Islam in our hand. If we had not chosen to endure these tribulations, we should not be worthy of being called *Gazi*."⁷⁶

Here, the key factor was indeed military force. In one of his *nâme-i hûmayuns* (imperial letter) informing the ruler of the Karakoyunlu state, Cihanşah b. Kara Yusuf Bey (1437–1467) about the conquest of the Despotate of Morea in 1458–1460, Mehmed II refers to this force as "the victorious soldiers of Allah, whom Allah supports in all campaigns"⁷⁷ thus displaying to the Muslim world the legitimacy and strength of the military as a pillar of centralized power and authority. And the pivot of the system was the person of the Sultan himself. For not even the Grand *Vezir* was entitled to issue orders directly to the chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps (*Yeniçeri Ağası*), who was responsible only to the Sultan.⁷⁸ By such means did Mehmed II establish his supremacy through the consolidation of a personal force and become, after a series of some thirty successful campaigns by the 1480s, the true founder of an "Islâmic gazi sovereign state",⁷⁹ namely the Ottoman Empire.

The death of Mehmed II in 1481 was followed by a struggle for the throne between his two sons, Cem and Bayezid, in which the importance of *kul* support, and especially that of the *yeniçeri* corps, was demonstrated.⁸⁰ The disappearance of central authority coupled with weariness from numerous campaigns which continued, contrary to Ottoman practice, even in winter, had paved the way for a *yeniçeri* revolt and general discontent in the Empire.⁸¹ The last Grand *Vezir* of Mehmed II, Karamanî Mehmed Paşa, leader of the non-*kuls* in their support of Cem, was assassinated by the *yeniçeris*, who sided with Bayezid.⁸² In the ensuing armed struggle between the brothers, Bayezid had the allegiance of two *kul*-origin ex-Grand *Vezirs* of Mehmed II – Gedik Ahmed Paşa, a former *devşirme-yeniçeri* and the idol of the corps, and his father-in-law, İshak Paşa – who were instrumental in placing Bayezid on the throne.⁸³ The pattern of Ottoman political life thus continued unabated.

For the assertion of his authority, Bayezid II (1481–1512) needed to gain the goodwill of the *yenîçeris* who, by then, had become the most powerful instrument at his disposal. According to a reliable source, on his accession to the throne he had to promise the *yenîçeris* that non-*kuls* would not be brought into positions of power,⁸⁴ such as that of the Sultan's deputy or military commander. Hence, we find that during his reign, among the seven Grand *Vezirs* who served under him, six had a *kul* (*devşirme*) background.⁸⁵

Bayezid II's successful campaigns in the north against Moldavia were followed by six long and exhausting campaigns in the south against the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria, which ended indecisively in 1491. Although he had established his authority over the military forces by leading them to the victories of 1484, his inconclusive Mamluk campaigns prompted him to reform his military and modernize them, increasing the number of field-guns and firearms.⁸⁶

On the other hand, his renunciation of some of Mehmed II's harsher policies, notably the restitution of *vakıf* and reversion to private ownership of *emlâk* which had been converted into *timars*, seems to have been unable to prevent the growth of large-scale social discontent, particularly after his less successful later campaigns. For his supposed weakness reinforced disaffection among some Anatolians, including the semi-nomadic, Turkish, tribal groups who were opposed to the centralizing tendencies of the government, not least because of its systematic taxation policies. Their revolts, starting in about 1500, appeared under the banner of the heterodox religious belief of the *Kızılbaş* (Red Heads),⁸⁷ as they came to be known, who were hostile to uncompromising Sunni orthodoxy – the unifying force of the Ottoman régime. People such as those who had formed the Akkoyunlu state in eastern Anatolia but had formerly been subjugated by Mehmed II in 1473, now supported a new, Turkish, religious leader, İsmail Safavî (1502–1524), who in the 1510s challenged the Ottoman central authority. After extending his hold over Azerbaijan (Azerbaycan) and Iran, he assumed the ex-officio political leadership of those Ottoman subjects who were rising in revolt even around western Anatolia.⁸⁸ It is significant that these revolts tended to be led by former *sipahis* who had been dispossessed of their *timars*. Although I shall have to discuss the political and military implications of the already changing conditions of warfare more fully at another point, it may briefly be noted here that there is clear evidence of the use of siege artillery in the early fifteenth century and by the middle of the century the Ottomans were using field-guns. But more important was the introduction of small firearms slightly earlier,⁸⁹

the development of which, during the fifteenth century,⁹⁰ reduced the military importance of “feudal” cavalry. Thus, the provincial military came to be of reduced weight militarily and were in the process of becoming dysfunctional politically. Meanwhile, their economic importance was growing because of the need to finance guns and artillery, the increased adoption of which accelerated the military obsolescence of the *sipahis* in the later sixteenth century. It is, then, significant that the *sipahis* participated in large numbers in the *Kızılbaş* rebellions.

Thus, as might be expected, the introduction and use of firearms emphasised the need for *devşirme* (*kul*) foot-soldiers (*yaya*) and especially for those of the élite corps, the *yeniçeris*, from the military and political standpoints simultaneously. One result of this development was the enforced abdication of Bayezid II in favour of his son, Selim, which occurred while the continuing *Kızılbaş* insurrection was spreading into north-west Anatolia – insurrection coinciding with the struggle for the throne among Selim and his brothers begun in 1511 under the impetus of the already uncontrollable situation in Anatolia. And it was Selim I (1512–1520), with his call for strong action against İsmail Safavî, who managed to win the support of the *yeniçeri* corps and thus created the circumstances for the abdication of his father in April 1512.⁹¹

Selim I's campaigns against his brothers and against the supporters of İsmail Safavî in Anatolia, followed by decisive victories over İsmail Safavî himself in Azerbaijan and over the Mamluk, Tuman Bay (1516–1517), in Egypt between 1514 and 1517, bear, apart from the geographical extension of the Empire, significant aspects or patterns which had been present from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire and continued afterwards.

Selim I utilized the loyalty of the *yeniçeris* for the elimination of his brothers, especially Ahmed (d.1513). Hence, during a *yeniçeri* uprising in İstanbul towards the end of September 1511, they had tacitly expressed their support for him against Ahmed, although the Sultan had strongly expressed his preference for Ahmed's succession to the throne⁹²

Having enjoyed the support of his professional élite corps in the fratricidal struggle that took him two years to conclude, the new Sultan concentrated on conquest in Muslim lands. After slaughtering some 40,000 followers of İsmail Safavî in Anatolia, he prepared a campaign against him, the official justification for which may be seen as confirming my analysis. In one of his *nâmes*, dated 920 Sefer (1514 April), sent from İzmit, Selim I accuses İsmail Safavî of acting against Islâm and of misconduct towards and oppression of Muslims, and declares his intention to occupy Iran

in support of Islâm; according to the *şeriat* (Islâmic law), of which he has obtained a *fetva* (binding juridical opinion), it is a pious duty to put an end to İsmail's activities. İsmail will have to accept Islâm (that is, Sunnî Islâm) and withdraw, or face the Sultan's sword. Accordingly, he will be setting out from İstanbul in order to conduct this *gaza* personally.⁹³ It was no coincidence that on his accession to the throne, Selim I had explained and justified his intentions to the officers of the élite corps along exactly the same lines, presumably in order to gain their promise of support for a campaign against İsmail Safavî. He appears to have realized that there existed a certain amount of opposition from some high government officials to this campaign against a Muslim ruler.⁹⁴ The paradox of a successful *gaza* on a Muslim foe with inferior weaponry was completed at Çaldıran (August 1514), which represented a decisive victory over internal as well as external opponents and confirmed his centralization of political power. One consequence was that on his return from the Iranian campaign, having also annexed some twenty local dynasties in eastern Anatolia (such as Dûlkâdir), he attempted to consolidate his absolute authority and control by ordering the execution of three prominent administrative and military officials. *Anadolu Kadı Askeri* Tacızâde Cafer Çelebi, second *Vezir* İskender Paşa and *Sekbanbaşı* Osman Ağa were executed as the first step towards effective control of the professional imperial troops. The reasons given were those of apostasy and treason against the state and its military by means of fomenting dissidence and rebellion during the campaign, among the officers as well as the ranks of the "soldiery of Islâm".⁹⁵

A further step towards increasing control, even at the risk of reduced professional efficiency, was the establishment of a new recruitment base for the post of chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps. Until then, the chief officers had been selected from among the officers of the corps. Selim I, however, changed this rule apparently in order to prevent any disaffection among the ranks, and established a new rule by which the chief-officer was to be appointed from among the trusted personnel of the Imperial Household.⁹⁶

Meanwhile, in Selim I's continuing foreign campaigns, two victories over the Mamluks – again, mainly due to supremacy in firearms – at Merc-i Dâbık in August 1516 and at Reydaniyya in January 1517 won the recognition of Ottoman sovereignty by Syria, Egypt and Hejaz and marked the beginning of a new era. The Ottoman Sultan now became the "... Hâdimül-haramayn üs-sarîfayn"⁹⁷ (Servitor of the Two Holy Sanctuaries), a development that gave the *şeriat* supreme importance in the reinforcement of the Sultan's authority in the subsequent "Sultan-State",⁹⁸

as it may be termed. Such a development occurred because the Islamic concept of *Dar-ül Harb* sanctified the use of military force, legitimizing the Ottoman Sultan's supremacy through his effective control of the professional military corps.⁹⁹ Perhaps even more valued, however, was the realization of a major Ottoman goal – the definitive establishment of Sultanic authority over the world's richest centre of transit trade, a region of never-ending economic ambition and international rivalry. Rule here was bound to be hotly contested and could only be perpetuated, therefore, by means of further conquests and hence the continuous reliance on military force, including the *yeniçeris* who numbered some 12,000 at the accession of Süleyman I (1520–1566).¹⁰⁰ Süleyman I is considered to have been the Ottoman Sultan most beloved, respected and obeyed by his soldiery.¹⁰¹ This was partly due to the fact that in the years between 1521 and 1566 Süleyman I, true to the innate characteristic of his state, assumed the position of personal commander-in-chief of imperial troops in no fewer than thirteen of their conquests.¹⁰² He subordinated every other consideration to that of retaining the absolute loyalty of his military force and firmly establishing the *kapıkulus* as a military “caste”. These *kapıkulus*, by the 1580s, considered themselves indispensable to the Sultan. They appear to have achieved an impregnable position within the *Sultan-kapıkulu* duality. Yet the last great Ottoman *gaza*, the conquest of Cyprus in 1570–1571,¹⁰³ is generally considered to mark the beginning of the “decline” of the Ottoman Empire – a gradual process towards disorder and dysfunction of which the chief causes were internal.

The effects of these were already making themselves visible, and not least within the *askerî*. It was no coincidence that on the day of his first entrance into İstanbul as Sultan (5 December 1566), with the imperial troops whom he had already upset by his niggardly distribution of the traditional *cülûs in'amı* (accession bonus), the new Sultan Selim II (1566–1574) was forced personally to submit to the *yeniçeri* corps' demand for the full remuneration to which they were entitled – with the traditional phrase “Let the full gifts and increases (*bahşış ve terâkkîler*) be given; it is my will”. In this incident, the Sultan's own authority and that of all his *vezirs*, the head of the *ulema* (*Şeyhülislâm*) and the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Fleet (*Kapudan-ı Derya*) was importunately challenged all along the route from the *Edirne Kapı* (Edirne Gate) to the doors of the Topkapı Palace; in no uncertain terms, the corps made clear that unless the required sums were paid no-one would be allowed to enter the Palace.¹⁰⁴ Such an event had wider implications in the sense that the Sultan's élite corps became only too conscious of

both their material and their psychological strength and knew that they had become the sole means not only of preserving the central authority but of ensuring its continuance. After an incident of this kind, it is significant that Selim II was the first Ottoman Sultan never to assume personal command of his armed forces in the field during their campaigns,¹⁰⁵ a pattern that was to become common in subsequent Ottoman practice.

In the years between 1578 and 1606, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in a series of exhausting wars against Iran (1578–1590, 1603–1612) to the east and against Austria (1593–1606) to the west, at times fighting simultaneously on both fronts; for example, in the 1603–1612 war initiated by the Safavids during the course of the continuing Hapsburg conflict. These wars called for an increase in the number of *kapıkulu* soldiery, particularly the infantry to cope with Austrian infantry equipped with advanced firearms,¹⁰⁶ and thus further increased the military dependence of the state on the *yeniçeris*. Re-equipment was unavoidable to the extent that the expansion of the corps of musketeers (*tüfekçi*, *tüfeng-endaz*) became essential. In direct consequence, the number of *yeniçeris* had to be raised: on the accession of Murad III (1574–1595) the number of *yeniçeris* was 13,599,¹⁰⁷ and it was later doubled to meet the needs of the Iranian and Austrian wars¹⁰⁸ in the time of his son, Mehmed III (1595–1603).¹⁰⁹

From the military point of view, this increase was justified because the strategic importance and use of traditional *timar*-holding cavalry (*sipahi*) armed with bow and arrow, sword and shield, was no longer valid against Austrian infantry with more developed equipment.¹¹⁰ Indeed, according to İnalcık, the total number of *sipahis* during Süleyman I's reign had been at least 87,000; it decreased to 45,000 in 1609, and by 1630 had fallen to about 8,000.¹¹¹ Contrasting with this, the number of *yeniçeris* increased in inverse proportion. By 1630, they totalled about 46,000.¹¹²

II.

These changes in the classical military structure naturally had repercussions beyond the sphere of the strictly military, mostly in the political and in the economic. It is clear that the decades following the 1570s saw the social disintegration of Anatolia, partly caused by the unanticipated alteration in the structure of the Empire's total armed forces, imposed by the developments in weapon technology. Central and provincial forces were affected

alike – the former developing to the detriment of the latter – and in the ensuing social flux were utilized and manipulated by various groups for their own ends.

The financing of an ever-increasing number of *kapıkulu* troops, the rising cost of actually killing the enemy notwithstanding, required an increase in state revenue to meet expenditure. The first need of the state was now for cash in order to meet these financial requirements, including payment of the salaried troops and expenditure on armaments and maintenance.¹¹³ Hence the initiation of a government reorganization intended to strengthen central authority, deemed necessary for the implementation of this policy. For evidence on this point we may look at the prediction made by Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (1564–1579),¹¹⁴ the then Grand *Vezir* to Sultan Murad III. Just before the war against Iran in 1578, his words were:

“These paid soldiery [*ku*l] become superior before the people as a whole [*cümle*], salaries and expenditures increase, and the peasants [*reaya*] become oppressed both by taxes and by the depredations of the soldiery [. . . *tecavüz-ü askerden payimal olur . . .*].”¹¹⁵

He alone among his contemporaries seems to have realized the potential consequences of an attempt at large-scale conquest.

The main point for our purpose is that, coupled with the burden imposed specifically by the campaigns in Hungary from 1593 to 1606, the whole edifice was shaken as Anatolia fell prey to a social turmoil and confusion from which the Empire never fully recovered.

The expansion of the *kapıkulu* soldiery ran parallel with that of the *kapıkulu* system itself. Here, we approach the nub of the matter: as the *kapıkulu* soldiery expanded for military reasons, the tax-paying subjects comprising, in the words of the historian Selânikî, during “the reign of Sultan Murad . . . the *reaya*, the farmers who have abandoned their farms . . .”,¹¹⁶ were also admitted to the salaried standing armed forces. The immediate price was the undermining of the classical recruitment base of the corps, the *devşirme* system. The *levendat*, as these landless, unattached and unemployed vagrant youths became known, were predominantly Turkish Anatolians, many of them were settled in areas like Bosna (Bosnia) and Albania. Those taken into the service of the central government were equipped with firearms and put under the command of the Sultan’s *kuls* in various military capacities, usually as troops bearing the designation of *sekban* or *sarıca*; others were levied into the provincial forces, under the same designation. Either way, the *levendat* were recruited chiefly for use

on the battlefields of Europe, resulting in the further quantitative increase, although qualitative decrease, of the *kapıkulus*, including the *yeniçeri* corps.¹¹⁷

From the political point of view, the inclusion of tax-paying subjects, and particularly of native Turks and Muslims from the newly-conquered eastern provinces, in the *askerî* developed to the detriment of the *Türk-devşirme* duality, finally causing its disappearance. Since the *kapıkulus* theoretically came under the sole imperial authority, the Sultans welcomed this development, regardless of its ramifications, as one they might utilize towards enhancing their own power¹¹⁸ – provided they could maintain political control.

In essence, the long-standing wars with their requirements in men and *matériel* had prepared the ground for very complex changes in state finances in the forms of land tenure and in taxation, which had up to this period been based on the Empire's classical estate system.¹¹⁹ Measures intended to remedy the Empire's financial distress had, as Sokollu Mehmed Paşa had predicted, affected the Anatolian *reaya*, for

“... the like oppression and maltreatment of the poor peasantry has never been at any time, in any clime, or in the realm of any king ...”

observed Mustafa Koçi Bey, intimate adviser to Sultan Murad IV (1623–1640), in his 1631 treatise.¹²⁰

Civil disturbances resulting from the disequilibrium between the politico-military organization of the centre and the economic system of the periphery, and prompted by both the continuing wars and sporadic population pressure, had intensified in Anatolia by the 1570s.¹²¹ Social disintegration, exacerbated by the effects of the state's political, military and financial distress, developed by the mid-1590s into tumultuous opposition in the form of uprisings throughout Anatolia, known as *celâlî* insurrections. In these were involved well-organized reactionary groups such as aggrieved, disillusioned and hence disaffected *suhtes* (*softas*, theological students) and *timarlı sipahis* who opposed the *kapıkulus* and their increasing importance and were able to manipulate the ever-increasing numbers of loose, available *levendat* and unemployed, armed *sekbân*. Almost all over Anatolia hostilities were launched against the “privileged class [*ehl-i örf*]” of the state. For, as Akdağ has put it:

“Since the *kapıkulus* were the richest group [*zümre*] of the country and, as soldiers, had privileges before the law and their children, even, had a more preferential treatment than the *reaya* in state duties, there was no possibility that those *kapıkulus* would be left alone by these

struggling groups. Almost everywhere there was an open hostility towards the *kapıkulus*.”¹²²

The classical Ottoman view, on the other hand, as expressed by the establishment historian Naîmâ, was that these uprisings were, in most instances, instigated by *sipahis* who had deserted during the 1596 campaign of Mehmed III in Hungary because they could not face the firearms, equipped as they were with only swords and bows; as a result, they were deprived of their land-holdings.¹²³ This, however, does not fit the historical reality well attested by Akdağ, and while those who lost their *timars* for military reasons may have become involved with the *celâlîs* they cannot be said to have caused the uprisings. More importantly, it was often *sekban* units, originally intended to combat the uprisings but with payments long overdue or discharged from the service during interludes of peace, who joined the rebels in order to secure provisions and money. Indeed, the most well-known leader of a *celâlî* group, Karayazıcı Abdülhalim, who emerged in the summer of 1598, had almost certainly himself been a *sekban*.¹²⁴ And yet it was only *sekban* units with their firearms and finally the regular élite forces, the *yeniçeris*, that could be employed effectively against the *celâlîs*. Under the personal command of Grand Vezir Murad Paşa in 1607 and 1610, during the reign of Sultan Ahmed I (1603–1617), *yeniçeri* units across Anatolia were mobilized to put down the insurrections.¹²⁵ By so doing, the security of the state was at last established, but at an immense human cost overall in terms of *celâlî* depredations against the peasantry, dislocation of population, ruination of agriculture and, ultimately, harsh suppression by the military; nor were the inherent problems of *nizam* at all addressed.

As the *yeniçeri* numbers increased, so did their power and influence. They already enjoyed esteem as an élite corps and now also joined the influential non-*seyfiye* or, to use a convenient anachronism, “civilian” sections of provincial society – the *ulema*, the guild masters and merchants. Moreover, by virtue of their position, they were able to practice tax-farming, acquiring large tracts of state lands.¹²⁶ It soon became apparent that the *kul* system, instead of strengthening the central authority, had become a factor in its increasing weakness owing to the way in which the *kuls* added their strength to that of the provincial authorities. This alliance provided the physical power-base for later phases as local dynasties started to come into being in the eighteenth century under the generic name of *âyan*. They formed what may be called quasi-governments within the imperial structure. At the centre,

however, the deliberate increase in the number of *kuls* and their composition, by undermining the pivotal *devşirme* system, had momentous effects internally. Paradoxical though it may seem, the salaried imperial soldiery “. . . came to feel its power more . . . than ever. Thenceforward it was ready to meet any opposition to its wishes with force”.¹²⁷

This was the period in which the relative importance of the numerous principal offices of the central government was undergoing considerable adjustment.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, Koçi Bey, good *kul* that he was, observed disapprovingly in 1631 that the *yenîçeri* corps were penetrated by and themselves penetrated into all sections of the populace,¹²⁹ thereby strengthening their grip on government in a society where leadership came to be identified with groups rather than with the person of the Sultan. Consequently, these groups, such as the *kalemiye* and the *ilmiye*, became the chief policy-making, rather than policy-implementing, bodies by impressing the military seal on decisions through the use of military force. In this respect particularly,

“the provocation of the corps by the *vezirs* . . . for the purpose of strengthening their own position, went on in a chain motion from the last half of the sixteenth century”.¹³⁰

This process closely corresponded to the growth of the soldiery's political power at the expense of the Sultan's authority. An all-too-vivid example is that of Osman II (1618–1622). He challenged the power of the *yenîçeris*, thinking it an opportune moment to do so since after the unsuccessful 1621 Polish campaigns the ineffectiveness of the *yenîçeris* was considered the main reason for the failure of the Ottoman armies.¹³¹ But the *yenîçeris* proved too strong for him to contain and the struggle ended in his deposition and execution by his own troops, who then brought his mentally-defective uncle, Mustafa I, to the throne for the second time (1622–1623). The point deserves to be made that the procedure by which Mustafa I had first succeeded to the throne (1617–1618), that is, through the informal adoption of succession according to seniority, replaced “. . . the customary passage of the Sultanate from father to son”¹³² and the royal fratricide that generally accompanied this. Nevertheless, it could not prevent succession struggles during the seventeenth century, which may be seen as occurring in parallel with the loss of Sultanic authority and power.

Furthermore, there was no attempt to check the increasing power of the *yenîçeris* in Anatolia where their privileges continuously heightened the rivalry between themselves and the auxiliary

troops – provincial *sekban* also equipped with firearms. The latter, ever jealous of the *yeniçeris*' privileges, were gathered around rebellious *valis* (provincial governors) who, by organizing them, were attempting to build up their own personal power in the cities at the expense of the central authority. In the years between 1622 and 1628 these troops, under the *Vali* of Erzurum, Abaza Mehmed Paşa, attacked provincial *yeniçeri* garrisons and gained control of eastern Anatolia, thanks mainly to the continuing war with Iran. Yet despite their poor showing and lack of enthusiasm for the Iranian campaigns of 1623 to 1630, the political influence of the *yeniçeris* became so visibly great that in 1628, for the first time, a former chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps, Boşnak Hüsrev Paşa, was appointed Grand *Vezir* with the support of the *Şeyhülislâm*, Yahya Efendi.¹³³ Indeed, it was Boşnak Hüsrev Paşa who finally succeeded in the suppression of Abaza Mehmed Paşa's rebels in October 1628 and thus retained the power and privileges of the corps, even though opposition had come from armed forces other than the *yeniçeris*.

Before carrying the analysis further, it will be well to comment on the weakening of the Sultanate, first, because of its significance in relation to the imperial troops and, secondly, for its effect on the personality principle.

The appointment of the chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps as Grand *Vezir* was made during the early years of Sultan Murad IV (1623–1640) who reigned from the age of eleven at a time when certain of the Palace courtiers, such as the *Valide* Sultans (mothers of the reigning Sultans), were more influential at the Palace than was the Sultan himself. Not surprisingly, under such circumstances, inability to control the imperial troops continued. When the Palace dismissed Boşnak Hüsrev Paşa from office in 1631, most presumably on the pretext of his inconclusive Baghdad campaigns, two Palace men were brought in as reliable supporters of the young Sultan and the Palace – Hâfız Ahmed Paşa (1631–1632), for a second term as Grand *Vezir*, and Hasan Halife Ağa (1631–1632), as chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps. The corps immediately rose up in revolt, despite Boşnak Hüsrev Paşa's apparent attempts to calm them. During their return to İstanbul they were joined by the imperial cavalry companies who, once in the capital, themselves instigated a further uprising by the entire imperial troops. They demanded, in a list presented to the Sultan, the execution of some seventeen high civil and military officials including the new Grand *Vezir*, the chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps and the head of the *ulema*, all of whom they blamed for Boşnak Hüsrev Paşa's dismissal. Thus, the whole of the imperial troops challenged the Sultan and,

through his person, the edifice of the state. They succeeded in securing the deaths of the Grand *Vezir* – and later the chief-officer of the corps and some others – and the replacement of the head of the *ulema*.¹³⁴

The humiliation of his enforced acquiescence in the demands of his own soldiery must have determined Murad IV to use all available means to reassert Sultanic power, authority and prestige over his arrogant *kapıkulus*. To this end, he sought support from every quarter, even making a parade of religion; for example, he claimed to be the saviour of Islâm and issued laws prohibiting the consumption of the tobacco, coffee and alcohol so favoured by the soldiery – and so conducive to their gatherings with, no doubt, the building up of discontented gossip into sedition. Yet he appears to have aimed concurrently at conciliating the imperial troops and, in particular, the *yeniçeri* corps even as he attempted to control them.¹³⁵

Ultimately, Murad IV was able to succeed in curbing the *yeniçeris*, but only by still further undermining the effective basis of the military organization – resorting to a suspension of the *devşirme* levy in order to reduce the establishment of the corps, or at least to keep the numbers stable.¹³⁶ Added to this, his successful campaigns against Iran during the years 1635 to 1639 prepared the ground for the consolidation of his own personal power and authority. Murad IV was commander-in-the-field and thus gained the necessary prestige for such power while, at the same time, it helped him to widen the base of his authority over Anatolia by the use of military force in suppressing the rebellious factions.

But Murad IV's reign was only a short reversal in a period of sustained diminution of the Sultan's authority.¹³⁷ It was a process in which the loss of imperial control over the soldiery was accompanied by the loss of power, authority and thus influence by the centre, occurring simultaneously with the rise of provincial centres of power, authority and influence. In other words, the process was intensifying away from centralization – centralization which, for both military and political reasons, Imperial governments had always attempted to create and maintain.

III.

The changes in the *kul* system, and especially of the *yeniçeris*, meant a break with a fundamental principle of the Empire, which was to exclude its *reaya* from the *askerî* since they were essential as producers and tax-payers.¹³⁸ Consequently, the abandonment

of this principle in favour of letting *reaya* become members of the *askerî* was immediately followed by the disorganization of the land and taxation system upon which the classical Ottoman edifice was founded. Moreover, the disappearance of the *devşirme* levy by the middle of the seventeenth century was most damaging to the power base of the Ottoman state “. . . because it involved the decline of the whole admirably arranged order of military and administrative training”¹³⁹ which provided an élite instilled, by virtue of what would nowadays be called their political socialization, with absolute obedience and loyalty to the Sultan.

On the other hand, careful consideration would anticipate (indeed should then have anticipated) the course Ottoman history was taking, as the Empire had, by the end of the sixteenth century, reached the effective limits of its expansion, and expansion had been dearly achieved. For the benefits of the geographical extension of the Empire were accomplished by permitting the growth of an internal malaise; there was a direct connection between its territorial mass and inner vulnerability. My own suspicion is that the wish and the need to secure ever-expanding frontiers necessitated further attempts at conquest beyond the optimum and made the continuation of such attempts increasingly unavoidable. This put a heavy strain on the economy upon which the soldiery were, in the last resort, dependent. Ultimately, in what may be labelled a paradox of hegemony,¹⁴⁰ expansion accentuated the need for an increase in the type, size and maintenance of the soldiery as well as in the state revenues, producing a series of problems which had to be faced when the conquests had reached their limits.

Even though the negative effects of expansion might have been mitigated by a decision to refrain from further conquest, the government still had to secure the existing frontiers – a major problem because, during the latter half of the seventeenth century and the first forty years of the eighteenth, the Empire was seldom left in peace. Hence, the provision of adequate military reinforcements was essential but could only be met by changing fundamental principles – the abolition of *devşirme* levies and the recruitment of the *kuls* from freeborn Muslims. Besides, as mentioned earlier, the change in the system suited the Sultan's policy because in effect the freeborn Muslims became *kuls*, thus increasing royal authority over the Muslim population.

It may now be useful to put the problem in more political terms. As has been indicated, the *yeniçeri* corps within the *kul* system constituted the basis and mainstay of Sultanic authority. They were the pillar of the Sultan's absolute power because of their

direct attachment to his person. He controlled them traditionally through the chief-officer of the *yeniçeri* corps who, according to the *Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, was placed at the top of the "Outer Service" hierarchy in the Palace.¹⁴¹

The change in the nature of the *kul* system had occurred during what is widely considered the period of decline. It is the main argument of all classical Ottoman histories that the reign of "good" Sultans ended and the era of "bad" Sultans began in the second half of the sixteenth century for, in the nature of traditional society, the authority of the state was solely incorporated in the person of the Sultan or, in other words, the state was the Sultan. This meant that the personal character of the Ruler necessarily had a profound influence on the course of events. Of course, this does not mean that the causes of the decline of the Empire can only be explained by the character and behaviour of individuals, but it is true to assert that in the history of the Ottoman Empire the weakness of the state and the weakness of the Sultans appear to have run more or less parallel with one another.¹⁴² This, truism though it may be, was the period in which the throne, considering itself synonymous with the state and subject to its own traditions of authority, was unable to solve – nor, at times, even comprehend the nature of – problems created by internal and external changes. Previously, the *kul* system had expanded according to the need of the Sultan. The professional *yeniçeri* corps, in particular, had served as the main arm for the consolidation of the sacred authority of the Ruler, held to be the representative of Allah on earth.¹⁴³ Such an authority, as I have already pointed out, was geared to keep each individual in his proper place under the sacred reasoning of *şeriat*, as stressed by Tursun Beg, Ottoman statesman and historian of the late fifteenth century.¹⁴⁴ Yet in the period of decline, when the leadership came to be identified more with a group than with the Sultan alone, not only the Sultan but also other groups at the centre became in practice the chief makers of policy. They included the imperial troops who, possessing overwhelming physical force, were capable of acting for their own ends; and their services were essential to the success of any other faction.

The *yeniçeri* corps, which at first constituted the principal support of the Sultan's absolute power and authority, now became simply the supporters of their own power and privileges. Not only were they strengthened by their increased numbers and more powerful weapons, but the abandonment of two cardinal principles of the original organization, namely the prohibitions against marriage during active service and against engagement in any kind of craft or trade, had also given them economic incentives over and

above their profession.¹⁴⁵ It is no wonder that they took advantage of the many opportunities which arose in the aftermath of the numerous uprisings to secure land and tax-farms from the Sultan. They became desirable symbiotic allies and intermediaries for the *ulema*, the *vezirs* and heirs to the throne, who sought their aid for the attainment of power. Thus, in the period when the centre grew weaker, the military power-base grew stronger, making the position of the Sultan challengeable at any time.¹⁴⁶ Here, the deposition of Sultan İbrahim I (1640–1648) and the placing of his seven-year-old son on the throne as Mehmed IV (1648–1687) may be mentioned as a case in point. The *ulema* were influential and the *yeniçeris* instrumental in the alliance between the two. One consequence was that the *ulema* gained the power to overthrow Sultans and the *yeniçeris*, by utilizing the *fetvas* of the *ulema*, gained a semblance of legality for their revolts.¹⁴⁷

The process of disintegration may indeed be discerned in the Ottoman Empire from at least the seventeenth century onward. It marked the period of progressive disengagement by the centre. As the Sultan's power and authority weakened, his loss of control over his professional soldiers had the most profound impact on statecraft. One obvious result was that what had previously been an instrument of order now became the instigator of disorder, in fact, the leader of discontent and rebellion on no fewer than thirteen occasions.

Attempts to control the imperial troops were chiefly made by reducing their numbers. And the most effective but fragile control mechanisms were put into operation as remedial measures by the Grand *Vezirs* who, although they did not directly command the *yeniçeris*, assumed, as the Sultans retired from active involvement, a greater independence through becoming themselves the executive authority instead of merely the implementors of the Sultan's will. Such a development was epitomized by the physical separation of the Grand *Vezir* and his staff from the Palace on the setting up of the *Bâb-ı Âli* (Sublime Porte) establishment in 1654. The associated shift of power to the Grand *Vezirate* matched the attempt to control what were actually designated as the Sultan's own troops, because whoever managed to control them became master of the state. Notably, Kemankuş Kara Mustafa Paşa (1638–1644), first Grand *Vezir* of İbrahim I, was able to reduce the number of *yeniçeris* to 17,000 from a peak of 47,000 during the reign of Murad IV.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, the policy was continued during the *Vezirates* of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (1656–1661) – of whom it was said that he accepted the Grand *Vezirate* on condition that the Sultan not reject any proposals that he might submit,¹⁴⁹ with the

result that he had virtually dictatorial powers – his son, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661–1676) and his son-in-law, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (1676–1683), who made the *yeniçeris* obedient to the extent that there was no “political” interference from the professional corps.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, successful though such measures were, in the longer term they effected little more than transient delusions of grandeur in their progenitors. They may have concealed but failed to reverse the social stasis that had by now set in – even though Mustafa Paşa was able to open an Austrian campaign with the largest Ottoman army ever mustered. Significantly, his combined office of Grand Vezir and Commander-in-Chief blended, as it were, with the ambitious revival of the ancient *gazi* spirit as expressed in the vainglorious words, “The *kuls* want a campaign”.¹⁵¹ Yet the ill-founded and unsuccessful campaign of 1683 marked more than the end of the Paşa’s life; it marked the beginning of an end.

IV.

After the last great conquest, of the island of Crete (Girit) in 1669, the nature of the transformation of the Ottoman state began to alter. It was now changing from a proud, expansive empire into a timorous, shrinking polity, forced by vengeful adversity into concern for its self-preservation. From the failure of the second siege of Vienna (1683) and the loss of Hungary (1699), continuous wars with a combination of European states right up to the end of the eighteenth century revealed the most obvious symptom of the so-called decline. Despite failing to apprehend the deeper economic implications concerning their relative position in terms of world dominion, constant defeats in defensive wars finally obliged Ottoman governments to recognize that the military balance had shifted in favour of uncompromising Christendom.

Keeping the “military balance” argument in mind, we see that incessant wars substantiated their effect at the centre of government and therefore intensified an apparent inconsistency which became glaringly obvious in the uprisings of the *yeniçeri* corps. While attempts were being made to reduce the number of men on the rolls, the need for reinforcements for the continuing external wars stimulated the recruitment of every class of men, urban and rural alike, under the name of *be-dergâh*¹⁵² (raw *yeniçeri* recruit). At the same time, the increased number of paid soldiery not only became a strain on the Treasury¹⁵³ but also acquired a greater potential for imposing their will on any government. Their behaviour

fell into an invariable pattern according to which an unsuccessful campaign or a defeat was immediately followed by *yeniçeri* uprisings in the capital. Concessions were then given to their allies at the centre as well as to the soldiers themselves. The military seal was thus further impressed on the highest level of administration. Notably, after a defeat in 1687 against the Austrian armies at Mohács, the *kapıkulu* corps rose against the Grand Vezir and Commander-in-Chief, Süleyman Paşa (1685–1687), for his alleged inability to pay their salaries and installed Siyavuş Paşa (1687–1688).¹⁵⁴ In addition, as agreed during their return to the capital, an alliance of the *kapıkulus* and the *ulema* forced the Sultan, Mehmed IV, to abdicate and secured the accession of his brother, Süleyman II (1687–1691).¹⁵⁵

After sixteen years of wars to the west, the signature of the Carlowitz (Karlofça) peace treaty in 1699 was the first of its kind in which the Ottoman Empire signed as the defeated side in a clearly decided war.¹⁵⁶ For the still complacent Ottoman Empire, the advent of the Christian European states was relatively sudden and unexpected. The technological and economic superiority of their arms not only brought about the series of military defeats but also impressed many Ottomans. Various prominent figures and intellectuals, ignorant of contemporary political economy, came to feel the need to investigate the causes of, to their blinkered eyes, this astonishing advance by the hitherto despised yet now dreaded *gâvurs* (*küffâr*; infidels), as epitomized on the battlefield. Then, turning their attention to the lamentable state of their own polity, these men sought to apply the very limited conclusions they had reached – on the basis of an ill-founded, reactive, even inert foreign policy – to achieving the reversal of the Exalted State's fortunes and the revival of its old vigour, through the restoration of its warrior strength.

Consequently, the reasons for the Ottoman military reverses were diagnosed as being due to the fragmentation, disobedience and corruption of the *kapıkulu* soldiery, and especially of the *yeniçeris*. The basis of suggestions for improvement was retrospective, recalling a "glorious past"; as so neatly encapsulated by Uzunçarşılı:

"... the old order should remain, that is to say consisting of a recommendation of the return to the order of the time of Kanunî [Süleyman I], and that meanwhile, bearing in mind the interests of the Treasury, the number of *kapıkulu* [soldiery] should be reduced."¹⁵⁷

In this vein, Sarı Mehmed Paşa, an Ottoman intellectual and the head of the Treasury (*Defterdâr*), urged in 1703, in his *Counsel for Vezirs and Governors*, that

“... beyond all other affairs of which the proper organization is very essential and necessary in the Exalted Government, the most important is the *yeniçeri* corps.”¹⁵⁸

It is known that the flurry of attempts at improvement after 1699 were largely technical and made with military purposes in mind, but it is less well grasped that they were primarily designed to provide the Sultan with an efficient instrument for the preservation of his power and authority. Yet the improvements introduced during the Grand *Vezirates* of Amcazâde Hüseyin Paşa (1697–1702) in the reign of Mustafa II (1695–1703),¹⁵⁹ of Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Paşa (1718–1730) in the reign of Ahmed III (1703–1730)¹⁶⁰ and of Halil Hamid Paşa (1782–1785) in the reign of Adbülhamid I (1774–1789)¹⁶¹ – aimed mainly to prevent large-scale corruption and to cut down the large sums set aside by the Treasury for the payment of the standing army – proved superficial. The deep-rooted attachment and loyalty to this major institution of the Empire, the *kul* system, made it virtually inconceivable for a ruler to make any viable adaptation. Far from adjusting over time so as to provide appropriate responses to continual challenges, the system invariably set rigid under threat. That the attempted reforms of the *kapıkulu* soldiery in 1701 failed is understandable given the psychological climate and administrative situation of the day.¹⁶²

With the re-opening of wars with Russia in 1711, followed by wars with Venice and Austria from 1715 marked by the Treaty of Passarowitz (Pasarofça) of 1718, the Empire made further territorial concessions.¹⁶³ Thereafter, a new phase in the series of wars with Iran occurred in 1723–1746, and with Russia and Austria in 1737–1739, and again with Russia in 1768–1774 ending with the humiliating Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774,¹⁶⁴ which brought the loss of major territories to a halt for a century.¹⁶⁵

Thus, especially after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, although the impact of external forces had taken the form of continuous military defeats for the Empire, the Reform Movements (*Harekât-ı Islâhat*) concerning the military did not go beyond modernization measures and largely bypassed the conundrum of the most influential standing forces of the state. These and subsequent endeavours to improve the imperial troops were not successful in creating an efficient force against external enemies, and were not

even effective in accomplishing their main purpose of consolidating the Sultanate. This occurred in a period when the chief threat to the classical unity and integrity of the state came from within, due to psychological, cultural and economic stimuli which worked to the detriment of the political power structure at the centre. One important consequence was the Sultan's complete loss of confidence and trust in his *kuls* and avowed inability to cope with the problems¹⁶⁶ created by the change in their function. And of course such a change did not remain isolated from the other social changes affecting the Empire since the end of the sixteenth century. After all, the *seyfiye* was a key political institution, one of the essential pillars of the state and, as such, integral to the society.

V.

On the other hand, the internal forces threatening the central authority were embodied, as indicated earlier, in the person of the *âyan*.¹⁶⁷ He was a member of a powerful group of magnates in the provinces who started to play an important role as a direct result of the changes in the Empire's land tenure system, which allowed him, among other things, to recruit and maintain his own private army. This development was all the more important because of the decreased military effectiveness of the *timar*-holding cavalry when firearms were introduced. Unable to face infantry with modern equipment, they returned to Anatolia where they became a menace to public order. They had already lost their main function because the imperial troops, and notably the *yeniçeri* corps, became not only the major force against any external threat but also the channel through which the central government was attempting to retain and strengthen its authority over the provinces. Unsatisfactory as this turned out to be, the government had no other instrument which it could employ for the purpose. The need to use these professional troops involved increasingly heavy financial demands on the agricultural producers who were the fundamental revenue-base. The emergence of the *âyan* was thus simultaneous with the disintegration of the *timar* system of the state-owned lands.

It would therefore be a mistake to dismiss the rise of the *âyan*, the most important group outside the central authority in the eighteenth century,¹⁶⁸ as no more than agents of selfish privilege. For example, Karpas has singled out two main sources for the rise of the *âyan*, especially those of the eighteenth century; first, from

the old, communal leaders or local notables in the various parts of the Empire (known by different titles, e.g., *ağa*, *mültezim*) and, secondly, from enterprising individuals of different social strata (e.g., *reaya*, rank-and-file soldiers), who all achieved the status of *âyan* through the advantages created by land administration and tax-collection.¹⁶⁹ The *âyan*'s political power rested on their *de facto* control over economic resources and the allocation of these resources in the countryside, often indeed as the protector of the local *reaya* against the central government and local bandits. They created by such means a power base for their own ends. This power increased to the detriment of the central government which had come to accept the *âyan* as intermediaries to the extent that they were employed by the Sultan's governors as local agents in financial and administrative matters.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the *âyan*'s *de jure* incorporation into the existing social structure had been realized through the action of the central government. A special charter (*berat*) permitted them to raise private armies for the defence of their territories – territories they had originally gained by acquiring state-owned lands from the *timar*-holders and had subsequently rented out to peasants and lesser *âyan*. The desire to expand what tended to become hereditary holdings in combination with their tax-farming activities enabled, even required, private armies. Such a practice (*tegallüb*) utilized, opportunely, the growing surplus of young men which had already come into existence with the orderly cultivation of state lands in the sixteenth century and had, by now, created a visible unemployment on the land, so providing a steady supply of conscripts for the armies of the *âyan*.¹⁷¹ The state, however unwillingly, was impelled by its need for more troops to encourage the *âyan* to equip, at their own expense, soldiery under their own personal command.¹⁷² In fact, by the end of the eighteenth century, the *âyan* had become so well-entrenched and rich that, despite attempts to abolish the institution, the central government found it could only muster troops and ammunition with their assistance, thereby "giving in"¹⁷³ to the rapidly increasing power and privileges of these "lords of the valleys" (*derebeyî*)¹⁷⁴ – to give the popular Anatolian nomenclature for the *âyan*. This was especially so during the campaigns of 1768 and 1787.¹⁷⁵ As the culmination of these developments and the policies adopted by the government to cope with them, there came to exist within the state two forces, the indisciplined imperial troops and the disciplined armies of the *âyan*.

III. The military as a modern institution – restamping the seal

I.

In the course of the above inquiry, the central message that I have been able to discern is the coincidence of the two immediate negative stimuli, foreign and domestic, acting upon the Ottoman Empire. Continuous confrontation with advanced technology and with capitalist economies, increasingly reliant upon industry, that underpinned military power, formed the external stimulus. At the same time, growing decentralization of power and authority in the countryside at the expense of the traditional philosophy and social organization on which the classical Ottoman state rested, constituted the internal stimulus.

The effect of the convergence of these two negative stimuli was exemplified in the legal re-establishment of the institution of *âyanlık* in 1790, immediately followed by military defeats in the 1787–1792 wars with Austria and Russia. Their ominous significance was admitted by Selim III (1789–1807), who succeeded Abdülhamid I during the war against Russia at a time when the disillusioned populace sought hope in the new monarch:

“By God, what a state of affairs we are in. In everything the truth has become concealed . . . If the soldiery is mentioned, the answer is given, ‘What can we do? We have no paid troops ready to go on campaign’; if it is said, ‘Let some be put on the register’, it is replied, ‘There is no money in the Treasury’; if it is said, ‘Let this be remedied’, it is replied, ‘This is not the right time for that now, the corps should not be pushed’ . . . It is in this way that the country is slipping from our hands.”¹⁷⁶

Thus, beset by internal and external challenges that appeared as threats to the very existence of the Empire, a new response became urgent and the type deemed necessary and sufficient was proper reform rather than a mere return to the “glorious past” – the age of *Kanunî* Sultan Süleyman I. The political reforms that came about, however, beginning with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order), were superstructural and did not emanate from *sui generis* remedies intended to treat previously diagnosed problems. They were implanted piecemeal in a flurry of autocratic modernization on to an anachronistic economic structure by a court and intelligentsia who were capable of only the most superficial understanding of their own and their enemies’ social institutions, be they economic, political or cultural – and of the foundations of those institutions. Worse, these men neither knew the Occident nor, apart from a handful of enthusiasts, did they show any inclination to

learn about it. They thus wholly lacked “Occidentalism” – a way intellectually of coming to terms and coping with the Occident. And their indifference to contemporary civilization was not new. Since the victory of orthodoxy in the twelfth century, the more rigid interpretation of Islâm, imbued with the elaborate doctrine of *taklid* (blind obedience and imitation in matters of faith and ritual) and its spreading irrational and inflexible accretions, had contributed to the progress of Islâm from a reasoned belief to mere faith and to Muslims turning away from the study of, and hence innovation in, the rational and practical sciences – ideas that had, in contrast, taken root in Reformation Europe. It had therefore, from the end of the fifteenth century, become increasingly difficult for the cramped minds of the Ottomans, and Muslims in general, not only to match the scientific and technical developments of their despised rivals in “secular” Christendom, but even to understand the principles upon which these developments were based. Not surprisingly, then, true to the tradition of *din ü devlet*, Selim III simply attempted, in his *Nizam-ı Cedid*, to pursue the classical aims of maintaining the strength and status of the centre and trying to impose strict control on the social fabric overall. His response to the various threats with which he was faced was conceived entirely within the traditional context, although the means he pursued were not. So that, as has convincingly been argued, the promulgation in 1792–1793 of a whole series of new instructions and regulations on provincial governorships, taxation, grain-trade, other administrative and fiscal matters and, above all, the establishment of a modern corps of infantry

“... must be attributed not merely to his [Selim III] desire to strengthen Ottoman military power in order to fight outside enemies but chiefly to the unavoidable necessity of asserting the authority of the central government over the *ayans*.”¹⁷⁷

Nevertheless, for the present it will suffice to indicate the direction in which such consideration, based on the numerous advisory reports he had commissioned, led. Selim III’s paramount aim of creating a new social element – a corps of regular infantry troops with advanced weapons, knowledge of military sciences, training procedures and uniforms, supported by the establishment of the relevant administrative organization¹⁷⁸ – was, I stress, the “revitalization”¹⁷⁹ of the old maxim with great emphasis upon the first principle; that is, a ruler can have no power without an armed force. If, in the absence of competent and committed cadres, the embryo of a structurally-centralized and functionally-oriented modern state were to be conceived voluntarily and deliberately, the

provision of substantial compensation became unavoidable, at least to the key elements in the Old Order – the *yeniçeris* and the *ulema* in the centre and the *âyan* in the Anatolian and Rumelian provinces. Hence, attempts to replace the Old Order with a New one, yet imbued with the philosophy of the Old, proved to be instrumental in further undermining the Sultan's authority but paved the way for a fresh stamping of the traditional military seal in the following periods. Although structural changes occurred at the centre, including the armed forces, during these periods, the military seal on society as a whole remained affixed.

In brief, initial resistance to the *Nizâm-ı Cedid* was led by the militarily and economically dysfunctional *yeniçeris* supported by the *ulema*, disgruntled at the perceived foreign and non-Muslim orientation of the reforms, when Selim III ordered, in 1805, a general levy in order to provide men for the new corps. Their resentment was compounded with that of the Rumelian *âyan* the following year when, with the intention of reconsolidating his authority in the region, the Sultan ordered the transfer from Anatolia of a *Nizâm-ı Cedid* force; he was obliged to back down by stiff opposition of the *âyan* assembled at Edirne and threatening to march on İstanbul.¹⁸⁰

Such curtailment of the Sultan's authority in the provinces resulted in his power, and hence authority, being checked at the centre by an alliance between the new Grand *Vezir*, İbrahim Hilmi Paşa (1806–1807), former chief-officer of the *yeniçeris*, and the new *Şeyhülislâm*, Mehmed Ata'ullah Efendi.¹⁸¹ In the capital, the eventual separation into two camps, that is, the partisans of the New Order versus the partisans of the Old, marked the deposition of Selim III by the 1807 mutiny of auxiliary levies (*yamak*) jointly with the *yeniçeris*, the *ulema* and the already disaffected populace of İstanbul – for all of whom the *Nizâm-ı Cedid* was an alien implantation to be rejected. They were supported, under duress, by the new Sultan, Mustafa IV (1807–1808), who had to submit to their major demands.¹⁸² The 1807 incident leading to Selim III's deposition had consequences beyond that of just another mutiny against the throne as an isolated episode in Ottoman history. In the politico-historical continuity of the Empire's life, it marked the emergence of what I call a “structural-cultural duality”,¹⁸³ deriving from the confrontation of so-called “eastern-Islamist” with “western-secularist” structures and their corresponding ideas, and preconditioned by the rigid theory of *nizam* still prevailing in the Empire. This duality, symbolized in cultural expression as well as in political structures, formed a crucial stage in the process of

political development which deeply affected the subsequent periods of Ottoman-Turkish behaviour, and especially that of its armed forces.

To continue the narrative, the conflict at the centre in 1807 gave rise to an authority gap which was swiftly filled by the *âyan* in Rumelia, backed by their private armies, under the leadership of Âlemdâr Mustafa of Rusçuk. He suppressed the overbearing *yeniçeris* in İstanbul and played an instrumental role in bringing Mahmud II (1808–1839) to the throne, becoming himself the Grand *Vezir*. There followed, as a result, pressure for the signature of a Pact of Alliance (*Sened-i İttifak*) in 1808 – a negotiated agreement between the Grand *Vezir*, representing the incipient modern bureaucracy, and the *âyan*, who had established *de facto* control over the provinces of Anatolia and Rumelia.¹⁸⁴ The Pact determined the respective positions of the central and the provincial parties by a compromise between two different administrative concepts best suited for the interests of each group: centralization for the bureaucracy, decentralization for the *âyan*.¹⁸⁵ Such a compromise could only last as long as the central authority did not seek to diminish the power of the provincial notables and respected their status and independent rights. This Pact, though ultimately signed neither by the Sultan nor by more than four of the *âyan*, was the first and unique document of Ottoman political history in which a limitation on the Sultan's power was set by his subjects.¹⁸⁶ Above all, the lesson constituted by the *Sened-i İttifak* was perhaps the most important that Mahmud II had learned – that a ruler cannot pursue his policies against internal and external pressures without the support either of his own resources or of a general consensus or, better still, of both. In fact, during his first eighteen years on the throne, the Sultan had to face a revolt in Serbia, growing Wahhabi power in Arabia and a war with Russia (1809–1812). Taking advantage of the Russian war which necessitated the re-establishment and the strengthening of the armed forces, Mahmud II began to subdue the principal *âyan* in the provinces. From 1815 onwards, he was generally successful in dispossessing many of the rebellious *paşas* and local dynasties,¹⁸⁷ thus consolidating his authority over the provinces.

The restoration of the imperial authority through the strengthening of that of the central government now became the one overriding purpose of the Sultans. It required the absolute centralization of power in their hands in order to weaken and destroy the traditional social forces that might oppose this policy, a policy only partly generated by the external threats that were put forward as the justification for their actions. This manner of

reasoning in turn facilitated the formation of, first, an obedient and efficient military as the best counter to both internal and external pressures and, secondly, a bureaucracy – another key political institution – for determining, interpreting and safeguarding the policies of the state.

In this complex of related changes, Mahmud II's attempts at reforms (*usûl-ü nizam-ı müstahsene*) were more successful than those of his predecessors, especially Selim III, since he was able to put down the refractory *âyan* and persuade the *ulema*, two of the recognized bases in power struggles, before trying to deal with the third, the *yeniçeris*, who had already, in the words of Karal,

“... ceased being the source of state's authority; the principle that the corps exists to serve the state had been replaced with the formula that the state exists merely for the corps”.¹⁸⁸

To this end, in 1826, an imperial edict (*ferman-ı âlî*) issued on 17 June, abolished the corps of *yeniçeri* and set up in their place

“... soldiery bearing the title of the Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammed [Muallem Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediyye], to serve religion and state [*din ü devlet*] and to reply to the enemy in *gaza* and *cihad*, who were registered and organized ...”.¹⁸⁹

under the command of Hüseyin Paşa, former chief-officer of the *yeniçeris*. He was given the title of *Serasker* (Commander-in-Chief), combining also the functions of a Minister of War and a kind of garrison commander and police chief in the capital. Despite such an apparently drastic policy, including the savage suppression of the mutinous *yeniçeris* prior to the abolition of the corps, Mahmud II aimed essentially at preserving the traditional social structure and protecting it from more extensive changes. He actually made this plain in a *hatt-ı hümayun* (imperial rescript) to his Grand Vezir, Selim Mehmed Paşa (1824–1828):

“Since the organization and order of this soldiery was carried out in a very short time, it is necessary to be cautious and circumspect ... The possessor of our Exalted Government is great, and as the only aim of this organization and order consists of the premise of serving our religion and state, those who oppose it will, if Allah wills, meet with the sword of *şeriat* [*seyf-i şeriat*].”¹⁹⁰

The avowed purpose of this structural reform, therefore, was the development of the military as a political institution in the modern sense, although the reform itself would seem to have been based upon that same view of the function of the military and its relation with the state which remained constant throughout

Ottoman history. Hence, between 1826 and 1839, Mahmud II reorganized, as the consequence of previous structural changes, his *kapıkulus* into a fledgling bureaucracy which, as the official line had it, would be the servants of the state instead of the *kuls* of the Sultan. Corresponding changes occurred as the imperial authority superimposed a series of new responsibilities on the central and provincial administration,¹⁹¹ most of which had previously been performed by religious or voluntary organizations or were unknown in the nature of traditional society.

The emergence of this centralized government with its added responsibilities through the assimilation of newly-formed groups into the political system resulted, in effect, in the gradual expansion and extension of power of the government. There thus evolved two linked centres of power, unlike classical Ottoman society which was a polity evincing, according to Mardin, strong "patrimonial characteristics".¹⁹² And over time, the two centres would reciprocally expand or contract, concentrate or disperse. This interaction formed the main basis of the "neo-patrimonial" Ottoman system until its effective end in 1918. But the main point for our purpose is that the convergence towards a modernization of the military, partly inspired by foreign militaries and partly, and more importantly, by the remedial cogitation of Ottoman statesmen,¹⁹³ facilitated the emergence of the Ottoman military as the foremost of the key political institutions.

It may then be suggested that "institutionalization", starting from 1826, proved an integral element in the establishment of the desired unified polity. Yet it may equally be argued that it acted also as an agent for disintegration, however unwittingly. For the imposition of military reforms had other important consequences, one of which was to put the armed forces in a position analogous to that once occupied by the *yeniçeris*. But this was a modern military, which meant that officers were now educated in military schools where they were exposed to contemporary political ideas and, indeed, prevailing political ideals. This, in turn, resulted in an increasing specificity and self-identification by the military who could henceforth play the role, in their own eyes, of a legitimate power – one that must necessarily have been exerted from above rather than emanating from a popular base. The continuing process therefore deepened the impression of the military seal on the state and was to reveal the military as its most prominent institution, thus contributing towards a degree of institutional disequilibrium in the polity.

II.

From now on, as the analysis proceeds, I shall try to indicate the changes in the military structure and its relationship with the central government after 1826. Such changes at first allowed and later encouraged the military to regard itself as a professional corporate body, ready to defend its autonomy, and as such a new source of power. The soldiers came to think of themselves as the most competent and best equipped, among a number of *élites*, for propounding solutions for the country's problems and then imposing them. Their attitude, based on the image of the military *imperium*, thus made the institution the most likely instrument for pursuing goals which were generally thought to be necessary, appropriate and sufficient.

The setting up in 1826 of the Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammed¹⁹⁴ establishment, with a force of 12,000 men, to be stationed in the capital and divided into eight units (*tertib*) according to current European models, was doubly significant. First, there was on paper no longer a counterweight to balance it nor to threaten its very being as had been the case in the *Nizâm-ı Cedid* period, when the New Corps and the *yeniçeri* corps had to coexist. Secondly, it facilitated the creation of a competent officer corps, the lack of which was the most serious defect of the new armed forces; for continuing military defeats and territorial losses between 1827 and 1833¹⁹⁵ further prompted Mahmud II's military reform measures to this end. These entailed the introduction and use of foreign military instructors, the sending of military students to train in western European capitals and the setting up of new military schools.

Indeed, a Prussian Lieutenant, later Field-Marshal, Helmuth von Moltke, who was assigned by the Sultan for the inspection of imperial defences and the reorganization of the new armed forces, commented, with two of his colleagues, in a report to General Headquarters in Berlin, that

"[t]he weakest part of the army . . . was the officers . . . There were a few talented officers among the brigadiers and colonels, and these provided the momentum that kept things going, though they received almost no help from the officers junior to them. Often, very young men were made majors . . . Captains and lieutenants were usually the more elderly men . . . none had scientific training as we know it, and few had battle experience".¹⁹⁶

In order, therefore, to lay the foundation of the new officer corps for the new armed forces, from 1827 on batches of army and navy

cadets were sent abroad for training.¹⁹⁷ Meanwhile, as the educational reform which most concerns us here, a whole batch of modern military schools were either reorganized or opened for the training of officers. Notably, the existing Imperial Naval Engineering School (*Mühendishâne-i Bahrî-i Hümayun*, 1773–1776) and the Imperial Army Engineering School (*Mühendishâne-i Berrî-i Hümayun*, 1793–1795?) were now revived; in addition, in 1826 the Imperial School of Medicine and Surgery (*Tıbhâne-i Âmir ve Cerrahâne-i Mamure*) and, in 1834, the first truly modern and integrated military school, the School for Military Sciences (*Mekteb-i Fûnun-u [Ulûm-î] Harbiye*) were established.¹⁹⁸ These reforms, however, were carried out under the direct control of the Sultan and through the illiterate *Serasker*, Hüsrev Paşa, who served Mahmud II between 1827 and 1837, and who appears to have been selected not because of any special competence in the military reforms he was expected to inspire and to manage, but because of his deep loyalty to the Sultan.¹⁹⁹ For Mahmud II saw control of the military, more than anything else, as the instrument for carrying out the various reforms aimed mainly at strengthening the authority of the central government against the economic and political forces operating within²⁰⁰ and without Ottoman society.

On the death of Mahmud II, his son, Abdülmecid (1839–1861), ascended the throne at a moment of critical internal menace, when Mehmed Ali, the *Paşa* of Egypt, had resumed his struggle against the central government and had just won a victory against the new Ottoman armed forces at the battle of Nezib (June 1839). It was against this background that on 3 November 1839 an Imperial Rescript, known as the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of Gülhane, initiated the era called the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization) between 1839 and 1876. This document, in contrast with the *Sened-i İttifak*, enunciated the reform movement in terms of the promulgation of a Sultanic “will” (*îrade-i Seniye*).²⁰¹ Yet it explicitly renounced the traditional prerogative and authority of the person of the Sultan in favour not of any notion of popular sovereignty but of the increased power of the central government. Concomitantly, the Rescript allowed for a measure of representation in the provinces, partly to induce the greater loyalty of subjects to the central government and partly, to be sure, as a potential check on the existing power of the *âyan* and other local notables. Although partially responsible for a massive increase in ministerial insecurity of office, it became instrumental in accelerating the process of centralization and bureaucratization of the Empire²⁰² towards the main target of structurally strengthening its political institutions. For the Rescript

compounded principles of the modern constitutionalism of the 1830s with the traditional Ottoman state philosophy. Indeed, what

“... [t]he Rescript said was that the state needed armed forces which in turn required money, that state finances could remain in good order only if the subjects were protected against injustices, and so on”.²⁰³

That the reforms in the armed forces, already well under way, were affected by the new regulations and institutions initiated by the Rescript, was essentially in line with the view that military reform could not take place entirely in isolation from the rest of the body politic. Quite apart from the systematic taxation²⁰⁴ required to support the new armed forces, for example, an efficient provincial administration was essential for conscription. Certainly, with the destruction of the *yeniçeris* in 1826, this had become imperative and further preliminary preparations already made in 1831 following the first Ottoman census and survey, which was introduced mainly for conscription and taxation purposes. Conscription was first formally proposed in the Imperial Rescript of 1839²⁰⁵ and put into effect with the promulgation of the first comprehensive military law of 6 September 1843, during the War Ministry of Rıza Paşa (1841–1845), who succeeded in power the Foreign Minister, Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1837–1841) – dismissed in 1841 when his reform measures suffered a setback. Rıza Paşa, representing the influential old-time reformers, is said to have believed principally in military reorganization as a means of resuscitating the Empire, and showed less interest than had Reşid Paşa in reforming the civil bureaucracy.²⁰⁶

The 1843 law laid down the reorganization and composition of the armed forces so that, for example, the land forces consisted of five armies with five years' service for regular soldiers (*muavazzaf*) followed by seven in the reserves (*redif*). The soldiery were recruited by way of conscription, with the drawing of lots, and matters of training, equipment and maintenance were based on Prussian and French models.²⁰⁷ Incidentally, according to a *Hatt-ı Hümayun* of January 1845, issued by Sultan Abdülmecid, this military reform was more successful than his others.²⁰⁸

In 1854, reform in the military intensified in response to new external and internal stimuli. It was in this year that the Empire became allied with Britain and France against Russia in the Crimean War (1854–1856), which revealed the relatively poor performance of the new Ottoman armies, together with excessive exploitation by its allies,²⁰⁹ despite the fact that in 1856 the Empire was on the winning side. As a result partly of allied insistence²¹⁰

and partly of internal political pressures, a new Imperial Rescript of 10 February 1856, known as the *Islâhat Fermanı*, provided a theoretical base for universal conscription by promulgating civic equality for all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The promises of the central government in this context included the abolition of the poll-tax and the opening up of military service to all, to the extent that non-Muslims would be allowed to rise to the rank of colonel.²¹¹ Through offering such civic equality the government hoped to rally loyalty under the name of Ottomanism in order to thwart separatist attempts by various subject peoples. The 1856 Rescript reaffirmed the provisions of the 1839 Rescript; both were the response of Ottoman leaders to the social and, particularly, political pressures that had been present across Europe since 1789.

The Ottoman government introduced a series of measures based on the 1856 Rescript, through statesmen recruited from the newly developed civilian élite of, mainly, the Translation Office (*Bab-ı Âli Tercüme Odası*) and the Embassy secretariats. Best known were Âli (1814–1871) and Fuad (1814–1868) Paşas, who oversaw the measures until Âli Paşa's death in 1871. Legal and administrative in character, the forms they took were largely influenced from outside by way of imitation, direct diplomatic representation or foreign occupation,²¹² despite growing opposition from influential Muslims, especially Turkish Muslims, who saw the reforms as placatory and as foreign, Christian impositions favouring non-Muslims.²¹³

The main determining factor in the Tanzimat reforms was the policy of integration (*Osmanlılık*), inspired by the idea of civic equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. But integration was in reality a workable legal device through which the central authority sought desperately to substitute Ottoman patriotism for the ethnic and religious loyalties of the various *millets* – loyalties that were constantly being worked upon by the Christian Powers for their own ulterior motives as part of the international power-game. Not surprisingly, the policy of integration failed, perhaps most obviously in the attempt to incorporate the Christian subjects in military conscription. Certainly, many of the Christians wanted integration to fail as they had already set their sights beyond the Empire.

Conversely, the changes stimulated by the 1856 Rescript and subsequent measures in the political and ideological perceptions of the new generation were to lead in a very different direction. The educational reforms of Mahmud II had not concerned only the armed forces, as I have emphasised; they had also tackled civilian education with the aim of the enlightenment of the adult public for

the purpose of leading it to accept change. And by the 1860s, the emergent civilian élite had come to be dominated by a Muslim-Turkish intelligentsia who, unlike the Christian minorities, conceived of Ottomanism as a unifying force and interpreted it in terms of a nationalist-cum-religious ideology. These intellectuals, who have been called “the Muslim interpreters of the New Order”,²¹⁴ came to be known as the Young Ottomans (*Genç Osmanlılar*). It is true that, as is generally assumed, they were influential as the first literary-intellectual agents of what is considered the nascent political culture of the modern Ottoman state. Yet as a group, incorporating as they did a broad spectrum of personal opinion and inclination, they possessed no clear, agreed, ideological programme beyond a rejection of Christian European interference in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire and the oppressed Muslim world generally, and a fervent desire for some form of modern constitutional government. They still, however, seem to have thought largely in terms of constitutional modification of the traditional state philosophy, as epitomized in the personality principle and legally sanctioned by *şariat*. And they were by and large unable to see beyond revelatory Islâm to its rationalist essence which, unlike the purely revelatory Christianity, would permit, even positively encourage, intellectual development and the progress of civilization. Yet they worked towards the dissemination of the new ideas through the symbolic concepts of “freedom” (*hürriyet*) and “motherland” (*vatan*). One of the most influential of the Young Ottomans was Namık Kemal (1840–1888) whose poems, plays and journalism had a major impact since they could be widely disseminated as never before to a mass audience, thanks to the development of new communication channels – the post, the telegraph, the railway and, above all, the press.²¹⁵ Thus the Young Ottomans, in introducing certain political ideas, played a vital role in the modernization of the Empire in its first constitutional experiment of 1876–1877.

However, far more important for understanding the new élite's capacity for change is their position vis-à-vis the use of force, for example, in the effecting in 1876 of the first *coup d'état* for some seventy years.²¹⁶ Such action was facilitated by the comparative homogeneity of the Ottoman military due to the fact that conscription and recruitment only succeeded among Muslims. Further, the rise of the officer corps stemmed from the imposed military reforms, originally designed in response to external and internal pressures, although with the passage of time the corps became increasingly autonomous.

Military autonomy was first recognizable after the military reform

process had been set in motion with the creation of the institution of *Serasker-i-ate* (combined Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief and principal military adviser to the Sultan) in 1826, and the *Serasker's* inclusion in the Council of Ministers (Cabinet; *Meclis-i Vükela*), followed by the establishment of the Council for Military Affairs (*Meclis-i Dar-ı Şura-yı Askerî*) in 1836. This latter was a small, executive group consisting of a chairman, five members – war, planning, judiciary, supply and health – and secretaries. Like its parent body, the Ministry of War (*Bab-ı Seraskerî*), its membership remained, probably in part for reasons of exclusivity, predominantly Muslim; and it played an important role in the planning, implementing and executing of the military reform measures that followed.²¹⁷

These changes present us with important markers on the move towards the transformation of the military into an “institution” broadly recruited from among the Muslim population, self-perpetuating, with a firm conviction of its privileges and an awareness of its responsibility – as the foremost protector of *din ü devlet* – in the growing complexity of the central government apparatus.

As a direct result of the developments in the military sphere, its professional schools varied according to the different tasks and activities they served, and thus provided for the highest degree of professional specialization and a clearly-defined stratification as compared with the civil bureaucracy. Moreover, as conceivably the most logical response, in Ottoman perception, to external, and the avowed response to internal, stimuli the military enjoyed a powerful and unimpeachable position as the possessors of the imperial prerogative. It is also worth noting that their position as the first intelligentsia open to progressive influences provided the military with the ability to impose demands which would have been resisted had they sprung from any other élite group. Indeed, first, the relatively more advanced training, organized lifestyle, discipline and rigid hierarchy along with their *esprit de corps*, promoted a qualitative superiority over the Muslim, civilian, élite schools. Secondly, and more importantly, they possessed arms. Here, in short, the officer corps had intellectually outgrown the state. Thus, although the literary intellectuals were the first to express a liberal critique of government action and to support a programme for constitutional reform, it was the officer corps who took steps to put these ideas into effect. And the first visible indication that they were becoming the most influential element in the modern Empire's affairs was when they spearheaded the proclamation by Parliament of the first Ottoman Constitution on 23 December 1876.

On 31 May 1876, the day after Abdülaziz (1861–1876) had

ceased to reign, he wrote in a note to his nephew and successor, Murad V (1876), who was installed with the approval of the *ulema*:

“ . . . Commencing with the recommendation that Your Highness should bear in mind that the very soldiery whom I have armed with my own hands have put me in this position [. . . kendi elimle silâhlendirdiğim asker[in] beni bu hale getirdiğini dahi tahattur buyurmalarını tavsiyeye ibtidar ederek] . . . I pass on the dominion of the House of Osman to the noble family of Abdülmecid Han.”²¹⁸

Yet inability to control the military was one of the main factors in the fall of Murad V, stimulated by internal and juxtaposed with external political crises.²¹⁹ Such inability was the visible culmination of the changes of the previous periods and was inextricably linked to those changes at each stage in the development of the external and internal stimuli and their respective representative forces – forces which conflicted or coalesced as the case might be, but which were all trying to strengthen their own position and some, such as the Sultans – mainly in response to external stimuli, inadvertently generating paradoxes that would prove to be to their own detriment.

The years 1875 and 1876 witnessed domestic uprisings in Bosna and Hersek, immediately followed by revolts among Bulgars, Serbs and Montenegrins, each arising from an induced local discontent blended with a kind of nationalism and tinged with pan-Slavism.²²⁰ The suppression of the revolts in Rumelia and the defeat of the Serbs in the war that followed (June–November 1876) could obviously only be achieved by the Ottoman armed forces which had been completely reshaped, in a law of June 1869, along the Prussian lines of organization and training under the initiative of Sultan Abdülaziz through his *Serasker*, Hüseyin Avni Paşa (1868–1871 and subsequently).²²¹ Yet fleeting successes in the field did not appear sufficient to reduce the threat of Russian intervention, with the approval of the rest of colonialist Europe, on the side of the rebels, with the spurious excuse of “liberalizing” the Ottoman government. On the contrary, the military’s successes had precipitated, even increased, those European governments’ acceptance of a British initiative for the convening of an international conference in İstanbul “ . . . in order to formulate a program of reforms to be carried out under European supervision and partial occupation of the Balkan provinces”.²²² However, as has also been stressed,²²³ the internal stimuli toward reforms should not be dismissed as negligible in comparison with those external pressures. There is indeed good ground to assume that the imminence of the projected constitutional reform was recognized by the

influential politician, Midhat Paşa (shortly to become Grand *Vezir* for the second time, 1876–1877), as an opportunity for establishing a system of balances and cooperation between the two dominant groups – the provincial landowners and the central bureaucracy, as well as a means to curb the Sultan's powers.²²⁴ The development of the external and internal stimuli were thus so closely associated that the reformers, headed by Midhat Paşa, in their *naïveté* and haste to force the coincidence of the two with the proclamation of the first Ottoman Constitution in December 1876, inadvertently provided the new Sultan, Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), with major concessionary loopholes. For the first Ottoman Parliament, officially opened on 19 March 1877, was prorogued within a year (14 February 1878) by Abdülhamid II since, during the framing of the Constitution, he had secured the right to dissolve the Ottoman Parliament as one of the “sacred rights” of the ruler.²²⁵ It would appear that, having witnessed the troubles of the last two rulers, the Sultan was quick to realize how the new forces which his predecessors had helped to create might pose as serious a threat to his own position as to those who had been eliminated in the recent past.

To counter this process, from the beginning of his reign Abdülhamid II first increased his power by acquiring effective control of government and, secondly, sought further to legitimize his governing authority within the framework of Islamic thinking, whose reinterpretation and reimposition he actively encouraged. He thus secured the *ulema's* backing,²²⁶ through the revitalization of the concept of Caliphate and its attribute as the rallying symbol of Islâm,²²⁷ towards an unrestrained authority over the other two key political institutions, the bureaucracy and the military²²⁸ – as well as, it should be said, towards the active support of Muslims everywhere in the face of Christian oppression. It was by such means – the promotion of Islâm for internal unity and as an external weapon – that Abdülhamid II as Sultan-Caliph sought to impose his convinced absolutism within a seemingly constitutional monarchy. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, his despotism was simply a misconstrued attempt to invigorate the Empire against slow throttling by the Great Powers of the day.

It is not then without significance that the increased attempts at reform, predominantly professional and technical, which emphasised “. . . the administrative and material aspects of modernization”,²²⁹ were deemed essential by the Sultan; and he promoted them for the purpose of strengthening politically both the Ottoman Empire, following the disastrous war and defeat by Russia (1877–1878), and more importantly, his own position in

it.²³⁰ Consequently, the paradox of the reformer, Midhat Paşa, was now followed by the paradox of the Sultan, Abdülhamid II, whose autocratic efforts towards mainly vocational education served, ironically, to intensify institutional growth and thence social development. This brought clearly into focus the conflict between the Ottoman political structure and its perception by the Ottoman ruling order, a conflict that made both increasingly dysfunctional. The basis of this growth was the increasing professionalization of the civilian and military élites, spurred on by extensive educational reform which was itself the outcome of underlying social factors, such as the growing demand for specialized personnel from the Muslim population now that the Christian minorities were in the process of complete disaffection.

The cumulative effect of the century's impulse to change was most evident in the military sphere, particularly after a special division, the *Erkân-ı Harb* (Staff-Officer) class was formally established in 1848 for the *Mekteb-i Fûnun-u Harbiye* graduates. On 5 July 1849, after an examination, five officers became the first staff-officers of the Ottoman military. By 26 August 1909 (62nd class), 830 staff-officers had joined the ranks. Moreover, as Ergin has emphasised,

"[s]ince in this country, for the first time, higher professional education was seen as necessary for military reasons, . . . the first preparatory schools or reserve classes [ihtiyat sınıfları] were opened in order to recruit students for those schools".²³¹

Thus the military developed, from 1846, its own secular preparatory schools through the regional army centres. These *askerî idadîs* (upper-secondary military schools) later extended down to middle level, especially after 1864, and to elementary level by 1875, when nine *askerî rüşdiyes* (lower-secondary military schools) were opened. Hence, in the Empire, the most advanced and specialized system of schooling from elementary to highest level, through secular, competitive and sustained study, was that of the military, which even provided teachers for the civilian middle and higher educational institutions set up some sixty-five years later. The growth of these schools has all the appearance of a concerted evolution aiming at the production of a particular type of Ottoman soldier. The schools thus made the most important contribution in preparing the nucleus for the officers' and staff-officers' section, since they represented the avenue to an élite status with all the mental outlook and material privileges invested therein. Indeed, a wide base of social and geographic recruitment, coupled with the nineteenth-century reforms, meant that the expanding, modernized armed forces offered the most conspicuous channels and best

opportunities for advancement by merit²³² within the state as well as within the military establishment.²³³ That a remarkable era was approaching was apparent. But few of the soldiers could have guessed through what tribulations the Empire would have to pass before any salvation.

I am speaking here of change in soldiers' minds. For the rise of the military élite was by no means unaffected by, or aloof from, the new stream of political values being articulated by an increasing number of intellectuals, so that no profound changes could develop without the simultaneous spread of a new set of political beliefs and ideology. These found especially fertile ground among the soldiers as they interacted with the whole gamut of political, cultural and economic pressures on them.²³⁴ The significance of the development by the Young Ottomans of such concepts as motherland, as briefly mentioned earlier, and its derivatives, loyalty and political identity, is that although they were still conceived within a religious framework they provided the basis for the nascent, secular, Turkish nationalist sentiment of the military élite. It would, however, be a mistake to overestimate the importance of Young Ottomanist thought in the creation of a Turkish nationalism exempt from historical contingencies. On the contrary, the spread of nationalist ideas, and the fanning of nationalist ambitions, among the Christian subjects, while weakening the dynastic allegiance of the Empire, had kindled a sense of injury and outrage from which a Turkish identity was shocked into awareness. To this kind of sentiment was attached the growing perception of being deliberately disadvantaged, through such events as the occupation of Tunisia by the French (1881) and of Egypt by the British (1882), the agitation by Greece and the Powers' intervention on its behalf when defeated in the ensuing war (1896–1897), and the danger of renewed uprisings, fostered by the Powers, in Rumelia. Reactive nationalism, then, seemed the logical, nay the only, choice and a fitting "political mode" (*tarz-ı siyaset*)²³⁵ to the predominantly Turkish military élite, among the organized oppositions – usually, if not altogether accurately, referred to as Young Turk movements. These movements chiefly consisted of intellectuals and professional élites "... who retained all the rights and duties of politics, including that of opposition".²³⁶ How far these men were at any time seriously engaged is a question even now not easy to answer. Nor is it necessary for the present purpose so to do. It is, however, supremely important to assert that the soldiers, who were most certainly affected by ideas, were also perfectly capable of developing their own. They still stood for the Empire; they also stood for revolutionary methods.

It is against this background that the most visible step leading to the restamping of the military seal on the state can be detected in 1905/1906, when the revolutionary cells among the serving officers of the Vth Army, Şam (Damascus), IIIrd Army, Selânik, and IIInd Army, Edirne, were established. The explicit terminology used in their titles – Motherland Society (*Vatan Cemiyeti*), Motherland and Liberty Society (*Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) and Ottoman Liberty Society (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) – was significant. The Ottoman Liberty Society, however, merged in 1907 with the Paris-based, predominantly civilian Ottoman Progress and Union Society, at the latter's initiative, and, in so doing, provided it with a power-base regardless of the various ideologies and bodies represented.²³⁷

But the essence of the military seal, which had yet to be felt, lay not in the answer to the question: what was the likely outcome if there were an attempt to alter the order of Ottoman society by the use of force? It was rather related to the question: by whom and when might such an attempt occur and, if so, which organized opposition would have the best chance of success? At this juncture, a piece of evidence deserves particular attention.

Like his predecessors, Helmuth von Moltke and two of his colleagues who – as may be recalled – had submitted a report in 1840 on the Ottoman officer class, another Prussian officer, General (later Field-Marshal) Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, who served as the Inspector-General of Ottoman military schools, wrote privately a long report, dated 11 December 1907, to his Kaiser, Wilhelm II (1888–1918), providing a valuable insight into the contemporary Ottoman officer corps. After a long preamble on the homogeneity of the Ottoman military in historical perspective and its relatively close structural and ideological unity and discipline in comparison with the inherently cellular, largely autonomous groups and *millet*s of the Empire, he commented:

“Until this moment the Ottoman military has not entered partisan politics. This aspect must not be taken to mean that young officers, whose numbers in recent years have been continuously increasing, who are given good education and know one of the western languages and are thus able to follow the world press and news, are strangers to political life and do not wish to learn about such things. This interest, which is subdued and latent under the tight control of the Sultan in İstanbul, is changing in parts of the Empire far from the capital, particularly in Macedonia, and young staff-officers are sensitively and anxiously considering the future of their country. They are deeply hurt by some occurrences that the Porte [*Bab-ı Âli*] regards as natural . . . Within its compound . . . it can be expected that the enlightened young officers of the military will very soon take over the High Command in place of the old *paşas*, most of whom are *alaylı* [i.e., rankers] or that

they will fill the positions of influence . . . There is no doubt that the military expects various radical improvements in the country . . .

In addition to these, during my recent visits and contacts I have seen that, in the military, feelings of Turkish nationalism have grown astonishingly and found supporters. If this sentiment develops and becomes widespread, it will be necessary to add the reaction against the incidents which are corrosive and offensive to Turkish nationalism among the military's reasons for an effective intervention in the politics of the state."²³⁸

Meanwhile, near-famine conditions were developing due to two consecutive crop failures across, especially, Anatolia and Rumelia, contributing to a severe domestic economic crisis. The upward spiral in the price of bread, flour and other staples combined with delayed remittance of taxes, arrears in salaries and suspension of promotions to create palpably explosive discontent and disaffection where it mattered most – among the military and bureaucracy.²³⁹ On a less personal plane, the Sultan and his opponents shared a common political predicament: fear of the imminent loss of the cherished province of Macedonia, perhaps even the whole of Rumelia, as a result of the ostensible reforms being insisted upon by Britain and Russia, now moving towards an opportune *rapprochement* at Reval.²⁴⁰ The revolutionary organizations, civilian and military alike, began perforce to speed up their existing plans for action, supported by an anxious and resentful Rumelian Muslim population who suffered constantly from the barely disguised European bias in favour of the local Christians and their brigandage. In particular, the military's disposition not to stand by while the Empire crumbled in an atmosphere of perceived Sultanic political ineptitude domestically and inactivity internationally, became apparent in the first half of 1908 with unrest spreading to the IIIrd Army. By this time, the IIIrd Army, spread across Rumelia, was the Empire's most sophisticated unit containing the cream of the *Erkân-ı Harbiye* graduates – no doubt in part to impress the reform commissions and other representatives of the Powers there gathered.

The escalation of officer frustration, and popular resentment of foreign officers in positions of command in the reorganized Macedonian *Gendarmerie*, led to a series of mutinies which also afflicted the IInd Army. Thriving on success, the mutineers gained in confidence what they lost in loyalty and became ripe for Young Turkish persuasion.²⁴¹ The clinching event came in July 1908.

Among the numerous reports which must have reached the

Government at the beginning of the month was a manifesto issued by *Kolağası* Niyazi Bey to the authorities of Ohri, stating that the reason for his insurrection was to combat

“... the injustices and iniquities which [*sic*] our fatherland has been suffering for many years ... and to force the government to restore the constitution of 1293 (1876)”.²⁴²

News came of Niyazi Bey's armed rebellion in the hills of Resne, joined by other junior officers, which turned into a mutiny within the IIIrd Army and rapidly spread to the IIInd Army, bearing a clear political demand – for the restoration of the 1876 Constitution.²⁴³ The Sultan's desperate efforts to crush the insurrection with all available means included calling out troops under one of his most trusted officers, General (*Birinci Ferik*) Şemsi Paşa,²⁴⁴ only to see him immediately assassinated. His successor, Marshal (*Müşir*) Tatar Osman Paşa, proved unable to retain the loyalty of the troops under his command,²⁴⁵ who refused to fire on their comrades, thus rendering the Sultan's policy of suppression wholly ineffective. Inability to subdue the latent power of the officers in the Macedonian garrisons juxtaposed with the growth of support for the rebels' cause among the Muslim population, evinced, for example, in the number of popular meetings chaired by the local Muslim notables.²⁴⁶ In a classic *volte-face*, the Palace opted instead for conciliation. Then, confronted with a *fait accompli*, as a flood of telegrams from Macedonia were read at the Palace reporting the proclamation of the 1876 Constitution in Manastır and elsewhere, the Sultan gave way on 23 July 1908. An imperial *irade* was issued in İstanbul the next day, restoring the Constitution of 1876.²⁴⁷

It was the climax of the Young Turks' activity which had snowballed as a series of organized oppositions within and without the Empire since the foundation, in June 1889, by a mere handful of cadets at the *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* (Imperial Medical School) in İstanbul, of what was initially known as *İttihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Union Society).²⁴⁸ Allocating to themselves the role of self-appointed “doctors of society”, from these beginnings the Young Turks sought to apply scientific remedies to the Ottoman malady. Yet, ironically, they tended to be unaware that the remedies they lifted wholesale from Europe had originally been devised for a very different purpose – to combat the ills of Christendom, riddled as it was with the Christian irrationality that blocked scientific advance. The application, therefore, of these remedies to essentially rational Islâm was both misguided and likely to isolate them intellectually

from the not-so-rational Ottoman Muslim masses; it rendered them increasingly élitist, engaged in a more or less exclusive dialogue with themselves.

Significantly, when it occurred, the effecting of their long-standing goal was not carried out by the Young Turks from the offices of an expatriate conspiratorial organization – *Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti* – based in Paris, Geneva, Cairo and elsewhere. It was a hard core of “Young Turkish” military officers²⁴⁹ in Macedonia who brought the Sultan’s attempts at control to a halt and thus aggravated the situation which he had hoped to calm, until the military could no longer be constrained but rebelled with the call for the restoration of the Constitution. Submission to this demand simply gave oblique constitutional recognition to the fact that the real power had already passed into the hands of the military institution, where it was to remain for a considerable time. The restriction of the monarch’s power and substitution of a constitutional monarchy was a definitive action by the military in which not only did the means become the end, by giving them the widest area of influence, but it also became possible for them to secure their own political aims. Such, as will now be seen, was the restamping of the military seal.

On Tuesday, 1 September 1908, when nearly six weeks had elapsed of the second constitutional period, Basri Efendi, son of Halil of Şumnu, graduated from the Staff-Officer division, 61st class, of the War College and was promoted to Staff-Captain (*Erkân-ı Harb Yüzbaşı*). He took the oath as follows:

“The holder of this diploma has taken the oath that he will serve His Excellency the Padişah within the limits of the Constitution and serve his motherland and nation loyally [. . . Kanun-u Esasî dairesinde Zati Şevket Simat Hazret-i Padişâhiye ve vatan ve millete sadakatla hizmet . . .], and in all circumstances protect the honour of the illustrious military and give up his life for the security of the motherland [. . . selâmet-i vatan nâmına . . .].”²⁵⁰

Two years previously, he had had to take a very different oath:

“The above-mentioned gentleman has taken the oath that he will serve loyally the religion and the empire and serve our munificent benefactor, our ruler, His Excellency the Sultan Gazi Abdülhamid II Han [. . . din ve devlete velî nimet bî minnetimiz Padişahımız Sultan Gazi Abdülhamid Han Sani Efendimiz Hazretlerine sadakatla hizmet . . .], and in all circumstances protect the honour of the illustrious military and, in case of need, give up his life for the sake of His Excellency the Sultan [. . . icabında uğur-u miyamen mevfur Hazret-i Padişahide feday-i can edeceğine . . .].”²⁵¹

To conclude, having dwelled upon history, I can now elicit certain political maxims before advancing further. The course of Ottoman history has been, so far, a demonstration of the Ottoman military's overdeveloped sinews of power. It is this magnitude of power that has been tested and found to have been functioning continuously despite structural changes – changes that were largely superimposed on the flow of Ottoman society. I have shown that in this society, in the face of internal and external stimuli, there has always been a military component in every significant historical event. Conversely, since the military has traditionally monopolized the instruments of violence, more violence has always, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, led to a further increase chiefly in the political power of the military, to the level of monopoly power. And since the military is vital to the functioning of the state it has maintained its central, nay preponderant, position among the other two key political institutions. It has done so to the extent that a military seal has been impressed both on the conduct of the affairs of state and on the organization of government.

As the military seal has been impressed in accordance with the structural changes occurring and impressed once again as a directing force in their creation, it thus reveals a continuity in Turkish history. The Young Turk era, to which I am now ready to move, was the last phase of the Ottoman Empire and was also the prelude to the Republic of Turkey. And the Republic was likewise to be imbued with the military legacy; it, too, was to be impressed with the military seal.

Notes

- 1 I have translated *ordu* variously as the military, the army and the armed forces (including the navy) as I feel the sense of the context dictates. In line with the method I propose in Chapter 1 these terms will, unless otherwise indicated, henceforth be taken to apply to the profession of arms as comprising the corps d'élite of the total armed forces. It thus refers to the "men of the sword" (e.g., the *yeniçeri* corps) *mutatis mutandis* to the "men of the gun" (e.g., the 19th-century officer corps of the Ottoman armed forces). I have likewise treated the military as singular or plural according to context, whether in the sense of a single entity or of the individuals who compose it.
- 2 F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*. (Trans.) S. Reynolds. London: Collins, 1973. 2 vols. Vol.2, p. 661.
- 3 Cf., H. İnalcık, "The question of the emergence of the Ottoman state", *International journal of Turkish studies*, 2:2 (Winter) 1981–1982, pp. 71–79.
- 4 These developments are summarized in: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: the classical age, 1300–1600*. (Trans.) N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973; pp. 5ff. For details, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. Cilt I (Anadolu Selçukluları ve Anadolu beylikleri hakkında bir

mukaddime ile Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşundan İstanbul'un fethine kadar). Genişletilmiş 2. baskı. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16a1. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1961; [Hereafter İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I]; pp. 1-32; O. Turan, *Selçuklular zamanında Türkiye*. İstanbul: Turan Neşriyat Yurdu, 1971; and H. İnalcık, "The emergence of the Ottomans", Vol.1, pp. 263-291 in P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton and B. Lewis (eds.), *The Cambridge history of Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 2 vols.

5 For example, as one chronicler perceived:

"The Turkish chieftains [beys] on the frontier [uç] from every clan [boy] of the Oğuz used to go to summer and winter pasture fearing the evil of the Tatars [Turco-Mongols] there on the frontier. Those offended by the opposing Tatars came to the frontier and increased their numbers; as a whole, all the chieftains and headmen [*kethüdas*] of these provinces gathered together and came up to Osman Bey and had a consultation. After much discussion what they chose to do was this: . . . 'From now on, we will not be able to get any help or assistance from the Selçuk sultans; most parts of the country have passed from our hands; the Tatars, as they needed, have become invaders upon it . . . [so] you be our *Han* and we *kuls* [servants] will occupy ourselves with the holy war [gaza] here, in the service of our Sultan', they said. Osman Bey, may *Allah* have mercy upon him, accepted."

"Yazıcızâde, Selçuk-nâme", and narration from it in: Edirneli Ruhi, *Tarih-i Âli Osman*. (A manuscript in the possession of Mükrimin Halil Yınanç). Quoted in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, p. 104. For a more general discussion: C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*. (Trans.) J. Jones-Williams. London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1968; esp. pp. 143-155; and his expanded French version: *La Turquie pré-ottomane*. İstanbul: Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 1988; esp. pp. 339-346. For a specific example: E.A. Zachariadou, "Pachymeres on the 'Amourioi' of Kastamonu", *Byzantine and modern Greek studies*, 3, 1977, pp. 57-70, esp. pp. 69-70.

6 The term is borrowed from H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 7.

7 Also see: M.N. Turfan, "A note on the Anatolian civilisations", pp. 13-107 in B. Mc Donagh, *Blue guide Turkey: the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts*. London: A & C Black, 1989; esp. pp. 92-94. Cf., C. Imber, "Paul Wittek's 'De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople'", *Osmanlı araştırmaları/ Journal of Ottoman studies*, V, 1986, pp. 65-81; and C. Imber, "The Ottoman dynastic myth", *Turcica: revue d'études turques*, XIX, 1987, pp.7-27. Further, see: R.C. Jennings, "Some thoughts in the gazi-thesis", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 76.Band, 1986, pp. 151-161.

On variant understandings of the term *gazi*, as apparent in at least one foreign chronicle, see: C. Imber, "Canon and apocrypha in early Ottoman history", pp.117-137 in C. Heywood and C. Imber (eds.), *Studies in Ottoman history in honour of Professor V.L. Ménage*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1994; pp. 118-119.

8 See esp. what is to my mind one of the best surveys, written with the author's inimitable style: M. Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin iktisadî ve içtimai tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959-1971. 2 cilt. Cilt I (1243-1453), pp. 77ff. and Cilt II (1453-1559), pp. 1-22.

Ahis represented a semi-religious fraternity of late Selçuk and early Ottoman times, with an emphasis on economic activity since they were professional organizations based on craft guilds with *futuvvet* ethics and appeared as societies. For our present purpose, it is important to note that such an organization of craftsmen was based on hierarchy under a leader (*ahî*) who was chosen from among the ranks, during a period (13th century) in which no strong centralized authority existed in Anatolia. Thus they were able to dispose of

resources, filling the authority gap in public and political functions, since they had an autonomous structure. See: "AKHI", Vol.I, pp. 321-323 in H.A.R. Gibb [et al.] (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, and London: Luzac, 1960 to date. [Hereafter, *E.I.2*]; and H. Koşay, "Small businessmen's organization 'ahilik' (friendship) and its traditions", *Etudes balkaniques*, I, 1979, pp. 101-109; and "FUTUWWA", in *E.I.2*, Vol.II, pp. 961-969. However, cf.: N. Çağatay, *Bir Türk korumu olan ahilik*. Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyet Fakültesi Yayınları: 123. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974; N. Çağatay, "Futuvvetçilikle ahiliğin ayrıntıları", *Belleten*, XL:159 (Temmuz) 1976, pp.423-438; and N. Çağatay, "Anadolu'da ahilik ve bunun kurucusu Ahi Evren", *Belleten*, XLVI:182 (Nisan) 1982, pp. 423-436.

Baba'is were one of the itinerant *melâmi* Turkish *derviş* groups conforming to a tribal social structure, more or less opposed to established authority based on centralized government and its requirements and also to religious orthodoxy. The significant point is that when they revolted in Anatolia in 1241, two years before the Turco-Mongol invasion, and were suppressed, they found refuge on the western frontiers where Turks constituted the majority of the population. They thus provided the first mystic orders of the state-to-be in the binding sense within the context of Islâm. See: "BABAI", in *E.I.2*, Vol.1, pp. 843-844. An invaluable survey is: C. Cahen, "Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Age", *Arabica*, V, 1958, pp. 225-251, and VI, 1959, pp. 25-56 and pp. 253-265. For an example, see: A.Y. Ocak, "Les menakib'ul-kudsiya fi menaşibil-unsıya: une source importante pour l'histoire religieuse de l'Anatolie au XIIIe siècle", *Journal asiatique*, CCLXVII:3-4, 1979, pp.345-356; but cf., C. Cahen, "A propos d'un article récent et des baba'is", *Journal asiatique*, CCLXVIII:1-2, 1980, pp. 69-70.

A general appreciation of both *ahis* and *baba'is* is found in: R. Kardaş, "Türk cemiyetinde dinî hayat", pp. 1405-1421 in *Türk dünyası el kitabı*. Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları: 45. Seri.1-Sa.A5. Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1976. Also see: M.F. Köprülü, *The origins of the Ottoman Empire*. (Trans. and ed.) G. Leiser. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992; pp.93-98 and pp. 103-107 respectively.

- 9 See: H. İnalcık-M. Oğuz (yayınlayanlar), *Gazavât-i Sultân Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân: İzladi ve Varna Savaşları (1443-1444) üzerinde anonim 'Gazavât-nâme'*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVIII.Seri-Sa.1. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1978; esp.N.12, pp. 88-91, for the best exposition of *uç*. In general: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Anadolu beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu devletleri*. 2.baskı. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.2a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1969.

That, for example, the prevalence of Turkish toponyms in western Anatolia may be due to settlement by Turks is suggested by: W.C. Brice, "The Turkish colonization of Anatolia", *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 38:1 (September) 1955, pp. 18-44. Cf., C. Cahen, "Le problème ethnique en Anatolie", *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale*, II:2, 1954, pp. 347-362. Further: M.T. Gökbilgin, *Osmanlı müesseseleri teşkilâtı ve medeniyeti tarihine genel bakış*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:2272. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1977; pp. 15-17; and, of course: M.F. Köprülü, *The origins of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 42-44.

- 10 Cf., B. Lewis, "The Mongols, the Turks and the Muslim polity", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (London), Series 5, 18, 1968, pp. 49-58. On *gaza* in particular: M. Kaplan, "İki destan ve iki insan tipi", İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi *Türk dili ve edebiyatı dergisi*, IV:4 (Mayıs) 1952, pp. 399-417.
- 11 See maps reproduced in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, facing p. 17 and facing p. 113; and D.E. Pitcher, *An historical atlas of the Ottoman Empire from earliest times to the end of the sixteenth century*. Leiden: Brill, 1972; Map VII:

- The Turkish Emirates, c.1300-1320; and Map VIII: Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea, c.1360; showing the conquests of Osman I and Orhan. Cf., B. Lewis, "Politics and war", pp. 156-209 in J. Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (eds.), *The legacy of Islam*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974; p. 198.
- 12 Cf. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 106ff. The Selçuk Sultan's proclamation of Osman I's *Beylik* was indicated in his sending of a robe of honour, flag, horse and drum – the traditional symbols of authority – to Osman I: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 55; and M.T. Gökbilgin, *Osmanlı müesseseleri teşkilâtı ve medeniyeti tarihine genel bakış*, pp. 8-11. Also: "OSMAN I", in Cilt IX, pp.431-443 in *İslâm ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940-1986. 13 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.A.]
- 13 The question of how to engineer a "common will" is discussed in: A. Hourani, *A vision of history: Near Eastern and other essays*. Beirut: Khayats, 1961; pp.156ff. As for Ottoman tradition, it may be significant that the receiving of sanctification by Osman Bey from a very influential *ahi* leader on the frontier, Şeyh Ede Balı, who girded him with a *gâzi* sword and gave him his daughter, Bala Hatun, in a sense not only conforms with the important role that *ahis* played in the establishment of the Ottoman State, but also indicates Osman's intention to go in search of legitimization of his political power. See: M.F. Köprülü, *The origins of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 6-7. Also, on the relation between Osman Bey and the *ahis*: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp.105-106; and, on the *ahis* and Osman Bey's reciprocal political power relations: *ibid.*, p. 496 and p. 530. Cf., an early source: Mehmed Neşri, *Kitâb-ı Cihan-nümâ*, 1492, (Neşri tarihi). (Hazırlayanlar F.R. Unat-M.A. Köymen. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, III.Seri-Sa.2a, 2b. Ankara: T.T.K. Basimevi, 1949-1957. 2 cilt. Cilt I, pp. 82ff.
- An examination of the actual historical authenticity of Şeyh Ede Balı and his relationship with Osman Bey, in so far as it can be deciphered, is made by: H. İnalcık, "How to read 'Âshık Pasha-zâde's history", pp. 139-156 in C. Heywood and C. Imber (eds.), *Studies in Ottoman history in honour of Professor V.L. Ménage*, esp. pp. 147ff.
- On the various elements that played such a vital role in those early days of the Ottoman *uç beyliği* – *gazis* and *alps*, *ahis* and *bektaşis*, see: A. Taneri, *Osmanlı kara ve deniz kuvvetleri (kuruluş devri)*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981; pp. 91-96.
- For a useful exposition of "... the 'Islam' that the Turkish conquerors and immigrants brought with them ...", see: V.L. Ménage, "The Islamization of Anatolia", pp. 52-67 in N. Levzion (ed.), *Conversion to Islam*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979; esp. pp. 59ff.
- 14 In this Islamic sermon known as *hutbe*, the ruler's (e.g., the Sultan) and Caliph's (*Halife*) names are mentioned; it was used by the Ottoman dynasty from Osman I onwards. Cf., "KHUTBA", *E.I.2*, Vol.V, pp. 74-75; and "HUTBE", İ.A., Cilt V, pp. 617-620. The reliability of the Ottoman accounts of "Just how Osman came to power" is discussed in R.P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in medieval Anatolia*. Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1983; pp. 21-25; and a broader comparison of Ottoman and Byzantine accounts in: R.P. Lindner, "Beginning Ottoman history", pp. 199-208 in C. Heywood and C. Imber (eds.), *Studies in Ottoman history in honour of Professor V.L. Ménage*.
- 15 The personality principle appears to have been best formulated by a statesman and historian, Tursun Beg (1426?-1490?), in his *Tarih-i Ebu'l Feth [History of the Conqueror*, i.e., Mehmed II (1451-1481)], written c.1488 in Bursa. The work opens with a lengthy introduction on the theory of state and rulership

which is not common in similar "histories". Yet, allowing for the margin of bias which is often present in the theoretical observations of these works or those of a similar nature – that is, the justification of the person and policies of the current ruler (in Tursun Beg's time, Bayezid II, son of Mehmed II) – it is quite significant that one does not find any formal dedication to Grand *Vezir* Mahmud Paşa, whom he served for twelve years in war and peace. In the Ottoman realm, Tursun Beg's "introduction" is widely considered the earliest of its kind – no earlier one, to the best of my knowledge, has come to light – and thus is worth quoting here in part:

"Discourse on the emphasis on the needs of the people for the noble existence of the Sultan, the shadow of Allah [*Padişah-ı zillu'llah*] . . . Now, first and foremost, according to the rules of scholarly books, let us say: what an exalted degree is the rank of *Padişah* and the essence of his being is the highest divine favour [*mertebe-i padişahi nice ni'mettür*]. Why do the subjects [*ra'iyetün*], even the whole of creation, need him and with what qualities is that person, who is dignified and exalted with the robe of Sultanate [*Saltanat*], worthy to be adorned?"

Tursun Beg answers: the Sultan who,

"by Allah's generosity and favour distinguished from among men with pre-eminence and superiority, has been laden with the burden of *Saltanat*,"

must possess justice (*adâlet*), forbearance (*hilim*), generosity (*seha*) and wisdom (*hikmet*). Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebû'l-Feth*. (Hazırlayan) M. Tulum. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1977; p. 10 and p. XXV.

For the life, times and work of Tursun Beg, see: *ibid.*, pp. XI-XXXII. Also cf., H. İnalcık, "Osmanlı padişahı", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XIII:4 (Aralık) 1958, pp. 68-79; and H. İnalcık, "Tursun Beg: historian of Mehmed the Conqueror's time", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 69, 1977, pp. 55-72.

It is, however, interesting in tracing the development of this personality principle, but without getting involved in the theoretical implications of so doing, to recognize the hint implicit in an inscription of 1435, some 50 years earlier. The inscription, on a plaque over the entrance of the Darulhadis Mosque in Edirne (Adrianople), is, significantly, in Arabic and reads:

"This noble Friday-mosque [belongs] to the very great sultan, the exalted king of kings who is helped from heaven, the victorious, the subduer of enemies who gives support to justice and beneficence, who spreads the wings of security over the people . . ."

F.Th. Dijkema, *The Ottoman historical monumental inscriptions in Edirne*. Leiden: Brill, 1977; Catalogue no. 6, pp. 21-23, p. 22.

- 16 P. Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1938; p. 41. Also: M.F. Köprülü, *The origins of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 114. Cf., A.Z.V. Togan, *Umumî Türk tarihine giriş*. Cild I: En eski devirlerden 16. asra kadar. İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1946; pp. 323-327.

- 17 Ş.A. Mardin, "Ideology and religion in the Turkish revolution", *International Journal of Middle East studies*, 2:3 (July) 1971, pp. 197-211.

- 18 See İbn-i Kemal, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*. 1. defter. (Yayına hazırlıyan) Ş. Turan. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVIII.Seri-Sa.2. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1970; p.81 and pp. 116-120. Also see: "MİHAL-OĞULLARI (MİHAL BEY, KÖSE MİHAL VE GAZİ MİHAL-OĞULLARI)", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 285-292. And cf. what I consider to be the most informative background: A. Pertusi, "Tra storia e leggenda: Akritai

- e Ghazi sulla frontiera orientale di Bizanzio", Vol.1, pp. 237–283 in M. Berza et E. Stanescu (publ.), *Actes du XIVe Congrès International des Etudes Byzantines, Bucarest, 6–12 septembre 1971*. Bucaresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1974–1976. 3 vols.
- 19 The Ottomans divided the peoples of a newly-conquered region, Muslim or non-Muslim, into the *askerî* (military class) and the *reaya* (tax-paying subjects). Military groups in the Anatolian principalities annexed to the Empire similarly received the privileges of the Ottoman military class, but those engaged in trade and agriculture, whether Christian or Muslim, in Rumelia (Rumeli) and Anatolia, were considered *reaya* and paid *reaya* taxes. The *askerî* comprised all "armed forces" (*seyfiye*) not engaged in production together with other groups, i.e., "men of learning" (*ilmiye*) and "men of the pen" (*kalemiye*). A class known as "exempted *reaya*" received certain tax-exemptions in return for their respective services to the state. For the most succinct discussion of "The Ottoman concept of state and the class system", see: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 65–69, esp. pp. 68–69. Also: H. İnalcık, "Ottoman methods of conquest", *Studia Islamica*, II, 1954, pp. 103–129, esp. pp. 112–115; and, more recently: H. İnalcık, "Empire and population", pp. 11–43 in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; pp. 16–17.
 - 20 The relation of power position to occupational function for the social estates (*erkan-ı erbaa*) is ably analyzed by the 16th-century Ottoman writer, Hasan Kâfi el-Akhisarî (also known as al-Bosnavî): M. İpşirli, "Hasan Kâfi el-Akhisarî ve devlet düzenine ait eseri – 'Usulü'l-hikem fi nizami'l-âlem'" *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü dergisi*, 10/11, 1979/1980, pp. 239–278. Hasan Kâfi's work is also utilized in: K. Karpat, *An inquiry into the social foundations of nationalism in the Ottoman State: from social estates to classes, from millets to nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1973; pp. 19–31, esp. p. 22 (table 1) for an "approximate arrangement of the Ottoman social structure in the fifteenth century".
 - 21 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 65. Also: H. İnalcık, "Islam in the Ottoman Empire", *Cultura Turcica*, V-VII, 1968–1970, pp. 19–29, esp. pp. 22–23.
 - 22 Such bifurcation in the structure of Turkish society may best be observed in the relics of Turkish mythology, originating in Central Asia. Cf., B. Ögel, *Türk mitolojisi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1971; esp. pp. 269–300. For a general exposition of its structural organization, see: L. Krader, *Formation of the state*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968; esp. pp. 86–88 and pp. 96–98. Cf., S. Divitçioğlu, *Kök Türkler (kut, küç ve ülüğ)*. İstanbul: Ada Yayınları, 1987; pp. 174–200 and pp. 266–280. Eight detailed monographs were found particularly useful in developing the main thread of my argument: B.Ya. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols: le féodalisme nomade*. (Trans.) M. Carsow. Paris: Publications du Musée Guimée, 1948; esp. pp. 73–100. Cf., W. Eberhard, *Das Toba-Reich nordchinas: eine soziologische Untersuchung*. Leiden: Brill, 1949. Further: S.I. Rudenko, *Die Kultur der Hsiung-Nu und die Hügelgräber von Noin Ula*. (Ed.) H. Pollems. Bonn: Rudolf Habert Verlag, 1969. Also: W. Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers: social forces in medieval China*. Leiden: Brill, 1952; esp. pp. 69–72 and pp. 89–102. Cf., L. Krader, *Social organization of the Mongol-Turkic pastoral nomads*. The Hague: Mouton, 1963; R. Giraud, *L'empire des turcs célestes: les règnes d'Elterich, Qapghan et Bilgä (680–734)*. Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1960; E. Esin, *A history of pre-Islamic and early-Islamic Turkish culture*. (Supplement to the Handbook of Turkish culture, ser.II, vol.1/b). İstanbul: Ünal Matbaası, 1980; esp. pp. 76–77 and p. 95; and P. Cannata, *Profilo storico del 1. Impero*

- Turco (metà VI-metà VII secolo)*. Roma: Università degli Studi di Roma, Istituto di Studi dell'India e dell'Asia Orientale, 1981.
- 23 H. İnalcık, "Capital formation in the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of economic history*, XXIX:1 (March) 1969, pp. 97-140. Though it will later be expounded more fully, suffice it to say here that the impetus to include all public services (*hizmet-i amme*) under the main class known as *askerî*, which has no etymological connection with the word *idare* (administration), may be explained as follows. The word appears with this broad meaning as a result of the establishment of the state organization. The structure of the state during its formative years was in the main geared to military demands and interests and their successive outcomes, so that, as a consequence, the word *askerî* came to cover the overall concept of state functions. For the breadth of the concept of *askerî* and its very elaborate assertion, see: Ö.L. Barkan, "Edirne askerî kassamı'na ait tereke defterleri (1545-1659)", *Belgeler*, III:5-6, 1966, pp. 1-479. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1968. An inclusive definition of *askerî* is also contained in a *ferman* (edict) from the Ankara Canonical Court (*şer'îye*) record, IX/3050, reproduced in: Y. Yücel, "XVI-XVII. yüzyıllarda Osmanlı idarî yapısında taşra ümerasının yerine dair düşünceler", *Belleten*, XLI:163 (Temmuz) 1977, pp. 495-506; see p. 495, N.2.
- The ways of entry into the *askerî* are neatly summarized in: C.H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986; p. 19. Also see, for a more general appreciation: Ş.A. Mardin, "Center-periphery relations: a key to Turkish politics?", pp. 7-32 in E.D. Akarlı and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political participation in Turkey: historical background and present problems*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975; esp p. 11. Cf., C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980; pp.45-48.
- 24 In the 14th century, one encounters a series of principalities such as Çandarogulları, Germiyanogulları, Aydınoğulları &c. For the political conditions of these Anatolian principalities from the 14th century onwards, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 39-91; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Anadolu beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu devletleri*; M.F. Köprülüzâde, "Anadolu beylikleri tarihine ait notlar", *Türkiyat mecmuası*, II, 1926, pp. 1-31; M.F. Köprülü, *The origins of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 36-42; and Y. Yücel, *XIII-XV. yüzyıllar küzeybatı Anadolu tarihi Çoban-oğulları, Çandar-oğulları beylikleri*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.74. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1980. Also see: P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche: Studie zur Geschichte westkleinasiens im 13-15 Jahrhundert*. İstanbul: Universum Druckerei, 1934; and Y. Yücel, *Kadı Burhaneddin Ahmed ve devleti (1344-1398)*. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları:201. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970. For a readable general survey, see: A. Sevin - Y. Yücel, *Türkiye tarihi: fetih, Selçuklu ve beylikler dönemi*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XXIV.Seri-Sa.12. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1989; pp. 203ff.
- 25 For example, according to İnalcık, the relationship between Osman Gazi and Mihal Gazi, the Byzantine lord of Harman Kaya who converted to İslâm, appears to have been that of an alliance and, later, of a vassalage. İnalcık attributes this to

"... the particular military organization in the 'uç' borderlands in which there were overlords [*uç emîrî*] and vassal lords [*bey*]. At any rate, in the 14th century we see many small states being incorporated into the Ottoman State after a more or less long period of vassalage."

H. İnalcık, *Ottoman methods of conquest*, pp. 103–104.

For the structure of the “military organization” during the time of Osman I Gazi, see: R. Egeyen-H. Aytepe, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III. Cilt, 1. Kısım (1299–1451). T.C. Gnkur. Bşk. Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Resmi Yayınlar, Seri sa.2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1964; pp. 188ff. and Ek 4: “Osman I. devrinde ordu kuruluşu”.

Also see the more recent and detailed commentary: “TÜRKLER”, *İ.A.*, Cilt XII/2, esp. pp. 288–290, on the structure of the Turkish frontier principalities.

- 26 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 8. Also see his early, seminal article: H. İnalcık, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun kuruluş ve inkişafı devrinde Türkiyenin iktisadi vaziyeti üzerinde bir tetkik münasebetiyle”, *Belleten*, XV:60 (Ekim) 1951, pp. 629–684, esp. p. 641.
- 27 Cf., B. Savcı, “Türkiye’de devlet hayatında askerî mahiyetin ve tesirin seyrine bir bakış”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XVI:3 (Eylül) 1961, pp. 39–45. And, regarding traditional features surviving through the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, see: D.A. Rustow, “The modernity of tradition”, pp. 171–198 in L.W. Pye and S. Verba (eds.), *Political culture and political development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- 28 See H. İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda raiyyet rüsumu”, *Belleten*, XXIII:92 (Ekim) 1959, pp.575–610, esp. pp. 595–598. Also see: H. İnalcık, “15. asır Türkiye iktisadi ve içtimai tarihi kaynakları”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi mecmuası*, XV:1–4 (Ekim-Temmuz) 1953–1954, pp. 51–73, esp. p. 53. Also cf., “ASKARI”, *E.I.2*, Vol.I, p. 712.
- 29 See, for example: V.J. Parry, “Elite elements in the Ottoman Empire”, pp. 50–73 in R. Wilkinson (ed.), *Governing élites: studies in training and selection*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969; p. 55; and “KAPI”, *İ.A.*, Cilt VI, pp. 200–201.
However, the most succinct exposition of the *kul* concept is given in: N. Berkes, *100 soruda Türkiye iktisat tarihi*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1975–1976. 2 cilt. (Cilt I, 3. baskı; Cilt II, 2. baskı); Cilt I, pp. 91–107. Cf., İ.M. Kunt, *The Sultan’s servants: the transformation of Ottoman provincial government, 1550–1650*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983; pp. 40–41.
- 30 Cf., P. Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 45–46. For a very recent definition of the Ottoman “conquest notion of state”, see: H. İnalcık, “The economic mind”, pp. 44–54 in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, p. 44.
- 31 See: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 9–11; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 155–177; F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, Vol.II, pp. 661–663; and “ORHAN”, *İ.A.*, Cilt IX, pp. 309–408. Also cf., G. Arnakis, “Gregory Palamas, the Khiones and the fall of Gallipoli”, *Byzantion*, XXII, 1952, pp. 305–312; and H. İnalcık, “The conquest of Edirne (1361)”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, III, 1971, pp.185–210, esp. pp. 192–193. A tentative alternative date is proposed by: E.A. Zachariadou, “The conquest of Adrianople by the Turks”, *Studi Veneziani*, XII, 1970, pp. 211–217.
For a general assessment of the “Early history and establishment of Ottomans in Europe” and observations on what the author terms the core provinces up to the end of the 16th century, see: P.F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354–1804*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977; pp.14–23 and pp. 108–110.
- 32 The geographical conditions determining the conquests of Ottomans in the west are best discussed by: F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, Vol.II, pp. 664ff.
- 33 Such conditions were related to the decline of Byzantine central authority and, thus, the rise of successor states in the Balkans* which, in the economic

sphere, coincided with the rise of feudalism – for example, magnates and monastic orders who had gained possession of previously state-controlled lands were able to increase feudal dues and taxes levied from the Balkan peasantry. For such conditions, see esp.: P. Charanis, “On the social and economic organization of the Byzantine Empire in the thirteenth century and later”, *Byzantinoslavica*, XII, 1959, pp. 94–153; and S. Vryonis, Jr., “Religious change and continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the fourteenth through the sixteenth century”, pp. 127–140 in S. Vryonis, Jr. (ed.), *Islam and cultural change in the Middle Ages*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975. Cf., H. Kaleshi, “Türkler’in Balkanlar’a girişi ve İslamlaştırılma”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü dergisi*, 10/11, 1979/1980, pp.177–194; and M. Mladenović, “The Osmanli conquest and the Islamization of Bosnia”, *Slavic and east European studies*, III:4 (Winter) 1958/1959, pp.219–226. Further: J. Rollet, “Caractères généraux de la conquête ottomane dans le Balkans”, *Ethnopsychologie*, 33:2, 1978, pp. 143–156.

* I use the terms “Rumelia” and “Balkans” interchangeably according to whether the region, or specific parts of it, lay within or without the Ottoman polity.

- 34 Much of the conquered cultivable land within the provinces passed under direct Ottoman state control by way of conversion into fiefs (*timar*, *zeamet*). They were granted to the *feudal* cavalry. A *timar* provided an Ottoman cavalryman with an income in cash, kind and labour services. The peasants who lived on the state land included within a *timar* were obliged by Islamic law (*şeriat*) to pay certain taxes to the central government. These taxes – mainly on the productivity of those lands – were calculated during the periodic government censuses. When state land was converted to *timar*, the state obliged the peasants to pay some of those taxes directly to the cavalymen who held the *timar*. Thus, by diverting to military men, in this simple way, certain taxes due to the Treasury, and by maintaining strict bureaucratic and financial control – the operation of the census – the Ottoman state was able to provide a large number of warriors with an income sufficient to maintain themselves and their dependants and to equip themselves for military service. The holders of *timars*, *sipahis*, were subject to the administration of the office of the governor-general (*beylerbeyi*) vis-à-vis the district-general (*sancakbeyi*). The *sancak* was an administrative unit under a military governor who held it in return for a military duty to provide *sipahi* troops. The *sancakbeyi* was able – so long as the records remained accurate – to ensure that the *sipahi* carried out his military obligations. For the *sipahi*, failure to perform military service to the satisfaction of his superiors could cause him to lose his *timar*. The system was organized in such a way as to inspire the *sipahi* to perform his military duties zealously. One significant result was that since each *sipahi*’s entitlement to land varied with the significance of his military contribution, the popular enthusiasm for war for further conquests was sustained on a sound economic basis. Indeed, it was doubled with the need of the Ottoman state for land in order for it to be distributed as *timars* or *zeamets* in support of the fulfilment of its military requirements of increased forces. Thus the state had to undertake new conquests for such distribution within a spiral growth policy resulting in the extension of its borders.

Cf., G. Káldy-Nagy, “The first centuries of the Ottoman military organization”, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, XXXI:2, 1977, pp. 147–183, pp.159–160. Also cf., M.T. Gökbilgin, *Osmanlı müesseseleri teşkilâtı ve medeniyeti tarihine genel bakış*, pp. 122ff.

The fundamental economic importance of the *timar* system, and hence economic

- reasons to expand the *kapıkulus*, is neatly outlined in: N. Berkes, *100 soruda Türkiye iktisat tarihi*, Cilt 1, pp. 70–71.
- 35 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtından kapukulu ocakları*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.12(1), 12(2). Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1943–1944. 2 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*]. Cilt I, p. 5. According to the causation of the 19th-century analytical Ottoman historian, Mustafa Nuri Paşa, it was “. . . as the country expanded and the population increased [that] the organization of a regular, standing army became necessary . . .”. Mustafa Nuri, *Netayic ül-vukuat: kurumları ve örgütleriyle Osmanlı tarihi*. (Sadeleştiren) N. Çağatay. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XXII.Seri-Sa.1, 1a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1979–1980. 4 cilt. Cilt I-II (1979), Cilt III-IV (1980). Cilt I-II, p. 18.
- Also: G. Káldy-Nagy, *The first centuries of the Ottoman military organization*, p.162, for the changing composition of the military force.
- 36 P. Wittek, “Devshirme and shari’a”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XVII:2, 1955, pp. 271–278, p. 271. Also: M.T. Gökbilgin, *Osmanlı müesseseleri teşkilâtı ve medeniyeti tarihine genel bakış*, pp. 21–22.
- 37 The sustaining foundations and main strength of the early Ottoman state lay in the frontier regions, especially Rumelia, and in the hands of hereditary families such as the Mihçioğulları, the Evrenosoğulları and the Malkoçoğulları, who held vast domains and possessed large armies. Cf., for example: V.J. Parry, *Elite elements in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 52–53.
- 38 As the lord of all frontier principalities, the House of Osman had relatively little difficulty in annexing the small Anatolian principalities, such as Germiyan and Hamidili; and later, when they came to recognize Murad I’s sovereignty, he assumed the title of Sultan (*Hünkâr*) which came to be followed thereafter as the title of the throne. See: “MURAD I”, *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 587–598.
- 39 H. İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda saltanat veraseti usulü ve Türk hâkimiyet telâkkisi ile ilgisi”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XIV:1 (Mart) 1959, pp. 69–94, p. 89.
- 40 The name refers to the Sultan’s standing army, paid from the state’s Treasury. They originally came to him in his one-fifth share (*pençik*) of the booty captured in war. Detailed information may be found in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 144ff; and J.A.B. Palmer, “The origins of the Janissaries”, *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXV:2 (March) 1953, pp. 448–481. Also see: “DEVSHIRME”, *E.I.2*, Vol.II, pp. 210–213.; “GHULAM”, *E.I.2*, Vol II, pp.1085–1091; and N. Weissemann, *Les janissaires: étude de l’organisation militaire des ottomans*. Paris: Librairie “Orient” Edition, 1964. In addition: R.C. Repp, “A further note on the devshirme”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXXI:1, 1968, pp. 137–139; K. Mihailović, *Memoirs of a Janissary*. (Trans.) B. Stolz. (Historical commentary) S. Soucek. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1975; see esp. Chapter 13 and N.1 of p. 205; and, for a brief but accurate summary of the organization of the *yeniçeri* corps: G. Káldy-Nagy, *The first centuries of the Ottoman military organization*, pp.165–168. A recent, very readable, popular work is: G. Goodwin, *The Janissaries*. London: Saqi Books, 1994.
- 41 H. İnalcık, *Osmanlılarda saltanat veraseti usulü ve Türk hâkimiyet telâkkisi ile ilgisi*; and A. Mumcu, *Osmanlı devletinde siyaseten katl*. [Doktora tezi]. Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaası, 1963; esp. pp. 57ff.
- 42 V.J. Parry, *Elite elements in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 57.
- 43 “These are stout souldiers and excelently versed in military affairs, who in their first encounters break their lances, without other Armour than a Sword, Lance and Target . . . [and who] advance against an Enemy, courageously

and valiantly; and for each victory of these men, their stipends are doubled, . . . and [they] are paid as well in Peace as War."

H. Marsh, *A new survey of the Turkish Empire and Government, in a brief history deduced to the present time and the reign of the Grand Seignior Mahomet the IV* . . . London: Princess Arms in Chancery Lane, 1663; p. 29.

As the *timar*-holding cavalryman in the provinces, the *sipahi* had certain administrative duties. In peacetime, such duties included the collection of taxes and the application of land laws and a force charged with the protection of the *reaya*. In the case of war, a *sipahi* had to provide a certain number of light cavalry (*cebelü*), armed horsemen and supplies of arms according to his *timar* revenue. For a general appreciation, see: Ö.L. Barkan, XV. ve XVI. asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ziraî ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları. 1. cilt: Kanunlar. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Türkiyat Neşriyatı:256. İstanbul: Burhaneddin Matbaası, 1943; and N. Beldiceanu, *Le timar dans l'état ottoman début XIVe-début XVIe siècle*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980. Also: "SİPAHİ", *İ.A.*, Cilt X, pp. 689-694; and, for a more specific discussion: O Zirojević, "The Ottoman military organization in Yugoslav countries in the 15th and 16th centuries", pp. 176-188 in *Ottoman rule in Middle Europe and Balkan in the 16th and 17th centuries*. Dissertationes Orientales:40. Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978.

44 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 9.

45 On Lala Şahin Paşa, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 572-573. Cf., esp.: H. İnalcık, *The conquest of Edirne (1361)*, p. 193 and pp. 196-198; and "MURAD I", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 587-588. Also: M. Aktepe, "XIV. ve XV. asırlarında Rumeli'nin Türkler tarafından iskânına dair", *Türkiyat mecmuası*, 10, 1953, pp.299-312; and A. Taneri, *Osmanlı kara ve deniz kuvvetleri (kuruluş devri)*, p.118, p. 121 and p. 151.

The first *beylerbeylik*, the largest administrative unit in the Ottoman state, was created in Rumelia, capital Edirne, in 1362: H. İnalcık, *op. cit.*

46 A. Mumcu, *Osmanlı devletinde siyaseten katl*, p. 58; and H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı padişahı*. The inscription on the tomb of Gazi Evrenos Bey reads, "Malik al-ghuzât wa'l müjahidin (king of the ghazis and the fighters of the jihad)". (Author's translation): V. Demetriades, "The tomb of Ghâzî Evrenos Bey at Yenitsa and its inscription", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXXIX:2, 1976, pp. 328-332, p. 332.

47 "BAYEZİD I", *İ.A.*, Cilt II, pp. 369-392. Cf., P. Charanis, "The strife among the Paleogi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402", *Byzantion*, XVI, 1942, pp.286-314.

48 See, in particular: E. Zachariadou, "Manuel II Palaeologos on the strife between Bayezid I and Kadı Burhan al-Din Ahmad", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XVIII, 1980, pp. 471-481.

49 "MEHMED II", *İ.A.*, Cilt VII, pp. 506-535; see esp. p. 512. The number of *kapıkulus* was to increase to 7,000 during the reign of Bayezid I: H. İnalcık, "Osmanlı devrinde Türk ordusu", *Türk kültürü*, II:22 (Ağustos) 1964, pp. 49-56, esp. p. 51.

50 *Devşirme* was the levy of male children from the state's non-Muslim subjects for the Sultan's *kapıkulu* personnel. Initiated at the end of the 14th century, for the next 200 years the *devşirme* system provided the bulk of the *kuls*, earlier acquired chiefly as prisoners-of-war through the sultan's *pençik*. See, in general: M.F. Köprülü, *The origins of the Ottoman Empire*, esp. pp. 114-116; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin saray teşkilâtı*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.15. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1945; esp. pp. 297ff.; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, esp. pp. 13-30 and pp. 139-141. Also: "DEVŞİRME", *E.I.2*, Vol.II, pp. 210-213; and V.L. Ménage, "Some notes on

the devshirme", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIX, 1966, pp. 54–78. Cf., S. Vryonis, Jr., "Isidore Glabas and the Turkish devshirme", *Speculum*, 31:3 (July) 1956, pp. 433–443; and also S. Vryonis, Jr., "Byzantine and Turkish societies and their sources of manpower", pp. 125–152 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1975; esp. pp. 141ff.

For a more recent assessment, see: Y. Ercan, "Devşirme sorunu devşirmenin Anadolu ve Balkanlardaki Türkleşme ve İslamlaşmaya etkisi", *Belleten*, L:198 (Aralık) 1986, pp. 679–725, esp. pp. 712ff.

51 V.J. Parry, *Elite elements in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 57.

52 At the time of the battle, Emir Timur, after having founded an empire in Central Asia and Iran, had proclaimed himself heir to the sovereign rights of the İlhanlı over Anatolia, which was challenged by the Ottoman Sultan, Bayezid I. On the demands of Timur Bey, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 306–308. Cf., in general: M.M. Alexandrascu-Dersca, *La campagne de Timur en Anatolie, 1402*. Bucharest: Universitatea Mihaileană din Iași, 1942.

53 In fact, these former beys who were deprived of their land-holdings following the annexation policies of Bayezid I (for example, appointing *kuls* brought up in the Palace in their stead for the administration of the land-holdings) re-established their former independent principalities after the battle of Ankara, under Timur Bey's protection, to the detriment of a unified estate: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 309–315; and Neşri, *Kitab-ı cihan-nüma*, (T.T.K.), I, pp. 357–359.

For Bayezid I's annexation policies in Anatolia and their repercussions, from a military point of view, see: A.H. Bıyıktay, *Yedi yıl harbi içinde Timur'un Anadolu seferi ve Ankara savaşı*. İstanbul: Askerî Matbaa, 1934. Cf., M.Y. Yücel, "Kastamonu'nun ilk fethine kadar Osmanlı-Çandar münasebetleri, 1361–1392", *Tarih araştırmaları dergisi*, I, 1963, pp. 133–144; and Y. Yücel, "Timur tarihine dair araştırmalar", *Belleten*, XLII:166 (Nisan) 1978, pp. 239–299, esp. p. 240, N.6.

54 "BAYEZİD I", *E.I.2*, Vol.1, pp. 1117–1119.

55 In the complex political situation, there thus appeared an authority gap in the period under discussion, which may be summarized as follows. In order to maintain the status quo established in 1402, local states and dynasties sought to preserve the equilibrium among Bayezid's sons. For example, the Byzantines' support for Emir Süleyman (1402–1411) against Çelebi Mehmed was based on a treaty in which Süleyman relinquished certain rights and territories on the coast. As Süleyman lost his struggle in Rumelia against another brother, Çelebi Musa (1411–1413), who also later became too powerful for the Byzantines to cope with, the Byzantines therefore, this time, helped Çelebi Mehmed to cross over. Indeed, although Çelebi Musa inflicted several defeats on his adversaries he, too, lost in the end due to the changing sides by the powerful beys whom he had alienated and who were now supporting Çelebi Mehmed. The basic information is drawn from: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 17–18; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 333–345; and P. Wittek, "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople (un démi-siècle d'histoire ottomane)", *Revue des études islamiques*, 12:1, 1938, pp. 1–34; and, further, from: "MUSA ÇELEBİ", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 661–666; "MUSTAFA ÇELEBİ", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 687–689; "SÜLEYMAN ÇELEBİ", *İ.A.*, Cilt XI, pp. 179–182; "MEHMED I", *İ.A.*, Cilt VII, pp. 496–506; and C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1481*, pp. 56–62.

56 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 328ff.; H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p.17; and, more recently: C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1481*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1990; pp. 55–73.

- 57 "BEDREDDİN SİMAVÎ. Badr al-Din Simâvî", *İ.A.*, Cilt II, pp. 444-446; and "BADR al-DIN b. KÂDÎ SAMÂWNÂ", *E.1.2*, Vol.I, p. 869.
A profound examination, but emphasising particularly the economic aspects of the revolt, may be found in: İ.Z. Eyüboğlu, *Şeyh Bedreddin ve varidât*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1980; esp. pp. 65-142. However, cf., E. Werner, "Häresie, Klassenkampf und religiöse Toleranz in einer islamisch-christlichen Kontaktzone – Bedr ed-din und Bürklüce Mustafa", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, XII, 1964, pp. 255-276; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 360-367 and p. 345; and M.T. Gökbilgin, *Osmanlı müesseseleri teşkilâtı ve medeniyeti tarihine genel bakış*, pp. 61-70.
- 58 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman empire*, p. 19. Also see: "MURAD II", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp.598-615.
This was particularly evident in 1446 when Murad II acceded for the second time to the throne and when, according to Mustafa Nuri Paşa, he sought the advice of his *yeniçeris* and increased their daily wage, so that "... they perceived the importance of their own existence". Mustafa Nuri, *Netayic ül-vukuat*, Cilt I-II, p. 69.
- 59 On these rivals, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 375-393. A convenient English narrative of events is given by: C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481*, pp. 91-125.
- 60 H. İnalcık, *Fatih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar*, I. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XI.Seri-Sa.6. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1954; pp. 196-197; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 439-440. For the origins and influence of the Çandarlı family, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, "Çandarlı (Çenderli) Kara Halil Hayreddin Paşa", *Belleten*, XXIII:91 (Temmuz) 1959, pp. 457-477; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Çandarlı Vezir ailesi*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.66. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1974; pp. 8-66.
- 61 A *kul*-origin paşa and *lala* (tutor) of Mehmed II, Zaganos Paşa, and the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia, Şehabeddin Paşa, represented the opposing camp against the power of the Grand Vezir, Çandarlı Halil Paşa. As will be indicated later, Zaganos Paşa was to play an important role in the reign of Mehmed II after 1451. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 506; and, for details, see: H. İnalcık, *Fatih devrinde üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar*, I, pp. 55-136.
- 62 H İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 21 and pp. 23ff.; and M. Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin iktisadî ve içtimai tarihi*, Cilt II, pp. 52ff. Also: "MEHMED II", *İ.A.*, Cilt VII, pp.506-535.
- 63 The two codes of law issued by Mehmed II as imperial decrees are quite distinct from, and do not adhere solely to, the *şariat*. Cf., K.H. Karpat, "Structural change, historical stages of modernization and the role of social groups in Turkish politics", pp. 11-92 in K.H. Karpat [et al.], *Social change and politics in Turkey: a structural-historical analysis*. Leiden: Brill, 1973; p.32. Also cf., S. Şener, *Osmanlı'da siyasî çözümme*. İstanbul: İnkilâb Yayınları, 1986; pp. 27-45. Further: H. İnalcık, "Osmanlı hukukuna giriş", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XIII:2 (Haziran) 1958, pp. 102-126; and R. Anhegger-H. İnalcık, *Kânunnâme-i Sultân-î ber müceb-i örf-i Osmânî: II. Mehmed ve II. Bayezid devirlerine ait yasaknâme ve kânunnâmeler*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XI.Seri-Sa.5. T.T.K. Basımevi, 1956; esp. pp. XV-XVIII; together with A. Özcan, "Fâtih'in teşkilât kanunnâmesi ve nizam-ı âlem için kardeş katli meselesi", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi*, XXXIII:33 (Mart) 1980/81, pp. 7-56.
Codes reproduced in full, with commentary, in: A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı kanun-nâmeleri ve hukukî tahlilleri*. İstanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1990-1996. 8 cilt. Kitap 1, pp.305-366.
- 64 "MEHMED II", *İ.A.*, Cilt VII, pp. 506-535; and H. İnalcık, *Fatih devri üzerinde*

tetkikler ve vesikalar, I, pp. 55–136. Cf., M.A. Mehmet, “De certains aspects de la société ottoman à la lumière de la législation (Kanunname) du Sultan Mahomet II (1451–1481)”, *Studia et acta orientalia*, 2, 1959, pp. 127–160.

- 65 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, p. 479 and pp. 484–485; H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 22; and H. İnalcık, *Fatih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar*, I, pp. 79ff. For the positions of the various factions on the attack, as reflected in some contemporary and subsequent foreign accounts, see: *Byzantium, Europe and the early Ottoman Sultans, 1373–1513: an anonymous Greek chronicle of the seventeenth century (Codex Barberinus Graecus 111)*. (Trans. and annotated) M. Philippides. New Rochelle (N.Y.): Aristide D. Caratzas, 1990; pp. 67–68; and C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1481*, p. 156.
- 66 A. Mumcu, *Osmanlı devletinde siyaseten katl*, p. 39. Also: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Çandarlı Vezir ailesi*, esp. pp. 78–84; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, “Osmanlı tarihinde gizli kalmış veya şüphe ile örtülü bazı olaylar ve bu hususa dair vesikalar”, *Belleten*, XLI:163 (Temmuz) 1977, pp. 507–554, esp. pp. 508–510. Immediately after the conquest of Constantinople (İstanbul), on 29 May 1453, Çandarlı Halil Paşa was arrested, charged with treason and executed. (Note that he was the grandson of Çandarlı Halil Hayreddin, the first Grand Vezir of Murad I, who had status as military commander and the Sultan’s absolute deputy in civil administration.) It may be significant that he was the first Grand Vezir to face a “political execution” (*siyaseten katl*) in the Ottoman Empire. For a general assessment, see: A. Taneri, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun kuruluş döneminde vezir-i a’zamlık (1299–1533)*. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları:248. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974; esp. pp. 88ff. However, the contemporary Ottoman writers, while no doubt aware of the truth of the matter, do not put forward any ideas on the execution, either because of their approval of Mehmed II or because of their wariness of him. Cf., Neşri, *Kitab-ı cihan-nüma*, (T.T.K.), II, p. 707:

“Then Halil Paşa was imprisoned on Wednesday with all his relatives . . . The stories about them are long and the premises are known, because the incident of Halil Paşa is well-known in the world.”

- 67 H. İnalcık, *Fatih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar*, I, pp. 131–136; and the comments of Uzunçarşılı in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilâtı*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.16. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1948; pp. 112–113.
- 68 The institution of *sekbân* (*seymen*), according to the generally-accepted view, was a gathering of soldiery, or of those providing a service, assembled as a result of obligations deriving from *avarız-ı divaniye* and *tekâlif-i orfiye* (*divan* levies and sovereign obligatory levies). See, for example: M. Cezar, *Osmanlı tarihinde levendler*. İstanbul: Çelikkilt Matbaası, 1965; pp. 25–29. Also, in general: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 162–166.
- 69 On the organization, pay and training of the *yeniçeri* corps, the basic information is drawn from: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 144ff.; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I, pp. 510–513; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. Cilt II (İstanbul’un fethinden Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’ın ölümüne kadar). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16b. Ankara:T.T.K. Basımevi, 1949; [Hereafter, İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II]; pp. 545–552. On their numerical strength: H. İnalcık, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, p.301; H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı devrinde Türk ordusu*, p. 53; and S. Baştav, *Ordo Portae: description grècque de la Porte et de l’armée du Sultan Mehmed II*. Budapest: Pázmány Péter tudományegye terni görög Filológini intézet, 1947; p.7.

- 70 H. İnalcık, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 301; and H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı devrinde Türk ordusu*, pp. 53–54.
- 71 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, pp. 264–265 and p. 546. Cf., H. İnalcık, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 301.
- 72 The Grand Vezirs who served during the reign of Mehmed II (18 February 1451–3 May 1481):

Name	Origin	Duration in office	
Çandarlı Halil Paşa	non-kul	1451–1453	
İshak Paşa (twice)	kul	1453–1455	
		1470–1472	1469–1472
Mahmud Paşa (twice)	kul	1455–1468	1453–1456
		1472–1473	1472–1473
Rum Mehmed Paşa	kul	1468–1470	1466–1469
Gedik Ahmed Paşa	kul	1473–1477	1474–1477
Karamanî Mehmed Paşa	non-kul	1477–1481	1477–1481

Information is drawn from: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, pp. 521–525. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947–1972. 5 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*]. Cilt 5, Osmanlı devlet erkânı; pp. 10–11, where the dates in some cases differ, as indicated in the extreme right-hand column. I use these authoritative works although some further slight variation in the dates does occur in other studies. Also, the comment of: A. Taneri, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun kuruluş döneminde vezir-i a'zamlik (1299–1453)*, p. 104, in view of his “Tablo 1” on p.105 and N.14 on pp. 133–134.

- 73 H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı padişahı*, pp. 68–79. Cf., C. Imber, *The Ottoman empire, 1300–1481*, pp. 199–200.
- 74 H. İnalcık, *Fatih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar*, I, p. 125. Also, for example, quoted in: H. İnalcık, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 295. (Translation his).
- 75 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 56.
- 76 Neşri, *Kitab-ı cihan-nüma*, (T.T.K.), II, p. 753.
- 77 “Cund Allah el-galib, eyyedehum Allah taâlâ fi Cemî’ul-metalib”. Quoted in: Feridun Ahmed Bey, *Mecmu’a-i münşeât-üs Selâtin*. [İstanbul]: Takvimhane-i Âmire, 1264–1265. 2 cilt. Cilt I, p. 255.
- 78 See: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 177–191, on the *Yeniçeri Ağası*. Also: K. Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973; pp. 18–20.
- 79 H. İnalcık, “Mehmed the Conqueror (1432–1481) and his time”, *Speculum*, 25:3 (July) 1960, pp. 408–427. A recent and most able assessment of the policies of “Fatih Sultan Mehmed” is found in: Y. Yücel, “Reformcu bir hükümdar Fatih Sultan Mehmed”, *Belleten*, LV:212 (Nisan) 1991, pp. 79–86.
- 80 “CEM”, *İ.A.*, Cilt III, pp. 69–81. Cf., S.N. Fisher, “Civil strife in the Ottoman Empire, 1481–1503”, *Journal of modern history*, 13:4 (December) 1941, pp. 448–466; and especially C.S. Tekindağ, “İkinci Bayezid’in tahta çıkışı sırasında İstanbul’da vukua gelen hadiseler”, *Tarih dergisi*, 14, 1959, pp. 85–96. A useful contemporary account is: B. Moser, *Die Chronik des Ahmed Sinân Çelebi genannt Bihişti: eine Quelle zur Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches unter Sultan Bâyezid II*. München: Dr.Dr. Rudolf Trofenik, 1980; pp. 60ff. The situation was, to a large extent, due to regarding the outcome of the fratricidal struggle for the throne as a divine decree – an accepted practice which, further, was codified and legitimized by the *Kanunnâme Âl-i Osman* of Mehmed II:

"And to whomever of my sons Allah accords the sultanate, it is fitting for him to put his brothers to death for the sake of the order of the realm. The majority of the *ulema* also deem this lawful . . ."

Such an Article, then, must have paved the way for a royal struggle in which the support of the powerful factions, and especially that of the *yeniçeri* corps, was essential. The text is drawn from: A. Özcan, *Fâtih'in teşkilât kanun-nâmesi ve nizam-ı âlem için kardeş katli meselesi*, p. 46. The full text of the Article (No.37) may be found in: A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı kanunnâmeleri ve hukukî tahlilleri*, Kitap 1, p. 328 (p.341 facsimile). Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 155; and "KANUN-NAME", İ.A., Cilt VI, pp. 185–196. Also: R. Anhegger-H. İnalçık, *Kânunnâme-i Sultân-i ber müceb-i örf-i Osmânî*, pp. XV–XVII.

Konstantin Mihailović, a contemporary *yeniçeri*, gives his own version of "How the Two Brothers [Cem and Bayezid] Dealt with Each Other", and comments, rather pertinently, that

" . . . there is among the Turks the following custom: when two brothers are left after an emperor and carry on a struggle between them, the one who first takes refuge at the court of the Janissaries will gain the imperial throne."

K. Mihailović, *Memoirs of a Janissary*, p. 149

- 81 Mehmed II's large-scale, harsh policies, moreover, were instrumental in stirring widespread discontent. Notably, in order to finance his frequently-used *yeniçeri* corps, he had increased customs duties and some of the taxes paid by the farmers, debased the silver coinage and brought some 20,000 villages and farms, previously held as *vakıf* or *emlâk*, under state control in distribution as *timars*. The last measure, in particular, was a major cause of discontent among old and influential families and the *ulema*. See, for example: H. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 30. Further: H. İnalçık, "State, land and peasant", pp.103–178 in H. İnalçık with D. Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, pp. 126–128. Cf., B. Cvetkova, *Sur certaines réformes du régime foncier au temps de Mehmed II*.
 - 82 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 156 and p. 525. Cf., İnalçık's comment in: H. İnalçık, "A case study in renaissance diplomacy: the agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan", *Türklük bilgisi araştırmaları*, 3, 1979, pp. 209–230, p. 210.
 - 83 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, pp. 170–172. Also, İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, "II. Bayezid'in oğullarından Sultan Korkut", *Belleten*, XXX:120 (Ekim) 1966, pp.539–601, esp. p. 542; and, in more detail: H. Reindl, *Männer um Bâyezîd: eine prosopographische Studie über die Epoche Sultan Bâyezîds II. (1481–1512)*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983; pp. 100–128 and pp. 223–239.
- The risk for the Ottoman Sultanate of its centralizing tendencies appears to have been perceived by Queen Beatrice of Hungary who wrote, in connection with the fate of the defeated Cem, that:

"If the Prince is given to him, my husband, with his aptitude in military matters and by the suitability of local conditions, will chase the Turk out of Constantinople and the other Christian countries within three years. Prominent Turkish lords have often written to His Majesty the King, promising to go over to his side as soon as he goes to war together with the Prince. It has been reported by the King's envoys sent to Egypt that the Sultan of that country and the Prince's mother also wish that Prince Djem be handed over to His Majesty the King."

V. Fraknoi, *Egy pápai követ Mátyás udvarában*. Budapest: [n.pub.], 1901; p.42. Quoted in: L. Tardy, *Beyond the Ottoman Empire: 14th-16th-century Hungarian diplomacy in the east*. (Trans.) J. Boris. Szeged: Universitas Szegediensis de Attila József Nominata, 1978; p. 106, N.3.

84 Donado da Lezze, *Historia Turchesca (1300-1514)*. (Sometimes attributed to Giovanni Maria Angioiello). (Publicată, adnotată, împreună cu o introducere) I. Ursu. Bucureşti: Editiunea Academiei Romane, 1909; esp. pp. 164-183. See also Ursu's comments in his "Introducere", pp. ix-xviii on Giovanni Maria Angioiello and pp. xviii-xxv on Donado da Lezze. For further points of interest on the role of the *yeniçeris* in the fraternal struggle, consider the comments of Christophoro Richerio Thorigneo Senone, described as "Cubicularia Regio et Cancellario Franciae e secretis":

"Baiazethi & Gemmae, vel vt quibusdam placet, zizimo paterna haereditas gravissimi belli causa fevit. Orta nimirū in Turcis repētina controversia, siliorum vtri potius patris honores atque insignia deferrent: in id ventum est factionis vt sanguine clariores Zizimum Imperatorem, Ianizari Baiazethem exposcerent. Accidit igitur in hac animorum discordia, vt hi inuitis nobilioribus, in absentia Baiazethis Corcuthem eius filium pusione in aui sede collocarent: & absentis patris loco, Imperatore paruulum vrbi talibus auspiciis falutandū proponerent, innocato insinuatoque populariter Baiazethis nomine."

C.R.T. Senone, *De rebus Turcaru: ad Franciscum Gallorum Regum Christianis*. Paris: Rob. Stephani, Hebraicarum & Latinarum Lierarum Regii, 1540: pp.35-36.

An example of the means employed by Bayezid II to reward his *yeniçeris* is a *ferman* of 1484, reproduced by İnalçık, which abolished rents for all *kuls* at that time in his service living in the capital: H. İnalçık, "The policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek population of Istanbul and the Byzantine buildings of the city", pp. 231-249 in *Dunbarton Oaks papers, 23/24*. Washington D.C.: Dunbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1969-1970; see pp. 245-246 and N.76-78.

85 These *kul* (*devşirme*)-origin Grand Vezirs and their duration in office are as follows:

Name	Duration in office	
İshak Paşa	1481-1483	1481-1482
Davud Paşa	1483-1496	1482-1497
Hersekkzâde Ahmed Paşa	1497-1498	1497-1498
(three times)	1503-1506	1503-1506
	1511	1511
Mesih Paşa	1499-1501	1499-1501
Hadım Ali Paşa	1501-1503	1501-1503
(twice)	1506-1511	1506-1511
Koca Mustafa Paşa	1511-1512	1511-1512

Information is drawn from: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, pp. 525-530. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 5, pp. 11-13, where the dates in some cases differ, as indicated in the extreme right-hand column. I use these authoritative works although some further slight variation in the dates does occur in other studies.

86 Information is drawn from: S. Tansel, *Sultan II. Bayezid'in siyasi hayatı*. İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1966; and V.J. Parry, "The Ottoman Empire, 1481-1520", Vol.I, pp. 395-419 in *The new Cambridge modern history*. Cambridge: The University Press, 1957-1970. 14 vols; and esp. M.C.Ş. Tekindağ, "II. Bayezid devrinde Çukurova'da nüfuz mücadelesi: ilk Osmanlı

Mamlûklu savařları, 1485–1491”, *Belleten*, XXXI:123 (Temmuz) 1967, pp.345–373.

Andrea Gritti, Venetian *bailie* in İstanbul, makes the following comments in a report dated 2 December 1503:

“... le Grand Seigneur [Bayezid II] a commencé à s'occuper de la réforme de son armée. Il attribue à son manque de discipline les défaites que lui ont fait éprouver les mamelouks d'Egypte: il a augmenté le nombre des Janissaires et il a pris les mesures nécessaires pour que les autres troupes fussent pourvues d'armes offensives d'une forme meilleure que celles dont elles avaient l'habitude de se servir. Il a fait des dépenses considérables pour l'artillerie, à fin de pouvoir la transporter partout et la faire servir par des gens expérimentés; il a mis un ordre admirable dans la cavalerie, et des gens de pied et de cheval ainsi que les marins de la flotte sont rassemblés avec une promptitude qui lui a permis de réaliser les choses merveilleuses dont nous avons été les témoins.”

in T.S. Cantacasin, *Petit traité de l'origine des Turcs*. (Publié et annoté) C. Schefer. Paris: Ernest Leroux, Editeur, 1896; p. XXXVIII and pp. LX–LXI.

The extent of the post-reform build-up of Ottoman armaments during the first two decades of the 16th century, in terms of naval aid to the Mamluks, in artillery as well as money, manpower and other materials, is reviewed in: P. Brummett, “Kemal Re'is and Ottoman gunpowder diplomacy”, pp. 1–15 in S. Deringil and S. Kunalalp (eds.), *Studies on Ottoman diplomatic history V*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1990. This, in the wider context of the development of Ottoman seapower towards political and mercantile hegemony from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, is also taken up in: P. Brummett, *Ottoman seapower and Levantine diplomacy in the age of discovery*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

- 87 The word *Kızılbaş* denotes the red head-covering which they wore as members of semi-political Shī'ite (*Şiî*) sects in Anatolia. See: “KIZIL-BAS”, *İ.A.*, Cilt VI, pp.789–795. Also: I. Melikoff, “Le problème kızılbaz”, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, pp.49–67. For a brief summary from a more general perspective, see: W.E.D. Allen, *Problems of Turkish power in the sixteenth century*. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1963; pp. 10–12 and esp.N.30 and N.31 (pp.45–47). In addition to economic and political pressures, the attraction of such sects for the peasantry by virtue of their relaxed, mystical and syncretist nature is attested in: “BEKTAŞ. HACI BEKTAŞ VELÎ”, *İ.A.*, Cilt II, pp. 461–464. Cf., a specific study: A. Gökalp, *Têtes Rouges et Bouches Noires: une confrérie tribale de l'ouest anatolien*. Paris: Société d'Ethnographie, 1980; pp. 69–76 and pp. 175ff; and, more widely: S. Faroqui, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien (vom späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert bis 1826)*. Wien: Verlag des Institutes für Orientalistik der Universität Wien, 1981; and K. Kehl-Bodrogi, *Die Kızılbaş/Aleviten: Untersuchungen über eine esoterische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Anatolien*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1988.

- 88 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, pp. 225–227. Cf., H. Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, *Der Islam*, 41 (October) 1965, pp. 95–223; with F. Sümer, *Safevi devletinin kuruluşu ve gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin rolü*. Selçuklu Tarih ve Medeniyeti Enstitüsü Yayınları, Tarih Dizisi:2. Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1976; esp. pp. 20ff. Also, for religious policies in general, see: I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La règne de Selim 1er: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'Empire Ottoman”, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, pp. 34–48. Cf., A. Allouche, *The origins and development of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict (906–962/1500–1555)*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983; pp. 94ff.

- 89 On this point, an examination and assessment based on Ottoman sources is found in: M. Cezar, *Osmanlı tarihinde levendler*, esp. pp. 156–160. For somewhat more detailed examination, see: D. Petrović, “Fire-arms in the Balkans on the eve of and after the Ottoman conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries”, pp. 164–194 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*.
- 90 Information on the Ottoman adoption of firearms and changes in warfare is drawn from: “BARUD”, *E.I.2*, Vol.I, pp. 1061–1066; “HARB”, *E.I.2*, Vol.III, pp. 190–194; and also D. Petrović, *Fire-arms in the Balkans on the eve of and after the Ottoman conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries*, esp. pp. 174–178 and pp. 186–188.
- 91 Ç. Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim nasıl padişah oldu”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi*, VI:9 (Mart) 1954, pp. 53–90, and VII:10 (Eylül) 1954, pp. 117–142. Also, in general: S. Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*. Ankara: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1969; and “SELİM I”, *İ.A.*, Cilt X, pp. 423–434. For a wider perspective, see: A. Uğur, *The reign of Sultan Selim I in the light of the Selim-nâme literature*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985; pp. 190–204.
- 92 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, pp. 236–238. And Ahmed himself appears to have given a written promise to the yayas in December 1512, swearing to do everything they demanded in return for their support. Document, reproduced in full and in facsimile, in: Z. Orgun, “Şehzade Ahmed’in yayalara verdiği ahidname”, *Tarih vesikaları*, II:9 (İlkteşrin) 1942, pp. 166–167. Moreover, the third brother, Korkud (d.1513), was eliminated from the throne in accordance with the desires of the *yenîçeris*. See: “KORKUD b. BAYEZİD. Abu'l Khayr Muhammad”, *E.I.2*, Vol.V, p. 269; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *II. Bayezid'in oğullarından Sultan Korkut*, esp. pp. 545ff.
- 93 Feridun Ahmed Bey, *Mecmu'a-i münşeat-î Selâtin*, Cilt I, pp. 351–353; and also reproduced in part in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 249. Further: M.C.Ş. Tekindağ, “Yeni kaynak ve vesikaların ışığı altında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran seferi”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi*, XXII:22 (Mart) 1967, pp. 49–78; and C.H. Imber, “The persecution of the Ottoman Shī'ites according to the muhimme defterleri: 1565–1585”, *Der Islam*, 56:2 (Juli) 1979, pp. 245–273, esp. p. 250.
- 94 Mustafa [b. Ahmed 'Abd al-Mevla Çelebi] Âli, *Künh-ü'l-ahbâr ve lakh-ü'l-efkâr*. [İstanbul]: Takvimhane-i Âmire, 1277–1285. 5 cilt. Unpublished Cilt I, p. 259, in Uzunçarşılı's private possession. Paraphrased in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 248.
- 95 Mustafa Âli, *Künh-ü'l-ahbâr ve lakh-ü'l-efkâr*, Cilt I, p. 273, in İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 263. Moreover, the *kul*-origin Grand Vezir, Dükakinzâde Ahmed Paşa (January–March 1515) had already been charged with the above-mentioned offences and executed after two months in office. *ibid.*, p. 264. On the annexation of Dûlkâdir province, see: “DÜLKADIRLILAR”, *İ.A.*, Cilt III, pp. 654–662.
- 96 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 264; and, on this particular change, see: Ahmed Djébad Bey, *Etat militaire ottoman depuis la fondation de l'Empire jusqu'à nos jours*. Tome I, Livre 1: Le corps des Janissaires depuis sa création jusqu'à sa suppression. (Traduit) G. Macrides. [İstanbul]: Imp.du Journal “La Turquie”, 1882; pp. 36–39 and pp. 48–54, esp. p. 51.
- 97 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 292. Cf., H. İnalçık, *Osmanlı padişahı*; and also F. Sümer, “Yavuz Selim s'est-il proclamé Calife?”, *Turcica*, XXI–XXIII, 1991, pp. 343–354.

A view of the Ottoman Empire at this time, within the wider context of observers in Christendom, is found in: M. Kortepeter, “The Turkish question

in the era of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517)", pp. 155–178 in D.P. Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic civilization, presented to Niyazi Berkes*. Leiden: Brill, 1976.

Two contemporary references are, I think, particularly significant here. On 18 June 1517, Leonardo Bembo, Venetian *bailie* in İstanbul, wrote from Pera of Selim I that "... questo Signor turco e signor del monde; pero estote parati". M. Sanuto, *Diarii*. (ed.) F. Stefani, G. Berchet e N. Barozzi. Venezia: [n.pub.], 1886–1901. 59 vols. Vol. XXIV, p. 506. Quoted in: K.M. Setton, "Pope Leo X and the Turkish peril", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CXIII, 1969, pp. 367–424, p. 391. Exactly one year later, another Venetian *bailie* in İstanbul, Alvise Mocenigo, wrote in a communication to his Government that Selim I "... legge la vita di Alessandro Magno, e vuol imitarlo; spera esser signor del mondo, con Africa, Asia, Europa, sotto di se". E. Alberi (racolte, annotate ed edite), *Le relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*. Firenze: Società Editore Fiorentina, 1840–1863. 3 series. Series III, Vol. 3, 1855; pp. 53–54.

- 98 The enhanced position of the Sultan appeared as the enunciation of the "personality principle" in the state concept by means of the assessment of the concomitant increase of Sultanic power analogous to Sultanic personality. The perception of Ottoman sovereignty was becoming more autocratic and abstract in the Empire, which was gradually becoming more universal, while, in parallel, the person of the ruler was beginning to acquire a superhuman stature. This, as will be indicated later, was to have repercussions during a period of general decline which appeared to correspond to the decline of Sultanic personalities. Secondly, increased Sultanic powers were reflected in his assumption of the legislative power which now appeared to be recognized by the *şeriat*. Among the *ulema*, *Şeyhülislâm* Kemalpaşazâde (İbn Kemal, d.1536) made it clear in a *fetva* which he gave concerning the matter of a slave (*köle*) transaction that the ruler possessed superior power. In the *fetva*, he said "... canonically [*şer'an*] it is not lawful and also it is forbidden on the part of the Sultan". And the *Maruzat* of *Şeyhülislâm* Ebu Suud Efendi (d.1574) formed a highly significant collection of *fetvas*, in effect legislating *kanun*, which blended *şeriat* and *kanun* so as to provide ultimate Sultanic authority. H. Gerber, *State, society, and law in Islam: Ottoman law in comparative perspective*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994; pp. 88ff.

Thus, the Sultan was clearly recognized as the supreme defender of the customary (consuetudinary) law (*örf-i hukuk*). This boundless power in the field of public law gave the Sultan a direct right of disposition over the lives and properties of his subjects. R. Anhegger-H. İnalçık, *Kânunnâme-i Sultân-i ber müceb-i örf-i Osmanî*, p. X and N.11. Also see: H. İnalçık, *Osmanlı hukukuna giriş*, esp. p. 104. Cf., A. Demir, "Kanunî Sultân Süleyman'ın Terk-i Salât edenlerle ilgili fermânı", *Ege Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi*, II, 1984, pp. 46–53; "ÖRF", *İ.A.*, Cilt X, p. 480; and Ö.L. Barkan, "Türkiye'de din ve devlet ilişkilerinin tarihsel gelişimi", pp. 49–97 in *Cumhuriyetin 50. yıldönümü semineri: seminare sunulan bildiriler*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.71. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1975; esp. pp. 51–56. Further: U. Heyd, *Studies in old Ottoman criminal law*. (Ed.) V.L. Ménage. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973; esp.see p. 187.

- 99 For example, the Sultan's effective control of his professional soldiery (*kapu halkı*), extending to the field during the Egyptian campaign (e.g., Merc-i Dabık), is to be found in a contemporary source: S. Tansel, "Silâhşor'un Feth-Nâme-i diyâr-ı Arab adlı eseri", *Tarih vesikaları*, Yeni Seri, I:2, 17 (Ocak) 1958, pp.294–320.

- 100 At the battle of Mohács against Hungary in 1526 and during the first siege of Vienna, the Hapsburg capital, in 1529, the total number of *yeniçeri* corps is given as 12,000 in: Lûtfi Paşa, *Tevarih-i Âl-i Osman*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1341; pp. 326–327. Cf. two military analyses: Şeref, *Mohaç meydan muharebesi, 1526: Türk-Macar seferi*. İstanbul: Askerî Matbaa, 1930; and A. Savaşkurt, *Tarihinin eski seferlerinden birinci Viyana muhasarası [Kanunî Sultan Süleyman]*. İstanbul: Askerî Basımevi, 1946.

A contemporary source considered the *yeniçeris* from a military point of view as “. . . il vero nervo delle forze Turchesche”. P. Giovio, *Commentarii delle cose de Turchi (1531)*. Venezia: [n.pub.], 1541; 35r. Quoted in: V.J. Parry, “La manière de combattre”, pp. 218–256 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*, p. 222.

- 101 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, II, p. 408; and “SÜLEYMAN I”, *İ.A.*, Cilt XI, pp.99–155. Cf., Y. Öztuna, “Kanunî'nin Türk ve dünya tarihindeki yeri”, pp.41–46 in *Kanunî armağanı*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.55. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1970.

A perceptive contemporary, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, referring to obedience and discipline in the field, said of the Ottoman encampment: “. . . summum erat ubique silentium, summa quies, rixa nulla, nullum cujusquam insolens factum.” O. Ghiselin de Busbecq, *Omnia quae extant opera*. (Einleitung) R. Neck. Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1968; p. 234.

A similar observation is found in the comments of the French Ambassador, Gabriel d'Aramon, who visited the Ottoman army camp *en route* to Iran, in a report dated 8 July 1548 to his sovereign, Henri II:

“... la masse de son camp . . . est, par commune estimation, de trois cens mille hommes, . . . avec tel ordre et obéissance qui, veu la grande multitude, est quasi incroyable . . .”

Document, reproduced in full, in: E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848–1860. 4 tomes. Tome II, pp. 66–69, p.68. In addition, see: J. Paviot, “The French Embassy of d'Aramon to the Porte: scholars and travellers in the Levant, 1547–1553”, pp. 27–39 in S. Kuneralp (ed.), *Studies on Ottoman diplomatic history*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1987. Further evidence relating to the Ottoman military discipline, as opined in the French “travel literature” in the 16th century, is provided in: C.D. Rouillard, *The Turk in French history, thought and literature (1520–1660)*. Paris: Boivin et Cie., [1938?]; esp. pp. 292–295. Similarly, for the Venetian diplomatic sources, see: L. Valensi, *The birth of the despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte*. (Trans.) A. Denner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993; pp. 27–29.

- 102 For example, that “the soldiers are encouraged by the constant presence of the Sultan in the field”, is attested by a contemporary observer, René de Lucinge, in a treatise published in Paris in 1588. Quoted in: S.C. Chew, *The crescent and the rose: Islam and England during the Renaissance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937; pp. 115–116 and N.2.

- 103 H. İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 45. Also, in general: E. Aysan, *Kıbrıs seferi (1570–1571)*. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları, Seri 2, IIIüncü Cilt, 3üncü Kısım ek. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1971.

- 104 In fact, Selim II's official enthronement occurred some six weeks prior to this incident. On the death of his father, Süleyman I, during his last conquest – the siege of Szigetvár (5 August–7 September 1566) in Austria – on 6 September 1566, the Grand Vezir, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, concealed the fact and secretly sent word to Selim, then Governor in the *Sancak* of Kütahya. Selim hastened to İstanbul, acceded to the throne on 24 September and travelled to Belgrade

to join the Grand Vezir and the forces now returning to İstanbul from the "successful campaign". All the events narrated here are described fully by an eye-witness, the contemporary historian Mustafa Efendi (Selânikî), who was in the campaign: Mustafa Efendi (Selânikî), *Tarih-i Selânikî*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1281; pp. 64-74. (Unpublished part: Esat Efendi - Süleymaniye - Kütüphanesi. Yazma sa. 2259:34a); and are found, in summary form, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. Cilt III, Kısım 1 (II. Selim'in tahta çıkışından 1699 Karlofça andlaşmasına kadar). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16/3. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1951. [Hereafter, İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1]; pp. 1-5, with his references.

An analysis of Selânikî's treatment of the "The Military" is given in: M. İpşirli, "Mustafa Selânikî and his history", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü dergisi*, IX, 1978, pp. 417-472, esp. pp. 458-460. Cf., "SELİM II", İ.A., Cilt X, pp. 434-441.

It is noteworthy that the Venetian *bailie*, Gianfrancesco Morosini, writing in 1585, seems to have taken this as the usual practice, most probably with the much publicized accession of Selim II in mind:

"... in fact, whichever of the sons can first enter the royal compound in Constantinople is called the sultan and is obeyed by the people and by the army. Since he has control of his father's treasure he can easily gain the favour of the Janissaries and with their help control the rest of the army and the civilians."

Report quoted, in part, in: J.C. Davis (ed. and trans.), *Pursuit of power: Venetian ambassadors' reports on Spain, Turkey and France in the age of Philip II, 1560-1600*. New York: Torchbook Library, 1970; pp. 125-155, p. 127.

- 105 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, p. 40. In this respect, wrote Lorenzo Bernardo, the Venetian *bailie*, in 1592:

"Sultan Selim [III], the father of the present Grand Signor, was the first to hold that a king or emperor's real satisfaction is not to be found in brave deeds on the field of glory but in peace and quiet, in gratifying all his physical senses, in enjoying the pleasures and comforts of the seraglios in the company of women and jesters, and treating himself to jewels, palaces, loggias, and every other human creation his heart desires. Sultan Murad [III] has followed his father's example - in fact, he has gone further, because at least Sultan Selim occasionally left the seraglio and hunted as far away as Adrianople, but the present Grand Signor ... hardly ever goes out."

Report reproduced, in part, in: J.C. Davis, *Pursuit of power: Venetian ambassadors' reports on Spain, Turkey and France in the age of Philip II, 1560-1600*, pp.156-166, p. 164

- 106 Cf.,

"It seems that the turning point in this respect was the 'Long War' of 1593-1606, during which the Ottomans were overcome by the Imperialist [sic] armies now fully equipped with up-to-date fire-arms."

H. İnalcık, "The socio-political effects of the diffusion of fire-arms in the Middle East", pp. 195-217 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*, p. 210.

For example, as also quoted by İnalcık (*ibid.*, p. 199), Lala Mehmed Paşa, in a report (*telhis*) drawn up for submission to the Sultan, Mehmed III, admitted that against Austrian infantry

“... in the field or during a siege we are in a distressed position, because the greater part of the enemy forces are infantry armed with muskets, while the majority of our forces are horsemen and we have very few specialists skilled in the musket ... so the *tüfeng-endaz* [musketeer] Janissaries, under their *agha*, must join the imperial army promptly.”

(İnalcık's translation) in: C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı tarihine âid belgeler: telhisler (1597-1607)*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:1511. İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1970; belge no. 81, pp. 71-72. Also see: M. İlgürel, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ateşli silâhların yayılışı”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi* (Ord.Prof.İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı hatıra sayısı), XXXII (Mart) 1979, pp. 301-318; and M. Heppner, “Der lange Türkenkrieg (1593-1606) – ein Wendepunkt im habsburgisch-osmanischen Gegensatz”, *Osmanlı araştırmaları*, II, 1981, pp. 133-146.

A contemporary, Hasan Kâfi el-Akhisarî, in his “Usulü'l-hikem fi nizâmî'l-âlem” (1596), allocated the whole of the third section to a discussion, on the basis of 50 years' personal experience in Croatia, of the need for increased development and use of firearms in order to match “... our more technically-advanced enemies”: M. İpşirli, *Hasan Kâfi el-Akhisarî ve devlet düzenine ait eseri – 'Usulü'l-hikem fi nizâmî'l-âlem'*, esp. pp. 267-271.

- 107 [Mustafa] Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey risalesi*. (Eseri bulup tahşiye eden) A.K. Aksüt. İstanbul: Vakıf Matbaası, 1939; p. 27; and *ibid.*, pp. 3-15, for Aksüt's introduction on Koçi Bey and his “Risale”, together with: M.Ç. Uluçay, “Koçi Bey'in Sultan İbrahim'e takdim ettiği risale ve arzları”, pp. 177-199 in *Zeki Velidî Togan'a armağan/Sybolae in honorem Z.V. Togan*. İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1950-1955. Also, on the numbers, see: K. Rohrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, p. 78, N.128. Also see, for an astute explanation and figures for the general increase in the numbers of *kapıkulus*: H. İnalcık, “Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI, 1980, pp. 283-337, pp. 288ff. and esp. p. 289, N.14.

- 108 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 614.

- 109 Mustafa Efendi (Selânikî), *Tarih-i Selânikî*, yazma sa. 2259:266b. Cited in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 614. On the enthronement of Mehmed III, the number was slightly more than 26,000, as indicated in Selânikî, increasing to more than 30,000 in 1597, 35,000 in 1598 and reaching 37,627 in 1609. Also: *ibid.*, pp. 614ff. for further references. Cf., K. Rohrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, p. 78, N.128.

- 110 It should, however, be noted that the value of *sipahis*, from the military point of view, had been reduced since the 1570s. This became apparent from their increasing losses in the battlefield and, consequently, their tendency to abandon the theatre of war because of their recognition of the superior firepower of the enemy. The point is made, in view of the heavy *sipahi* losses during the Cyprus expedition, by the historian İbrahim Peçevi: İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1281-1283. 2 cilt. Cilt I, p. 496. Cf., Mustafa Nuri, *Netâyic ül-vukuât*, Cilt III-IV, pp. 124-125.

Yet the fact that there were included, during this expedition, Anatolian nomads armed with muskets (*tüfeng, tüfek*) “... demonstrates how widely this weapon had spread over the country [i.e., amongst the *reaya*]", as asserted by: H. İnalcık, *The socio-political effects of the diffusion of fire-arms in the Middle East*, p. 197. Cf., R.C. Jennings, “Firearms, bandits and gun-control: some evidence on Ottoman policy towards firearms in the possession of *reaya*, from judicial records of Kayseri, 1600-1627”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI, 1980, pp.339-358. It may also support a further assertion: that is, the perception

- by the government of the increased military importance of infantry armed with firearms over the cavalry. Hence the sanctioning of the employment of mostly self-armed *reaya* to this end and thus, paradoxical though it may appear, the countenancing and even encouragement of *reaya* carrying arms, despite its illegality and detrimental effect on the professional (i.e., *devşirme*-origin) corps. This point will later be considered simultaneously with the changing social conditions of Anatolia. The strict rule in the Empire not to allow *reaya*, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to bear weapons of any kind, and yet its infringement for both internal – e.g., the rebellion of Çelebi Bayezid (1535–1561), son of Süleyman I – and external – e.g., the impact of the Austrian infantry – reasons, are emphasised in H. İnalcık, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–197. In advancing my assertion I, too, have consulted the sources of H. İnalcık, *op. cit.*, loc.cit., and *Tarih-i Peçevi*, loc.cit.
- 111 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 48. Cf., “TİMAR”, *İ.A.*, Cilt XII, pp. 286–333. Indeed, more recent research on the western Anatolian district of Aydın indicates a dropping off in *timar* bestowals to provincial *sipahis*’ sons from a peak of c.63% of the total during Süleyman I’s reign to fewer than 10% by 1611: D.A. Howard, “Central and provincial administrative interaction in *timar* bestowals in the early seventeenth century”, pp. 81–87 in C.E. Farah (ed.), *Decision making and change in the Ottoman Empire*. Kirksville, Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993.
- 112 [Mustafa] Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey risalesi*, p. 41. The actual number is given as 46,113.
- 113 The annual payment figures for the total number of *kapıkulu* troops are provided in: M. Cezar, *Osmanlı tarihinde levendler*, p. 167. Further, see: C. Finkel, *The administration of warfare: the Ottoman military campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606*. Wien: Verband der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs, 1988; pp. 67–109, where the need for ready cash and the various mechanisms of cash payments to the different kinds of soldiery are examined in great detail. The wider significance of this issue has recently been queried by: S. Faroqui, “Crisis and change, 1590–1699”, pp. 413–636 in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, p. 467.
- 114 That Sokollu Mehmed Paşa was well placed to make predictions is attested by the contemporary historian, Mustafa Âli, who describes him as “the actual ruler” (*padişah-ı ma’nevî*): C.H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600)*, p. 53. (Fleischer’s translation used here).
- 115 İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*. Cilt II, p. 36. The overall impact of the wars with Iran is assessed along these lines in: R. Murphey, “The construction of a fortress at Mosul in 1631: a case study of an important facet of Ottoman military expenditure”, pp. 163–178 in O. Okyar and H. İnalcık (eds.), *Türkiye’nin sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi (1071–1920): “Birinci Uluslararası Türkiye’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi Kongresi” tebliğleri*, Hacettepe University, Ankara, July 11–13, 1977. Ankara: Meteksan, 1980; esp. pp. 168–169. See, in general: B. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran siyasi münasebetleri*, I:1578–1590. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:888. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1962.
- 116 Mustafa Efendi (Selânikî), *Tarih-i Selânikî*, yazma sa. 2259:126. Quoted in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, II, p. 201. Some suggestions as to why peasants tended not to rebel but rather to desert their farms are presented by: K. Barkey, *Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994; p. 90 and pp. 146–151.
- 117 Cf.,

"... the most important region of hired *tüfeng-endaz* soldiers was Asia-Minor ... these soldiers who were best known under the name of *sekbān* ... became indispensable to the Ottoman army".

H. İnalcık, *The socio-political effects of the diffusion of fire-arms in the Middle East*, p. 200. Also: H. İnalcık, *Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700*, pp. 292-294.

For a discussion of the need to increase the salaried infantry troops, in particular, and of the inclusion in these of greater numbers of *reaya*, at the cost of tax-paying labour on the land, see: C. Finkel, *The administration of warfare: the Ottoman military campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*, pp. 35-46. For the *levendat* and related terms, see: M. Sertoğlu, *Osmanlı tarih lügatı*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1986.

- 118 For further evidence on this point, as particularly applied to "state executions" in the exercise of Sultanic power over the *askerî*, see: A. Mumcu, *Osmanlı devletinde siyaseten katl*, pp. 71ff. The general implications of the practice of admitting free-born Muslims into the *askerî* are discussed in: N. Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth century Ottoman realities", *Studia Islamica*, XVI, 1962, pp. 73-94; and, far more extensively, based on the personal observations of the historian, Mustafa Âli: C.H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, pp. 155-159.

- 119 These are summarized in: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 43-50; and enumerated in: H. İnalcık, "Land problems in Turkish history", *The Muslim world*, 45, 1955, pp. 221-228, pp. 224-225. Cf., B. McGowan, *Economic life in Ottoman Europe: taxation, trade and the struggle for land, 1600-1800*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; pp. 45-56. Analysis of such changes is found in: Ö.L. Barkan, *XV. ve XVI. asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda zirai ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları*; and Ö.L. Barkan, "Quelques observations sur l'organisation économique et sociale des villes ottomans, des XVe et XVIe siècles", *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, VII (La ville:2) 1955, pp. 289-311. The reasons for social dislocations, particularly economic and political dislocations, are neatly summarized in: R.A. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the modern state: the Ottoman Empire, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991; pp. 11ff. The fiscal system is analyzed in: H. İnalcık, *Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700*, pp. 311-337.

In developing the circumstances of the gold/silver exchange in the 16th century, Barkan has, in a later article, argued that the price revolution was the most pressing fiscal problem facing the Ottoman Empire at this time: Ö.L. Barkan, "The price revolution of the sixteenth century: a turning point in the economic history of the Near East", (trans.) J. McCarthy, *International journal of Middle East studies*, 6:1 (January) 1975, pp. 3-28 and esp. pp. 19ff. on the effects of increased military expenditure. Indeed, cf., H. Gerber, "The monetary system of the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of the economic and social history of the Orient*, XXV:III (October) 1982, pp. 308-324, esp. pp. 316ff. Also see: R.W. Olson, "The sixteenth-century price revolution and its effects on the Ottoman Empire and on Ottoman-Safavid relations", *Acta Orientalia*, 37, 1976, pp. 45-55; and B. McGowan, *op. cit.*, pp. 56ff.

A survey of the debate over the effects of New World silver and the price revolution is presented by: Ş. Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1328-1914", pp. 947-985 in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 959-961.

- 120 [Mustafa] Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey risalesi*, p. 48. Also quoted in: B. Lewis, "Ottoman

observers of Ottoman decline", pp. 199–213 in B. Lewis, *Islam in history: ideas, men and events in the Middle East*. London: Alcove Press, 1973; p. 206. (Lewis's translation used here).

The successor to Murad IV, İbrahim I (1640–1648), was also presented with a memorandum in, as I understand, the first year of his reign, by his Grand Vezir, Kemankuş Kara Mustafa Paşa (1638–1644). In it, the Paşa appears to have pleaded specifically that:

"What, at the moment, is absolutely necessary for my compassionate Sultan to do is to abolish the unreasonable taxes on the *reaya* . . . [so that] the *reaya* may have a degree of release. The situation of the *reaya* is very grievous. Command one of your *vezir kuls* to send good, god-fearing Muslims [i.e., tax-collectors] throughout the imperial dominions to survey the land fairly, and let the [burden of] oppression be lifted from the *reaya* [. . . *reaya* üzerinden zulüm kalksun] . . ."

The document, reproduced in full, in: F.R. Unat, "Sadriazam Kemankuş Kara Mustafa Paşa lâyihası", *Tarih vesikaları*, I:6 (Nisan) 1942, pp. 443–480, pp. 447–474.

An important study of the effects upon the *reaya* of the crisis in financial and land administration following the 1580s (e.g., the fall in the value of silver) has been made by: H. İnalcık, "The Ottoman decline and its effects upon the *reaya*", pp. 338–354 in H. Birnbaum and S. Vryonis, Jr. (eds.), *Aspects of the Balkans: continuity and change*. The Hague: Mouton, 1972; esp. pp. 348–353.

- 121 See: M. Akdağ, *Türk halkının dirlik ve düzenlik kavgası*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975. This posthumously published work incorporates his *magnum opus*, *Celâli isyanları (1550–1603)*. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları:144. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963; and, in addition, has various papers on the subject. See esp. pp. 33–114 for a detailed study of the disequilibrium, and pp. 124ff. for solid examples, mainly based on *şer'îye* records.

Further, a study of the economic conditions of the mid-17th century and the consequent pressures on a particular individual, in this case Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Grand Vezir from 1653 to 1654, is made by: İ.M. Kunt, "Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and entrepreneur: a study in Ottoman political-economic theory and practice", *Turcica*, IX:1, 1977, pp. 197–214, esp. pp. 211ff. And a description of the intense suffering of the Anatolian populace is given in a contemporary anonymous work: *Ahvâl-ı celâliyan*, Esad Efendi – Süleymaniye – Kütüphanesi, yazma sa. 2236:5b. Quoted in: M. Ülgürel, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ateşli silâhların yayılışı*, p. 309.

A detailed overview of provincial economic and political conditions at all levels, within the context of state centralization policies, is found in: K. Barkey, *Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization*. However, cf. the comment of: B. McGowan, "The age of the ayans, 1699–1812", pp. 639–758 in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*, p. 644.

- 122 M. Akdağ, *Türk halkının dirlik ve düzenlik kavgası*, p. 325. Arguably the best explanation of the uprisings is to be found in this work: pp. 153–207 on the *suhtes* and their involvement; pp. 225–254 on other *askerî* groups, mainly the *timarlı sipahis*; and pp. 283ff. on the struggle between the *reaya* and the *ehl-i örf*. Also see: K. Barkey, *Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization*, esp. pp. 141–228.

The documents relating to the famous Turkish Anatolian folk hero, Köroğlu, epitomize the point made here: F. Sümer, "Kör Oğlu, Kızır Oğlu Mustafa ve

- Demirci Oğlu ile ilgili vesikalar”, *Türk dünyası araştırmaları*, 46 (Şubat) 1987, pp.9-46.
- Also see, on “The Sekban-Janissary rivalry”: H. İnalcık, *Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700*, pp. 297-299.
- According to a local historian of Amasya, the *celâli* agitation was an open revolt by the Turkish population of Anatolia against the corrupt administration of the Ottoman government, which had fallen into the hands of the *devşirme*: H. Hüsameddin, *Amasya tarihi*. İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1928. 7 cilt. Esp. Cilt 3, pp. 348-375. In a more specifically economic argument, İslamoğlu-İnan confirms burgeoning peasant antipathy to the provincial “privileged class”: H. İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and peasant in the Ottoman Empire: agrarian power relations and regional economic development in Ottoman Anatolia during the sixteenth century*. Leiden: Brill, 1994; pp. 243-244.
- 123 Mustafa Na’imâ, *Tarihi-i Na’imâ: (Ravzat-ü'l-hüseyin fi hulâsat-ı ahbâr-ı'l-hafikeyn*. [İstanbul]: [Matbaa-i Âmire], 1281-1283. 6 cilt. Cilt I, esp. p. 165.
- 124 M. Akdağ, *Türk halkının dirlik ve düzenlik kavgası*, esp. pp. 371-376 and pp.376ff. on the emergence of Karayazıcı. Cf., W.J. Griswold, *The great Anatolian rebellion, 1000-1020/1591-1611*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983; esp. pp. 24ff. More recently: K. Barkey, *Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization*, pp. 204-206.
- 125 Cf., “MURAD PAŞA KUYUCU”, İ.A., Cilt VIII, pp. 651-654; “AHMED I”, İ.A., Cilt I, pp. 161-164; and M. Ülgürel, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ateşli silâhlarm yayılışı*, pp. 309-310. For details, see: W.J. Griswold, *The great Anatolian rebellion, 1000-1020/1591-1611*, pp. 136ff. and passim.
- 126 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 51. Cf., for example, A.K. Rafeq, “Changes in the relationship between the Ottoman central administration and the Syrian provinces from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries”, pp. 53-73 in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in eighteenth-century Islamic history*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977; esp. pp. 59-62; and Y. Yücel, *XVI-XVII. yüzyıllarda Osmanlı idarî yapısında taşra ümerasının yerine dair düşünceler*, pp. 496ff.
- 127 H. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic society and the West: a study of the impact of Western civilization on Moslem culture in the Near East*. Vol.I, Parts 1-2. London: Oxford University Press, 1950-1957; Vol.I/1, p. 180.
- 128 For instance, according to İnalcık, the Grand Vezir’s loss of independence, with certain exceptions, was the main cause of the political crisis of the first half of the 17th century. Subsequently, however, with the removal of effective government from the Palace to the Grand Vezir’s residence, the *Vezirs* of the Imperial Council (i.e., the *Kadıasker*, the *Kaptan Paşa*, the *Nişancı* and the *Defterdar*) passed into the background as three officers directly in the service of the Grand Vezir came to the fore (i.e., the *Kahyabey*, the *Reis-ül-küttab* and the *Reis Efendi*, who all enjoyed the status of Vezir after the 1720s). H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 99ff. For a detailed commentary, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilâtı*, pp. 214-267, pp. 325-337 and pp.414-420.
- 129 [Mustafa] Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey risalesi*, pp. 44-46. Cf., more generally, K.H. Karpat, *Structural change, historical stages of modernization and the role of social groups in Turkish politics*, p. 37. For a closer analysis, see: R.A. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the modern state: the Ottoman Empire, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries*, pp. 17-18, pp. 20-23, pp. 29-40 and pp. 79-89.
- 130 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 508. The author also provides supportive examples on pp. 508-509. However, the contemporary social setting is best described in the five works (*Hamse*) of the poet, Nev’îzâde Atâyî (d.1636).

See: T. Kortantamer, "17. yüzyıl şairi Atâyî'nin Hamse'sinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun görüntüsü", *Ege Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih incelemeleri dergisi*, I, 1983, pp. 61-105.

- 131 After the return of his forces, in January 1622, from the unsuccessful Polish campaigns, Osman II's reformative thoughts on his soldiery also seem to have been provoked by his influential *Dâr-üs-saâde Ağası* (Master of the Abode of Felicity), Süleyman Ağâ:

"His *kuls*, that is the *yeniçeris*, pull the strings where our Sultan is concerned . . . [In fact] . . . these *kul yeniçeris* have exceeded what is expected of them as *kuls*."

Hüseyin Tuğî, *İbretnûma*. Reproduced, in full, in: M. Sertoğlu, "Tuğî tarihi", *Belleten*, XI:43 (Temmuz) 1947, pp. 489-514 (the text: pp. 493-514), p. 493. Cf., "OSMAN II", *İ.A.*, Cilt IX, pp. 443-448. Indeed, a book of reforms (*Kitab-i müstetâb*), produced during the second year of the reign of Osman II, lays particular emphasis on the loss of order within the military. See: Y. Yücel, *Osmanlı devlet düzenine ait metinler, I: Kitab-i müstetâb*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974.

- 132 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 61. "MUSTAFA I", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 692-695, likewise provides some examples of succession by seniority. Yet there was no formal regulation governing the succession to the throne until the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876.

- 133 H. İnalcık, "The nature of traditional society: B. Turkey", pp. 42-63 in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; p. 46. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, p. 170. Also see: *ibid.*, pp. 154-174, from which the historical information on the situation in Anatolia and the war with Iran is taken. In addition: Mustafa Na'imâ, *Tarih-i Na'imâ*, Cilt II, pp. 318-324; and "HÜSREV PAŞA", *İ.A.*, Cilt V, pp. 606-609.

- 134 The historical information is based upon: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 182-190. Cf., Mustafa Na'imâ, *Tarih-i Na'imâ*, Cilt III, pp. 99-113. Also see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, II, pp. 203-204; and cf., "MURAD IV", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 625-647.

- 135 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 191-198. Cf., Mustafa Na'imâ, *Tarih-i Na'imâ*, Cilt III, pp. 160-164; and the comments of Mustafa Nuri, *Netâ'ic ül-vukuât*, Cilt I-II, pp. 296-297.

Uzunçarşılı has elsewhere reproduced an *arıza* (letter) of the Grand Vezir, *Tabanıyassı* Mehmed Paşa (1632-1637), a reading of which indicates that the underlying aim of the tobacco prohibition was to exert Sultanlic authority, hence to control the *kapıkulu* soldiery, for it is indeed with regard to this aspect that the Grand Vezir has reservations over the enforcement of the prohibition. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihinde gizli kalmış veya şüphe ile örtülü bazı olaylar ve bu hususa dair vesikalar*.

- 136 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 193-194; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. III.Cilt, Kısım 2 (XVI. yüzyıl ortalarından XVII. yüzyıl sonuna kadar). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16c2. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1954. [Hereafter, İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/2]; pp. 275-276. Also see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 615; "MURAD IV", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 625-647; "DEVSHİRME", in M.Th. Houtsma [et al.] (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leiden: Brill, and London: Luzac, 1913-1934. 4 vols. in 8. [Hereafter, *E.I.I*]; Vol.I, pp. 952-953; and cf., "DEVSHİRME", *E.I.2*, Vol.II, pp. 210-213.

- 137 That well-known observer of the Ottoman realm, Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682), commented in his *Seyahatnâme* that: ". . . following [the death of] Sultan

Murad Han, the *kul[s]* had started to fidget and to behave aggressively toward the Grand *Vezir* . . .”. Evliya Çelebi, *Gördüklerim*. (Seçen ve açıklamalar yapan) M.N. Özön. İstanbul: İnkilâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1976. 2 cilt. Cilt 1, p. 14.

- 138 In fact, in the classical Ottoman age (i.e., 1300–1600), it was by no means easy or common for someone of *reaya* status to enter the *askerî*; this required a special decree (*berat*) from the Sultan which was rarely granted. In order to achieve this distinction, a peasant either needed certain connections within the *askerî* or had to have fought as a volunteer in the Sultan’s campaigns or on the frontier. Therefore, those who gained *askerî* status by such means, as opposed to those with hereditary *askerî* status, were granted tax exemptions and joined the class known as exempted *reaya*. This summary is taken almost verbatim from: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 69. Also see: H. İnalcık, *Osmanlılarda raiyyet rüsumu*.

The normative balance in Ottoman classical economic thought and practice, and the process of its loss, is best explained in: A.G. Sayar, *Osmanlı iktisat düşüncesinin çağdaşlaşması (klasik dönem’den II. Abdülhamid’e)*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1986; pp. 53–165.

- 139 H. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic society and the West*, I/1, p. 181. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/2, p. 274. Just how admirable the arrangement was is perhaps best observed by the Pole, Albert Bobowski or Bobovius, who apparently served as a music instructor at Topkapı Palace for 19 years, from c.1638: C.G. Fisher-A. Fisher, “Topkapı Sarayı in the mid-seventeenth century: Bobovi’s description”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, X, 1985, pp. 5–81, pp. 19ff.

Almost a century earlier, the 1553 report of the Venetian Ambassador, Bernardo Navayero, conveys a like impression of a perfectly balanced and ordered structure under the Sultan at its apex: L. Valensi, *The birth of the despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte*, pp. 31–35. And a successor, Antonio Erizzo (reporting in 1557), emphasises “obedience” as the solid foundation of the Ottoman Empire: *ibid.*, p. 36. A convenient recent summary of the decline of the *devşirme* is provided by: S. Faroqui, *Crisis and change, 1590–1699*, pp. 570–572.

- 140 See, for a similar argument, more recently posited: P.M. Kennedy, *The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500–2000*. London: Fontana, 1989. The well-documented example of the puzzling administrative units created in newly-conquered Transdanubian Hungary in the mid-sixteenth century may support my assertion: G. Dávid, “Ottoman administrative strategies in western Hungary”, pp. 31–43 in C. Heywood and C. Imber (eds.), *Studies in Ottoman history in honour of Professor V.L. Ménage*.

- 141 The full text of the Article (No.5) may be found in: A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı kanunnâmeleri ve hukukî tahlilleri*, Kitap 1, p. 318 (p.334 facsimile). Further: “Kanunnâme” in *Tarih-i Osmanî Emcümeni mecmuası*, Sa.13 (İstanbul) 1912, p.11; and A. Özcan, *Fâtih’in teşkilât kanunnâmesi ve nizam-ı âlem için kardeş katli meselesi*, p. 31. Also: “KANUNNAME”, *İ.A.*, Cilt VI, pp. 185–195.

The “Outer Service” (*Birun*) of the Palace comprised all the organizations regulating the Sultan’s relations with the outside world. The six officers (*Ağa*) of the various groups belonging to the *Birun*, together with the *Ağa* of *yeniçeris* at the apex and the commanders of the imperial cavalry divisions, enjoyed the special privilege of riding beside the Sultan and were thus known as *Rikâb-ı Hümâyun Ağaları* (*Ağas* of the Imperial Stirrup). General information is contained in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin saray teşkilâtı*. For a

convenient and informative summary, see: C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 48–51.

- 142 For example, cf. a similar deductive argument by: T. Timur, *Türk devrimi: tarihi anlamı ve felsefe temeli*. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları:252. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1968; p. 62.

- 143 Cf.

“Naturally, the position of the Padişah [so called by the Ottomans] ranked highest in the hierarchy. He was the direct representative or shadow of God in the world. The title Khalifa (Caliph) was understood in this sense; in other words, it did not imply successorship to the Prophet who was never imagined as a ruler. The Ottoman ruler did not claim divine nature or any prophetic attribute; but he was viewed as being different from other mortals since he held the highest position in the divine arrangement of the world.”

N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in modern Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964; p. 13.

Cf., H. İnalcık, *Osmanlı padişahı*.

- 144 See p. 18 and N.15 of this Chapter.

- 145 H. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic society and the West*, I/1, p. 182; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 306–310. Also: Mustafa Nuri, *Netâyic ül-vukuât*, Cilt I-II, pp. 153–155. Two documents of 1584, reproduced in full by the historian Ahmed Refik, prohibit the *yeniçeris*' engaging in the sheep-trade and other commercial activities: A.R. [Altınay], *On altıncı asırda İstanbul hayatı (1553–1591)*. [New ed.]. İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1988; [Doc.no.] 38, p. 98 and [Doc.no.] 50, pp. 130–131 respectively.

- 146 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 245–350. Evidence provided there for the political situation at the centre between the years 1648 and 1656 warrants this assertion.

- 147 The *fetva* accused Ibrahim I of certain offences and claimed that, according to the *şeriat*, these offences rendered him ineligible as Caliph: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 240–242. Cf., “İBRAHİM I”, *İ.A.*, Cilt V, pp. 880–885; and “KÖSEM SULTAN”, *İ.A.*, Cilt VI, pp. 915–923. The significance of the use of firearms by the *yeniçeris* in their subduing of the subsequent (*kapıkulu*) *sipahis*' uprising against them was not lost on Bobowski: C.G. Fisher-A. Fisher, *Topkapı Sarayı in the mid-seventeenth century: Bobovi's description*, p.28.

Incidentally, in the accusations against and the following deposition of Mehmed IV (1648–1687), Ahmed III (1703–1730) and Selim III (1789–1807) from the throne, the same manner prevailed. See: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp.63–64.

An appreciation of the importunity of the *yeniçeris*, especially at the time of the deposition of Mehmed IV, has been:

“Gather'd from the Letters of a Person dwelling in, and Minutely inform'd of the Affairs of that city, and consecrated to the ever August Merit of the Most Serene Elector of Bavaria.”

He comments that:

“... the soldiery being more contumacious than ever, were not only intent upon their own satisfaction, but proceeding from Military to Political Matters, pretended to lay hand to the Helme, and with the Sword cut through the Chain of the present Government.”

[Anon.], *The Dilucidation of the late Commotions of Turkey*: containing an Exact and Distinc Account of all the Causes and Motives of the Deposing of Mahomet,

and of the Advancing of Soliman to the Imperial Throne of Constantinople. London: Randel Taylor, 1689; p. 5.

Further, see: "KADI", *E.I.2*, Vol.IV, pp. 374-375; and, in general: A. Altınsu, *Osmanlı şeyhülislâmları*. Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1972.

Cf., the comments of R.C. Repp about "The altered nature and role of the Ulema":

"Through the introduction and elaboration of the learned hierarchy, by the eighteenth century, a climate had been created in which essentially worldly considerations of position, salary and prerequisites had come to be of paramount importance. In such a climate, corrupting practices such as nepotism and bribery found fertile ground in which to develop, and these corrupting practices, in turn, led inevitably to trouble for the state."

pp.277-287 in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in eighteenth-century Islamic history*, p. 286.

- 148 Mustafa Na'imâ, *Tarih-i Na'imâ*, Cilt IV, p. 55. Also cited in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 615. Cf., "MUSTAFA PAŞA KEMANKES", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp.730-732.

- 149 See: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 313-314; "KÖPRÜLÜLER", *İ.A.*, Cilt VI, pp. 892-908; and also "KÖPRÜLÜ", *E.I.1*, Vol.II, pp. 1059-1062; and "KÖPRÜLÜ", *E.I.2*, Vol.V, pp. 256-263, for such policies.

For the conditions set by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, see: Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gilmânî*. [İstanbul]: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1340; "Türk Encümeni mecmuası ilavesi". However, a different interpretation regarding the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa is given by: İ.M. Kunt, "Naima, Köprülü and the Grand Vezirate", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi dergisi*, 1, 1973, pp. 57-63.

- 150 Cf. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 511. Yet the "Judge-Advocate of the Imperial Army", it seems, interpreted otherwise the strict discipline and obedience of the *kapıkulu* soldiery to the "... Grand Vezier whom ...", in his view,

"... the Army generally hated for his Pride and Tyranny as we have been assured by those who lived for many years as our agents in Turkey".

John Peter a Valcàren, *Relation or diary of the siege of Vienna*. Drawn from the original by His Majestie's Command. London: George Wells Bookseller, 1684; p. 92.

Also see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 467-468.

- 151 Reproduced in full in: "Mi'yar üd-düvel ve misrar ül-milel", M. Arif, "İkinci Viyana seferi hakkında", *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni mecmuası*, 3. sene (13-18), 1328, pp. 994-1016 and pp. 1071-1075, p. 998.

This great campaign against Austria was opened in June 1683, during the reign of Mehmed IV (1648-1687), who appointed his Grand Vezir, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, as the Commander-in-Chief (*Serdar-ı Ekrem*). Such an appointment may be viewed as the reiteration of the *gazi* spirit, in the sense that the Sultan himself was *de jure* present in front of the armed forces. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 450-451, on the appointment of Merzifonlu. Also see: "MEHMED IV", *İ.A.*, Cilt VII, pp. 547-557; and, in general, cf., N. Tacan, *Eski Osmanlı seferlerinden ikinci Viyana seferi*. İstanbul: Askerî Matbaa, 1945.

On Kara Mustafa Paşa's aspirations, see: Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silâhdâr tarihi*. İstanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1928. 2 cilt. Cilt II, pp. 18-20.

The distribution of the encampments of the Ottoman forces is described in detail in a contemporary Italian source: [Anon.], *Relatione della rassegn*

dell'essercito del gran Tvrco, vando sorti in campagna con la deferittione del treno, e vittouglie. Milano & Modona: Demetrio Degni, 1683.

- 152 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/2, p. 277; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. IV. Cilt, Kısım 1 (Karlofça anlaşmasından XVIII. yüzyılın sonlarına kadar). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16d1. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1956. [Hereafter, İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1]; p. 8; and cf., Mustafa Nuri, *Netâ'iy ü-l-vukuât*, Cilt I-II, pp. 297-298 and N.95, p. 344.
- 153 The continuous European wars of the Ottoman state (see: A.N. Kurat, "The retreat of the Turks, 1683-1730", Vol.VI, pp. 608-647 in *The new Cambridge modern history*), especially on the Austrian front (1683-1687), drained the Treasury to such an extent that there were constant arrears of payments and shortages of supplies for the *kapıkulu* troops, which in turn necessitated the finding of new sources of revenue. For example, in 1687 a new special tax, the *imdad-ı seferiyye* (an extraordinary levy of revenue for military purposes), was imposed at first on such persons as notables in towns and provinces, and later (c.1700-1717) came to be applied more generally, regardless of level of income or ability to pay. See: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 497-500. Cf., for example, Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silâhdâr tarihi*, Cilt II, pp.262-263; and H. İnalcık, "Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman administration", pp. 27-52 in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in eighteenth-century Islamic history*, p. 29 and esp.N.9 on p. 363.
- 154 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, p. 483. Further:

"... whereupon the Soldiers having gaine'd the point of placing in the management of publick Affairs Ministers depending on them, might the more freely give a loose to their Rapines, Insolencies and undue and boundless Pretensions of Pay, without fearing correction, seeing those who were to obviate such exorbitances were of their party; and their having once set foot upon the Authority of their supreme Lord, it would be no difficult matter in other occurrences to improve the same means for the attaining of their demands."

The Dilucidation of the late Commotions of Turkey, p. 5 and pp. 6-19.

Cf., Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silâhdâr tarihi*, Cilt II, pp. 280-294.

- 155 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, III/1, pp. 502-509. Information on further unrest of the imperial troops in the capital and the repercussions on the central government between November 1687 and March 1688, is found in: *ibid.*, pp. 507-521; and also Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silâhdâr tarihi*, Cilt II, pp. 295ff. Cf., "SÜLEYMAN II", *İ.A.*, Cilt XI, pp. 155-170.
- 156 Mustafa Nuri, *Netâ'iy ü-l-vukuât*, Cilt III-IV, pp. 95-96. Also see, in general: A.N. Kurat, *The retreat of the Turks (1683-1730)*. Cf., R.A. Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman diplomacy at Karlowitz", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 87:4 (December) 1967, pp. 498-572; and R.A. Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman attitudes toward peace-making: the Karlowitz case", *Der Islam*, 51:1, 1974, pp. 131-137.
- 157 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, II, p. 267. Also, from an overall perspective: H. İnalcık, "Süleiman the Law-Giver and Ottoman law", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, I, 1969, pp. 105-138, esp. pp. 105-106.

For a brief discussion of "... the common goals and intellectual biases shared by seventeenth-century Ottoman writers of Advice literature", see: R. Murphey, "The Veliyyuddin Telhis: notes on the sources and interrelations between Koçi Bey and contemporary writers of advice to kings", *Belleten*, XLIII:171 (Temmuz) 1979, pp. 547-571, pp. 555-556.

According to Fleischer, this kind of advice literature builds upon the earlier "pioneering work" of Mustafa Âli (*Nushat üs-selatin* [*Counsel for Sultans*] 1581) in what he calls a "new genre of political reform literature": C.H. Fleischer,

Bureaucrat and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600), pp. 95–105. The inadequacy of Ottoman élite education in terms of bureaucratic competence is noted by: B. McGowan, *The age of the ayans, 1699–1812*, p. 642.

Further, a piece of research discusses an imperial rescript (*hatt-ı hümayun*) sent by Sultan Mustafa II (1695–1703) on the third day of his reign (9 February 1695), in which he advocates, characteristically, the emulation of Süleyman I (*Kanunî*) in any policy matters that might arise, stressing in particular Süleyman's personally leading his troops in battle as Commander-in-Chief. In fact, Mustafa II led three campaigns against Austria during the years 1695–1697. M.K. Bilgegil, "Bir medeniyeti tasfiye teşebbüsleri", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi araştırma dergisi*, 8, 1978, pp. 1–24; and 10, 1979 (Ahmet Caferoğlu özel sayısı), pp. 77–85; esp. 8, 1978, pp. 3–4.

- 158 Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Nasâ'ih ül-vüzera ve'l-ümera*. Esad Efendi – Süleymaniye – Kütüphanesi, yazma sa. 1830; from "Chapter" 4: "Keyfiyet-i ocağ-ı bektaşian", pp. 64–70, p. 64.

Another prominent and experienced official was Ahmed Resmî Efendi who participated in two Ottoman embassies – to Vienna and Berlin – and the war with Russia (1768–1774) as second-in-command to the Grand Vezir. Although the author of two unusually perceptive and informative embassy reports, his damning indictment of the state on the basis of its abysmal organization of the campaign (*Synopsis of admonitions*) sought no more than a complete military overhaul. See: V.H. Aksan, *An Ottoman statesman in war and peace: Ahmed Resmî Efendi, 1700–1783*. Leiden: Brill, 1995.

- 159 See a document, reproduced in full, relating to the July 1701 *ferman* (imperial edict) and dated then, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 639–642; from *Başvekâlet (Başbakanlık) Arşivi*, İstanbul [Hereafter B.V.A.], Mühimme Defteri, sa. 111, pp. 616ff. Also: "HÜSEYİN PAŞA AMCAZÂDE", *İ.A.*, Cilt V, pp. 646–650.

- 160 See a document, reproduced in full, relating to the February 1728 *ferman* and dated then, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 642–645; from B.V.A., İbnülemin M. Kemal Tasnifi: Askeri Kısım, sa. 7745.

It appears that the successive attempts of the government to control the corps mainly took the form of budgetary measures. But even then, I argue, concessions had to be made; that is, the salaries and properties of those dismissed had to be dispersed among those who remained within the corps. Such an ineffective policy was due to the government's inability to exert control in terms of training and, especially, discipline. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1, pp. 619–623.

- 161 See a document, reproduced in full, relating to the February 1785 *ferman* and dated then, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 645–647; from B.V.A., Mühimme Defteri, sa. 181, pp. 144ff. Also: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, "Sadrazâm Halil Hamid Paşa", *Türkiyat mecmuası*, 5, 1935, pp. 213–267; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1, p. 478. In addition, a useful summary of the "western-inspired reform" during the 18th century may be found in: A. Levy, "Military reform and the problem of centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century", *Middle Eastern studies*, 18:3 (July) 1982, pp. 227–249, esp. see pp. 231–241. And on, for example, the assiduous French cultivation of Halil Hamid Paşa towards cooperative military reform measures, see: V.H. Aksan, "Choiseul-Gouffier at the Sublime Porte, 1784–1792", pp. 27–34 in Ş. Kunalp (ed.), *Studies on Ottoman diplomatic history IV*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1990; p. 32 and the sources therein.

- 162 Cf. esp. the comments of: Mustafa Nuri, *Netâyic ül-vukuât*, Cilt I-II, pp. 293–295; and see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 617–618.

Indeed, according to the *Divan Register*, by 1702 the number of *kapıkulu* soldiery had been reduced to 33,389 from a total of 70,000 following the Treaty of Carlowitz. This was, as Uzunçarşılı has indicated (*ibid.*, *loc.cit.*) mainly due to the efforts of Amcazâde Hüseyin Paşa. The figure is given in: Müezzinzâde Ayn Ali, *Kavânin-i Âl-ı Osman der hûlusa-ı mezâmin-i defter-i divân*. [İstanbul]: Tasvir-i Efkâr Matbaası, 1280; p. 115.

However, an event (known as the Edirne Incident [*Edirne Vak'ası*]) of 1703 once again proved that although the reduction of numbers may have been in the interest of the Treasury, it scarcely reduced the political power of the *kapıkulu* soldiery at the centre – just as their increasing numbers did not mean that their order, discipline and *manière de combattre* in the field was developing in accordance. Thus, in the Incident, which is generally accepted as having proceeded from a power struggle between the Grand Vezir, Rami Mehmed Paşa, and the *Şeyhülislâm*, Feyzullah Efendi, each attempted to use the *kapıkulu* soldiery as a tool for his own ends. However, these *kapıkulus* (e.g., *cebecis* [armourers] and other corps) became in fact the final arbiter in the events that followed, causing the removal from office of Rami Mehmed Paşa and the execution of Feyzullah Efendi, as well as the deposition of Sultan Mustafa II (at that time residing in Edirne – hence the name Edirne Incident) and installation of his brother, Ahmed III.

The events are best described by: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1, pp.24–45. Also see a more up-to-date and complete exposition: R.A. Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 rebellion and the structure of Ottoman politics*. İstanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984; pp. 40ff.

One of the most accurate and perceptive accounts, I find, of the Edirne Incident is given by an anonymous, contemporary, foreign writer who seems to have been well aware of the *yenîçeri* corps' position in the Ottoman Empire and their role in the deposition of Mustafa II. For he describes the *yenîçeri* corps as "... this formidable Body, which is the Flower and Strength of the Turkish Empire" and comments, on their activities during the "revolution", that they,

"... as soon as they had revenged themselves upon their indolent and cruel Monarch and his corrupt Ministers, very quietly laid down their arms, and restored Peace to the Empire. But they did not do this till they had obtained, Sword in Hand, some very advantageous Concessions from their new Sovereign, as the lessening of the Authority of the Grand Viziers, the augmentation of their own Body ... and several other alterations in their favour."

[Anon.], *An Exact and Full Account of the late Amazing Revolution in Turkey, with Historical and Political Remarks on the same: As likewise on that surprising Turkish Revolution That happen'd in the year 1703*. London: the booksellers of London and Westminster, 1730; p. 10 and p. 27.

Here, I cannot resist quoting Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, who accompanied her husband on his appointment as British Ambassador in 1717. Writing a letter, incidentally from Edirne, on 1 April 1717, she observed to the recipient:

"You may easily judge the power of these men who have engross'd all the learning and almost all the Wealth of the Empire. 'Tis they that are the real Authors, thō the Souldiers are the Actors of Revolutions. They depos'd the late Sultan Mustapha, and their power is so well known 'tis the Emperor's interest to flatter them. This is a long digression."

M.W. Montagu, *The complete letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu*. (Ed.) R. Halsbrand. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965–1967. 3 vols. Vol.1 (1708–1720), p.317.

- 163 The comments of the Grand Vezir, Damad İbrahim Paşa (1718–1730), to the Sultan, Ahmed III, on the weakness of the soldiery despite their increased numbers, together with the terms of the Treaty, may be found in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1, pp. 140–145, and esp. p. 143. See, in general: L. Cassels, *The struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717–1740*. London: Murrar, 1966.
- 164 The terms of the Treaty and the further attempts at the improvement of the soldiery, which were felt to be increasingly necessary after the defeat, may be found in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1, pp. 422–426. For the best overview in English to have appeared to date, see: R.H. Davison, “Russian skill and Turkish imbecility: the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji reconsidered”, *Slavic review*, 35:3 (September) 1976, pp. 463–483. That the weakness and declining morale of the Ottoman soldiery due to severe losses in wars had long been evident to foreign enemies and, moreover, contributed to those enemies’ eagerness to attack the Empire, is attested, at least as far as Austria is concerned, in: K.A. Roeder, Jr., *The reluctant ally: Austria’s policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737–1739*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972; esp. p. 58 and p. 95; and K.A. Roeder, Jr., *Austria’s eastern question, 1700–1790*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982; esp. p. 176.
- 165 Indeed, from the loss of Bukovina to Austria in 1775 and of Bassarabia to Russia in 1812, to the losses of further territories in 1878 – Bosna (Bosnia) and Hersek (Herzegovina) to Austria and Batum and Kars to Russia – no other important concessions were made by the Ottoman Empire. The information is drawn from: M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern question, 1774–1923*. London: Macmillan, 1966; pp. 5–220.
- 166 The situation of the Sultan may, conceivably, be understood from the following conversation, which is said to have taken place between Sultan Mustafa III (1757–1774) and his Head of the Treasury (*Defterdâr*), Halimî Efendi:

“One day, while the Sultan was talking to Halimî Efendi, he said, ‘Unless a new standing soldiery is drawn up we won’t be able to cope with Europe; what can we do?’. When Halimî said in return, ‘Let us improve the *yenîçeris*, Sultan Mustafa gave a reply, saying, ‘Do they accept order?’.”

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarihi-i Cevdet*. 2. tabı. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1309. 12 cilt. Cilt I, p. 123.

Further complaints by Sultan Mustafa III regarding the indiscipline of the *yenîçeris* and relating it to their loss of fighting ability were expressed to his Grand Vezir and Commander-in-Chief during the initial stages of the war with Russia (1768–1774). The *hatt-ı hümayun* is reproduced, in part, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, IV/1, p. 622; from B.V.A., Mühimme Defteri, sa.168.

- 167 See, in general: “AYAN”, *E.I.2*, Vol.I, p. 778; and “AYAN”, *İ.A.*, Cilt II, pp. 40–42.

168 Cf.,

“From the seventeenth century onward, the expansion of the practice of *arpalık*, the consequent administration of *sancaks* by *mütesellims* and, finally, the appointment of *mütesellims* from among the local *ayan*, appear to have been the most important operative factors which resulted in the rise to prominence of *ayan* in provincial administration.”

H. İnalçık, *Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman administration*, p.31, and also pp. 39–40 on *ayan* and *kapıkulu* relations.

Âyan in the 18th century, as a powerful, semi-feudal aristocracy, included Muslims and Christians alike in the Anatolian and Rumelian provinces. Known as *derebey* in Anatolia and as *çorbacı* or *celep* in Rumelia, at times they played identical intermediary roles which reflected, to a certain extent, the experiences of previous empires – the Byzantine as well as the Selçuk. These had also possessed centrally-controlled taxation systems, later giving way to big, landed families becoming hereditary “feudal” structures. In general, see: S. Vryonis, Jr., *The decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. But cf., O. Turan, *Selçuklular tarihi ve Türk-İslâm medeniyeti*. Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 7.Seri-Sa.3, A-1. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965; and, more importantly, M.F. Köprülü) *Bizans müesseselerinin Osmanlı müesseselerine tesiri*. (Yayımlayan) O.F. Köprülü. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1981. For an overall assessment of the institution of *âyanlık*, see: Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda âyanlık*. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları:273. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1977; esp. pp. 69–128. And for a convenient summary: S. Faroqui, *Crisis and change, 1590–1699*, pp.565–568.

- 169 K.H. Karpat, “The stages of Ottoman history: a structural-comparative approach”, pp. 79–98 in K.H. Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman state and its place in world history*. Leiden: Brill, 1974; pp. 91ff. Cf., H. İnalcık, *Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman administration*, esp. pp. 37–39, and the classification of *âyan*.

According to İnalcık (*ibid.*, p. 40):

“The most significant development, which . . . occurred in the eighteenth century, was the granting of the actual posts of *bey* and *paşa* to . . . *ağas* of *reaya* origin, that is, the direct delegation of the sultan’s authority. As a result, *paşas* of *ayan* origin and their families rose to prominence in the provinces, while the centralized Ottoman régime, based on the sultan’s absolute authority, was breaking down.”

Also *ibid.* N.41 pp. 365–366, where numerous references to the rise of powerful dynasties in the provinces are cited.

On the causes of the formation of *âyanlık* in Anatolia, the most extensive study is in: Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda âyanlık*, pp. 103–145.

- 170 Cf.,

“Another important phase in the growth of *ayan* power was their assumption of both de facto and de jure authority formerly exercised exclusively by the governors who . . . were counted among the sultan’s *kuls*.”

H. İnalcık, *Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman administration*, p.32. Also see: Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda âyanlık*, pp. 146–158; and B. McGowan, *The age of the ayans, 1699–1812*, pp. 661–662. The benefits accruing to local *âyan* from the growth of international trade in İzmir and its environs are considered in: E. Frangakis, “The Ottoman port of İzmir in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 1695–1820”, *Revue de l’Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 39, 1er semestre, 1985, pp. 149–162, esp. p. 156.

- 171 I base my conclusion on a general survey by: M.A. Cook, *Population pressure in rural Anatolia, 1450–1600*. London: Oxford University Press, 1972; and also on papers relating specifically to population changes in Anatolia: L. Erder, “The measurement of preindustrial population changes: the Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the 17th century”, *Middle Eastern studies*, 11:3 (October) 1975, pp. 284–301, esp. pp. 290–294; L. Erder and S. Faroqui, “Population

rise and fall in Anatolia, 1550–1620”, *Middle Eastern studies*, 15:3 (October 1979, pp.322–345; and R.C. Jennings, “The population, society and economy in the region of Erciyeş Dağı in the sixteenth century”, pp. 149–250 in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et P. Dumont (eds.), *Contribution à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire Ottoman*. Leuven: Editions Peeters, 1983; see esp. pp. 180ff. *Âyan* also found the opportunity to attach to their households some of the numerous men in the militia (e.g., *levend*, *sekbân* and *sarıca*) whom the state could no longer afford to pay. See: M. Cezar, *Osmanlı tarihinde levendler*, pp.337ff.

Âyan, indeed, sometimes engaged in armed struggle against each other or against the state, mainly in order to extend their area of leasehold through their power and authority. Thus, the curbing of rival *âyan*'s or the central authority's power made the use of physical force imperative. The intensity of struggles for power in Anatolia are best exemplified in: M.C. Uluçay, *XVIII. ve XIX. yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da eşkiyalık ve halk hareketleri*. İstanbul: Berksoy Basımevi, 1955. For Rumelia, see: D.R. Sadat, “Rumeli ayanları: the eighteenth century”, *Journal of modern history*, 44:3 (September) 1972, pp. 346–363; and S. Faroqui, “Rural society in Anatolia and the Balkans during the sixteenth century”, part I – *Turcica*, IX:1, 1977, pp.161–195, and part II – *Turcica*, XI, 1979, pp. 103–153. For the second half of the 18th century, see: Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ayanlık*, pp. 215–244.

- 172 H. İnalçık, *The nature of traditional society: B. Turkey*, p. 48.

For example, the *âyan*'s forces were required for the suppression of a series of uprisings between 1791 and 1808 by mountain brigands (*dağlı eşkiyâsı*) in Rumelia, an opportunity which the *âyan* used to their own advantage in increasing their power. See: Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda dağlı isyanları (1791–1808)*. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları:344. Ankara: Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Basımevi, 1983.

- 173 Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli âyanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılık oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.6. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942; pp. 6ff. Possibly the best exposition of this “giving in” to the *âyan* that I have found is: Y. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve ayanlık müessesesi*. Tokyo: Gaikokugu Daigaku, 1976; esp. pp. 53–66.

- 174 Cf., “DEREBEY”, *E.I.2*, Vol.II, pp. 206–208. Originally a type of *âyan* but without the official status accorded them. By the early 19th century the distinction seems to have clouded, to the extent that in Anatolia *âyan* generally became known as *derebeys*.

Here, it may suffice to note that although the institution of *âyanlık* was abolished by a *ferman* of April 1786, partly in order “. . . to restore the authority of the central government in the provinces . . .”, after some five years it was re-established, mainly because the inability of the central government to gather taxes or even to draft soldiery seems to have become so apparent. See: H. İnalçık, *Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman administration*, p. 50.

- 175 On the *âyan*'s fulfilment of the central government's wartime requisitions, and for related documents, see: B.S. Baykal, “A'yanlık müessesesinin düzeni hakkında belgeler”, *Türk tarih belgeler dergisi*, I:2 (Temmuz) 1964, pp. 221–225. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli âyanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılık oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, pp. 6ff.

Instances of the state's requesting military assistance from *âyan* for the war effort, starting as early as 27 November 1724 but becoming well-established with the 1768–1774 Ottoman-Russian war, are documented in: Y. Özkaya,

Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ayanlık, pp. 158–173. Also see: Y. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve ayanlık müessesesi*, pp. 74–80.

- 176 *Hatt-ı hümayun*, reproduced in full, in Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Cilt IV, pp. 284–285. Also see: E.Z. Karal, *Selim III'ün hatt-ı hümayunları*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.10. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1942; esp. pp. 31–33 and pp. 155–157. Cf., Y. Özkaya, “XVIII. yüzyılın sonlarında timar ve zeametlerin düzeni konusunda alınan tedbirler ve sonuçları”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi* (Ord.Prof. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı hatıra sayısı), 32 (Mart) 1979, pp. 219–254, esp. pp. 225–226. Also: “SELİM III”, *İ.A.*, Cilt X, pp. 441–457.

Observations of, particularly, army camps by foreigners had changed too since the time of Busbecq and d'Aramon (See N.101 of this Chapter), for example, in a description – this time in 1801, by a British officer, Captain Thomas Walsh:

“A Turkish camp may not unaptly be compared to a confused and crowded fair, in which every person, whether officer or soldier, pitches his tent where he thinks fit. . .”

T. Walsh, *Journal of the late campaign in Egypt . . .* London: Cadell and Davis, 1803; p. 55.

- 177 K.H. Karpat, “The transformation of the Ottoman state, 1789–1908”, *International journal of Middle East studies*, 3:3 (July) 1972, pp. 243–281, p.252. Cf., A. Levy, *Military reform and the problem of centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century*, pp. 240–241. One of the best overall assessments is: İ. Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun en uzun yüzyılı*. İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1983.

Two specific examples of Ottoman thinking may be found in: J.M. Stein, “Hapsburg financial institutions presented as a model for the Ottoman Empire in the sefaretname of Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi”, pp. 233–241 in A. Tietze (ed.), *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen/Relations habsbourg-ottomanes*. (CIEPO Colloque, Wien, 26–30 September 1983). Wien: Verlag des Verbandes der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs, 1985; and R. Murphey, “The city of Belgrade in the early years of Serbian self-rule and dual administration with the Ottomans: vignettes from Rashid’s history illuminating the transformation of a Muslim metropolis of the Balkans”, pp. 281–292 in *ibid*. Further, “Ottoman awareness of Europe” is conveniently summarized in: N. Itzkowitz and M. Mote (annot. and trans.), *Mubadele: an Ottoman-Russian exchange of ambassadors*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970; esp. pp. 1–14.

- 178 On military reforms during the reign of Selim III, the best exposition is provided by: E.Z. Karal, *Selim III'ün hatt-ı hümayunları – nizam-ı cedit – 1789–1807*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.14. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1946; pp. 43–93. For further details, see: S.J. Shaw, “The established Ottoman army corps under Sultan Selim III (1789–1807)”, *Der Islam*, 40 (February) 1965, pp. 142–184; S.J. Shaw, “The origins of Ottoman military reform: the Nizam-ı Cedid army of Sultan Selim III”, *Journal of modern history*, 37:3 (October) 1965, pp. 219–306; and S.J. Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman navy”, *Turcica*, 1, 1969, pp. 212–241.

As for the navy, see: A.İ. Gencer, *Bahriye’de yapılan ıslahât hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezâreti’nin kuruluşu (1789–1867)*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:3250. İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1985; esp. pp. 29–91.

Also, for a general assessment, see: N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, IIIüncü Cilt, 5inci Kısım (1793–1908), T.C. Gnkur. Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı

Harp Tarih Yayınları, Seri sa.2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1978; [Hereafter, N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5]; pp. 160–189. Further: “SELİM III”, İ.A., Cilt X, pp. 441–457. For the other social reforms, see: E.Z. Karal, *op. cit.*, pp. 95ff; and S.J. Shaw, *Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Selim III (1789–1807)*. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1971; pp. 167ff. For a good assessment of the advisory reports (*Islâhat lâyiğâları* [reform memoranda]), see: Y. Akçura, *Osmanlı devletinin dağılma devri (XVIII. ve XIX. asırlarda)*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.1. İstanbul: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1940; pp. 40–48.

- 179 A “revitalization”, according to Karpat, that was

“... clearly indicated by his desire to reform the *timars*, the back-bone of the old Ottoman socio-political system. His efforts to force the members of each social estate to wear their traditional costumes, which marked their established social rankings, confirms this view.”

K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman State*, p. 252.

Cf., E.Z. Karal, *Selim III'ün hatt-ı hümayunları – nizam-ı cedit – 1789–1807*, pp.120–121. Indeed, according to Karal:

“The reforms being carried out in the administrative, judicial and social spheres are before everything [to be considered as] reforms in discipline. That is to say, the authority and prestige of the state, which had been shaken, were desired to be restored with a newly written code of laws and orders commensurate with the spirit of the old. Certainly, “reform movements” of this kind had been attempted before. Therefore, it is not correct to seek here the quality of *ceditlik* [newness] of the *Nizam-ı Cedit*.”

ibid., p. 188.

As for the economic sphere, the paucity of modern economic thinking and understanding is discussed in: A.G. Sayar, *Osmanlı iktisat düşüncesinin çağdaşlaşması (klasik dönem'den II. Abdülhamid'e)*, pp. 171ff.

- 180 H. İnalcık, *The nature of traditional society: B. Turkey*, p. 50. Cf., B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1968; p. 70.

On this Edirne Incident, but for a slightly different interpretation, see: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*. Cilt V: Nizam-i cedit ve tanzimat devirleri (1789–1856). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16/5. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1947; [Hereafter, E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V]; pp. 84–85. Cf., S.J. Shaw, *Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Selim III (1789–1807)*, pp.345–351.

That the Sultan had already anticipated, on the basis of at least one report submitted to him, opposition by the *âyan*, among others, is found in: Y. Özkaya, “III. Selim devrinde Nizam-ı Cedit'in Anadolu'da karşılaştığı zorluklar”, *Tarih araştırmaları dergisi*, I:1, 1963, pp. 145–156.

- 181 H. İnalcık, *The nature of traditional society: B. Turkey*, p. 50; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 339–340. Cf., S.J. Shaw, *Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Selim III (1789–1807)*, p. 351 and p. 375.
- 182 Known as the *Kabakçı* Mustafa Mutiny after the name of its leader, an auxiliary levy who was then able, along with the Grand Vezir and the *ulema*, to command powerful support and thus secured an agreement (*şer'i hüccet*), under the *raison d'être* of *şeriat*, with the new Sultan, Mustafa IV. Yet the Sultan's part in this, in the “historico-legal” sense, was previously unknown in the history of the State. In the preamble of the *hüccet*, it was noted that the mutineers would not be prosecuted for their activities which had led to the deposition of

Selim III. Details of the Mutiny are, I think, best described in a contemporary source, reproduced in full, in: F.C. Derin, "Tüfengci-başı Ârif Efendi tarihçesi", *Belleten*, XXXVIII:151 (Temmuz) 1974, pp. 379-443, pp. 380-443. This source also constituted the background of the explanation in: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Cilt VIII, pp. 128-145.

As Berkes has emphasised, the

"... God-given authority of the Padişah was for the first time subjected to a written document by a pact dictated by the Yeniçeris upon Selim's fall."

N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 90.

Cf., E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, pp. 86-89.

The text of the *şer'i hüccet* is found in the work of the contemporary imperial historiographer: Ahmed Âsım Efendi, *Tarih-i Âsım*. [İstanbul: n.pub., 1871?]. 2 cilt. Cilt I, pp. 46-49.

- 183 See: Köprülüzâde Mehmed Fuad, "Ottoman Turkish literature", *E.I.I.*, Vol.IV, pp.938-959; Ş.A. Mardin, "Power, civil society and culture in the Ottoman Empire", *Comparative studies in society and history*, II:3 (June) 1969, pp.258-281, esp. pp. 270ff. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler, 1859-1952*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952; pp. 161-171; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*. 3 cilt. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984-1989. Genişletilmiş 2. baskı Cilt 1: II. Meşrutiyet dönemi (1908-1918); [Hereafter, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1]; pp. 3-15; and P. Safa, *Türk inkılâbına bakışlar*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: İnkılâb Kitabevi, [n.d.] (1. baskı, 1938); pp.7ff.

Four other works were found to be particularly relevant: S. Ülgener, *İktisadi inhitat tarihimizde ahlâk ve zihniyet meseleleri*. İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1951; N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*; H.Z. Ülken, *Türkiye'de çağdaş düşünce tarihi*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1979; and A.H. Tanpınar, *Yaşadığım gibi*. (Hazırlayan) B. Emil. İstanbul: Türkiye Kültür Enstitüsü, 1970.

- 184 K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman state*, p. 254. For the role of Âlemdâr Mustafa Paşa in Selim III's deposition, see: A.F. Miller, *Mustapha Pacha Baïraktar*. Bucarest: Association Internationale d'Etudes du Sud-Est Européen, 1975 (Originally published: Moscow, 1947); and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli âyanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılık oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Âlemdar Mustafa Paşa*, pp. 40ff. Both are based on contemporary sources.

A fairly accurate account of this event also figures prominently in a document about Ottoman Sultans written by a Christian Arab subject in the mid-19th century: R.Y. Ebeid and M.J.L. Young, "A nineteenth-century Arabic survey of the Ottoman dynasty", *Turcica*, VIII:1, 1976, pp. 246-271, esp. pp. 266-268.

- 185 Cf., K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman state*, p. 254; and see E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, pp. 94-97.
- 186 The *Sened-i İttifak* is, indeed, considered by a noted Turkish jurist to be the "first regulation in public law". See: S.S. Onar, *İdare hukukunun umumî esasları*. İstanbul: İstanbul Tercüme ve Neşriyat Bürosu, 1952; p. 127. Cf., S. Özçelik, "Sened-i İttifak", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 24:1-4, 1959, pp. 1-12; and R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*. 1. kitap: Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşundan inkırazına kadar. İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları:281. İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1968; pp. 56-58. Also see: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp.90-91; and H. İnalıcık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane hatt-ı hümayunu", *Belleten*, XXVIII:112 (Ekim) 1964, pp. 603-622.

- 187 Cf. two examples: A. Bryer, "The last Laz risings and the downfall of the Pontic *derebeys*, 1812–1840", No. XV, pp. 191–210 in A. Bryer, *Peoples and settlement in Anatolia and the Caucasus, 800–1900*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1988; and M. Ursinus, *Regionale Reformen im osmanischen Reich am Vorabend der Tanzimat: Reformen der rumelischen Provinzialgouverneure im Gerichtssprengel von Manastir (Bitola) zur Zeit der Herrschaft Sultan Mahmuds II. (1808–39)*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1982.

Two exceptions may be mentioned here. One was Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt where the Sultan was forced to concede autonomous status to an Ottoman military figure governing that province. The second was Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, ruling an area of the Empire stretching from Albania through mainland Greece as far as Morea. See: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 78. Also see: D.N. Skiotis, "From bandit to pasha: first steps in the rise to power of Ali of Tepedelen, 1750–1784", *International journal of Middle East studies*, 2:3 (July) 1971, pp. 219–244; and Ş. Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa isyanı, Mısır meselesi, 1831–1841*. Kısım I. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.7. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1945. Attempts to curb the growing Wahhabi power from 1811, ironically through the agency of Mehmed Ali Paşa, have been studied in: A.-W.S. Babeair, *Ottoman penetration of the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula, 1814–1841*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1985; pp. 65ff.

- 188 E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, p. 9. Also cf., Ahmed Âsım Efendi, *Tarih-i Âsım*, Cilt II, pp. 237–260.

A British contemporary, Captain Adolphus Slade, recorded his observations on the state of the Ottoman body politic. He considers there to be three internal threats, or "checks", to Sultanic power, by virtue of their "... being possessed of authority not emanating from the sultan ...", comprising *derebeys*, *âyan* and *ulema*, but does not endorse Mahmud II's reform attempts on the ground that

"... rapid as has been the decline of the Ottoman empire since victory ceased to attend its arms, I venture to assert, that it would have been ten-fold more rapid but for the privileged orders – the *derebeys* and the *ulema*. Without their powerful weight and influence – effect of hereditary wealth and sanctity – the Janizzaries would long since have cut Turkey in slices, and have ruled it as the Mamelukes ruled Egypt."

However, he recognizes that, these restraints notwithstanding, the *yeniçeris* themselves formed a check on the "despotic" power of the Sultan in that they

"... somewhat resembled a chamber of deputies, for they often compelled their sovereign to change his ministers, and any talented member among them, with the art of enflaming men's passions, was sure to obtain a good employment in order to appease him."

A. Slade, *Records of travels in Turkey, Greece, etc. and of a cruise in the Black Sea with the Captain Pacha*. New edition. London: Saunders and Otley, 1854; p.116, pp. 122–123 and p. 145 respectively.

- 189 See the document, *ferman-ı âli*, reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, pp. 666–672, p. 670 from B.V.A., Cevdet tasnifi: Askerî Kısım, sa.25109. Cf., a document, dated 11 Zilkade 1241 (17 Haziran 1826), reproduced in full, in: S. Umur, "Yeniçeriliğin ilgası", *Tarih ve toplum*, 12:69 (Eylül) 1989, pp. 19–20.

For the restoration of the military establishment and the following reforms during Mahmud II's reign, see: A. Levy, "The officer corps in Sultan Mahmud

II's new Ottoman army, 1826-1839", *International journal of Middle East studies*, 2:1 (January) 1971, pp. 21-39; and J.M. Bastelberger, *Die militärischen Reformen unter Mahmud II, dem Retter des osmanischen Reiches: ein militärhistorische Studie*. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1874. Cf., Ahmed Cevad Bey, *Tarih-i askeri-i Osmanî*. II. Cilt, Kitap 4. İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kütüphanesi, yazma sa.TY/6127; and, in general, N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 189-201.

The original, and the official, Ottoman account of the abolition of the *yenîçeris*, called the *Vak'a-i Hayriye* (Auspicious Incident), is found in: Mehmed Esad Efendi, *Üss-ü zafer*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1243. Esad Efendi also provides considerable information on Mahmud II's military reform measures. A critical appraisal of his work is found in: H.A. Reed, *The destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June, 1826*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1951.

- 190 See the document, *hatt-ı hümayun*, reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu ocakları*, I, p. 581; from B.V.A., Dolap 2, Sandık 61, *hatt-ı hümayun* sa.62.

On *Serasker Hüseyin Paşa*, see: "Agha HUSAYN PASHA", *E.I.2*, Vol.III, pp.628-629; "BAB-I SER'ASKERİ", *E.I.2*, Vol.I, p. 838; and "A-A HÜSEYİN PAŞA", *İ.A.*, Cilt I, pp. 147-148.

- 191 A new bureaucratic structure then began to emerge as a direct result of the measures towards administrative centralization, to the detriment of all intermediate potential power bases, in the capital as well as in the provinces. These reforms, affecting mainly the economic, political and cultural aspects of society, are found in: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, esp. pp. 89-90 - "Centralization"; and E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, pp. 155-168. Cf. esp.: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 92-135. Further: M. Çadırcı, "Tanzimat'ın ilânı sıralarında Türkiye'de yönetim (1826-1839)", *Belleten*, LI:201 (Aralık) 1987, pp. 1215-1240.

For some consideration of and generalizations on the development of a "bureaucracy-dominated polity", and on the "bureaucratic orientation toward change" in Ottoman-Turkish society, see: M. Heper, *Bürokratik yönetim geleneği: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin gelişimi ve niteliği*. Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler Matbaası, 1974. Cf., W.F. Weiker, "The Ottoman bureaucracy: modernization and reform", *Administrative science quarterly*, 13 (December) 1968, pp. 451-470; and S.J. Shaw, "The origins of representative government in the Ottoman Empire: an introduction to the provincial councils, 1839-1876", pp. 53-142 in R.B. Winder (ed.), *Near Eastern round table, 1967-1968*. New York: Near East Center and Center for International Studies, New York University, 1969. Also: S.J. Shaw, "The central legislative councils in the nineteenth-century Ottoman reform movement before 1876", *International journal of Middle East studies*, I:1 (January) 1970, pp. 51-84. Cf., C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 113-120.

- 192 Mardin summarizes the patrimonial characteristics as follows: Under the basic premise that the ruler is personally responsible for the welfare of his subjects, they form barriers to the legitimization of an autonomous civil society; i.e., the unwillingness of the governing élite to assume the role of carrying out popular demands, the rigidity of the prebendal system and the complex web of derivations - in the Paretian sense - that enter into the cultural ideology of Turkish intelligentsia. Ş. Mardin, *Power, civil society and culture in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 279ff. Yet cf. İnalcık's caution as to the checks and balances within the sixteenth-century Ottoman "patrimonial state": H. İnalcık, "Decision making in the Ottoman state", pp. 9-18 in C.E. Farah (ed.), *Decision making and change in the Ottoman Empire*.

- Further, an extensive discussion of what the author terms "patrimonial officialdom" may be found in: C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 6ff. and N.6 on pp. 353–354; and C.V. Findley, *Ottoman civil officialdom: a social history*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; pp. 6–7 and esp. N.12.
- 193 Cf., S.J. Shaw, "Some aspects of the aims and achievements of the nineteenth-century Ottoman reformers", pp. 29–39 in W.R. Polk and R.I. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of modernization in the Middle East: the nineteenth century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Also: C.V. Findley, "The legacy of tradition to reform: origins of the Ottoman foreign ministry", *International journal of Middle East studies*, 1:4 (October) 1970, pp. 335–338; C.V. Findley, "The foundations of the Ottoman foreign ministry: the beginnings of bureaucratic reform under Selim III and Mahmud II", *International journal of Middle East studies*, 3:4 (October) 1972, pp. 388–416; and, amplified, C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 120–150 and pp. 155–158.
- The economic straitjacket allowing Ottoman cogitation to be "remedial" only, is discussed in: Ş. Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European capitalism, 1820–1913: trade, investment and production*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; H. İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the world economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; and R. Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the world economy: the nineteenth century*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. For an earlier case-study, see: B. Masters, *The origins of western economic dominance in the Middle East: mercantilism and the Islamic economy in Aleppo, 1600–1750*. New York: New York University Press, 1988.
- 194 For a most informative summary, see: M.S. Kütükoğlu, "Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediyye kıyâfeti ve malzemesinin temini meselesi", pp. 519–605 in İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi *Doğumunun 100. yılında Atatürk'e armağan*. İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1981; esp. pp. 519–522. And, for the subsequent establishment of reserves, see: M.S. Kütükoğlu, "Sultan II. Mehmed devri yedek ordusu: Redif-i Asâkir-i Mansûre", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü dergisi*, 12, 1981/82, pp. 127–158.
- 195 Notably, in 1829, Russia won Rumelian territory. In 1830 France began the occupation of Algeria. Serbia, after a successful revolt, established in 1829 semi-autonomy for the principality. The Greek revolt succeeded, with mainly British naval aid, in the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino while the Empire was at war with Russia in 1827–1829. In the south, the Egyptian attack of 1832–1833 was so successful that it forced the Sultan, in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (8 July 1833), to request the support of Russia against the military victories of his vassal, Mehmed Ali, the refractory Paşa of Egypt. Information is drawn particularly from: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, pp. 110–142. Also, in general, from: W.E.D. Allen and P. Muratoff, *Caucasian battlefields: a history of the wars on the Turco-Caucasian border, 1828–1841*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953; S. Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa isyanı: Mısır meselesi, 1831–1841*; N. Botzaris, *Visions balkaniques dans la préparation de la révolution grèque, 1784–1821*. Genève: Ambilly-Annemasse, 1962; and M. Sabry, *L'Empire égyptien sous Mohamed-Ali et la question d'Orient, 1811–1849*. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1930.
- 196 H. von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839*. Berlin: Mittler, 1893; p. 528. Quoted in: E. Be'eri, *Army officers in Arab politics and society*. New York: Praeger, 1970; p. 302. For von Moltke's stay and work in the Empire between 1835 and 1839, see:

G. Rosen, *Geschichten der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform in Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856*. Berlin-Leipzig: [n.pub.], 1866–1867. 2 Band. Band I, pp. 234ff; and, in general, J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: die preussisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei, 1835–1919*. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976; pp. 15–33.

- 197 It is known that Mahmud II sent four students to France in 1827–1828, and that others followed later. Cf., E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, p. 166.

Yet it was not until 1835 that the sending of students for strictly military education or further training began. For example, according to one source, in 1835 a total of 20 were sent to various countries – Prussia (1), Austria (4), Britain (14) and France (1). In 1838, a total of 10 were sent – to Belgium (3) and Austria (7), making a sum total of 30 during Mahmud II's reign. The dates and figures are found in: Hakkı, (Piyade Kolağası), *Osmanlı ordusu ahvâl ve tensikât-ı askeriyesi*. [İstanbul]: Mekteb-i Fünun-u Harbiye Matbaası, 1325; pp.58–59.

According to Mehmed Esad, following the destruction of the *yeniçeris*, the idea of opening a school for training officers for the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* evolved but was not immediately put into effect. Instead, training units were established within the forces, with companies (*mekteb bölükleri*) being instructed by mature soldiers, corporals and sergeants with some prior schooling or special aptitude. These later became, as it were, officers coming up through the ranks. Mehmed Esad, *Mir'at-ı Mekteb-i Harbiye*. [İstanbul]: Şirket-i Mürettebiye Matbaası, 1310; pp. 8ff. Also see pp. 19ff. for the sending of military students abroad in 1835. Cf., Mahmud Cevad, *Maârif-i umumîye nezareti tarihçe-i teşkilât ve icraâtı*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1338; pp. 4ff. Yet already the establishment of the new forces in İstanbul was beginning to have a visible effect at ground level, as was noted by Captain Frankland of the British Royal Navy in his "Journal" for the date 11 April 1827:

" . . . About six o'clock, we heard a distant drum; and as we approached Buyuk Tchekmadjeh [on the outskirts of the capital], met a large body of the newly organized troops, with twelve pieces of cannon, and about one hundred ammunition and provision waggons. The state of the guns and waggons very much surprised me, as their equipment and order appeared to be equal to anything of the sort in European armies. The horses were beautiful and well harnessed. The troops seemed very young; and out of the whole column, which perhaps might amount to fifteen hundred or two thousand hardly one hundred had a mustachio, or beard . . . They did not seem very particular respecting the manner of wearing their arms and accoutrements . . ."

C.C. Frankland, *Travels to and from Constantinople in the years 1827 and 1828*. London: Henry Colburn, 1829. 2 vols. Vol.1, pp. 85–87.

- 198 O. Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi*. [2nd ed.] İstanbul: Eser Kültür Yayınları, 1977. 5 cilt. Cilt 2, pp. 315–368; and K. Beydilli, "İlk mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa ve Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e dair risâlesi", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü dergisi*, 13, 1983–1987, pp. 387–479, esp. pp. 392–395.

As Berkes has emphasised, ". . . the most arresting though least known educational development in nineteenth-century Turkey, was directly related to the building up of the new army". N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 101–102.

Indeed, a foreign observer currently resident in the country quite evidently gained the impression, after visits to the Imperial Tannery, the Paper Manufactory and the Woollen Cloth Manufactory, that ". . . nearly all the

modern improvements introduced into Turkey have sole and exclusive reference to the military establishment". [J.E. DeKay], *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832, by an American*. New York: J.J. Harper, 1833; p. 124.

With regard to the effect of the opening of the War College, Berkes notes that while "... having a wholly secular base, the new army tradition had evolved from within; it had not been superimposed by European officers". N. Berkes, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

According to Levy, "Whatever its military shortcomings, the new Ottoman officer corps quickly grew to be the state's most favoured class". A. Levy, *The officer corps in Sultan Mahmud II's new Ottoman army (1826-1839)*, p. 39.

Also see: N. Berkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-121 – still the best assessment of the role of education in the reforms of Mahmud II, and the need for a "New Concept in Education" in primary and higher education. Cf., B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 83-86. For a general survey of military educational organization and institutions, see: N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 360-375 and *passim.*; and "HARBIYE", *E.I.2*, Vol.III, pp.203-204.

- 199 Note the comments of Baron d'Ottenfels, the representative of Prince Metternich in İstanbul, on Hüsrev Paşa, in drawing a

"Tableau de la situation intérieure de cette capitale, des inquiétudes causées par les fréquents incendies et de la sécurité du Gouvernement Ottoman . . .

Le nom de ce Pacha, la terreur de Janissaires qui a toujours su maintenir le bon ordre dans la capitale et qui a prêté au Sultan la secours de ses bras et de sa tête lors de la destruction de cette milice turbulente en 1826 . . ."

Le Baron d'Ottenfels à Son Altesse le Prince Metternich, Constantinople, le 10 septembre 1831. Wien: Haus Hof und Staatsarchiv. Berichte-Türkei, No. 345a. Document reproduced in full, in: Y.T. Kurat, "Sultan Mahmud II zamanına ait bir belge", pp. 425-434 in *Necatî Lugal armağanı*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.50. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1968; pp. 431-434.

Also see: "HÜSREV PAŞA, MEHMED", *İ.A.*, Cilt V, pp. 609-616, on his extensive powers; and "KHOSREW PASHA, MEHMED", *E.I.2*, Vol.V, pp. 35-36.

Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse, provides, on the basis of his own long acquaintance with him, a vivid account of *Serasker Hüsrev Paşa*, to whom he paid a visit on 23 July 1834. Maréchal Marmont, Duc de Raguse, *The present state of the Turkish Empire*. (Trans.) F. Smith. 2nd edition. London: Thomas Harrison, 1854; pp. 94-97.

- 200 Mahmud II's reforms, which helped the traditional Sultanic authority to revitalize itself so as to reassert the concept of order (*nizam*) between the ruler and the ruled, are studied extensively by Berkes, Karal and Lewis. The details, therefore, do not deserve repetition here. All that need be said is that in the dichotomy of the state and the society, the crucial idea behind the reforms of Mahmud II appears to have been retrospective. In essence, the revitalization of the Ottoman state was viewed instinctively and, one might add, most of the time consciously, as analogous to the reassertion of the equipoise between those two layers of the body politic; hence, the equiponderance of the state over the society, which were, in the Ottoman body politic, the Sultan and the subjects respectively. For example, one discernable reflection of this policy was Mahmud II's effort to centralize government at the expense of the *âyans*, *beys* and *paşas* of the provinces. In planning this policy he was in general successful, to the point of distributing lands of the notables to the men of the *Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye*. Such a policy simply, *ceteris paribus*, echoed the policy of Mehmed II to curb the power of the influential families for the

benefit of the *kul* system, and the Sultan's subsequent expansion and reliance upon the *kapıkulus*.

That policy, as I have indicated, seems to have been justified by Mehmed Neşri, in his history, during the reign of Mehmed II. During that reign, however, the rectification of *nizam* and the maintenance of it against forces not only within but also without the Empire – since the time of Mehmed II, the latter had gained preponderance over the former, be it in military, economic, political or cultural fields – also seems to have been justified by another intellectual, the doctor and polymath Şânizade Ata'ullah (appointed 1820; d.1826), to the point of inventing a socio-scientific term for it.

He was, as I learn from Berkes, the first man to coin the word *ihtilâl* as “revolution”; the word in its actual sense had, in fact, been in use elsewhere since 1789. In his writing, a caution is perceptible, as if he were warning the Sultan about the “dangers” of such disturbances. He writes about the revolutionary movements in “certain well-organized states” (meaning in western Europe) which aim at the establishment of “democratic rule” (*kanun-u dimikratî*). He further notes, in justification, the reactions of the rulers (i.e., monarchies and aristocracies) because to him – and this is the point on which he is cautioning the Sultan – these revolutionary movements would lead to the overthrow of all absolutism, that is, a total revolution (*inkilâb-ı küllî*) all over Europe.

See: Mehmed Ata'ullah Şânizade, *Tarih-i Şânizade*. [İstanbul: Various imprints], 1284–1291. 4 cilt. Cilt 4, pp. 2ff, on “certain well-organized states”, and pp.63–75 on “revolution” and its implications. However, cf. the information contained in: A.A. Adivar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde ilim*. 2. tabı. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1943; pp. 192–194. In general cf., N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 8–135; and N. Berkes, “The two facets of the Kemalist revolution”, *The Muslim world*, LXIV:4 (October) 1974, pp. 292–306. Also: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 76–105; and E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V.

- 201 Cf., Y. Abadan, “Tanzimat fermanının tahlili”, pp. 31–58 in *Tanzimat I: yüzüncü yıldönümü münasebetiyle*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940. [Hereafter, *Tanzimat* I]. Also see: T. Gökbilgin, “Tanzimat hareketinin Osmanlı müesseselerine ve teşkilatına etkileri”, *Belleten*, XXXI:121 (Ocak) 1967, pp.93–111; H. İnalcık, “Tanzimat'ın uygulanması ve sosyal tepkileri”, *Belleten*, XXVIII:112 (Ekim) 1964, pp. 623–690; and his revised English version: “Application of the Tanzimat and its social effects”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, V, 1973, pp.97–128; and “TANZİMAT”, *İ.A.*, Cilt XI, pp. 709–716. In general: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V. Further, cf., N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 137–200; and B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp.105–116.

- 202 For example, see a recent work: B. Eryılmaz, *Tanzimat ve yönetimde modernleşme*. İstanbul: İşaret, 1992; pp. 91ff. It seems that the period 1839–1876 saw no fewer than thirty-nine Grand Vezirs and thirty-three Ministers of Foreign Affairs; *ibid.*, p. 155. Further: R. Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.19. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1954; esp. pp. 191–316.

Drawing from an analysis of the Ottoman “ruling élite in the period of reforms”, its composition appears to have been wholly in accord with these processes, for the analysis concludes:

“The views of the Tanzimat personalities, their reform programme and the reforms themselves were the work of people who had not been specially trained for this but, being aware of the need for changes, tried themselves to guess the most suitable roads.”

M. Todorova, "Composition of the ruling élite of the Ottoman Empire in the period of reforms, 1826–1878", *Etudes balkaniques*, 12e année, 1976, no. 1, pp. 103–113.

Of course an earlier work on the principle of representative government is still valuable: R.H. Davison, "The advent of the principle of representation in the government of the Ottoman Empire", pp. 96–111 in R.H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish history, 1774–1923: the impact of the West*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990 (essay originally published in 1968).

- 203 H. İnalcık, *The nature of traditional society: B. Turkey*, pp. 56–57; and he adds:

"The basic principle of legislation, also, was discovered not in natural rights but in the practical necessity of resuscitating the empire. In brief, state power remained the ultimate goal as before; the people were still regarded as mere subjects of the state."

ibid., p. 57.

In general, cf., Z.F. Fındıkoğlu, "Tanzimatta içtimai hayat", pp. 619–659 in *Tanzimat I*; and A.H. Ongunsu, "Tanzimat ve amillerine umumî bir bakış", pp. 1–12 in *Tanzimat I*.

More specifically, the first issuing of paper money (*kaime*) in 1840, in part to satisfy the need to build up the armed forces, is well attested by R.H. Davison, "The first Ottoman experiment with paper money", pp. 60–72 in R.H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish history, 1774–1923: the impact of the West*.

- 204 For a discussion of the various measures taken to simplify and unify the collection of taxes, see: Y. Cezar, *Osmanlı maliyesinde bunalım ve değişim dönemi*. İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986; pp. 282ff. For example, "The problem of economic resources" is also attested, in summary form and based on reliable works, in: C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 161–163.

- 205 For the text, see: *The Imperial Rescript (Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane)* of 3 November 1839, reproduced in full, in: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V (Vesikalar), pp. 263–266. For an authoritative commentary, see: R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, pp. 68–71. An English translation may be found in: J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a documentary record, 1914–1956*. Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., 1956. 2 vols. Vol. 1, pp. 113–116, esp. p. 114.

The first census, based on the counting of the male population in the Empire, was carried out between 1831 and 1838 in Anatolia and Rumelia. See: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ilk nüfus sayımı*. Ankara: Ankara Basımevi, 1943; and E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, pp. 159–160.

- 206 On the conditions pertaining to Mustafa Reşid Paşa's dismissal and replacement by Rıza Paşa, a brief but effective analysis is found in: H. İnalcık, *Application of the Tanzimat and its social effects*, pp. 16–19. Also: H. İnalcık, *The nature of traditional society: B. Turkey*, p. 61. Of course, still the most reliable background is provided by: Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*. (Yayınlayan) C. Baysun. Nos. 1–40 and Tetimme in 4 vols. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.22, 17a, 17b, 17c. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1953–1967; esp. [Vol.I], pp. 9–10.

Note that, according to İnalcık, during Rıza Paşa's Ministry the new system of provincial administration and taxation was replaced by the traditional tax-farming, and the radical civilian administrative measures were judged as ill-timed. But when Mustafa Reşid Paşa regained power in 1845, the main

priority, this time, was given to the training of bureaucrats in the implementation of the proposed reform measures. *ibid.*, p. 61. Cf., B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 111–112.

- 207 E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*. Cilt VI: İslahat fermanı devri (1856–1861). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16f. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1954; [Hereafter, E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VI]; see esp. pp. 162ff. on the reorganization of the armed forces, e.g., the land forces.

For more technical details of the organizational changes, see: N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 143–146 and pp. 201–203; and N. Tacan, “Tanzimat ve ordu”, pp. 129–137 in *Tanzimat I*. As for the naval reforms, the reliable study is: A.İ. Gencer, *Bahriye’de yapılan ıslahât hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezâreti’nin kuruluşu (1789–1867)*, pp. 133ff.

- 208 Hafız Ahmed Lûtfi, *Tarih-i Lûtfi*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1290–1328. 8 cilt. Cilt VIII, p. 8. Also cited in: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 112.
- 209 N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, esp. pp. 457–465; and H. Süer, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi: Osmanlı devri Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi harekâtı (1853–1856)*. T.C. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1986; pp. 170–178. And cf., for example, W.E.D. Allen and P. Muratoff, *Caucasian battlefields: a history of the wars on the Turco-Caucasian border, 1828–1921*, pp. 57–102.

One of the most perceptive accounts I have found is a British “Report on the Turkish Contingent (Crimea)”, *Commissariat, Turkish Contingent to War Department*, Kertch, 12 January 1856. *British War Office Documents, Public Record Office, London*; [Hereafter, W.O.]; 32/7296.

- 210 R.H. Davison, *The advent of the principle of representation in the government of the Ottoman Empire*. Also see, in general: R.H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire (1856–1876)*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Cf., N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 148–152; and “TANZİMAT”, *İ.A.*, Cilt XI, pp. 709–716. Further, see the point made in: A.P. Saab, *The origins of the Crimean Alliance*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977; p. 159.

- 211 The text of the edict is found in: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V (Vesikalar), pp. 266–272. Also see: A.R. [Altınay], “Türkiye’de İslahat Fermanı”, *Türk Tarih Encümeni mecmuası*, 14. sene, 4:81 (1 Temmuz) 1340, pp. 193–215. The vexed question of civic equality is discussed in: R.H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish history, 1774–1923: the impact of the West*, pp. 112–132. Cf., C.V. Findley, *Ottoman civil officialdom: a social history*, pp. 30–33.

To my knowledge, no non-Muslim Colonel ever had to march a mixed regiment of Muslims and non-Muslims into battle. Nor did the abolition of the poll-tax (*cizye*) make any great immediate difference, since the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, who largely chose not to take up the option of military service, were permitted to commute it into an exemption tax, levied in the same way as the old *cizye*. B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 337. For the long-term effects of the *bedel*, see: “BEDEL-İ ASKERİ”, *İ.A.*, Cilt II, pp. 439–440. Cf., N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 152–157.

On the recruitment of non-Muslims into the navy from 1845 proper, see: A.İ. Gencer, *Bahriye’de yapılan ıslahât hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezâreti’nin kuruluşu (1789–1867)*, pp. 235–246.

- 212 Practically all the legal codes (commercial, penal and civil) were of French origin. Added to these were the French-inspired institutions, e.g., Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) founded in 1868 and the Imperial Ottoman Lycée (*Mekteb-i Sultanî*) opened at Galatasaray in the same year. In some cases the

effects of external stimuli went beyond inspiration to outright adoption. For instance, in 1859 and 1867, direct notes were conveyed from the European Powers urging the Government, for their own ends, to hasten the application of the 1856 Rescript. Moreover, the French embarkation of a force in 1860 was instrumental in the Lebanese administrative statute revisions.

Information is drawn from: R.H. Davison, "Foreign and environmental contributions to the political modernization of Turkey", pp. 73-95 in R.H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish history, 1774-1923: the impact of the West*; B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 118-124; E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VI, pp. 7-28; and, in general: E. Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat: un histoire des réformes dans l'Empire Ottoman depuis 1828 jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris: A. Cotillon, 1882-1884. 2 tomes; in conjunction with: C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, esp. pp. 165ff. Also: R. Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*; and R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun anahatları*, esp. pp. 77-79 and pp. 86-105. In addition: F. Çoker, "Tanzimat'ın getirdiği hukuk kurumları ve işlevleri", *Tarih ve toplum*, 12:70 (Kasım) 1989, pp. 16-20. Further: C. Bilsel, "Tanzimatın harici siyaseti", pp. 661-722 in *Tanzimat I*; H. Veldet (Velidedeoğlu), "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri ve Tanzimat", pp. 139-209 in *Tanzimat I*; T. Taner, "Tanzimat devrinde ceza hukuku kanunları", pp. 221-232 in *Tanzimat I*; Y.K. Tengirşenk, "Tanzimat devrinde Osmanlı devletinin harici ticaret siyaseti", pp. 289-320 in *Tanzimat I*; and M.T. Gökbilgin, "1840'tan 1861'a kadar cebel-i Lübnan meselesi ve Dürziler", *Belleten*, X:40 (Ekim) 1946, pp. 641-703. Also: A.L. Tibawi, *A modern history of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.

- 213 Cf., K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman state*, pp. 259-260.

Further speculation along these lines is made in various papers by: T. Baykara, *Osmanlılarda medeniyet kavramı ve ondokuzuncu yüzyıla dair araştırmalar*. İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1992.

Yet opposition to the reform measures took a more violent disposition in the Kuleli Incident (*Kuleli Vak'ası*) of 17 September 1859, when a small group of conspirators plotted unsuccessfully to depose and probably assassinate Sultan Abdülmecid. According to the finding of the most reliable research on the Incident, this seems basically to have been a reaction in defence of İslâm in the face, particularly, of what they saw as the European-imposed measures of Âli and Fuad Paşas and the extension of privileges to Ottoman non-Muslim communities. U. İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası hakkında bir araştırma*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.3. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1937.

The significance of the Incident, in view of this and other sources, has been assessed in: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 151-152 and esp. N.44 of p. 151. Cf., N. Berkes, *The emergence of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 203-204 and N.2 of p. 203.

- 214 K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman state*, p. 262.

Cf., Ş. Mardin, *The genesis of Young Ottoman thought: a study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962; esp. pp. 133-168. Also see the most perceptive analysis by: İ. Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar", pp. 777-857 in *Tanzimat I*. Further: M. Kaplan [et al.] (hazırlayanlar), *Yeni Türk edebiyatı antolojisi*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:1874, 2156, 2530 and 2932. İstanbul: Edebiyat Matbaası, 1974-1982. 4 cilt, esp. Cilt I and II; N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, esp. pp. 192ff; H.Z. Ülken, *Türkiye'de çağdaş düşünce tarihi*, esp. pp. 53-89; and H. Çelik, *Ali Suavî ve dönemi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1994; pp. 25-40.

- 215 For a detailed examination of Namık Kemal, his thought and influence, see: Ş. Mardin, *The genesis of Young Ottoman thought*, pp. 283–336. It ought to be mentioned that the most important communication channels, the postal system (1834), telegraph (1855) and railways (1856) were established, in the main, for military reasons. To these, however, was added the establishment of the “modern” press (1860). An exposition of the “literary-linguistic evolution” as underlying the overall improvement in communications, is by: Ş. Mardin, “Some notes on an early phase in the modernization of communication in Turkey”, *Comparative studies in society and history*, III (April) 1961, pp. 250–271; and K.H. Karpat, “Mass media: B. Turkey”, pp. 255–282 in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Also cf., in general: S.R. İskit, *Türkiye’de matbuat rejimleri*. İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, 1939; M.N. Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1938; and A.D. Jeltyakov, *Türkiye’nin sosyo-politik ve kültürel hayatında basın (1729–1908 yılları)*. (Trans.) Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü. Ankara: Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1979.
- 216 For details, see N.218 below.
- 217 B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 99; E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, V, p. 157; *ibid.*, VI, pp. 115ff; and N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 136–137 and pp. 300–303. See, in general: Hafız Ahmed Lûtfi, *Tarih-i Lûtfi*, esp. Cilt V, for these changes in the central government apparatus. A recent compilation of the membership figures of various government bodies, mainly Ministries, for 1883–1908, reveals the distinct homogeneity of the Ministry of War which, with by far the highest number of personnel, had consistently the highest percentage (98% throughout) of Muslims: C.V. Findley, *Ottoman civil officialdom: a social history*, p. 112.
- 218 The letter is reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Mithat Paşa ve Yıldız Mahkemesi*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.53. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1967; pp. 60–61. The preparations for the deposition, the events and the role of the organizers are given in *ibid.*, pp. 37–79. Also see: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*. [Rev.ed.] İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1959; pp. 82–110 and, for the letter, p. 101. It is worthy of note that the same rueful sentiments were expressed in precisely the same words to his Second Court Chamberlain, Fahri Bey, during a reflective moment shortly after the Sultan’s dethronement. Fahri Bey, *İbretnümâ: Mabeyinci Fahri Bey’in hatıraları ve ilgili bazı belgeler*. (Yayına hazırlayan) B.S. Baykal. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları II.Seri-Sa.23. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1968; p. 9.
- According to Mardin, the dethronement of Abdülaziz

“... was born from, and rested upon the same causes as, the discontent of the three elements which formed the cornerstone of the state edifice, the men of religion, the men of government and the military. The principally important point, however, is that the matter of the deposition was decided by the soldiers.”

Ş. Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlılar, Jön Türkler ve silahlı kuvvetler”, *Forum*, XIV:176 (1 Ağustos) 1961, pp. 6–7, p. 7.

Cf., the account of the head of the War College, Süleyman Paşa, who was instrumental in the deposition, together with the former *Serasker* and later Minister of War, Hüseyin Avni Paşa (1820–1876): Süleyman Paşa, *Hiss-i inkılâb*. [İstanbul]: Tanin Matbaası, 1326. For an appreciation and translation of this work, see: R. Devereux, “Süleyman Pasha’s ‘The feeling of the revolution’”, *Middle Eastern studies*, 15:1 (January) 1979, pp. 3–35. Also, for

the "role of the military" in the deposition, see: Ahmet Saip Bey, *Vak'a-i Abdül-Aziz*. Kahire: Matbaa-i Hindiye, 1326.

The correspondent of the *New York tribune* was in İstanbul during this time. His vivid account and accurate observations of people and events are found in: H.O. Dwight, *Turkish life in war time*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881; see esp. his entries for 30 May, 1 June and 2 June, on pp. 16-27. Cf., the account of the historian, Cevdet Paşa, in his "Submissions": Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ma'arûzât*. (Hazırlayan) Y. Halaçoğlu. İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980; pp. 229-232. Further, his *Tezâkir*. [Vol.4], pp. 153-161. In general, see: R.H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, esp. pp. 317-346.

- 219 For the deposition of Murad V on 1 September 1876, by a *fetva*, on the ground of insanity, and the internal and external crises leading up to that deposition, see: "MURAD V", *İ.A.*, Cilt VIII, pp. 647-651; and "MURAD V", *E.I.2*, Vol.III, Pt.2, p. 732. Cf., R.H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, pp. 317-346; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 283-284. Further: Mahmud Celeleddin, *Mirat-ı hakikat, tarih-i Mahmud Celeleddin Paşa*. [İstanbul]; Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1326-1327. 3 cilt. See esp. Cilt I, pp. 166ff.; and İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Mithat Paşa ve Yıldız Mahkemesi*, pp. 115-122.
- 220 Cevdet Paşa's explanation of these, based on his personal observation, has not yet to my mind been improved upon: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ma'arûzât*, pp. 61-112; and his *Tezâkir*, Cilt 2, tez.no.20, pp. 266-275, and Cilt 3, tez.no.21-26, pp. 3-105. But for a reliable study, see: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, Cilt VII: Islahat fermanı devri (1861-1876). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16g. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1856; [Hereafter, E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VII]; esp. pp. 72-101.

According to Anderson:

"Of all the nationalist and pseudo-nationalist movements which affected the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s the most impressive to observers in western Europe was Pan Slavism."

M.S. Anderson, *The eastern question*, p. 169. For his detailed exposition, see esp. pp. 169ff.

I have also relied upon the following works in assessing the Balkan crisis of 1875-1887: H. Sedes, *1875-1876 Bosna-Hersek ve Bulgaristan ihtilâlleri ve siyasi olaylar*. İstanbul: Çituri Biraderler Basımevi, 1946, 2 kısım; C. Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan nationalism: Russian influence in the internal affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958; D.Sliflepević, *The Macedonian question: the struggle for southern Serbia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968; M.D. Stolanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938; and, in general, W.L. Langer, *European alliances and alignments, 1871-1890*. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1962.

- 221 E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VII, pp. 187-189 and pp. 192ff.; M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940-1948. 5 cilt. Cilt 2, pp. 195-197, p. 202, pp. 213-214 and pp. 260-277, based on authoritative sources. Also: E. Kuran, "Serasker Hüseyin Avni Paşa", *Türk kültürü*, 58 (Ağustos) 1967, pp. 745-747. Cf., M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzamlar*. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1940-1953. 14 cüz. Esp. pp. 578-579. Further: Mehmed Memduh, *Tanzimattan Meşrutiyete: I, Mir'ât-i şuûnât*. (Sadeleştiren) H. Develi. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990 (originally published in 1912); pp. 76-105. Details of the modernization of the armed forces in 1869 are found in: Ahmed Cevad Bey, *Tarih-i askeri-i Osmani*. III.Cilt, Kitap 5. İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kütüphanesi, yazma sa. TY/6127; and N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 147-148 and pp. 205-208.

- 222 N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 224. Cf., B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 163–169.

The Young Ottoman, Ali Suavi, was in no doubt that Britain and France posed always a far greater threat to the Ottoman state than did Russia: H. Çelik, *Ali Suavi ve dönemi*, p. 449.

- 223 K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman state*, p. 267. According to Karpat, the constitution, from a functional point of view,

“... appeared as a rational measure designed to achieve essentially the integrative political roles performed by parliaments in the West. The need and place for a parliament was determined not by culture but by the functional necessities stemming from a diversified social structure and a differentiated political system.”

ibid., pp. 267–268.

Cf. the remarks of: A. Mumcu, “Osmanlı devletinde 1876 anayasasına değin temel hak ve özgürlükler ile 1876 anayasasının temel yapısı”, and the comments on it by E.Z. Karal, pp. 31–39 and pp. 41–44 respectively in: *Türk parlamentoculuğunun ilk yüzyılı, 1876–1976: Kanun-u Esasinin 100. Yılı Sempozyumu (9–11 Nisan 1976)*. (Hazırlayan) Siyasi İlimler Türk Derneği. Ankara: Türk Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık Sanayii, [1976]. Further, see: K.H. Karpat, “The Ottoman Parliament of 1876 and its social significance”, *Actes du Premier Congrès International des Etudes Balkaniques et Sud-Est Européennes*, IVme, Sofia, 1969, pp. 247–257.

On the provincial, administrative and economic policies of the reformer, Midhat Paşa (1822–1884), Governor of Danube and later of Baghdad, see, for example: A. Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha and the land system of Lower Irak”, pp. 106–136 in A. Hourani (ed.), *Middle Eastern affairs; St. Antony's papers: 16*. Carbondale: [n.pub.], 1963. Also: S.J. Shaw, *The origins of representative government in the Ottoman Empire: an introduction to the provincial councils, 1839–1876*; and S.J. Shaw, *The central legislative councils in the nineteenth-century Ottoman reform movement before 1876*.

- 224 Cf., R. Devereux, *The first Ottoman constitutional period: a study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963; pp. 30–41. Also see: B.S. Baykal, “93 Meşrutiyeti”, *Belleten*, VI:21–22 (II.Kanun – Nisan) 1942, pp. 45–83; and B.S. Baykal, “Birinci Meşrutiyete dair belgeler”, *Belleten*, XXIV:96 (Ekim) 1960, pp. 601–636. In addition: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism on Turkey*, pp. 223–226. For some perceptive points relevant to my argument, see: Z. Arıkan, “Midhat Paşa ve 1876 anayasası'nın savunusu”, *Tarih ve toplum*, 12:70 (Kasım) 1989, pp. 23–27.

- 225 Indeed, Article 7 of the Constitution recognized the right to dissolve Parliament as one of the “sacred rights” of the ruler and added, “... on condition that the Chamber of Deputies be elected again as required”. However, the Article did not specify any time limit. Moreover, Article 113 provided the Sultan with a personal right over the Government. The third clause of the Article read:

“It is in the sole power of His Excellency the Padişah to expel and banish from the Ottoman dominions those whom the authentic investigation of the police have established as having destroyed the security of the Government.”

The text of the 1876 Constitution used here is in: A.Ş. Gözübüyük-S. Kili, *Türk anayasa metinleri, 1839–1980*. 2. bası. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları:496. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1982; pp. 27–28 and p.42 respectively.

In general: "KANUN-U ESASİ 1", İ.A., Cilt VI, pp. 168-175; R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, pp. 143-171; and E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*. Cilt VIII: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve istibdat devirleri (1876-1907). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XIII.Seri-Sa.16h. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1962; [Hereafter, E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VIII]; pp. 219-230.

The İstanbul Conference ended on 20 January 1877, with the reactions to the Russian proposals by the Midhat Paşa Government, as a result of which Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

"Abdül-Hamid's judgement of the West proved to be correct. Midhat's policy of circumventing European consent to Russia's attack collapsed; his scheme of implementing reforms by subjugating the ruler to the will of parliament failed miserably."

N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 249.

Cf., W.L. Langer, *European alliances and alignments, 1871-1890*, pp. 89-120, on the İstanbul Conference; and Y.T. Kurat, "1877-1878 Osmanlı-Rus harbinin sebepleri", *Belleten*, XXVI:103 (Temmuz) 1962, pp. 567-592. Yet cf., R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-1878*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979; pp. 254ff. Also see, for a Palace insider's view of Abdülhamid's foreign policy skills: Ali Said, *Ali Said Saray hatıraları: Sultan Abdülhamid'in hayatı*. (Hazırlayan) A.N. Galitekin. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1994 (originally published in 1922); pp. 36-39. Further: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 1, pp. 232ff. and, on the issues discussed here, pp. 318-353.

- 226 E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VIII, pp. 305-306; and N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 258-259. Further: S.J. and E.K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977. 2 vols. Vol.II, pp. 259-260.

However, misunderstanding persists. Cf., D. Kushner, "The place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire during the age of reform (1839-1918)", *Turcica*, XIX, 1987, pp. 51-74, p. 71. The ulema's support for Abdülhamid II's policy of keeping Parliament closed is well attested in: Y. Özkaya, "Birinci Kanuni Esasi ve Meşrutiyet hakkında ortaya konulan görüşler ve Parlamento usulü hakkında bir layiha", *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi dergisi*, XXXI:1-2, 1987, pp. 397-415.

- 227 For example, the Constitution of 1876 formally claimed, under the "Rights of the Sultan", the high Islamic Caliphate for the Ottoman Empire. Thus, as a direct result, the head of the *ulema* (the *Şeyhülislâm*) was included in the *Meclis-i Vükela* (Council of Ministers) as *Meşihat*, with the same rank as a Minister. See, for example: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VIII, p. 222 and pp. 303-305.

This, indeed, was in accord with the political doctrine upon which rested the idea that sovereignty still belonged to Allah and to the Vicegerent of Allah on earth; the *Şeriat* was Allah's law, of which the Constitution was only a part. As it stood, the Constitution was, in fact, the constitutional reimposition of the personality principle (See N.15 of this Chapter). In the words of the contemporary historian, Mahmud Celaledin, ruling on the basis of this Constitution amounted to constitutional absolutism. Mahmud Celaledin, *Mir'at-ı hakikat: tarih-i Mahmud Celaledin Paşa*, Cilt I, p. 222.

As Berkes has put it:

"Needless to say, in a period of Islamic nationalism, the Hamidian view had a greater appeal to the majority of the Turkish and Muslim people. The same mood could be found all over the Islamic world. That is why the

best spokesman of this world, Jamal al-Dīn Afghani, denounced the constitutionalists and sided with Abdül-Hamid."

N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 231. On "the prevalence of outward religiosity" of the Hamidian period, see: *ibid.*, pp. 258-261; and, on Hamidian pan-Islamism, *ibid.*, pp. 267-270.

Cf. S. Duguid, "The politics of unity: Hamidian policy in eastern Anatolia", *Middle Eastern studies*, 9:2 (May) 1973, pp. 139-155, esp. pp. 139-141; and a number of detailed studies by: İ.S. Sırma, *Birkaç sahife tarih*. 2. baskı. Konya: Esra Yayınları, 1991; esp. pp. 9-68.

- 228 In order to support and illustrate this assertion, I have drawn up the following table, which indicates that during his reign, the ability of the Sultan to control the upper echelons of the civil and military offices was evident in his frequent changes and interchanges among their incumbents, with the exception of the *ulema*. It would appear that such measures provoked the insecurity and resulting inefficiency of these offices, and thus subordinated them by corroding their power.

Office holder	1876-1908: Number in period	1876-1908: Change in period	Source: Karal, <i>Osmanlı tarihi</i> , VIII p.nos.
Şeyhülislâm	6	6	pp. 306-308
Sadrâzam (i.e., Grand Vezir)	17	26	pp. 278-301, p. 302
Serasker and Harbiye Nâzırı	10	14	p.353.

An authoritative commentary may be found in: "Sultan Abdülhamide dair", pp. 1264-1306 in M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, see esp. p. 1269. Indeed, cf., R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, pp. 209-214.

- 229 D.A. Rustow, "The modernization of Turkey in historical and comparative perspective", pp. 93-120 in K.H. Karpat [et al.], *Social change and politics in Turkey: a structural-historical analysis*, p. 102.

For attempts at modernization as applied to education in general, see: B. Kodaman, *Abdülhamid devri eğitim sistemi*. İstanbul: Ötügen Neşriyat, 1980; pp. 100-224 and esp. pp. 252-253; together with: B. Emil, *Mizancı Murad Bey: hayatı ve eserleri*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:2417. İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1979; esp. pp. 92ff. And as applied specifically to the armed forces, see: N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 211-231.

All these should be seen within the general context, best outlined (in English) to date, in: C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 239-290; and C.V. Findley, *Ottoman civil officialdom: a social history*, pp. 137ff.

- 230 That the Sultan came to be recognized as the author of these reforms, in so far as they acted upon the military, may be discerned from the enthusiasm of an Ottoman junior officer, Adjutant-Major (*Kolağası*) Osman Senai Bey, in 1898:

"Staff-officers are in fact the soul of every state and of every army. Every state places great trust in its own staff-officers and holds them in much esteem. Ottoman staff-officers . . . have, *under the auspices of the Sultan*, acquired military education to the same degree as those of the Great Powers."

- O. Senai (Erdemgil), *Erkân-ı Harp Kolağası, Osmanlı-Yunan seferi*. [İstanbul]: İbrahim Hilmi Kitabevi, 1315; p. 163. (Emphasis his).
- 231 O. Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi*, Cilt 2, p. 495.
 For example, in 1876 the nine *Askerî Rüşdiyes* had 63 teachers and 1,468 uniformed students. The basis for my assessment of, especially, the development of the *Askerî İdadî* and the *Askerî Rüşdiye* from 1845 to 1908, is found in: *ibid.*, Cilt 2, pp. 426–721 and Cilt 3, pp. 837–934.
 Further, the merits of the establishment of preparatory schools (*Rüşdiye, İdadî*) were assessed on the basis of their coming under strictly military administration and thus providing the lead in secular military education, in: Hakkı, Piyade Kolağası, *Osmanlı ordusu ahvâl ve tensikâtı askeriyesi*, esp. pp. 258–264. The information on the *Erkân-ı Harb* division and its development is contained in: M.M. İşkora, *Harb Akademileri tarihçesi*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, Cilt 1: 1966 (2.baskı), Cilt 2: 1968. See Cilt 1, esp. pp. 5–6, on the decision for the formal establishment of the *Erkân-ı Harb* (known first as School and later as Academy) in 1845 and its implementation in 1848; and pp. 139–143 on the numbers and wide base of recruitment of its graduates. Also see: İ. Kayabalı-C. Arslanoğlu, “Kara kuvvetleri sayısı”, *Türk kültürü*, 130/131/132 (Ağustos/Eylül/Ekim) 1973, pp. 1389–1399.
 My assessment of the military education is also based upon the following works: Z.Ş. Soko, *Tanzimat devrinden sonra Osmanlı nizam ordusu tarihi*. İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1957; A. Avcı, *Türkiye’de askeri yüksek okulları tarihçesi: Cumhuriyet devrine kadar*. T.C. Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Geliştirme Başkanlığı Yayını. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1963; N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 355–375; and M.R. İnan, “Atatürk’ün devraldığı eğitim, öğretim durumu ve kurumları (eğitim düzeni)”, pp. 117–161 in *Atatürk konferansları, 1971–1972*, Cilt V. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVII.Seri-Sa.5. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1975; esp. pp. 118–133.
- 232 D.A. Rustow, “The army and the founding of the Turkish Republic”, *World politics*, II:4, 1959, pp. 513–552, p. 515.
 As I see it, the concept of advancement by merit is clearly implied in the words of an inscribed foundation plaque over the door of the Üsküdar *Askerî Rüşdiye*:
 “His Excellency, Sultan Abdülaziz Han, who has made it his business to provide education for the sake of procuring the future security of the realm, has omitted neither İstanbul nor Baghdad nor Syria. He has spent his time and money in order to open regular *Rüşdiye* schools. You too, while the cost is still so cheap, enter and claim your share . . .”
 Reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Konyalı, *Abideleri ve kitâbeleriyle Üsküdar tarihi*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1976–1977. 2 cilt. Cilt II, p. 301.
 Further: M.M. İşkora, *Harb Akademileri tarihçesi*, Cilt I, pp. 142ff., which provides a list showing the breadth of the geographical origins of the graduates of the Staff-College, according to place of birth.
- 233 The earlier title mentioned for the military high quarters, *Bab-ı Seraskeri*, changed to *Harbiye Nezareti* (Ministry of War) in 1879, reverted to its old name in 1884 and later took the name of *Harbiye* only. Two bodies were closely related to the Ministry of War, *Dar-ı Şura-yı Askerî* and *Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye* (General Staff), representing the seven major divisions of the military forces (*ordu*), and a separate body, *Tophane-i Âmire Nezareti* (Imperial Arsenal of Ordnance). See: E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VIII, pp. 352–354.
- 234 The point of such pressures causing rather intense dissatisfaction among the young officer corps, may be found in: E.E. Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks*:

prelude to the revolution of 1908. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957; esp. pp. 114–117.

On the other hand, for example, on the Sultan's displeasure with the liberal tendencies at the *Harbiye*, see: B. Stern, *Jungtürken und Verschwörer: die innere Lage der Türkei unter Abdul Hamid II*. 2. Auflage. Leipzig: Verlag von Gröbel & Sommerlatte, 1901; pp. 194–198, and also “Der Liberalismus in der Armee”, pp. 246–254. After all, the Sultan was very well informed, through the *jurnals* (secret reports) that he received regularly from several of the teachers there, examples of which are reproduced in full, in: A. Tugay, *İbret: Abdülhamid'e verilen jurnaller ve jurnalciler*. 2 cilt. Cilt 1: İstanbul: Okat Yayınevi, [n.d.]; Cilt 2: İstanbul: Yörük Yayınevi, 1962; [Hereafter, A. Tugay, *İbret*]; Cilt 1, pp. 50–53.

Also see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*. III. cilt, 6. kısım, 1. cilt (1908–1920). T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, Resmi Yayınları, Seri sa.2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1971; esp. pp. 112–119. Cf., Ş. Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri, 1895–1908*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1964; pp. 38–40 and pp. 225–230; and E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VIII, pp. 369–375.

- 235 The term originally belongs to Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey (1876–1935) – later known as Yusuf Akçura – who published a lengthy treatise entitled *Üç tarz-ı siyaset*, first appearing in: *Türk gazetesi*, sa.24–34. [Egypt], 1904; and later published as a monograph, under the same title, in İstanbul in 1912 (Kader Matbaası, 1327). Despite its date, it remains one of the most valuable contributions to the understanding of the rise of Turkish nationalism. Cf., Yusuf Akçura, *Üç tarz-ı siyaset*. Reprinted on the 100th anniversary of his birth and edited with a foreword by E.Z. Karal. *Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları*, VII.Seri-Sa.73. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1976.

For his influence, see: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 321–322; and N. Berkes, *Türkiye’de çağdaşlaşma*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978; pp. 392–394; and his important contribution: N. Berkes, “Unutulan adam”, pp. 194–203 in *Sosyoloji Konferansları, Kitap 14*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1976. Cf., B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 326–327 and pp. 349–350.

Further, as a convenient background, see: D. Thomas, “Yusuf Akçura and the intellectual origins of ‘Üç tarz-ı siyaset’”, *Türklük bilgisi araştırmaları*, 2, 1978, pp. 127–140; together with F. Georgeon, *Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935)*. Paris: Editions ADPF, 1980, which also includes the French translation of *Üç tarz-ı siyaset*; see pp. 95–112. Also: Y. Sarııay, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin tarihi gelişimi ve Türk ocakları, 1912–1931*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1994; p. 165ff.

- 236 B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 195.

Also: Ş. Mardin, “L’aliénation des Jeunes Turcs: essai d’explication partielle d’une ‘Conscience Revolutionnaire’”, pp. 157–165 in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et P. Dumont (éds.), *Economie et société dans l’Empire ottoman (fin de XVIIIe-début du XXe siècle)*. Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1983.

- 237 My information is drawn from: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler: 1859–1952*, esp. pp. 102ff.; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 21–23 and pp. 49–50; Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*. Cilt I. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.9. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940; esp. pp. 1–225; Y.H. Bayur, *Atatürk hayatı ve eseri, I*. Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1963; esp. pp. 15–22; and F.R. Unat, “Atatürk’ün II. Meşrutiyet inkılâbının hazırlanmasındaki rolüne ait bir belge”, *Belleten*, XXVI:102 (Nisan) 1962, pp. 339–349.

Cf., S. Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987; pp. 59–65. Also: E.E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*, pp. 95ff. Further: A.B. Kuran, *İnkilâp tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945; A.B. Kuran, *İnkilâp tarihimiz ve İttihad ve Terakki*. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1948; and A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve milli mücadele*. Also, for by far the best explanation of the setting for the restamping of the military seal: İ. Tekelli-S. İlkin, "İttihat ve Terakki hareketlerinin oluşumunda Selânik'in toplumsal yapısının belirleyiciliği", pp. 351–382 in O. Okyar and H. İnalçık (eds.), *Türkiye'nin sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi (1071–1920)*. Ankara: Meteksan, 1980. For a sense of the varieties of ideologies, see: M.Ş. Hanioglu, "Notes on the Young Turks and the Freemasons, 1875–1908", *Middle Eastern studies*, 25:2 (April) 1989, pp. 186–197.

- 238 Here, I wish to acknowledge with thanks the historian, Cemal Kutay, who informed me of the existence, and supplied me with the details, of this document, which he had also published himself in one of his monthly periodicals: C. Kutay, "Türk ordusu ne zaman ihtilâl yapar?", *Sohbetler*, I:1 (Nisan) 1971, pp. 31–37. I have not, to date, been able to see the original document.

Of interest is: C.M. Kortepeter, "Ottoman military reform during the late Tanzimat: the Prussian General von der Goltz and the Ottoman army", pp. 247–260 in C.M. Kortepeter, *The Ottoman Turks: nomad kingdom to world empire*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1991.

For a detailed assessment of "Die Ära von der Goltz", see: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, pp. 64–107. Cf., especially, the assessment of Colonel H.C. Surtees, British Military Attaché in İstanbul, in "Memoranda" entitled "The Turkish Empire as a military factor", dated 16 November 1906:

"... the standard of education and of intelligence both among the officers as well as in the rank-and-file is now very much higher than it has ever been before in Turkey, owing to the efforts the present Sultan has made."

Barclay to Grey, Constantinople, 18 January 1907, "Memoranda" enclosed in General Report on Turkey For The Year 1906, in *British Foreign Office documents, Public Record Office, London*; [Hereafter, *F.O.*]; 195/2363.

As for the significance and importance of Macedonia, and of Rumelia in general, two recent works are useful: P. Dumont, "A Jewish, socialist and Ottoman organization: the Workers' Federation of Salonica", pp. 49–75 in M. Tunçay and E.J. Zürcher (eds.), *Socialism and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1923*. London: British Academic Press, 1994; pp. 49–51; and A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*. Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1992; pp. 36–41.

- 239 For example:

"The past year has witnessed several cases of mutiny amongst the troops for arrears of pay. In every case the men carried their point, and after obtaining what was due to them quietly dispersed."

O'Connor to Grey, Constantinople, 13 January 1908, Turkey: Annual Report, 1907, *F.O.* 195/2363.

The significance of the disaffection among the military in terms of arrears of pay, irregularities in promotions, intra-service rivalry and so forth, is considered in a recent study by: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 41–48.

A general assessment of the internal unrest is found in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II, Kısım IV: Fikir cereyanları, inkilâp hareketleri, iç didişmeler, birinci genel savaşın patlaması. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.14b. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1952; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4];

esp. pp. 81–82, and further, pp. 145–161. Also, an informative source: H.Z. Kars, *Belgelerle 1908 devrimi öncesinde Anadolu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984. Further, for an overall coverage: A. Kansu, *1908 devrimi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1995. In particular: O. Türkdoğan, “1906–1907 Erzurum hürriyet ayaklanması”, parts I, II and III, *Türk kültürü*, XXII:255, 256, 257 (Temmuz, Ağustos, Eylül) 1984, pp. 453–466, pp. 497–509 and pp. 575–596 respectively; together with O. Türkdoğan, “1906–1907 Erzurum hürriyet ayaklanması ile ilgili yeni belgeler”, *Türk dünyası araştırmaları*, 47 (Nisan) 1987, pp. 23–39.

Scant though the studies may be, the economic crises during 1907 and 1908 as the underlying cause of internal unrest have also been examined by: D. Quataert, “Some considerations regarding the Young Turk Revolution”, *Turkish Studies Association bulletin*, 3:1 (March) 1979, pp. 16–17; D. Quataert, “The 1908 Young Turk Revolution: old and new approaches”, *Middle East Studies Association bulletin*, XIII:1 (July) 1979, pp. 22–27, esp. p. 27; and, more extensively: D. Quataert, “The economic climate of the ‘Young Turk Revolution’ of 1908”, *Journal of modern history*, 51:3 (September) 1979, microfiche supplement D1147.

- 240 Cf. for example, the comments of: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p.207. Also see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics (1908–1914)*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969; pp. 2–4.

One of the most important and influential political personalities of the era, Talât Paşa, much later recorded, while in exile in Germany, a detailed recollection of the events in which he had participated. He still dwelled on the theme of Anglo-Russian collusion at Reval towards the dismemberment of the Empire, a collusion of which he seems to have had no doubt: C. Kutay, [edited, with commentary], *Şehit Sadriazâm Talat Paşa'nın gurbet hatıraları*. İstanbul: [the author], 1983. 3 cilt; [Hereafter, Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*]; Cilt 1, pp. 188–189. For related documents, see: “The state visit of King Edward to Czar Nicholas at Reval, 9–10th June, 1908”, in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), *British documents on the origins of the War, 1898–1914*. London: H.M.S.O., 1926–1938. 11 vols. [Hereafter, B.D.]; Vol.V, nos.188–246, pp. 232–246; and cf., “Die Entrevue von Reval. Legenden und Intrigen”, in J. Lepsius, A.M. Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds.), *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes*. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte mbH, 1922–1927. 40 Band. [Hereafter, G.P.]. 25. Band, Zweite Hälfte [Hereafter, 25.Band/2], Nr. 8798–8829, pp. 441–494.

Abdülhamid II's perception of the intentions and motivations of the Powers is assessed in: M.K. Öke, “‘Şark Meselesi’ ve II. Abdülhamid garp politikaları (1876–1909)”, *Osmanlı araştırmaları*, III, 1982, pp. 247–276.

- 241 See the documentary evidence provided in a recent study: A.G. Tokay, *The Macedonian question and the origins of the Young Turk revolution, 1903–1908*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1994.
- 242 Quoted in F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 6.
Also cf. his own account: Niyazi, Kolağası Resneli Ahmed, *Hâtîrât-ı Niyazi, yahut tarihçe-i inkilâb-ı kebir-i Osmaniden bir sahife*. İstanbul: Sabah Matbaası, 1326. Yet Ahmad has emphasised that:

“Though these memoirs are valuable as a source for this period their political bias must not be forgotten: to exaggerate the role of the Committee in the

insurrection, and to make it appear as if the movement was directed at all times and through all stages by the C[ommittee of] U[nion and] P[rogress].”

F. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 5, N.3.

Cf., the perceptive comments of the then German Consul in Selânik on “Oberstleutnant Niasi Effendi”, *Ostman an den Bulow*, Saloniki, 8 Juli 1908, G.P., 25.Band/2, Nr.8876, pp. 559–560. Also cf. another, more sober, account of an officer of the period, Staff-Adjutant-Major Ali Fethi (Okyar) Bey: F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*. (Hazırlayan) C. Kutay. İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980; pp. 6–23.

Obviously, the Sultan’s knowledge of the happenings in the area was extensive, as may be gauged from the sheer number and breadth of *journals* he received, some reproduced in full, in: A. Tugay, *İbret*, Cilt 1, pp. 67–70, pp. 89–98 and pp. 140–141.

See, in general: F. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–13; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 163–203, for an appreciation of this and similar military insurrections, as the antecedents of the reproclamation of the Constitution.

- 243 B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 208. For details, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 163–203; and a reliable, personal history of the times by a Staff-Captain: K. Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, 1896–1909*. (Yayımlayan) F. ve E. Özerengin. İstanbul: Türdav Ofset Tesisler, 1982 (originially published in 1945); pp. 87–325.

- 244 See the report, dated 7 July 1908 (24 Haziran 1324), which *Serasker Rıza Paşa* presented to the Sultan concerning Şemsi Paşa’s appointment and the despatching of troops against rebels from Anatolia. Document reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, “1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar”, *Belleten*, XX:77 (Ocak) 1956, pp. 103–174, Ves.sa.IV, pp. 155–157. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 179–183, on the appointment of Şemsi Paşa; A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 466–470; and Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 211–215. Cf., İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–109.

- 245 See: Coded telegram no. 3178, dated 22 July 1908 (9 Temmuz 1324), which was sent to the Chief Secretary by *Müşir Osman Paşa*, General Officer Commanding at Manastır, regarding the fact that the reserve (*redif*) battalions who were required to be despatched to the area of Ohri, did not want to go there. Document reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar*, Ves.sa.VIII, pp. 160–161. Cf., *Hoffmann an den Bulow*, Nr.67, Saloniki, 23 Juli 1908, G.P., 25.Band/2, Nr.8877, pp. 560–563; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 187–192. Also see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 10. Further details in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–113. And cf., the personal recollections of: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 235–236.

- 246 See, for example: K.H. Karpat, *The transformation of the Ottoman state*, pp. 280–281. Cf., documents reproduced in full, in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar*, Ves.sa.XIII and XIV, pp. 170–171.

- 247 On all this, see: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar*, pp. 120–143, pp. 151–155, pp. 165–170 and pp. 172–174. Cf., the discussion of, for example: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 12–13. For a selection of authoritative contemporary opinion, given *verbatim*, see: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekilleri*, Cilt 5, pp. 674–720.

- 248 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler*, p. 108; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 19–20; and A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 154–155.

The most authoritative accounts of all the political societies, their founders,

members, programmes &c. between the years 1889 and 1908, are found in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasî partiler*, pp. 102–160. Further, see: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Bir siyasal düşünür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi*. İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, [1981]; pp. 21–28; M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Bir siyasal örgüt olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*. Cilt I: (1889–1902). 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989; pp. 173ff; and, more conveniently, his English version: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in opposition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; pp. 33ff. Also: M.Ş. Hanioglu, “The constitutional movement of 1908 according to documents of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress”, pp. 277–285 in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et E. van Donzel (éds.), *Comité International d’Etudes Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, VIth symposium, Cambridge, 1rst [sic]-4th July 1984*. İstanbul and Paris: Divit Press, 1987.

But, for a sceptical view of the, albeit unwitting, role of the Young Turks as a tool of all the major European powers throughout this period, see: S. Kocabaş, *Kendi itirafları Jön Türkler nerede yanlış? 1890–1918 hayaller . . . komplolar . . . kayıplar . . .* İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1991; pp. 125–154.

249 According to Kutay:

“The basic reason that caused the downfall of Abdülhamid lies in the fact that he . . . could not comprehend the conditions of absolutism at the time in which he lived. It should be admitted that the effects which opened the way to the second Constitution were based upon physical power rather than being intellectual.”

C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*. İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1957–1962. 20 cilt. Cilt 16, p. 9161. As the Chief Secretary, Tahsin Paşa (1895–1908), emphasised in his memoirs:

“. . . it can unhesitatingly be claimed that the greatest, most important and most powerful factor which caused Sultan Hamid to call for the restoration of the Constitution and the assembling of Parliament [*Meclis-i Mebusan*] was the army [i.e., the military].”

Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamid [ve] Yıldız hâtıraları*. İstanbul: Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931; p. 259 and also pp. 262–271. Cf., A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872–1946*. İstanbul: Mithat Akçit Yayını, 1946; p. 189. Also the assessment by: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*. İstanbul Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984–1989. 3 cilt. Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki: bir çağın, bir kuşağın, bir partinin tarihi; p. 17–18. Further:

“The revolution of July . . . was the work in a great measure of the army, and notably that of the officers of III Ordu, supported by their comrades of the II Ordu.”

Lowther to Grey, Conf., 17 February, 1909, Turkey: Annual Report, 1908. F.O. 195/2363; and the *Annual Register for the year 1908*, which contains the bald statement:

“The ‘Young Turkish’ Party . . . did not strike its blow for a constitution until it was assured of the support of the army.” (p.325).

Also cf. the assessment of a contemporary soldier, *Maggiore Generale* Félice de St.-Eustache:

“. . . ebbe carattere eminentemente costituzionale e nazionalista e si iniziò nel 3o ordu (Salonico) e passò nel 2o (Adrianopoli); dagli ufficiali si estese alla truppa, trascinando fulmineamente tutto il rimanente dell’esercito e l’elemento civile, non solo della Turchia Europea, ma

dell'Asia Minore . . . Il sultano, vistosi sfuggire l'appoggio sicuro delle truppe, dovette cedere e tutto l'antico regime, vero castello di carta, si sfasciò al primo urto. Questo movimento in molti punti ricorda quello dei Carbonari nel 1821, divampato nell'esercito, tanto nel Reame di Napoli, quanto in Piemonte, lasciando il popolo spettatore ad applaudire. Vedremo se l'esito attuale ne sarà differente!"

in his "L'esercito nel movimento costituzionale della Turchia", *Revista d'Italia*, anno XI, II:X (Ottobre) 1908, pp. 513-532, p. 525.

- 250 The details of the *şehadatnâme* (diploma) and the dates of its award and confirmation are reproduced in full, in: M.M. İşkora, *Harp Akademileri tarihçesi*, Cilt I, pp. 38-40.
- 251 In fact, Second-Lieutenant (*Mülazımsanı*) Basri Efendi was awarded his pass-certificate (*intihapnâme*) on completing his first year at the *Erkân-ı Harbiye*, and it was confirmed on 20 September 1906 (7 Eylül 1322). He was then informed that he had been accepted into the second year on his promotion to First-Lieutenant (*Mülazımevvel*). He took this oath on 26 September 1906 (13 Eylül 1322) upon the confirmation of his new rank and class. For the details of the *intihapnâme*, see: M.M. İşkora, *Harp Akademileri tarihçesi*, Cilt I, pp. 40-41. In his career, Staff-Captain Basri (Saran) Efendi rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General (*Korgeneral*) in the Republic of Turkey.

Part Three

The Influence of the Military Tradition upon the Young Turks

Preamble

The politicization of the officer corps

I.

The pressure leading up to the restoration of the 1876 Constitution in 1908 was exerted primarily by intellectuals, not least among the military, so that it emerged as overwhelmingly military in character. In fact, the re proclamation itself on 23/24 July was the direct result of action by military officers. At the onset of what I consider the transition period from empire to the nation-state, therefore, the military were propelled once again into the centre of the political arena. The most important result was the transfer of the locus of power to the armed forces, a transfer which conformed with the continuity of the Turkish military tradition.

In the tumultuous political upheavals following 1908, the military was the dominant factor in the process that was to lead ultimately to the foundation of the Turkish Republic. As such, the military did not merely represent the means without which civilian organizations would have been unable to exercise political power effectively. They constituted a political force, and did so throughout the threshold years of the transition. More important than this, however, was the fact that during these years officers were not just involved with partisan politics, they were obsessed with them. Corollary to this assertion, their obsession reflected an extraordinary degree of military power in the civil-military relations of the period.

Here, the nub of the matter is that the military now appeared to be instrumental not only as the regulator of internal conflicts

but also as an initiator of them – the inevitable consequence of involvement in domestic partisan politics. As it turned out, the regulative and initiative impulses were reciprocal. That is to say, the civilian organizations were themselves continually calling on the military for support, which allowed the armed forces to retain a monopoly of power. Concurrently the profession of arms, having absorbed the traditional military ethic, became distinctly aware of its moral superiority over the civilian élites. Thus a basic difference in outlook at the heart of these civil-military relations produced a unique political structure in the transition period to the extent that, at times of domestic and international crisis, politics far exceeded the conventional means of reconciling opposing interests.

On close examination, the political aspects of the civil-military relations are revealed in the various forms and motivations of the military's conscious political acts as well as in the nature of the politicization of the officer corps. From such a standpoint, the focus in this Part will be on the significant role that the military played in the Young Turk era and the way it set the scene for the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic.

II.

On the night of 12/13 April 1909, nearly nine months after the inauguration of the constitutional régime, an armed insurrection involving more than 3,000 *chasseur* artillery and infantry soldiery of the *Hassa Ordusu* (Imperial Guard Regiments), based in İstanbul, took place.¹ Later in the day they were joined by some theological students, members of the *ulema*, about a thousand naval ratings and some demoted or discharged *alaylı* officers in a reactionary coalition.² These insurgent elements, gathering in Sultan Ahmed Square and outside – even inside – Parliament, demanded generally “. . . the execution of the provisions of the *şariat* of illustrious Muhammed . . .”.³ Faced with the apparent inability of the Government of the day to do anything to contain this situation,⁴ the insurgents indulged in sporadic but belligerent demonstrations in the capital.

The Cabinet of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, having learned of the demands of the insurgents through Şeyhülislâm Ziyaeddin Efendi,⁵ “obligedly and forcedly [*bizzarure ve bilmeceburiyye*]” decided to resign and drew up a protocol accordingly.⁶ This was followed by an *irade* of the Sultan to be read to the soldiery informing them that the Government had resigned, a new Cabinet was about to take office and general security would be assured. Further, the

irade guaranteed an amnesty for the soldiers and for those who were with them, and the protection of the *şeriat*.⁷ In the meantime, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ahmed Rıza Bey, in compliance with the immediate demands of the insurgents, resigned.⁸

As soon as news of the insurgency reached, among other corners of the Empire, Selânik – by telegraph on 13/14 April – the IIIrd Army command took a decisive stance. Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the military's thinking was a stubborn insistence that the only means of suppressing the uprising was by the ruthless employment of military force.⁹ This decision was reached at the Military Club under the chairmanship of General Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Commander of the IIIrd Army, and was put into effect with the call for mobilization and the organization of a special task force, the Action Army (*Hareket Ordusu*),¹⁰ under the Paşa's overall command. On the night of 15/16 April, the first unit of the Action Army, commanded by Major Muhtar Bey, left Selânik by train. The IIrd Army, based in Edirne, had already been contacted and their support and allegiance to the cause confirmed; certain of its units joined the Action Army.¹¹ This, on the evening of 19 April, reached Ayastefanos (Yeşilköy) on the outskirts of İstanbul and, for the first time, officially communicated with the people of the capital in the name of the "Commander of the [Vanguard Forces (*Pişdar*) of the] Action Army, [Major-General (*Ferik*)] Hüseyin Hüsnü".¹² Having declared the intentions of the Action Army, Major-General Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa sent a telegram on the same day to the Directorate of the General Staff, which interests us more here:

"... With the treacherous intention of surrendering our legitimate Constitution into the executioner hands of despotism ... to outward appearance as if the *şeriat* were being demanded but, in fact, by totally opposing the manifest law of Muhammed, in the end [these men] have caused a bloody military rebellion ... The actions of these men of the *Hassa Ordusu* together with the men of the Navy and of the Imperial Arsenal have subjected to a very great shame the sacred Ottoman military which has sustained a six-hundred-year unblemished honour in submission and obedience [. . . altı yüz senelik lekesiz bir namus-ı inkiyad ve itaat taşımakta olan mukaddes Osmanlı ordusunu . . .]; [and] in order to cleanse this extraordinary blemish with all speed, those regular Ottoman forces which have been allocated from the IIrd and IIIrd Armies [have] just arrived at Ayastefanos [Yeşilköy] and Küçükçekmece, relying upon the help of *Allah*; henceforth, [for] the protection of the Constitution against every kind of transgression and injury, the restoration of public order and security in the capital and the taking of effective measures in the matter of fortifying [it], and the designation of suitable penalties for those despicable self-seekers and secret agents who have made the day of 31 March the most ill-omened

and inauspicious day of the Ottoman nation – *in order to be able to have a free hand in all these operations so as to restore the honour of the Ottoman military* [. . . bu sayede Osmanlı ordusunun namusunu ikmâl edilebilmek için . . .], [these forces] demand the following from their Navy and Army comrades in İstanbul . . .”¹³

Let me now seek to draw another historical incident into symmetry. The passage of scarcely a decade was to witness the further dismemberment and final collapse of the Ottoman Empire when the Central Powers, to which the Empire had during the First World War attached its last hopes of political survival, crumbled. And just over a year after the signing, on 30 October 1918, of the Mondros (Mudros) armistice of surrender, a letter was sent from Sivas, dated 8 December 1919. The sender was the former Inspector-General of the IIIrd Army Inspectorate, the newly-resigned Brigadier-General (*Mirliva*) Mustafa Kemal Paşa, and the receiver the Commander of the XIIth Army Corps stationed in Konya, Colonel (*Miralay*) Fahreddin (Altay) Bey. The letter consisted of six handwritten pages giving the author’s views on the existing situation. For our present purpose, however, it contained three particularly noteworthy passages:

“In order to be able to keep our nation as a solid mass among perverse and vexatious currents – *before everything, it depends upon the auspices and devotion of our valuable and patriotic friends, our exalted brothers like yourselves* [. . . herşeyden evvel zat-ı birâderileri gibi kıymetli, hamiyetli kumandan arkadaşlarımızın hizmet ve fedâkârlıklarına mual-lâktır].

Experience has shown the fickleness, for the most part, of high civil servants. Even the most sincere among them has done nothing but *comply always with the military commanders*.

It is worthy of gratitude and praise that *today, without exception, all our corps commander friends, with great goodwill, have united their opinions on the salvation of the country* [. . . tek mil kolordu kumandanları arkadaşlarımız, büyük bir hüsn-ü niyetle tahlis-i vatan noktasında içtihadlarını tevhid etmiş . . .] and in order to mould the nation into an imposed form [. . . milleti müşekkel bir hale ifrâğ için . . .] are working to such a degree of magnanimity and of resolution.”¹⁴

These representative pieces of evidence elucidate two fundamental points about the military’s role in the politics of transition. First, the military profession saw itself as an expression of society. To the officer of the *Meşrutîyet* (Constitutional Government), the military was not seen simply as a key political institution of the Ottoman state but considered itself to be sacrosanct, possessively watching over its inherited political power, prerogatives and privileges and maintaining a distinct political

identity of its own. Such an identity becomes apparent in the various forms of the military's conscious political acts. Whenever individual organizations or groups tried to assume, or succeeded in assuming, political power with the purpose of detaching the state from the grip of the officer corps, the officers reasserted their predominance. Secondly, the defeat and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent occupation of its remaining vital territories placed its social institutions under foreign control. When the officer corps perceived the foreign presence as the prime cause of the erosion of their predominance, they identified themselves all the more with the destiny of the Turkish nation which they were convinced of their vocation to save, a vocation sanctioned by their uniform.

I argue, therefore, that in a time of almost incessant internal turmoil and external conflict, the military was the primary and directing force in organizing a nucleus for the re-establishment of order in the chaos. The military, both in 1909 and in 1919, claimed that this was the justification for their action, because in such situations the military was the only alternative which would make future alternatives possible.

Notes

- 1 Among those in the mutiny were included the 4th Battalion of Taşkışla (Stone-Barracks), the troops of the Kılıç Ali Barracks, the Beyoğlu Model Artillery Regiment and the 5th, 6th and 7th Regiments of Yıldız. More details are found in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları:305. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970; pp. 31-32. Also, in general: E. Güresin, *31 Mart isyanı*. İstanbul: Habora Yayınları, 1969. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-ı a'zam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vak'ası*. 3. baskı. İstanbul: İstanbul Kitabevi, 1986.
A detailed contemporary account of the first six days, according to the official report of the 3rd Chasseur Battalion Commander, Adjutant-Major Aziz Bey, is given in: Mevlânzâde Rifat, *İnkilâb-ı Osmanîden bir yaprak yahut 31 Mart 1325 kıyamı*. Kahire: Matbaat al-Ahbar, 1329; pp. 80-89.
- 2 The composition and characteristics of the reactionaries may best be consulted in the official report of the First Court Martial, presided over by General Hurşid Paşa and comprising 25 officers of various ranks, dated 21 June 1909 (8 Haziran 1325). Reproduced in full, in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım: millî mücadeleye gidiş*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965-1972. 8 cilt. Cilt 2, pp.400-409.
- 3 Quoted from the Protocol drawn up by the Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa Government (14 February-13 April 1909), to be submitted to Sultan Abdülhamid II informing him of the resignation of the Cabinet, dated 31 Mart 1325 (13 April 1909). Reproduced in full, in: Ali Cevad Bey, *İkinci Meşrutîyetin ilanı ve otuzbir Mart hâdisesi: II. Abdülhamid'in son Mabeyn Başkatibi Ali Cevad Bey'in fezlekesi*. (Yayına hazırlıyan) F.R. Unat. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.19.

- Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1960; [Hereafter, Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*]; Vesika sa.6, pp.90-92.
- 4 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 31-56; and cf. D. Farhi, "The şeriat as political slogan – or the 'Incident of the 31st Mart'", *Middle Eastern studies*, 7:3 (October) 1971, pp. 275-299; esp.p.275. Also: Y.H. Bayur, "İkinci Meşrutiyet devri üzerine bazı düşünceler". *Belleten*, XXIII:90 (Nisan) 1959, pp. 267-285; and, more recently: Z. Türkmen, *Osmanlı meşrutiyetinde ordu-siyaset çatışması*. İstanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 1993; pp. 23-25.
 - 5 These demands, despite certain changes in their contents as supplied in the various lists, may be summarized as follows: the dismissal of the Grand Vezir, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister of War and the Commanders of the *Hassa Ordusu*, 2nd Division (*Hassa Ordusu*) and *Taşkısla*; the dismissal of certain Unionist deputies; the full implementation of the şeriat; the reinstatement of the demoted and discharged *alaylı* officers and a promise by the Sultan that those who revolted would not be punished. Discussed, with implications, in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 44-50. Cf., D. Farhi, *The şeriat as a political slogan*, p. 276.
 - 6 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 48, and Vesika sa.5 and 6, p. 90 and pp. 90-92 respectively.
 - 7 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 49, for the text of the memorandum (*tezkere*) outlining the *irade*; and S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 50-51, for details. And the Government was anxious to spread the news of this pardon to the various corners of the Empire. For example, see the text of the official communiqué, dated 15 April 1909, to the Governor of Bursa, Mehmed Tevîk Bey, reproduced in full in: M.T. Biren, *Mehmed Tevfik Bey'in (Biren) II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve mütareke devri hatıraları*. (Yayına hazırlayan) F.R. Hürmen. İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993. 2 cilt. Cilt 2, pp. 16-17.
 - 8 For his version of the course of events, see: Ahmed Rıza, *Meclis-i Mebusan ve Ayân Reisi Ahmed Rıza Bey'in anıları*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988; pp. 36-37. The further resignations in compliance with the demands of the insurgents (e.g., the dismissal of the Minister of War, Ali Rıza Paşa, and the Commander of the *Hassa Ordusu*, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa) are all found in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 51-52.
 - 9 News of the insurgency appears to have reached Selânik on the day of its occurrence (13 April 1909). A telegram sent from İstanbul by Gendarmerie Captain İsmail (Canbulat) Efendi read: "The constitutional régime has been destroyed". However, this is discounted as a rumour by Danişmend: İ.H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947-1972. 5 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronolojî*]. Cilt 4, p. 375. Farhi accepts the authenticity of the telegram by quoting it in his paper: D. Farhi, *The şeriat as a political slogan*, p. 277, N.12. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-ı a'zam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vak'ası*, p. 40. The main source concerning the telegram is Ali Fuad (Türkgeldi) Bey, then Chief Secretary to the Grand Vezirate: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.15. 2nci basılış. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1951; p. 29. Akşin also accepts the date as 13 April 1909, and discusses further sources: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 31ff. and p. 55. Another source refers to a coded telegram sent on 14 April, from İstanbul to the 11th Selânik Reserve Division: C. Erikan, *Komutan Atatürk*. 2. baskı. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1972; p. 86, N.6.
- Yet none of these works indicate a clear primary source for the immediate attitude adopted by the military, which is far more important and is of particular interest here. This is found in the diaries of a contemporary Ottoman official and later prominent journalist, Süleyman Tevfik Bey. The diaries were given

to the late Ziya Şakir Soko, who subsequently arranged them, and were published for the first time in three instalments by Kutay: C. Kutay, "Uzaklardan yakın sesler: olayların öncesi de yaşamış bir kalem emektârının hususî deferinde; gün-gün, saat-saat, o kanlı-kinli geri dönüş ayaklanması", *Bilinmeyen tarihimiz*, Cilt 1 (Mart) 1974, pp. 85-123; Cilt 2 (Eylül) 1974, pp. 59-97; and Cilt 3 (Aralık) 1974, pp. 42-104 respectively. [Hereafter, Süleyman Tevfik Bey, *Bilinmeyen tarihimiz*].

Süleyman Tevfik Bey, in his entry for 15 April 1909, quotes extensively from a long, telegraphic conversation which took place between the Commander of the IIIrd Army, General Mahmud Şevket Paşa, at Manastır and the Chief Secretary to the Sultan, Ali Cevad Bey, at the Palace (Yıldız). He was at the time, he writes, beside the Chief Secretary at the Palace telegraph office and copied the exchanged messages there. This conversation specifically concerns us here because it is the first concrete evidence to shed light on the military thinking. Yet, before quoting, there is an incident which has to be mentioned for a better understanding of the significance of the events that were to follow. Although it will be treated later in its proper context, I should mention that the insurgency of the soldiery in İstanbul followed the arrests and even sporadic murders of their career officers (*mektepli*) all over the city. Among the murdered was Commander (*Binbaşı*) Ali Kabûli Bey, trainee (*berâ-yı tâlim*) Captain of the battleship (*zırhlı*) "Asar-ı Tevfik" – it was alleged by the insurgents, but never proved, that he wanted to bombard the Palace. His ship was anchored at the sea-front at Beşiktaş. The particular significance of this incident is that the murder – he was bayoneted to death and later strung up in a tree near the Palace – was committed in the late afternoon of 15 April and, further, it was committed in the gardens of the Palace under the very eyes of the Sultan. We have eye-witness accounts of this event. Apart from Süleyman Tevfik Bey who had just arrived at the Palace, Ali Cevad Bey dealt with the incident in his *Fezleke* and, moreover, implied the "indifferent" attitude of the Sultan. Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 59-60. Also see: *İkdam*, 9 Nisan 1325. Cf., "Behaviour of the Ottoman Navy", in *Surtees to Lowther*, No.24, Constantinople, 17 April 1909, F.O. 195/2323. Further: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 1, pp. 143-145. And, most importantly, it was dealt with in the report of the First Court Martial of 21 June 1909. See: C. Bayar, *ibid.*, Cilt 2, pp. 400-409; and cf., S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 86-89.

Bearing in mind this particular, and other similar, incidents causing the arrests and deaths of *mektepli* officers, we may now turn to the conversation. It begins thus:

[M.Ş. = Mahmud Şevket Paşa; A.C. = Ali Cevad Bey]

M.Ş. – This is Manastır. I am Mahmud Şevket Paşa who has now assumed the civil and military administration all over Rumeli. I want to talk to the Chief Secretary, Ali Cevad Beyefendi. Who are you?

A.C. – This is the telegraph centre of the Exalted Sultan . . . Your Exalted Paşa, you are now talking to the Chief Secretary [*Mabeyn-i Hümayun Başkâtibi*] Ali Cevad . . . I am listening.

M.Ş. – The tragic events in İstanbul have endangered the constitutional régime. The military [*ordu*] will not sit back and watch in the face of this criminal attempt . . . Those who were wronged and killed show that the main aim of the conspiracy is against the military and the *Meşrutîyet*. I first want to ask this. Where are the Minister of War, Ali Rıza, the former Grand *Vezir*, Hüseyin Hilmi, and the Commander of the *Hassa Ordusu*, Mahmud Muhtar Paşas, and are their lives secure?

A.C. – We are all agreed on the tragedy of the events in İstanbul. Those

who share in the love of motherland and humanity cannot tolerate this kind of uprising. His Excellency the Sultan is extremely upset. We are all convinced that the nation, with her military, will suppress this uprising. Ali Rıza, Hüseyin Hilmi and Mahmud Muhtar Paşas are all secure up to this moment . . .

M.Ş. – Sir, you are occupying the highest position at the Palace and [thus] you are the only person who is aware of our Sultan's beliefs and thoughts . . . Why has the Palace still not released an official *communiqué*? In a very short time now, the troops will move on the road . . . The real instigators of the incident will certainly be punished. Yet who will carry on their shoulders the responsibility of those hundreds and even thousands of innocent victims?
Süleyman Tevfik Bey, *Bilinmeyen tarihimiz*, Cilt 2 (Eylül) 1974, pp. 70-71.

- 10 While in Ottoman-Turkish military terminology *hareket* is rendered *operation* – hence *Hareket Ordusu*, in order to keep in line with more familiar English usage I have used the term Action Army throughout. Yet, at the time, the term was translated as Operation in the British Ambassador's despatch. See: *Lowther to Grey*, Constantinople, 18 April 1909, F.O., 371/770/13941. Cf., "HAREKET ORDUSU", Vol.III, p. 204, in H.A.R. Gibb [et al.] (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, and London: Luzac, 1960 to date.

The Action Army was a special task force, made up of the regular units of the IIIrd Army and IInd Army as well as of various volunteer units (e.g., *Millî Taburlar*, National Battalions). See, for example: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*. London: Methuen, 1910; pp. 305-308; S. Akşın, *31 Mart olayı*, esp. pp. 284-288; and, for some documents concerning the Action Army: İ. Ilgar, "31 Mart ve Hareket Ordusu", *Belgelerle Türk tarihi dergisi*, 6, 1968, pp. 23-31. Also: *Schoen an Kaiser Wilhelm II*, Nr.27, Berlin, 19 April 1909, G.P., 27.Band, Erste Hälfte [Hereafter, 27.Band/1], Nr.95896, p. 9. And, in addition, see: K.-, "Die militär-politischen Ereignisse im Konstantinopel und die Operationen der Saloniker Armee im April 1909", *Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift*, II:8 (August) 1909, pp. 1181-1202; and C. Erikan, *Komutan Atatürk*, pp. 88-91.

- 11 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 185; İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 375; and Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtıratı*. [İstanbul]: Sabah Matbaası, 1328. 3 cilt. Cilt 2, Kısım 2; p. 475.

More particularly, on the movement of Major Muhtar Bey's unit, the documentary source in the *Başvekâlet (Başbakanlık) Arşivi*, İstanbul [B.V.A.], is quoted in: Z. Türkmen, *Osmanlı meşrutiyetinde ordu-siyaset çatışması*, p.43 and N.17 on p. 165.

Evidently, the question of foremost importance confronting the units in Selânik was that of the attitude of the IInd Army in Edirne:

"It was understood that far from opposing the Action Army, the IInd Army would support it."

S. Akşın, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 85. He derives his information mainly from an authoritative source, the account of Midhat Şükrü (Bleda) Bey, General Secretary (*Kâtib-i Umumi*) of the Committee of Union and Progress (*Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), as it had by this time become – now accessible in: M.Ş. Bleda, *İmparatorluğun çöküşü*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979; pp. 65-68.

Still more reliable sources are the memoirs of Major-General (Rtd.) Selâhattin Âdil Paşa, then Staff-Major Selâhaddin Âdil Bey, Commander of the 3rd Battalion (13th Regiment) of the IInd Army: Selâhattin Âdil, *Hayat mücadeleleri*.

- İstanbul: Zafer Matbaası, 1982; pp. 95–98; and K. Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, 1896–1909*. (Yayınlayan) F. ve E. Özerengin. [2. basım]. İstanbul: Turdav Ofset Tesisleri, 1982 (originally published in 1945); pp. 447–448
- 12 Details in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 138–155, esp.p.149.
- Copies of this first declaration were apparently stuck on the walls in the capital, under this signature, and seen by Fahri (Belen) Efendi (General, Rtd.), then a student at the War College: F. Belen, *20nci yüzyılda Osmanlı devleti*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973; p. 104.
- In a postcard of the period, Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa is described as “Hareket Ordusu Pişdarı Kumandanı [Commander of the Vanguard Forces of the Action Army]”. The declaration of the Action Army to the people of İstanbul, originally dated 19 April 1909 (6 Nisan 1325), is reproduced in full in: Y. Nadi (Abaloğlu), *İhtilâl ve inkilâb-ı Osmanî*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Cihan, 1325; pp. 149–151. Also in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, Belge 25, pp. 583–584 (in simplified Turkish). Cf., Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, Ekler Sa.23, pp. 137–139. Reproduced in full from *İkdam*, 8 Nisan 1325.
- 13 Reproduced in full in: Y. Nadi, *İhtilâl ve inkilâbı Osmanî*, pp. 146–149. (Emphasis mine). Also in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, Belge 24, pp. 581–582 (in simplified Turkish). Cf., Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, Ekler Sa.24, pp. 139–140. Reproduced from *İkdam*, 8 Nisan 1325.
- 14 F. Altay, *10 yıl savaş (1912–1922) ve sonrası (görüp geçirdiklerim)*. İstanbul: İnsel Yayınları, 1970. The letter is reproduced in full on pp. 196–200. This particular quotation appears on pp. 198–199. (Emphasis mine). The letter is also reproduced in full, together with a facsimile page, in: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*. İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1957–1962. 20 cilt. Cilt 19, pp. 10861–10863.
- As the main issues relating to this will be touched on in the Epilogue, no details are given here. However, Mustafa Kemal Paşa had already forcefully made his point during consultations with the military commanders and prominent civilians in a representative council (*heyet-i temsiliye*) of which he was president, convened at Sivas between 16 and 28 November 1919. In the second sitting of the 19 November session, he retorted to one of his fellow-delegates, the *Mutasarrıf* (Governor of a *Sancak*) of Menteşe, Hilmi Bey: “We cannot trust the civil servants [Memurin-i mülkiyeye itimat edemiyoruz.].” U. İğdemir, (Hazırlayan), *Heyet-i temsiliye tutanakları*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.26. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1975; p. 65.

From the military's intervention to its role as the political ruling group

I. The officer corps as regulator of domestic politics

In spite of the widespread conviction that the purely political remedy of the restoration of the Constitution and declaration of liberties would cure all the ills that afflicted the Empire, in the months which followed these ills not only recurred but took more virulent forms.¹ Political extremism grew in direct proportion to social disappointment.² Thus, notwithstanding the raptures with which the idea of the embracing of all *millets* of the Empire was received, the political speeches and student meetings in support of the new régime on nearly every corner of the capital and other cities and the unprecedented freedom of the press, all the hopes

began to fade gradually, if not immediately, away. There are ambiguities in this interpretation. Those stemming from the nature of the available evidence are best discussed as the analysis proceeds. Others lie deeper and, as I shall try to show at the end of this Chapter, do not disappear, no matter what evidence comes to light.

Although the press and periodical literature of the day exuded an ecstatic joy,³ such a joy was only too naive. The “revolution” of 1908 was, as noted earlier, the corroboration of the ideas and activities of a handful of idealists who leaned upon the military for its prompt and smooth execution. Meanwhile, the joyous and eager royalist crowds, including large groups of equally enthusiastic students, saw fit to exercise their new freedom only by daily and nightly untrammelled demonstrations of loyalty to the House of Osman, in the streets of İstanbul and before the gates of Yıldız Palace, with the slogan “Long live the Sultan! [Padişahım çok yaşa!]”; evidently, a meagre comprehension both of what had actually happened and of what was still in the process of unfolding. A more sceptical first-year student at the War College observed that:

“While the orators were criticizing Hamidian despotism, the crowds were shouting ‘Down with despotism!’. But very few of them understood the profound Arabic word *istibdad* [despotism]. Indeed, among the yelling crowds some were even carrying pictures of the despotic Sultan.”⁴

In contrast, the ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity, while striking a chord with the population at large, were in fact almost confined to those triumphant idealists who expressed them so vividly. By way of evidence, in a treatise published in the same year, infantry Captain Şemseddin Efendi of Selânik hailed the revolution with the rhetoric that the military

“. . . by putting into practice, with divine aid, the clandestine activities of the secret Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, on 24 July 1908, with the light of freedom sprinkled a golden lustre over the soil of this motherland [. . . nur-u hürriyetle bu hâk-i vatana bir şûle-i zerin saçtı]. Long live the Committee of Union – long live the nation – long live freedom – long live justice – long live the motherland!

Damn the supporters of despotism! [Kahrolsun taraftaran-ı istibdad!]”⁵

To place too much emphasis upon this evidence, however, would not lead to a true picture of what was taking place. Indeed, if the reforms were to be carried out with the urgency they required, without the threat or use of force and yet from above instead of through a popular catalyst, it must have been thought necessary to compromise with the key elements in the old order. Hence, on

the enunciation of freedom, the situation that developed in İstanbul was, according to a student of the period, "curious".⁶ It seemed that the revolutionaries were compromising with their enemies and hoping to survive in the meantime. The most significant feature of this progression was that the Sultan and prominent figures of the era of absolutism had managed to remain where they were by accepting the reinstatement of the Constitution.⁷ Thus, the revolutionaries' compromise became juxtaposed with the old order's concessionary stance. The inevitable result was that neither achieved total gain nor suffered total loss, but both coexisted for some months in a diversified form in a modified old order.

In this context, during the days that followed, censorship of the press was abolished, the Sultan's own network of internal intelligence disbanded, a general amnesty for political prisoners declared and the most unpopular, if not the most important, and overtly corrupt Government and Palace officials dismissed.⁸ Conversely, the first sign on the road to compromise appeared in the Imperial Decree drafted by the new Grand *Vezir*, Said Paşa (from 22 July 1908), with the support of the Lord High Chamberlain, Nuri Paşa, and publicly read on 1 August.⁹ According to the tenth clause, the appointment of two relatively important Cabinet portfolios, those of the Ministers of War and the Navy, was now left entirely to the Sultan. Apparently, on this issue, to which major importance was attached by the Sultan, the experienced Grand *Vezir* would not organize any opposition.¹⁰ As was to be expected, the press, eager to exercise their newly-won and much-prized freedom, took up this particular theme with a virulence which the Grand *Vezir* could not withstand.¹¹ He resigned and was replaced by Kâmil Paşa on 6 August 1908.¹²

The importance of the occasion which had called for the resignation of Said Paşa was concomitant with the arrival, on 3 August, of a deputation from Selânik representing the revolutionaries. The deputation, consisting of four civilians and three officers "... whose timidity could be discerned",¹³ seem to have felt that the Sultan's control of the new offices weighted the Government against them and that their hold on affairs was being eroded. And it was in this respect that pressure was exerted on the Sultan and Said Paşa during the interviews granted to the deputation on the 3rd and, again, on Said Paşa on the 4th. It seems these interviews chiefly concerned the inclusion of the Acting-Governor and District Commander of Trablusgarb, Marshal Receb Paşa, as Minister of War in the formation of a new Cabinet under Kâmil Paşa.¹⁴ As a result, the Sultan, whose real preference lay with a certain Marshal Rıza Paşa, accepted the designation of Receb Paşa, then absent

from İstanbul – a man of whose potential opposition he was apparently extremely wary. Incidentally, news of Receb Paşa's appointment had the immediate effect of calming the widespread public agitation in the capital arising from rumours rampant in the press that the Sultan intended once again to suspend the Constitution. In the event, the identity of the new Cabinet was made public and those present sworn in before the Sultan after the Friday noon service (*Cuma selâmlığı*) on 7 August.¹⁵

Nevertheless, "the identification of the new entrants into the ruling stratum . . ." ¹⁶ came to public notice on 6 August when, as the "Committee of Ottoman Progress and Union (Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti)", they announced categorically, if somewhat patronizingly, their approval of the new (although entirely non-Committee) Cabinet and praise for the Sultan, and implied a resolve to safeguard and preserve the Ottoman state.¹⁷ This declaration, however, did not conceal the *de facto* acknowledgement by the revolutionaries of the modified old order. What is most telling about their acceptance of the elements of the old order, despite all attempts to check the erosion of their power after the initial success, is their inaction while they witnessed an oath of allegiance to the Sultan being taken by the new Government while the Sultan in return affirmed his intention to protect the Constitution.¹⁸ This is the compromise in its complete form that had already become manifest on 3 August 1908. On the very day that the Selânik deputation arrived in İstanbul, it was surely no coincidence that the commanding officers of the *Hassa Ordusu* and their units, together with the cadets of the military schools, were taking an oath of loyalty and obedience:

"I shall submit to and obey, word by word, as long as I shall live, the exalted principles of the constitutional law which was bestowed by our beloved *Padişah* on his loyal subjects; and if a situation such as that of its abolition for the last thirty-two years by the treachery of some scoundrels were to recur, for the sake of protecting the freedom of the motherland, until the last drop of my blood is shed, I shall support the Ottoman Progress and Union Committee; and whomever ventures to conspire against the Committee I shall kill with my own hands; and to our beloved *Padişah*, who has granted us this favour, to my religion, nation and motherland I shall give service with complete loyalty and servitude; I ensure upon my virtue and honour, placing my hand on the most glorious *Kur'an*; by *Allah*, I so swear."¹⁹

From the perspective of our immediate problem, we may at this juncture discern three prominent features in the tone of this document. The first of these may serve to confirm what had previously been discussed, namely the coexistence under the reinstated

Constitution of the old order with the “new entrants into the ruling stratum”. The second is the dependence of the Committee on the armed forces for the carrying out of its policies and the Sultan’s similar dependence on the armed forces’ loyalty for the preservation of his political power.²⁰ Finally, a feature that was later to prove profoundly significant was the way in which the officers had reintroduced themselves into the centre of the political arena by means of a revived tradition with a sound basis in Turkish history. The implication now was that they were the regulator of domestic politics (*nâzım-ı siyaset*) which paved the way for their potential influence upon the forms of the military’s conscious political acts. All considered, only the second and third features warrant our attention for the purpose of the present analysis.

On the day that the new Cabinet of Grand *Vezir* Kâmil Paşa was sworn in, the Committee was quick to respond with a declaration to the public, implying that it was henceforth a major partner in the governance of the country. Evidently the Committee,²¹ under the direction of its Central Committee based in Selânik, made its point.²² Having stressed its struggles towards the restoration of the Constitution, the Committee thanked the general public for their enthusiasm and support of the new régime, but noted that:

“... now the time has come for all the people to attend to and occupy themselves with their own affairs by putting an end to these political demonstrations. The Committee on this point, with complete sincerity, warns the public [Cemiyet bu ciheti kemal-i samimiyetle umuma ihtar eyler].”²³

This showed quite clearly the position which the Committee meant to occupy.

Moreover, towards the end of the month Kâmil Paşa, too, witnessed the Committee’s peremptory attitude, this time directly applied to the Government itself. During Cabinet changes, including that of the Ministry of the Interior, the Grand *Vezir* was notified by the Central Committee in a telegram from Selânik, dated 25 August 1908, that “the appointment of Ferid Paşa . . .” was seen as

“... indispensable and most suitable and the retention of Hakkı Bey in the Ministry of Education was considered [by us] to be agreeable; the fulfilment of this requirement is requested on behalf of the public interest”.²⁴

Under this pretext, it appears that the Committee was trying to utilize existing social unrest, fomented mainly by the bureaucracy who were professionally aggrieved at the reductions in staff numbers and salaries made by Kâmil Paşa’s Government.²⁵ At the same

time, popular unrest over mainly economic issues, such as pay and conditions, was increasing and found expression, in this new era of "liberty", in the assumption by workers of the right to organize and strike. A wave of strikes thus occurred during August and September by a range of service, transport and small-scale manufacturing industries across, especially, Anatolia and Rumelia and in the capital.²⁶ One other indication was the exploitation of sensitive religious themes in some newspapers, mainly staffed by religious personalities or journalists now expressing their dislike of the régime of the day and, particularly, of the Government's policies. They declared that they were doing this so openly because of the newly-won freedom of the press.²⁷

Added to these, on 5 October 1908, the new régime was confronted with its first external crisis which might well have made the Government despair. Bulgaria threw off Ottoman suzerainty. This was followed, next day, by Austria's annexing of the provinces of Bosna and Hersek which she had administered since 1879; and, after a week of declarations and counter-declarations, on 12 October the Greek-dominated National Assembly of Crete announced its definitive union with Greece.²⁸ Yet drastic as these events might be, involving as they did Great Power connivance if not outright complicity, it was their repercussions on domestic affairs in terms of the Government's standing and loss of self-esteem that bore the gravest import.²⁹ Most immediately, in İstanbul a number of protest movements, tinged with a religious hue and spearheaded by religious figures – *muezzins*, *imams* and *hocas* – were channelled through the opposition press; and the masses broke once again on to the political stage, filling the parts allotted them by the religious reactionaries. The rallying of the men-in-the-street was facilitated by it being the month of *Ramazan* (Islamic holy month) and was in no way aimed at the Sultan. Rather, they hoped to spur him on to some decisive act against what they saw as the deviation of the Empire from the "way of Islâm". At this point, the Government took action, arrested the ringleaders and extended its reprisals to include the opposition press. Meanwhile, on the 10th, the storm of popular indignation over not simply the Bosna-Hersek annexation but the Austrian refusal to pay any compensation provoked a complete and successful boycott of Austrian goods and shipping until compensation was finally agreed the following February.³⁰

The mass agitations in İstanbul coincided with the opening of the First Selânik Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress on 18 October. The Congress held secret sessions and reached decisions on the Committee's internal administrative matters as

well as on the general political situation of the country. One of the most important resolutions of the Congress was that:

“... as long as he remains obedient to the principles of the constitution, the life and the imperial rights of His Excellency the Sultan will be guarded from every kind of violation by the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress [. . . usûl-ü Meşrutîyete riayetleri bâki kaldıkça hayat ve hukuk-u hümâyunları Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetince her türlü taarruzdan masundur].”³¹

Amounting virtually to a threat, this was a further step in the direction of a political tutelage formally and explicitly expressed. In a sardonically courteous personal letter to Kâmil Paşa from Selânik, dated 25 October 1908 and stamped with the official seal of the Central Committee (Communication no. 22), it was pointed out that:

“While following the last revolution the hope born in the heart of the whole nation was, up to a very short time ago, that the affairs of the country would be on the road to improvement and reform, yet after the passage of three months, as there has not been any really significant indication in that direction which would give us confidence, His Excellency would admit that there could be nothing which would more sadden the patriots than to feel these hopes are slowly turning to despair and helplessness.”

Having then criticized the performances, to date, of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Public Security,

“... our Committee, on behalf of the nation, requests the immediate change of the aforementioned Ministers [and] ... impatiently awaits the results in this respect”.

Further:

“The Committee, bearing in mind that you may have some difficulty in refilling these positions . . .”

suggested three candidates, in what appears to be concern to have appointed persons whom they trusted.³²

Having ignored these “requests”, five days later Kâmil Paşa received a telegram from Selânik, again stamped with the official seal of the Central Committee. It read:

“We are vehemently awaiting the implementation of our official communication, dated 25 October 1908.”³³

No changes in the Government resulted from these written directives.

Meanwhile, the reality of this political tutelage began to become apparent when four *chasseur* battalions were despatched to İstanbul from Selânik, arriving on 19 October, to demonstrate the Committee's military backing as well as to provide a secure base for the forthcoming elections. The first aspect soon revealed itself in an incident on 31 October when some eighty-seven soldiers of Taşkışla, who were about to be posted elsewhere, disobeyed the orders of their commanding officer and refused to go. This episode, minor though it may have been, intimated that the Committee was by no means reluctant to take advantage of the possession of military force, with which they declared themselves proud to be allied, in suppressing any reaction that might occur. To this end, the disobedience was checked by the loyal *chasseur* battalions, so recently accommodated in the same barracks, under the orders of General Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, Commander of the *Hassa Ordusu*, who showed an "unaccustomed harshness"³⁴ in his crushing of the "mutiny" in order, apparently, to "teach them a lesson".³⁵

"This matter consists of the punishment of some privates who had grown accustomed to being spoiled in the *ancien régime* [Mesele devr-i sâbıkta şımarıklığa alışan bir kaç neferin tedibinden ibarettir]",

announced the Committee on the day of the Taşkışla incident. After all,

". . . there is nothing in the general conditions of the country which would cause the people to become excited and alarmed, because . . .",

it was quick to add,

". . . the welfare and freedom of the people is being rendered secure by our armed forces, and by the zeal and patriotism of hundreds of thousands of fighters of humanity [. . . ahalinin rahat ve hürriyeti ordularımızla ve yüz binlerce mücahidin-i insaniyetin himmet ve hamiyetiyle taht-i temine alınmıştır]."³⁶

What they were really saying was, "We run the show"!

The evidence just reviewed establishes quite clearly that there was a repressive element in the Committee's policies during its rise to a dominant position in government. Even while it was being asserted, during the heated atmosphere of the election campaign, that the widely-expected political developments in the second Constitutional era would be reached as a result of the due and proper working of the Chamber, some acts of violence were

perpetrated in the streets. For instance, one of the well-known former aides-de-camp and intelligence officers of the Sultan, İsmail Mahir Paşa, was assassinated on the night of 2 December 1908, adding one more to the number of victims of popular vengeance which had already taken an extreme form in the lynching of another aide and intelligence officer, Fehim Paşa, at Yenişehir of Bursa (Hüdavendigâr) on 5 August.³⁷ Indeed, tension was in the air and the demonstrations of freedom appear to have far exceeded the capacity for its absorption by the Ottoman masses. Ortega y Gasset's assertion that in disturbances caused by scarcity of food, as it were, the mob goes in search of bread and the means it employs is generally to wreck the bakeries, may not be entirely appropriate here. On the contrary, there was now an abundance of "bread" but excessive consumption diminished its marginal utility at the cost of upsetting the stomachs of those who were not accustomed to it and could not, therefore, digest it. In similar vein, Mehmed Âkif ascribed to his friend Abdürreşid İbrahim, the much-travelled visitor from Russian Turkistan, a cynical reaction to the people's misconception of this constitutional "freedom":

" . . .

Just as I arrived in İstanbul: all the markets, bazaars
Were swaying about with loud cries! Oh, yes, there is Freedom!
It is said that when excitement enters, logic departs. It's true:
Whomever I saw that day, there was something wrong with his mind,
No-one was aware, it seems, of what he was doing,
All minds were befuddled with daydreams, all eyes were wild.

. . . "38

Amidst, therefore, a widespread popular, but not necessarily coherent, interest in "politics", the Committee of Union and Progress was hoping to nurture its nascent, but by no means certain, power by stimulating that interest. The occasion which gave rise to its hopes was that of the 1908 elections wherein the Committee sought to consolidate its revolutionary success by going to the country. Indeed, the elections, held in late November and December, resulted in a resounding success for the Committee, despite the efforts of the opposition party, known in English as the Liberal Union (*Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası*).³⁹ This party hoped to gain popular support for itself through the forces that the "revolution" had already let loose, among which were elements envious of and therefore antagonistic towards the influence of the Committee and its power-base within the military.

For the Committee, as soon as the election campaign started, the question of fully representing the Turkish and Muslim populace

of the Empire conflicted sharply with the problem of electing the largest possible number of deputies overall in order to maintain dominance in the country. The Committee did its utmost to fulfil both aspirations. For this purpose, its relatively better local organizations were an advantage. But more important had been its ability to gain the support of those who believed that the constitutional régime was reinstated as the direct result of the Committee's efforts.⁴⁰ Moreover, by working to establish a common front with non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities the Committee acquired a monopolistic position, for which a highly-centralized structure had already paved the way. Such a position was to be significant, especially in the ensuing split between this and the federalist faction, to the detriment of the latter. Here, let it be emphasised that the commanding position of the Committee emanated not only from its supremacy in the Chamber of Deputies but also from its symbiotic relationship with the military, in so far as their respective attitudes were concerned. Indeed, one may discern this association at the psychological level. For the inherent values of the Unionists were those of a group "... which placed collective discipline above individualism, and favoured a centralized and oligarchical control over politics".⁴¹ Hence, the highly-centralized structure of the Committee was conceived in harmony with political necessity long before the restoration of the Constitution and, afterwards, was the only expedient which seemed to it to be available for saving the Empire from disintegration.⁴² In the Committee's view, it was only by a rigorous discipline that the movement could hope to obtain respect, consideration and recognition for its dedication to that single purpose and to the Ottoman society at large. Then, in what may be termed a "fighting party"⁴³ the Committee possessed the hierarchical structure necessary for effective competition for the acquisition of governing power. Thus, opposition in Parliament and in Ottoman society in general, which is the essential part of any constitutional government, was regarded as treason and "perfidy"⁴⁴ and treated as such.

On the other hand, the military's dilemma was clear. The soldiers, by their very nature, were involved in the task of applying an authoritarian order from above. Their self-imposed purpose was to maintain and defend a social order in which they perceived political authority as legitimate only to the extent that it was the product of constitutional government. Yet they expected government to ensure order rather than to allow political dissent; and it lived up to that expectation.

Shortly after the opening of Parliament, the relationship between the Committee and the Grand Vezir took a step towards

formalization. It became evident that in their rivalry for power, the former was gaining ground to the extent that Kâmil Paşa, strongly anti-Unionist, appears to have made great efforts to conciliate the Committee, for example, in deferring to it over the appointments of ministers.⁴⁵ Thus when Hüseyin Cahid Bey, Deputy for İstanbul and founder and editor of *Tanin* – the organ of the Committee – demanded and got an interpellation on Kâmil Paşa, the subsequent vote of confidence in the Grand Vezir indicated a distinct lack of support for Hüseyin Cahid Bey's tactic from within his own party.⁴⁶ The point to be made here is that either “. . . the Unionists as a party had decided not to make the interpellation a party issue”⁴⁷ or, more probably, they calculated that with the opening of Parliament, the Grand Vezir could be overthrown at a better time. A deputation consisting of an officer, Staff-Major Enver Bey, and a civilian, the Vice-President of the Chamber, Talât Bey, called on Kâmil Paşa and informed him that he would not be overthrown.⁴⁸ However, Kâmil Paşa, having interpreted this incident as “. . . a sign of weakness”,⁴⁹ made his first counter-move, and an adroit one at that. He got appointed three well-known Unionist officers, Staff-Majors Enver, Ali Fethi and Hafız Hakkı Beys, as military attachés to Berlin, Paris and Vienna respectively. Kâmil Paşa's main aim, after seeing the extent of his support in the Chamber, seems to have been to reduce the influence of the military and to leave the Committee without their power-base, so that he could eliminate them at a later date.⁵⁰ Kâmil Paşa's second move made a still greater impact and the consequences were far-reaching. He was determined to strengthen his position by making some changes in important Cabinet offices. Notably, on 10 February 1909, the recently-appointed Commander of the IInd Army, Major-General Nâzım Paşa, was promoted to General and replaced Army-Marshal (*Ordu Müşiri*) Ali Rıza Paşa, as Minister of War. Admiral (*Amiral*) Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa was appointed Acting(*vekâleten*)-Minister of the Navy in place of Arif Hikmet Paşa whose pending resignation was now enthusiastically confirmed.⁵¹ The immediate effect of these changes was an angry reaction by those forces which Kâmil Paşa was no longer able to manipulate. The main complaint of the Committee was the “irregularity”⁵² of the dismissal of the Minister of War and the lack of consultation with the Committee over both this and the appointment of a new Minister. Added to this was his neglecting to inform the other members of the Cabinet about the changes he had made. The result was the immediate resignation of those most in sympathy with the Unionists.⁵³ Kâmil Paşa in this way succeeded in provoking a confrontation with the Chamber by ignoring its position in the Constitution, to which the Chamber

responded on 13 February, passing a vote of no confidence by 198 votes to eight; and he resigned.⁵⁴

It must be admitted, however, that this series of events does not seem sufficient to account for the downfall of the Grand Vezir. What is to the point here is that Kâmil Paşa had also succeeded in instigating a confrontation with the officer corps. He had antagonized them by the distrust which he was accused of showing towards the four, picked, *chasseur* battalions of the IIIrd Army – especially brought to İstanbul at the behest of the Committee – by, for example, his attempt to remove them from the capital and his appointment of a Minister of War expressly to carry out his objective.⁵⁵ More important, the domestic factor in the reaction of the officer corps may be gauged from two specific incidents occurring close at hand. Towards the evening of 11 February, the day after the dismissal and replacement of the Ministers of War and the Navy, two naval officers presented themselves at the *Bab-ı Âli* to speak to the Grand Vezir. Evidently, and the evidence is as strong as one could wish for, commenting on the loss of discipline in the navy they urged, in emotional but courteous language,

“. . . the need to appoint a Minister from among the military high quarters who would be able to put his words into action . . . [. . . erkân-i askeriyyeden tehdîdini îkaa kadir bir nâzır tayini lüzûmunu . . .]”⁵⁶

– thereby implicitly criticizing the appointment of Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa as not being the choice of the navy. The effrontery of this action by the two officers would not have been lost on Kâmil Paşa who, by this time, must have been well aware of a linked move by senior naval officers. Earlier on the same day, eight commanders of warships which had anchored off Beşiktaş had sent a statement to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, the Grand Vezirate and the Ministry of the Navy, to the effect that they strongly opposed the replacement of the Ministers of War and the Navy at such a time, without a reason, and considered this action a blow against the Constitution which the Imperial Fleet had taken the oath to protect.⁵⁷

This was the signal for the downfall of Kâmil Paşa. Thus, despite the conventional explanation, it is evident that eight naval officers weighed more heavily in the scales than the 198 deputies who had cast the vote of no confidence. On the day after this vote (14 February), a new Grand Vezir was appointed – Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, “. . . another survivor of the old régime, but more acceptable for the moment . . .”⁵⁸ to the Unionists.

Looking back, three conclusions can be drawn from these events,

which may seem to be speculative but are firm enough to bear the weight of the arguments placed upon them here. The first is that these events, in brief, were a trial of strength and a struggle for existence on the part of the Committee. The second is the inability of the political structure to cope with a crisis, through lack of political flexibility – itself the result of long years of absolutism. Probing a little deeper, one may discern that although there was an undeniable military pressure on the Chamber,⁵⁹ the Committee could still have made their point on Kâmil Paşa without the rough demonstration of strength shown by the Navy. After all, the majority of deputies had been candidates who were elected with the approval and support of the Committee, and it was known to have been difficult to win a seat without such support.⁶⁰ It follows that if the Committee had brought all its pressure to bear through parliamentary channels, the deputies would presumably have acted according to the normal code of party procedure.⁶¹ However, because this course had not been followed, the general impression was that while only a month earlier almost unanimous approval had been given to Kâmil Paşa, on the second occasion drastic methods had been used against him. These methods were supported by strict party discipline and the influence of the leaders on the choice of candidates in constituencies, so that the deputies came to accept such methods and consider supporting them as the means of securing affluence and power.⁶² Finally, the political mechanism, in the case of the military, was decisive; and the officer corps revealed sound political instinct when they prevented the politicians from trying to undermine their traditional prestige and power. For the present, however, it is imperative to realize the significance of the military reaction which, I would urge, lay in the impulse it gave not only to the political changes already mentioned but also to those that were to come. Hence, both those reacting against the new Constitutional Government and those who wished to defend it needed the support of those who disposed of military power.

In reality, the dilemma facing the Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa Government and the Committee was that of an authoritarian Government with constitutional tendencies operating in a country with no real experience of constitutional government. It thus appeared that between the extremes of tight control coupled with repression of opposition, on the one hand, and relinquishment of the traditional Sultanlic authority, on the other, there lay a middle ground where a delicate balance had to be maintained between opposing political forces. The Government attempted to hold the balance at what I term the conjunctive level (or form of conscious political acts of the

military) of interaction between Unionists and officer corps – as we have seen, to the detriment of the Unionists. That this proved ineffectual as soon as it was established was simply because it showed how dependent the civilians had become upon the soldiers.⁶³ Consequently the manipulative policies of the Unionists, based as they were in the “mentality”⁶⁴ and the methods of the Palace, rapidly paved the way for an organized opposition⁶⁵ composed of the dissatisfied elements – anti-Unionist parties, some prominent members of the old order, opportunists, religious reactionaries and, most significantly, *alaylı* officers together with the rank-and-file soldiery, all sharing antagonisms but diverging in their aims.⁶⁶

Here, any analysis of the political opposition should emphasise the rank-and-file soldiery and reference should be made to this major variable; first, because of their importance and immediate consequence in any such study of military politics, although they are often ignored; secondly, because the opposition also realized that they needed the backing of an armed force if they were to achieve their aims;⁶⁷ finally, because the dissatisfied rank-and-file needed the opposition to articulate their discontent.

Starting from the last point, the essence of the argument is simple. Indeed, the fomentation of dissatisfaction among the *alaylıs* and the rank-and-file soldiery began by taking a professional grievance and working it up into a political issue. The constitutional régime had so far paved the way towards the increasing predominance, through privilege and promotion, of the War College-trained officers, known as *mektepli* (lit., with schooling, i.e., career officers), not only in day-to-day politics but also within the armed forces. The latter, military, aspect was mainly due to the attempts by the *mekteplis* to eradicate the influence of those officers risen from the ranks, known as *alaylıs*,⁶⁸ who still formed the majority. *Alaylı* officers had gained ascendancy for both military and political reasons. Militarily, they were selected on the basis of ability and were instrumental in filling the gap in the officer cadres since *mektepli* officers could not be recruited in sufficient numbers.⁶⁹ Politically, however, they represented in general the extension of traditional Sultanic authority through promotion in return for absolute loyalty – a feeling which, because of the growing reliance of the *alaylıs* upon the Sultan, was increasingly directed to the person of the monarch instead of to the constitutional monarchy.⁷⁰

From the very beginning of constitutional government in 1908, the military problem was closely intertwined with the whole question of differentiation of outlook and attitudes towards the constitutional régime. The task that the officer corps, especially the *mekteplis*, set themselves was to promote modern

professionalism parallel to the increase in their political power. Both aims had tended towards the creation of an élite of officers, obsessively self-aware and extremely self-possessed.⁷¹ The *alaylıs* naturally felt that the supremacy of the *mekteplis* meant they themselves would be assigned a permanently inferior position. Indeed, this process became apparent very early on, when the revolutionaries began with a gesture that could not help but alienate the majority of existing officers, whom they purged on the grounds that they were unruly, if not disloyal. According to the admission of General Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, Commander of the *Hassa Ordusu*, 1,400 *alaylı* officers were removed from its rolls following the restoration of the Constitution.⁷² By mid-November 1908, amidst rumours of *alaylı* purges, some of them had already called protest meetings. In order to prevent the repetition of such happenings, a Brigadier-General, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division (*Hassa Ordusu*) in İstanbul, and four other officers of various ranks, all of them of *alaylı* origin, were arrested and discharged.⁷³ It thus appears that the continuous widening of the gulf which divided the *mektepli* from the *alaylı* officers in turn affected the rank-and-file from among whom the *alaylı* had been promoted. In fact, in this case, the aspirations of common soldiers as privates, corporals and sergeants were affected as the prospects of becoming an *alaylı* officer became bleak. The disappearance of this potential promotion in terms of increased financial and social status meant, from a professional point of view, the alienation of rank-and-file soldiery from the new régime and consequent threat to the military *imperium*. Moreover, the rank-and-file, especially in the *Hassa Ordusu* whose *alaylı* officers had been faced with the prospect of further purges in order to make room for new *mektepli* officers, viewed these changes with deep resentment and hostility; the more so because the easy-going training schemes and disciplinary methods were being replaced by harsher ones.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the professional complaints of the common soldier took a religious form, as the new training routine was considered detrimental to their obligation to perform ablutions and rites of worship.⁷⁵

The growth of general discontent among the rank-and-file, couched conveniently in religious terms, seems to have created a bond between the civilian and military opposition. The civilians were already engaged in overt sedition through extraordinary parliamentary agitations and by encouraging the *alaylıs* and their rank-and-file sympathizers in their longstanding grievances against the policies of the Unionists. It is, perhaps, important to stress that it was the civilian opposition who started mobilizing the religious groups against the Committee and against Hüseyin Hilmi

Paşa. The first to respond were the students of theological high-schools (*medrese*) whose fears were aroused by rumours that their right of exemption from military service was to be abolished.⁷⁶ To this they reacted principally by organizing protest meetings. Meanwhile, a sense of Islâmic, traditional, group identity emerged and provided the basis for cooperation with the publication of a newspaper, *Volkan*, from 11 December 1908. On 16 March, *Volkan* published a declaration presenting the political programme of a new society known as the Society of Muhammed (*İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti*),⁷⁷ for which it agreed to become the official organ – to their mutual benefit, as is evinced in the massive increase of the paper's circulation to some 15,000–20,000 at its height.⁷⁸ In essence, the Society's programme argued the need for rule by *şeriat* within the ideal of an Islâmic community. As such, the programme was effective in placing a check on the policies of the Committee by arousing and articulating a wave of popular religious fervour. For the *ulema* and their students it was conceived as a means for the prospective increase of their influence since religion "... provided the opposition with the largest audience".⁷⁹ Through *Volkan*, the Society and its members disseminated the view that the two "exalted classes" of state, the *ulema* ("ilmiyye") and the military ("askeriyye"), were like-minded and shared the obligation of viable opposition to the Europe-obsessed Unionists.⁸⁰ Just as the military had secured the restoration of the Constitution, so now it should retrieve that Constitution from the grip of the Unionists; then, its duty done, it would withdraw, leaving the *ulema* to tend to its responsibility – the running of the state. The opposition, moreover, had already managed to infiltrate the rank-and-file soldiery by taking advantage of their professional unease, and this too was reflected in the columns of *Volkan*. When, for instance, "... the Committee decided to remove the rest of the Yıldız Guards and replace them with Anatolians",⁸¹ *Volkan* published a letter on 28 March, signed "on behalf of 5th Regiment [*Hassa Ordusu*] ... [names withheld]", complaining at the dispersal of over a hundred of its soldiers to other units and declaring that the entire Regiment now intended to join the Society of Muhammed.⁸² On 31 March 1909, those *alaylı* officers who had been either discharged or taken off permanent duties held a protest meeting in İstanbul,⁸³ at a time when anti-Unionist letters from common soldiers were reaching a peak in *Volkan*.⁸⁴

As the political atmosphere grew tense and antagonisms intensified, meetings and demonstrations in favour of far-reaching social changes became daily occurrences. Notably, for our purpose, two particular incidents demonstrate how the religious sentiments of

the ignorant and disillusioned public were being played upon by anti-Unionist elements for their own ends, how indeed religion was being used to cement the disaffection of the people. On 3 April, the official inauguration of the Society of Muhammed attracted a huge crowd of some 100,000 to the Ayasofya Camii (Haghia Sophia Mosque) for speeches by Derviş Vahdetî – the publisher of *Volkan* and prime mover behind the Society – and others, and recitation of the *mevlûd* (Turkish nativity poem of the Prophet); after this the crowd moved in a mass cortège with their green flags, chanting prayers, to the nearby administrative offices of *Volkan* to complete the official inauguration amidst further prayers and sacrifices before dispersing in an orderly fashion.⁸⁵ Shortly afterwards, on the night of 6 April, the assassination of Hasan Fehmi Bey,⁸⁶ editor of the influential anti-Unionist newspaper *Serbesti*, and the subsequent failure of the authorities to capture his assassin, prompted a widespread belief that the murder had been a Committee plot and provoked great indignation among the public, taking the form of mass demonstrations and agitation by huge crowds which included students of all shades of political opinion. The funeral itself on the 8th, attended by about 30,000–40,000 people, turned virtually into an anti-Unionist rally, especially in view of the large numbers of *ilmiye* students present. This event effectively cut off all dialogue between the Unionists and the opposition and formed the most recent and intolerable in the train of events leading up to the armed insurrection known as the *31 Mart Vak'ası* (31 March Incident, i.e., 12/13 April 1909).⁸⁷

The cleavage within the broad anti-Unionist alliance exposed by the 31 March Incident was one between Muslim revivalist groups supported by definite political interests on the one hand, and those who were vigorously struggling to gain power through force of arms on the other. It may seem repetitive to look back to the first official *communiqué* of the Action Army, issued on 19 April 1909, but the *communiqué* is fundamental to the situation, for I would emphasise that the Action Army's attitude there was due to its desire to force the issue. Here we approach the nub of the matter. Undoubtedly, some of the most powerful and influential military figures seem to have awaited the beginning of the shooting with actual eagerness, and to have feared only that some kind of reconciliation between the Ahmed Tevfik Paşa Government (14–30 April 1909) and the insurgent elements would prevent the action.⁸⁸ In contrast to this point of view was the behaviour of the rank-and-file soldiery, many of whom, it must be remembered, had been brought to the capital specifically to provide a bastion force for the Committee. The evidence shows that the common soldiery understood nothing of

the Liberal Union, nor of Liberalism, nor of the ex-Grand *Vezir* Kâmil Paşa, nor of the rest of the political and religious figures whom they were supposed to be supporting. They were only, and openly, showing their sympathy towards the Sultan-Caliph; all the more so since he had pardoned their rebellion.⁸⁹ The whole insurrection, indeed, was taking shape under the banner of *şeriat* – though ironically without any apparent antagonism towards the *Meşrutiyet*. The rebellious soldiery were eager to show their resentment of the *mektepli* officers and even, in some cases, of the *mekteplis* whether they were military or civilian,⁹⁰ indeed anyone who had received modern, “secular” training or education – deemed sacrilegious by the rank-and-file on account of its not being *şer’i*.

My assertion as to the military’s desire to force the issue is discernable in the austere, vengeful and decisive attitude of the Action Army, now on its way to the capital under the overall command of General Mahmud Şevket Paşa,⁹¹ and was, in fact, reflected in an ultimatum to the Grand *Vezirate*. This document dealt not only with the immediate measures that the “army” was going to take – such as to secure public order in the capital, to subdue and demobilize the rank-and-file who had been deceived by “traitors” and to punish those who had caused, organized and played a role in the “insurrection” – but also with long-term policy matters, particularly martial law, future public order in the capital, acts to be passed by the Chamber of Deputies which was to be recalled immediately and a new Cabinet formed, and even a veiled threat against the position of the Sultan unless “. . . he remain obedient to the *Meşrutiyet* [. . . *Meşrutiyete riayetleri baki kaldıkça . . .*].” These objectives clearly involved the direction of major governmental bodies by the military, which might well be described as military intervention by memorandum.⁹² To this, the IInd Army responded favourably and their Commander, Major-General Salih Paşa, in a communication with Mahmud Şevket Paşa, praised his command and proposals on the situation in general.⁹³ The reaction in the capital, however, was one of excitement and despair. The Government was trying to play its trump card by counter-proposing ill-defined, conciliatory measures, carried even to the point of loss of dignity, while the newspapers, regardless of their party affiliations, were expressing adulation of the advancing forces. The Committee, also, were announcing their full belief and confidence in the Commanders of the Action Army. In fact, the Government, the press, politicians of every persuasion and even the ringleaders themselves, in a unanimous mood of submissiveness and penitence, tried to disclaim any responsibility for the rebellion.⁹⁴ Moreover, on 22 April 1909, the combined

Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) and Senate (*Meclis-i Ayan*), under the new title of General National Assembly (*Meclis-i Umumi-i Milli*), in a secret session, supported the ultimatum of the Action Army and thus actually legitimized its previous and future behaviour,⁹⁵ converted might into right. And so those politicians, journalists and *hocas* who had been agitating against the Committee, when they realized that the Action Army was approaching, left the soldiery whom they had incited to revolt to face it alone.

The insurgent soldiery of İstanbul, meanwhile, especially the *alaylı* officers, were now coming to realize the gravity of their position as the first units of the Action Army started to surround the capital; they found themselves abandoned by those who had previously encouraged them but were now telling them to behave and surrender. The only bastion still remaining to them was the Sultan who had already condoned their behaviour by unwise indulgence, not necessarily because of his fatherly compassion but at least partly because of his determination to prevent any action against himself;⁹⁶ indeed, it was perhaps the Sultan's concern for his own position that influenced him against ordering resistance to the approaching forces. Be that as it may, the outlook shared by the Sultan and the insurgents paved the way towards the elimination first of the insurgents and then of the Sultan.

On the day of 24 April 1909, the Action Army entered İstanbul, met some spontaneous resistance but finally occupied the capital. An immediate curfew was put into effect under the direction of Colonel Galip Bey as Inspector-General of the Police and Gendarmerie of İstanbul, "... in order to restore order and maintain it ...", according to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Commander of the IIIrd and Action Armies, who then, on 25 April, imposed martial law in İstanbul (including Eyüp and Üsküdar) and the *Sancaks* of Çatalca and İzmit together with the surrounding districts. He was now defying the Constitution which left the imposition of martial law within the competence of the Government alone.⁹⁷ In spite of the continuing existence of the Government, the Paşa was in fact acting as the chief executive. He further demanded the appointment of Major-General Hurşid Paşa, Minister with responsibility for Artillery (*Tophane Nazırı*), as the President of the Court Martial which was likewise duly sanctioned by the Government. The Court Martial was set up next day with three subsidiaries in the field; mass arrests of civilian and military opposition figures continued, while the Army carried out mopping-up operations.⁹⁸ And on the afternoon of 27 April 1909, the General National Assembly proclaimed its unanimous decision to depose Sultan Abdülhamid II,

and legalized it through a *fetva*. That very day, Abdülhamid II was forced to abdicate in favour of Mehmed Reşad Efendi as Sultan Mehmed V (1909–1918).⁹⁹

II. The struggle for the political initiative

“Extreme simplicity marked the accession of the new Sultan”,¹⁰⁰ wrote the British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte in his *Annual report* for 1909. He was right. Yet it marked, too, the extreme complexity of the political aspects of civil-military relations. For the episode I have examined here inaugurated the accession of the military to political power. After all, the essential causes of military intervention, in the form of explicit assumption or direction of governmental offices, lay not only within “politics” but also within the intrinsically politicized military – a military which has historically acquired and continues to express political values generated by its own tradition. The immediate consequence of this level of action foreshadowed the manner in which such a role manifested itself in the following years; the ultimate effects were far greater than the causes at the time appeared to warrant. The comparatively trivial discontent of the rank-and-file – for instance, *alaylıs* – led directly to the continuous involvement of the armed forces in partisan politics. The process was described by a then staff-officer attached to the Action Army Headquarters, Captain İsmet (İnönü) Efendi: “In the long term, as the direct result of the insurrection, the weight of the Action Army as an abnormal constraint [on the polity] was felt.”¹⁰¹ Secondly, it is evident from the foregoing argument that political power, long before it was secured by force, had come to be conceived as a hereditary prerogative of the military. Finally, intervention, mingled with this prerogative, accelerated the formal process of the military’s conscious political acts. Thus, the role of the military as a ruling group, in the form of holding the political initiative, became permanent and continuous instead of sporadic. Now let us follow the course of this process as the political outcome unfolds itself.

Offering “A clue to the Turkish tangle”, a foreign observer wrote in June 1909:

“Sooth to say, the army is the one formidable force in the realm. Everything else resembles shifting cloud-pictures. The army is a reality with which all men must reckon . . .”¹⁰²

And yet, strange though it may seem, the former Sultan appears not to have reckoned with this until it was forcibly drawn to his attention. Then, as "Inspector-General of the First and Second Armies, [and] the Commander of the Action Army in Dersaadet [İstanbul], General Mahmud Şevket" Paşa stated, in an order sent to the IIIrd Army, that the Sultan, now living in exile in Selânik, should be reprimanded:

"... the life of the aforementioned Sultan is under the guarantee of the Ottoman Army [... hakan-ı müşarünileyhin hayatlarına Osmanlı ordusu zâmindir], ... [but still] it is not remembered [by him] that at the present time His Highness is under the protective power of the Ottoman Army. It is forgotten that since His Highness' life has been under the guarantee of the Ottoman Army, to demand a different undertaking would violate the honour and military pride of the Army; and any document of written undertaking [in this respect] that would be given by the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, who undergo a change every year, would not be of any value or real importance [... Osmanlı ordusu hayatlarına zâmin iken başka taahhüdât talebinde bulunmasının ordunun namus ve şeref-i askerisini muhil olacağı ve her sene tebeddül etmekte olan meclis-i âyan ve mebusan reisleri tarafından bu babta verilecek varaka-i taahhüdiyyenin bir kıymet ve ehemmiyet-i hakikiyesi olamayacağı feramûş olunuyor]. It must also be appreciated the extent of the ill-effect that this situation would have should it be known to the officers of the Army ..."¹⁰³

This letter quite clearly discloses military thinking on their possession of political power and, more importantly, on the Constitutional régime which had been reimposed under martial law through the restoration of the Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa Government (5 May 1909).¹⁰⁴ In a realm such as the Ottoman Empire, it was evident that those military figures who commanded many troops and achieved successes would acquire prestige and power. This was, indeed, the case of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, successful Commander of the Action Army, then so aptly described as "l'armée libératrice".¹⁰⁵ And he did not refrain from a perilous exploitation of the political power which success had placed within his grasp in the unprecedented post of Inspector-General.¹⁰⁶ Bearing this in mind, his evaluation of the constitutional legislative organ of government solely in terms of the annual vicissitudes of its Presidents not only exposes a disregard for parliamentary politics but establishes quite clearly the repressive aspect of the military's policies. This attitude was the basis of the politics of the officer corps; their appearance in the centre of the political arena was more a reflection of their pervasive influence in Ottoman society than of their material power. In other words, they not only had guns, they had, by now, an almost innate sense of purpose as representatives

of the public interest. Significantly, when the Constitution was reinstated in 1908, the military question seems to have become intertwined with the problem of technical efficiency as a prerequisite in the creation of a homogeneous, monolithic force. To this end, the reorganization of the High Military Command constitutes the first case in my interpretation.

With the reaction of the officer corps that followed the 31 March Incident, a major change was the disbanding of the Sultan's Own General Staff (*Maiyet-i Seniyye Erkân-ı Harbiyesi*). This was an executive group under the sole command of the Sultan, which exercised the imperial authority over the armed forces and acted as an intermediary between the Sultan, on the one hand, and the Ministry of War and the General Staff (*Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Dairesi*) on the other.¹⁰⁷ In this way, the traditional Sultanic authority over the military was impaired despite the Sultan's function as the object of loyalty – a rallying-point for the forces and a symbol of constitutional continuity. Having overcome their prejudice in favour of the throne and eliminated the interference of the Palace, the military attempted to achieve administrative unity and efficiency through the Ministry of War and the General Staff. Changes in both were initiated for this purpose. Most significant was the establishment, on 14 August 1909, of a new Council for Military Affairs (*Dar-ı Şura-i Askeri*) under the chairmanship of the Minister of War, then General Salih Paşa, former Commander of the IInd Army. This body combined, in some measure, the expertise of the Ministry of War, the General Staff and the executive commanders, and dealt with the military in exclusively military matters.¹⁰⁸ To avoid any civilian interference in military affairs, the Minister of War became the single professional adviser of the Government and of Parliament. He was both a member of the Cabinet and a high-ranking officer, like the Minister of the Navy. In the beginning, the major impetus towards technical efficiency seems to have come from the General Staff, now under the influence of the forceful personality of its chief, Major-General Ahmed İzzet (Furğaç) Paşa (15 August 1908 – 1 January 1914). It was he who was instrumental in the reorganization of the Supreme Military Council and in the preparation of the *Devlet-i Âliye-i Osmanîye Ordusunun Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Nizamnâmesi* (Fundamental Regulations of the Ottoman Armed Forces), passed on 5 July 1910.¹⁰⁹ The immediate results of this reorganization ran parallel with the changes in the character of the military personnel and of military education. And these constitute the second case in support of my interpretation.

From the foregoing, it may be evident that during the Hüseyn

Hilmi Paşa Government the impulse towards establishing the professional homogeneity of the armed forces came much more from the military than from the civilians. But the political climate, especially after the suppression of the 31 March insurrection, was favourable to this impulse even in matters which do not seem immediately germane to military affairs. For instance, the efforts of the Committee to strengthen the legislature through a series of constitutional amendments¹¹⁰ was not a matter of great concern to the military. But through the legislation introduced, the changes they themselves were making were legalized. The Government was actually under the domination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa who "... alone had a say in every matter",¹¹¹ in an atmosphere heightened by the continuation of martial law. Thus, the military inspired the bills and were able to procure their passage through Parliament. For instance, the publication of the Law for Age Limitation¹¹² on 26 June 1909, aiming at rejuvenation through a purge of the undesirable and the unfit, was authorized. New age limits were constituted for all ranks, resulting principally in the enforced retirement of most of the *alaylı* officers who, having risen through the ranks, naturally tended to be older than the *mekteplis*.¹¹³ In addition, the Law for the Purge of Military Ranks,¹¹⁴ published on 7 August 1909, covered all senior and junior officers and military employees. The Law dealt, in the main, with the revision of officers' ranks and conditions for promotion in order to do away with the unlimited patronage which had prevailed under the old régime. Many prominent officers who had obtained high rank without the prescribed number of years in the services and for no special act meriting promotion, were either struck off the Government's pay list or pensioned off.¹¹⁵ With additional legislative measures, proposed by the General Staff and scrutinized by the Military Council, the military also tried to increase their prestige, self-consciousness and morale through job-security, salary increases and attractive provision for retirement. For example, the Regulation on Leave,¹¹⁶ on 7 July 1909, specified for the first time the granting of leave for prescribed periods, mainly for the purpose of improving military morale. The Law on Retirement and Resignation,¹¹⁷ on 24 August 1909, introduced pensions at such a level that "... in most cases the retired officers were pensioned off with amounts they could not get when previously on the active list".¹¹⁸ And from 1909 on, proper increases in salaries, along with commutations of rations and travel expenses, started to come into force with regular and prompt payment.¹¹⁹

On the educational level, the basic professional institutions already established before 1908 were improved. Military education,

especially after “31 March”, was reorganized with the addition of specialized schools and drill-grounds in growing numbers at the organizational level.¹²⁰ However, the military reformers in general seemed to be of the opinion that the best way of improving the quality of officers, which was after all their chief concern, was to impose centralized control over the officer schools. Further, the 31 March Incident had strengthened the enduring belief that the officer corps was the sole bastion against a political or any other social upheaval, and the determination that it should remain so. These measures soon had their effect on recruitment. They had been proposed by the Command of the Action Army to the Ministry of War although such was not normal practice for an army command. On the basis of this proposal, a new General-Inspectorate of Education and Instruction (*Terbiye ve Tedrisat Müfettiş-i Umumîliği*) was set up with the authority of a divisional command, thus bringing all the military schools under the overall command of the army on 20 July 1909.¹²¹ Secondly, in connection with the new system, Manastır and Edirne War Colleges were abolished and their officer cadets transferred to İstanbul War Colleges. Meanwhile, the Staff College was directly attached to the General Staff under the new Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel (*Erkân-ı Harb Kaymakam*) Cevad (Çobanlı) Bey.¹²² Finally, the changes of curriculum, especially at the İstanbul War Colleges, corresponded with the appointment of Commandants known for professional competence, youth and disciplinarian attitudes, if not open political affiliations. Notably, Staff-Major Vehip (Kaç) Bey’s appointment as Commandant of the Infantry and Cavalry War College in August 1909, replacing Brigadier-General İsmail Fazıl Paşa, and Staff-Major Nihad Bey’s appointment as Commandant of the Artillery War College, replacing Major-General Ali Rıza Paşa, indicated motives that were due to more than a mere desire for improved efficiency.¹²³

The spectacle of the officer corps in the process of consolidating both its political power and its base in an effective military machine was vividly affirmed and made public when the first session of the Ottoman Parliament ended. In his closing address to the Chamber of Deputies on 27 August 1909, the President, Ahmed Rıza Bey, referred to the Ottoman army as being “. . . the protector of right and justice and the foundation of national existence”.¹²⁴

Turning back to the political arena, it may be surmised that the ground for the predominance of the military was also prepared during the latter months of 1909, when important changes in the outlook and position of the Unionists were taking place. On the strengthening of the political position of the Unionists

with the inclusion in the Cabinet of two of their members, Cavid Bey as Minister of Finance and Talât Bey as Minister of the Interior, the expedients to which they resorted concerning the Grand *Vezir* contributed to his ultimate resignation despite an overwhelming vote of confidence.¹²⁵ Then, with the appointment of İbrahim Hakki Bey as Grand *Vezir*, the affirmation of Ahmed Rıza Bey's statement was not merely resonantly proclaimed but was given oblique constitutional recognition. And it seemed to be substantiated further by the Grand *Vezir*'s appointment of Inspector-General Mahmud Şevket Paşa as Minister of War.¹²⁶ And the Paşa appeared to be fully in accord with the political and professional motives inspiring the military.¹²⁷

In assuming office, Mahmud Şevket Paşa clearly showed that if there were a choice to be made between the civilian and the military authorities he would choose the military, regardless even of the Committee. Nor could he be expected to remain inactive in view of the fact that the military had grown accustomed to regarding themselves as the "guardians of the *Meşrutiyet*" (*nigâhban-ı Meşrutiyet*) as well as of the state and society. More importantly, tradition, as we have noted, asserted that the military was in some mystic way closer to the core of the state than the parliamentary institutions which had been somewhat precariously grafted on to it.¹²⁸ However, if the officer corps were to thrive and enjoy a plenitude of legitimized power, prerogatives and privileges in Ottoman society, they had to play a leading political role. Hence the improvement in the technical efficiency of the armed forces, rendering them more capable of retaining their political predominance, was only made possible by subordinating the energies of the Government to the demands of the military establishment.

There can be no doubt that this development was facilitated by the various outbursts of political agitation, whether reactionary – as in the case of the "31 March", or provocative – notably on 14 April 1909 when the Ottoman Armenians in Adana erupted, sinisterly enough, the very day after the 31 March Incident.¹²⁹ It was further accentuated by secessionist tendencies in the Albanian, Macedonian and Arabian provinces, sometimes resulting in local revolts.¹³⁰ On the other hand, the members of a supposedly sovereign Parliament regarded it as their function to introduce absolute political equality. Yet in the course of doing so, political liberty of the most uncompromising kind was sought in a multi-"national" state which was not supported by the solid pillars of contemporary key political institutions – for, with the exception of the military, these had yet to be fully erected and made dependable. Nor was there the support of economic well-being, crippled

as the economy was by Capitulations, or of cultural accommodation, with the incompatible educational and intellectual development of the different *millet*s. Hence, society was insufficiently united to provide an adequate foundation for parliamentary government within a constitutional monarchy, in which different aspects of constitutional freedom and, in particular, liberty should be enjoyed by all. Consequently, the immediate transmission of every popular aspiration to the floor of Parliament was held to be the proper way in which government ought to function, so that the various separatist movements were represented in heated uproars in a Chamber composed of some nine different *millet*s of differing religious persuasions.¹³¹ Within this political context, the Committee reacted with repressive and centralist policies which they conceived as merely defensive. Indeed, they had inherited a realm which seemed to be on the verge of disintegration, and while admitting the gravity of the situation they refused to be cowed by it. The pitiless realism that was to characterize all their political thinking in time to come was not yet sufficiently developed to convince the new rulers that a clear break with Ottomanism would in the end be unavoidable. But the military, with a clearer vision, seemed already to have realized that ultimate salvation lay in the emerging political ideology of patriotic nationalism long before any civilian politician had seen its necessity.¹³²

What I have been arguing so far may best be exemplified by the Parliamentary debates of 1910, following a local revolt in Albania that developed during the months of February and March and the report of which was brought before the Chamber of Deputies in April. This is not merely illustrative of the domestic political situation of the day but, in addition, contains hints of later Ottoman Rumelian policies and, more importantly, indicates the attitudes of the various interested parties, of which there were four identifiable ones including the military.

As a result, mainly, of the ill-prepared and abrasive centralizing policies of the Unionists, the exemption of Albania from taxation and conscription granted by Abdülhamid II had been revoked. Opposition to such measures was incited by local chiefs who immediately took up the issue; and the seriousness of the Albanian reaction became apparent with the wounding, on 1 April, of the Governor of İpek (Kosova), İsmail Hakkı Bey, and the assassination of the local Commander of the 7th Regiment, Major Rüşdü Bey. Within two days, armed uprisings developed and spread in the Priştina, Volčtrin, Jakova and Ferizović areas. The Government's immediate response was to declare martial law locally and to despatch troops to suppress the revolt.¹³³

It was at this stage, on 10 April 1910, that the issue reached the Chamber of Deputies; the session was opened by the President, Ahmed Rıza Bey, who accepted two motions by the Albanian deputies.¹³⁴ The attitude of these deputies is best portrayed by one of the most intellectual Albanians in the Chamber, Necib Draga Bey, Deputy for Üsküp (Skopje), in explaining the motion. He declared their desire, too, for reforms in Albania, and continued:

“But these reforms should not be accompanied by repression, terror [and] injustice; on the contrary, they should represent equality and justice . . . Is it wise, during the establishment of a new régime, to pressurize immediately with unprecedented taxes and disciplinary measures a people whose special conditions have been taken into account for five hundred years, whether due to maladministration or sagacity? I leave this to your conscience. I am saying, with courage, in your presence that the desired outcome will not be obtained through martial law and diverse pressures.”

With the reading of a telegram sent on behalf of the people of the districts of Priština and Volčtrin, the debate took a heated turn. The telegram declared that shots had been fired at the crowds protesting against the taxation scheme. After it had been read, Hasan Bey, Deputy for Priština, opened an attack on the General Officer Commanding, Major-General Cavid Paşa, who had been sent personally by Mahmud Şevket Paşa, saying:

“I applaud with all my being the reforms in Albania; but on the condition that there be no oppression and terror. In Loma and other places, Commander Cavid Paşa’s cruel and tyrannical ways . . .”

Such strong language provoked an immediate reproof from the Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, Deputy for Edirne, as the representative of the second interested party – the Unionists and the Government. He rejected the charge by interrupting:

“I repudiate it, I repudiate it. There can be no expressions like this.”

But Hasan Bey continued:

“You can repudiate as much as you like. I am talking about reality. Yes, his [Cavid Paşa’s] attempting cruel and tyrannical activities I condemn on the floor of this Assembly and from this chair.”

Demands from other Albanian deputies followed, among which they asked for a speech from İsmail Kemâl Bey, Deputy for Berat, who had in fact brought one of the motions before the Chamber. He then outlined the reasons for the secessionist tendency in Albania, amidst an atmosphere of uproar:

“. . . Allow me; if the military operations were to continue in this way, the Albanians would consider this an infringement on their rights, and attempt activities which would impair their loyalty and ties to the state; I fear that deplorable events would occur.”

İsmail Kemâl Bey's veiled threat prepared the way for Lütfi Fikri Bey, Deputy for Dersim (Tunceli), to launch an all-out attack on the Committee and their general policies, revealing himself to be a most ardent representative of the third interested party – the opposition:

“Gentlemen . . . I shall speak briefly. Administering an empire is not the same as administering a country with national, religious and linguistic unity. The superficial knowledge which İbrahim Hakkı Paşa has translated from the French and put into his head [uproar; shouts to shut up] – Sir, though I may shut up, the *martinis* [Martini-Henry rifles] on the mountains of Kumanova will not shut up . . . Woe to the *Meşrutiyet*.”

İsmail Kemâl Bey, repeating his argument, now openly threatened the Unionists:

“Gentlemen, if anything should happen to Albania, and if, *Allah* forbid, an insurrection were to occur, by *Allah*, Ottoman unity would be severely damaged . . .”

As the session proceeded, the attacks on the Government culminated in assaults on Major-General Cavid Paşa who was repeatedly subjected to personal abuse, as in the words of Müfid Bey, Deputy for Ergiri (Gjirakaster):

“Gentlemen, please, I too want to say a word. Last winter, we exchanged ideas with Government Ministers concerning these matters and I then said that Commander Cavid Paşa, who was sent there, was bloodthirsty, cruel, a monster and a tyrant.”

Talât Bey admonished him too for the content and tone of his remarks. This led to a sharp exchange between him and Müfid Bey, which was cut short by the Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa:

“I repudiate it. I repudiate these words with all my being.”

He represented the last, but by no means the least, important interested party – the military. Now, not surprisingly, even the President supported him, with the words:

“Please, how can an Ottoman General be a monster?”

Yet Müfid Bey vehemently repeated his charges:

"[Shouting at the top of his voice] He is a monster, he is a murderer. I am a deputy. I took an oath to say all that I know. No-one can stop me from doing my duty. [Great uproar; banging of desk-lids; vehement arguments . . .]"

The outcry was condemned by Mahmud Şevket Paşa who adopted a protective attitude toward the officer corps:

"I repudiate with all my being these words being said, without relying upon any concrete evidence, about one of the most distinguished Generals of the country. Shame on you all."

Then the whole debate erupted into a physical fight, causing the closure of this particular session.

The main features of the political climate are evinced in this sketch. It was a combination of the maintenance of a clear military presence, policies severe and conciliatory in turn – designed to inhibit separatist tendencies – and, finally, attempts to consolidate the opposing factions behind the Government under the banner of Ottomanism. Ottomanism was, in fact, raised as a rallying-cry by the Grand Vezir in a speech on the same day.¹³⁵ Yet it is significant that by 31 May the premises of a certain opposition club in Macedonia had been forcibly closed and its members arrested under the official allegation that they were supporting the Albanian revolt.¹³⁶ Furthermore, in the capital growing dissatisfaction with the authoritarian policies of the Committee already existed, as is evident from the reappearance of opposition groups, beginning with the formation of the People's Party (*Ahali Fırkası*) on 21 February.¹³⁷ However, the bulk of the opposition remained for some time confined to the power struggle amongst the ruling groups and factions.¹³⁸ But the assassination of the editor of an influential opposition newspaper entitled *Sadâ-i Millet*, Ahmed Samim Bey, on 10 June – widely believed to have been politically inspired – marked the beginning of new developments. The subsequent spectacle of inter-party rivalries proved for a time to be damaging to the effective development of a constitutional opposition.¹³⁹ On the contrary, the spectacle, coupled with the separatist revolts, made the military more than ever convinced of its vital role in the restoration of security and order. While the continuation of martial law gave the military exceptional legal powers, its demands on the allocation of economic resources also increased, even to the point of taxing the patience of those civilian members of the Committee who looked to the military to guarantee their rule. The remark of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, who contributed to the debate on the military budget for the year 1910 by declaring "We shall begrudge the Army

nothing”,¹⁴⁰ elucidates the relations between the military and civilian authorities. They are further illuminated when it is remembered that the Minister of Finance had opposed the size of the allocation.¹⁴¹ And the higher echelons of Government, whether civilian or military, were in no doubt that this was “. . . the time of the *Meşrutîye*’s first dictator, that is to say the period of Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s one-man rule [. . . tek adamlık . . .]”.¹⁴²

Meanwhile, the popular view of the Paşa’s position, portrayed in a satirical poem of the day, establishes his political standing quite clearly by declaring that when he put forward a proposal:

“ . . .

If it were another minister it would be said, ‘No chance’, yet to His Suggestion they say, ‘Certainly, by all means’; they begin commending it!

If He so desired He could open and close Parliament hundreds of times Generalissimo of the Government should be His title!”¹⁴³

As the public’s enthusiasm for parliamentary government waned, various extra-parliamentary opposition currents surfaced, attracting the attention of the military. But they only stimulated the military to a demonstration of strength and exhibited the popularity, in a paternalist sense, of the Minister of War. It was at this stage that rumours of an alleged reactionary conspiracy took a more concrete form with the arrest of Dr. Rıza Nur, Deputy for Sinop and a well-known opponent of the Unionists, on 19 July 1910. He and some others were accused of being members of a Secret Society (*Cemiyet-i Hafiye*) aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government. Despite his inviolability as a Member of Parliament, Dr. Rıza Nur was arrested by the authorities under martial law.¹⁴⁴ Although the charges against the accused were dismissed for lack of evidence at the Court Martial some four months later, the military had made their point. On being asked whether he had attached any importance to the alleged reactionary conspiracy, the Minister of War is reported to have replied, “No; but if I did not crush these people now they would become important”.¹⁴⁵

As the constitutional façade failed to conceal the military basis of governing power, the soldiers’ policy was one of maintaining political order and restoring the status quo in the still restless provinces. Such policies seem to have aimed at the curbing of those who tried to challenge military predominance. Hence the first serious split in the Committee of Union and Progress by January 1911, on the appearance of the so-called New Clique (*Hizb-i Cedid*),¹⁴⁶ tended to polarize the political factions and to increase the military’s awareness of its position. The Committee tried to

appease the Clique with the resignation of Talât Bey, the Minister of the Interior, on 10 February. In the final analysis it was, however, left to Mahmud Şevket Paşa to constrain the activities of the Clique's powerful leader, Colonel Sadık Bey, the recently-retired Deputy-Chief of the Cavalry Department at the Ministry of War. Thus, the personal intervention of the Minister of War having eagerly been sought, Sadık Bey was removed to Selânik at the end of April.¹⁴⁷

Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not only putting down dissensions in the capital. It was due to his pressure on the Cabinet that Ahmed İzzet Paşa, the Chief of the General Staff, was sent to suppress another revolt in the Arab provinces, the main focus of which was in the Yemen.¹⁴⁸

These interminable dissensions, whether in the capital or the provinces, and their subsequent resolutions, whether by the threat or the actual use of force, at first appeared advantageous to the parliamentary régime but finally operated to its detriment by creating favourable conditions for military authoritarianism. The indefinite prolongation of martial law on 14 March 1911 proved that the military was still too strong to be challenged.¹⁴⁹ This condition became even more obtrusive when, in late August, the new Minister of Finance, Nail Bey, wished to examine the accounts of the Ministry of War through the newly-established Audit Office (*Divan-ı Muhasebat*) but failed to gain access to them.¹⁵⁰ The Minister of War persisted in its refusal, the Minister of Finance in its request. The dispute dragged on for a month before it was agreed to postpone a settlement until the reopening of Parliament. In the meantime, amidst the tangled course of such policy disputes, the Government suddenly faced the openly-declared designs of Italy on Ottoman Libya, the many warning signs of which it had entirely failed to observe.¹⁵¹ On communicating a diplomatic note from the Italian *Chargé d'Affaires* and its counter-note, dated 26 September, to the Ottoman embassies in Berlin, London and Paris, the Porte added a post-script: that it was imperative to do everything to reach an agreement with Italy,

“... because if the Italians start a war by landing forces or some other way our internal situation will reveal a menace much to be feared.”¹⁵²

When Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 29 September,¹⁵³ this prophecy of the Porte proved to be correct as the civil structure, not the military, was the greater casualty of war. Indeed, the immediate repercussions were felt in the civilian sphere rather than by the military as one might have expected.

The latter was only affected indirectly through its close connection with domestic partisan politics, over which its political influence was continuing as strongly as ever.

The resignation of the İbrahim Hakkı Paşa Government was a direct result of the outbreak of hostilities with Italy. Having accepted full responsibility for the prevailing situation, the Grand Vezir is said to have advised the Sultan, through the Lord High Chamberlain, to appoint Said Paşa in his stead. Said Paşa, a candidate acceptable to the Committee, was duly appointed Grand Vezir for the eighth time (30 September 1911) and formed his Cabinet by 5 October, including Mahmud Şevket Paşa as the Minister of War.¹⁵⁴ In the domestic political sphere, the Court Martial still sitting in İstanbul seemed anxious to exert its influence on the new Government, in liaison with the Ministry of War. Hence, on 11 October 1911, the Court demanded from the Government that:

"The discussion of important affairs that would take place and might perturb public opinion after the Chamber of Deputies recess, should not be published by the press in the inner martial-law zone."¹⁵⁵

The response of the Said Paşa Government seems cautious and rather conciliatory. Instead of questioning the persistent military pressure on successive Governments or on the constitutional freedom of the press, the new Government opted to draft an explanatory note on the same day: since they were going to propose that the discussion of important matters be secret, there was no harm in the publication of the rest in the newspapers.¹⁵⁶

As Parliament convened for the fourth session on 14 October 1911 and the new Grand Vezir received a clear vote of confidence, the initial Italian naval blockade and subsequent landings at Tobruk and Trablus were extended and an Italian expeditionary force, without meeting any serious resistance, invaded Derne (Derna), Homs and Bingazi between 18 and 21 October.¹⁵⁷ The apparent Ottoman inability to put up better resistance was a result of the poor condition and small numbers of the defending forces in comparison with the invaders. They were also cut off from receiving supplies and reinforcements because of Italian naval superiority.¹⁵⁸ However, with the seizure of Ottoman territory and the wave of popular rage that followed, there already appeared certain major radical traits in the expressed motives of the officer corps: that the object and end of their political conduct was in conformity with the interest and demands of the populace, and that the decisions leading officers to volunteer to fight in

Trablusgarb were consistent with these aims regardless of any difference in matters other than the maintenance of Ottoman rule. It is, therefore, fair to hold that in the launching of a successful guerrilla war against Italy, spearheaded by the "young" officers, the officer corps' arbitration in the domestic political sphere was coupled with their own professional duty during the war. This, in turn, accentuated the position of the military as the chief propelling force in domestic politics, encouraging the idea that the officer corps should engage in overhauling the political machine. Moreover, there seems to be no basic justification for the oft-repeated assertion that the participation of officers in organizing the local population against the regular forces of Italy was based on their close allegiance to the Committee of Union and Progress. Nor, indeed, were they all sent by the Porte or the Committee. On the contrary, even ". . . the Porte's struggle not to maintain [lit., to defend] Trablusgarb but rather to maintain appearances",¹⁵⁹ seems to have provided sufficient impetus to the officers to unite their efforts against a common enemy. Certainly, in the words of a then exiled, anti-Unionist follower of Prens (Prince) Sabahaddin Bey and chronicler of the anti-Unionist groups, Ahmed Bedevi (Kuran) Bey:

"Concerning the matter of the motherland, the choice between Government and opposition would certainly not have arisen."¹⁶⁰

Hence, in spite of their political differences, the most prominent and promising officers of the period were either sent or, as in most cases, volunteered to organize a guerrilla campaign against the invading forces. In other words, it appears that it was a sudden surge of indignation against Italian aggression which drove these men to action.¹⁶¹ However, although Ottoman success appeared possible towards the end of November, if only through a stalemate, the defence of Trablusgarb was significant in a symbolic sense rather than in that of an outright military victory. Yet in the domestic political situation, the war, even if it modified the bitterness of party strife, seems never to have led the two major rival parties to sink their differences. Thus, the chief aim of the new Liberal Union (*Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası*), formed on 21 November 1911 as a combined though heterogeneous opposition to the ruling Unionists, was determined by its structure. That is, those dissident personalities, groups and organizations who had unwillingly accepted their inability to oppose separately, now amalgamated with the sole aim of overthrowing the Committee of Union and Progress.¹⁶² But the content of the coalition policies, designed to

make a common cause, impelled the Unionists to opt for increasingly repressive measures. Considered as a whole, then, politics were caught in a vicious circle. Political life lacked the mutual accommodation of political interests and this obstructed the resolution of conflicts. Conversely, the lack of genuine and effective conflict resolution obstructed the development of mutual accommodation. The general reluctance to accept a degree of conflict as integral to constitutional politics exacerbated the continuous emphasis on consensus; if not achieved voluntarily it was to be imposed.¹⁶³ And in the process of its imposition, military participation in partisan politics was eagerly sought.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, reliance on the military as a conflict regulator juxtaposed with the increasingly self-confident attitude of the military towards themselves and towards "politics". Thus, the conversion of military intervention into the military's political ruling group role was already coming into effect with the officer corps' vision of themselves as the guardians of "politics".¹⁶⁵ For the guardians, civic order had to be established, an order in which the attainment of consensus had to be imposed from above and, more importantly, by command.

The nature of the political conflict came to the fore, ironical though it may seem, as the result of a by-election for a vacant seat in İstanbul on 11 December 1911.¹⁶⁶ The marginal victory of the opposition Liberal Union was seen by the Unionists ". . . as a sign of their impending fall and therefore the signal for immediate action".¹⁶⁷ The most significant feature of their thinking was reflected in their attempts to modify the amended Article 35 of the 1876 Constitution. These attempts led to an unprecedented controversy in Parliament. In the opposition's view, while this was in theory the reassertion of the executive's authority over the legislature, in practice it comprised the reaffirmation of the Unionists' power over the Chamber of Deputies. Since the Sultan was "a puppet in their hands",¹⁶⁸ a disagreement with Parliament on constitutional matters would dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and force a general election ". . . where the Committee thought it could win comfortably".¹⁶⁹ However, the opposition's successful obstructionist tactics resulted in the resignation of the Grand Vezir, Said Paşa, on 30 December. He was immediately reappointed on 1 January 1912, and this was approved by the Sultan on the 3rd;¹⁷⁰ but the obstructionist tactics in the debates on Article 35 were feverishly carried on. When finally put to the vote, the Bill was defeated because it failed to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary in order to carry out a constitutional amendment.¹⁷¹ Thereupon, the Unionists persuaded the Sultan to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. He, having had his decision endorsed by the

Senate, dissolved Parliament on 18 January 1912, to be opened again within three months after the general election.¹⁷²

This second general election, as one Unionist politician put it,

“... coincided with the period when all ambitions were on the increase [and] personal and national interests in collision. The two sides were struggling, like a commander who pushes all his reserves to the last man in battle, in order to get a favourable result.”¹⁷³

The opposition had already given proof of the strength of the forces behind it, and was now able to utilize the widespread public dissatisfaction and disenchantment in İstanbul over the dissolving of Parliament. To this the Unionist side responded with the mobilization of their civilian and military supporters, especially in the provincial towns, through their political clubs. During the course of the election campaign, from February to April, their members agitated and campaigned to secure a victory. For example, Mehmed Ali Bey, appointed in 1911 as Governor of Yanya *Vilayet* by the Unionists, “... had to struggle with the problem of the candidacy for the legislature”.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, seeing the military as the most feasible source of political coercion, the Unionists conspired to promote their most ardent supporters among the officer corps. Their recently-appointed Minister of the Interior, Hacı Âdil Bey, former Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress, admitted this, saying “I kiss the hands of those officers [i.e., show my great respect] who have been involved in the elections”.¹⁷⁵ Against these methods, coupled with certain repressive measures such as restricting the press and public meetings and even the mobilization of *gendarme* and police forces for the sake of “public order”, the pseudo-religious bond of the common-fronted opposition proved futile during the April 1912 general election.¹⁷⁶ The resulting Unionist landslide victory was said to have made “... a very parliament of the Government”¹⁷⁷ rather than a parliament of the people, the Liberal Unionists having no more than fifteen out of 275 deputies when Parliament was officially opened on 18 April 1912.¹⁷⁸ With the election of Halil (Menteşe) Bey, Deputy for Menteşe and former President of the Parliamentary Party of the Committee of Union and Progress, as the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Cabinet “... took on a decidedly Unionist colouring”.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, despite “... an obedient Parliament and a submissive Sultan ...”¹⁸⁰ seemingly providing them with full political control, the Unionists presumptuously declared their symbiotic relationship with the military. This was partly to make plain the strength of their military support and partly to make this support more certain. It impelled them to emphasise the high

reputation and supreme importance of the officer corps, of course only as long as it continued to support them. The prolongation of the guerrilla war against Italy provided an opportunity for the Unionists to express this in public for the first time. A motion was passed during the session of 4 May 1912, summarized in these terms:

"It is decided, on the proposal of Yusuf Şatvan Bey, Deputy for Bingazi, that on behalf of Parliament a declaration of appreciation be made to those of the principal high officials belonging to the Committee of Union and Progress, Enver, Fethi, Halil and Aziz Beys, [and] to Commander Neşet Paşa, and to other figures [. . . ve zevat-ı saireye] . . ." ¹⁸¹

The avowed moral and psychological purpose of this motion, and indeed its very embodiment in this parliamentary format, was of course to enhance the support of the military. On the other hand, the self-confidence instilled by the military training and career had already been carried over into political realms and meant that the military increasingly involved themselves in governmental decisions. In addition, as I have indicated, the officer of the period viewed himself as belonging to the group of men most competent to deal with domestic and international politics and, moreover, with the destiny of the state.¹⁸² Henceforth, the officer corps developed a vested interest – personal, institutional, ideological – in the supremacy of all things military. Yet also, as bureaucrats, they were zealous not only to enlarge their own domain but also to infiltrate that of others. And as men who possessed the power of coercion, they were anxious to develop an overriding influence in order to create the conditions for the exercise of this power. Besides, by 1912 political power in its most partisan form had been thrust upon them by civilians for their own purposes, as evinced in the motion of 4 May.¹⁸³ By June 1912, the polarization of domestic politics had resulted in Unionist platitudes to the effect that matters went wrong in the past because their opponents had not been thinking correctly. Both the diagnosis and its corollary, the closing of channels for the expression of opposition views, are exemplified in the following comment:

"The Government's manipulation of the Chamber and its disregard for the opposition showed again the futility of trying to bring about change peacefully and according to the law. The measures which the Government had taken – the dissolution of Parliament, the elections and the constitutional amendments, though absolutely legal – did much to discredit constitutionalism and its practitioners, the politicians and, more particularly, the Unionists."¹⁸⁴

Still, these measures alone do not, as is generally assumed, seem sufficient to account for the emergence of a group of officers in May/June 1912 in İstanbul,¹⁸⁵ calling themselves the Saviour Officers Group (*Halaskârân-ı Zabitan Gurubu*), which nomenclature and conception of themselves is significant. Indeed, from the military aspect a perusal of inter-relations within the officer corps is now overdue; the fact that it has not yet been considered has begun to cramp our discussion.

The officer corps was not wholly united but contained a minority of officers dissatisfied on either social or personal grounds. From the beginning, the disaffected group of officers would have been as content with the partisan politics of the day as the rest of the officer corps, had the foregoing considerations regarding Unionist policies been all that mattered, and the conflict might well have been smoothed over. The introduction of greater administrative centralization and the creeping tendency to equate Ottomanism with Turkish nationalism of a strongly Islâmic kind, despite the inherent contradiction between the two, would not have seemed contradictory to the predominantly Muslim-Turkish officer corps.¹⁸⁶ Yet at this stage the points of potential and actual conflict within the armed forces seem equally, if not more, serious in the emergence of dissatisfaction among a minority of the officers. Those involved in conspiratorial activities seem to have been motivated by a variety of professional and ideological reasons. Resentment of Unionist officers and their prominence, reaction against the large-scale demotions and purges, personal ambitions for fame and key positions; all can be regarded as posing serious threats to the unity of the existing corps.¹⁸⁷

From the political aspect, however, the ferment among these officers and their dissatisfaction with the political scene coincided, and subsequently became identical, with that of the heterogeneous civilian opposition, which took advantage of the opportunity to gain the backing of a military force. Since this force possessed the sole means of achieving the physical seizure of power, it would constitute the most active element in the mechanics of a *putsch*. In other words, the opposition attempted to curry favour with the most strategically placed, as well as dissatisfied, military men.¹⁸⁸

Underlying this were also factors on the domestic scene making for a deterioration in the authority of the central government. For instance, a new general insurrection in northern Albania in early May 1912 spread rapidly despite attempts by the Unionists to ameliorate the situation through concessions in taxation and conscription – concessions that fitted into the context of decentralization and the broadly conciliatory policy they were pursuing.¹⁸⁹ The rising, like those of the previous years, might have

been suppressed without much difficulty had not some of the officers of the 6th Army Corps (attached to the IInd Army [Group] Inspectorate and based at Manastır), seeking to show their dissatisfaction with the Government, taken to the hills and even joined the insurgents at the Tented Headquarters (*Çadırılı Karargâh*). These, naturally, gave them a warm welcome as powerful allies for their separatist aims.¹⁹⁰ To the opposition in the capital circumstances seemed ideal, and this in more than one respect. It was in these circles that the first real hopes arose of ending the Unionist régime, because their movement was beginning in a way so similar to that of the Young Turks in 1908. But more than this, the opposition needed a strategically-positioned military force in its struggle against the military-backed Government in İstanbul.¹⁹¹ For the moment, success seemed possible. In the meantime, the Government's slowness and quiescence facilitated the circulation of radical notions through cajolery, infiltration, pressure and propaganda. It was not until 30 June 1912 that the Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, publicly acknowledged the situation in Albania, when he declared:

"This action, which has stained the austere life of our soldiery, is the most categorical *de facto* evidence of the effects that could spring from the officers' occupying themselves with politics."¹⁹²

He went on to inform the officers that the draft of a law to forbid the military from taking part in partisan activities had already been sent to the Porte and concluded with a warning for those who ignored his words. The Bill was in fact presented by Mahmud Şevket Paşa on 1 July 1912, as a means for imposing control for the purpose of insulating the military from partisan politics. According to him, "The reason for presenting this Bill to Parliament was the event[s] of Manastır".¹⁹³ I would emphasise, however, that on the part of Mahmud Şevket Paşa this was no mere reaction to the disruptive events of some rebellious officers in Macedonia upon the military institution. As he himself put it:

"You know, in our motherland, during the process of gaining possession of the Constitution [*Meşrutiyet*] many services have been rendered by the Ottoman Army . . . [T]he Committee of Union and Progress could not perform this function on their own. In order to succeed in this service, reliance upon such a force was imperative [for the Committee] . . . But for an army, leaving aside its main task and getting caught up in politics is a disgraceful thing. It is a degradation . . . Yet since that participation [in politics with the Committee] was directed to the purpose of rescuing a nation on the verge of foundering and a state veering towards extinction, this was not dishonour but honour."¹⁹⁴

Important as Mahmud Şevket Paşa's contribution was, it is necessary to perceive it in its proper perspective. Many aspects of the situation were not unique to this particular time and place but contained in germ all the features and articulations familiar in military thinking all over the world. The paradox involved in this kind of thinking is, as a philosopher might express it, that what they see is different from the objects in the real world, but these objects are really there in the sense that political realities, with all their disturbing features, have to be taken into account. The Ottoman military were determined to invoke a higher source of legitimacy than the Constitution, a legitimacy considered by the officer corps to be derived from their role as the guardians of the Constitution.¹⁹⁵ Enough of this idea has survived to show that it was relevant to the needs of domestic politics and also met most of the military's needs. From such evidence, then, we may deduce that as the head of the military as well as of the political machine, it was sufficient for the Minister of War, who seemed capable of preserving order, to appeal to the general sense of crisis. And yet the argument he used against the military's partisan activities would subsequently be used by politicians against the whole of the governance of the country.

To put it another way, that the officers of the Empire supported Unionist policies was not conceived as participation in "politics", governmental political activity to be precise, whereas those officers who did not support them were considered to have unsuitably involved themselves in politics. What is more important for our purpose than Mahmud Şevket Paşa's repressive action is the conclusion which has come to dominate the writing about military politics in Turkey in particular and civil-military relations in general. This is implicit in the dichotomy between the military consenting and dissenting in politics. Whereas tacit, or even stated, military support for those in power in whatever kind of régime, in whatever capacity, has never been perceived as political involvement, opposition by the military has, in contrast, always been construed as active participation. To my mind, even passive support for a régime by those who have sufficient power to oppose it comprises, in reality, involvement in politics, namely consensus politics.

This dichotomy was evident in the attempts by subsequent Ottoman Governments to bar the officers from political activities through legislation, with the underlying assumption that constant support for governmental policies did not constitute political participation. Conversely, and more importantly, these attempts at control of the conscious political acts of the military – mostly specific, that is legislative, but occasionally in the more tangible

form of explicit controls such as purges – usually stemmed from military men holding political office, notably that of Minister of War. And not simply attempts to exclude men who had the potential ability to wield physical force, but also the creation and maintenance of a cohesive officer corps itself paved the way for the military's assuming the ruling group role and then, naturally, aspiring to a monopoly of political power.

Passing now to the course of events, a surprising move was the resignation on 9 July of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the "... most capable and energetic of contemporary Turkish statesmen",¹⁹⁶ as one foreign account remarked. Yet the explanation for the Minister of War's resignation lay in the domestic crisis that reached a climax at this time. Mahmud Şevket Paşa was unable to interpret the temper of the rebellious officers and their support in the opposition front. Nor did he act vigorously or quickly enough to curb the political power which the Committee of Union and Progress had obtained through their close alliance with the officer corps. Hence Mahmud Şevket Paşa's policy of stepping down apparently in favour of Nâzım Paşa, President of the Military Council, who seems to have had strong support in military circles. The Unionists appealed to Nâzım Paşa, hoping to find a rapid solution to the crisis.¹⁹⁷ Evidently his main condition for acceptance, the supreme military command as well as the War Ministry, was unacceptable as being too great a demand. The Ministry was then offered to two others who refused it, one because he felt he could not meet the demands of such a position and the other, after initially indicating acceptance, most probably because of a combination of personal and policy differences.¹⁹⁸ The conciliatory stance of the Unionists was insufficient to make up for their inability to fill the most vital Cabinet posts. The formal resignation of Said Paşa and his Cabinet on the night of 16 July 1912 was, in fact, a result of their failure to find anyone to accept office in their Government, and took place in spite of a clear vote of confidence carried on 15 July. They remained, however, as a caretaker Government.¹⁹⁹ Yet the Government maintained silence in public about the various pressures for as long as possible. Indeed, in a speech on general policy matters prior to the vote of confidence, Said Paşa still appeared to be making light of the agitation among the disillusioned officers:

"Now, gentlemen, you must have heard of some officers, limited in number but at any rate a few, taking to the hills; ... this event has been the cause of some sorrow to the state, not because of its importance but because of the impression it has made."²⁰⁰

As if to contradict the *Grand Vezir*, barely forty-eight hours after his formal resignation, that “event” inaugurated a major episode with the presentation of a manifesto, in the form of a letter, to the Military Council on 18 July 1912 by the “Saviour Officers”, a term used in their signature and employed by them for the first time.²⁰¹ The manifesto was presented by two captains to the Minister of the Navy, Hurşid Paşa, who was presiding over the Military Council then in session while simultaneously holding the post of Minister of War, temporarily, in the caretaker Government. The purport of the document was a demand for the expulsion of the caretaker Government under Said Paşa, the dissolution of the Chamber and the reappointment of Kâmil Paşa as *Grand Vezir* with a new Government. The instant reaction of the Military Council was that the Sultan should be acquainted with the situation, but through the mediation of the Cabinet. Hurşid Paşa therefore took a copy of the manifesto to the caretaker *Grand Vezir*, Said Paşa, whose Cabinet proved unable to reach an immediate decision other than to communicate the matter to the Sultan. The Sultan was duly informed on behalf of the Cabinet by Hurşid Paşa himself and three other *paşas* of the Military Council – its President, Nâzım Paşa, and two other members separately. On the night of 19 July 1912, Sultan Mehmed Reşad issued a proclamation to be read to all units of the military.²⁰² As the last resort, the Sultan hoped to evoke and maintain the special connection of the military with the House of Osman, not least in order to protect the military’s partisan activities. In essence, if there were to be strict discipline and unity, the military had to remain loyal to the Constitution and to the sacred rights of the Caliphate and Sultanate. Furthermore, the Sultan also, as the proclamation stated, attempted to take the initiative by appointing a new Cabinet under Tevfik Paşa, Ambassador to Britain, composed of persons with independent views and free from all kinds of party political ties. However, the approach to Tevfik Paşa proved unsuccessful because of his posing too many, and rather unacceptable, conditions. Other elder statesmen of the Empire, such as Kâmil Paşa, were considered unsuitable for the *Grand Vezirate* because such appointments might be interpreted as surrendering to the demands of the Saviour Officers.²⁰³ Under these circumstances the selection of retired Field-Marshal (*Müşir-Gazî*) Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, President of the Senate, was, in the prevailing opinion of the day, considered to be “. . . undoubtedly beneficial to the interest of the country . . .”, as the Lord High Chamberlain, Lütfi Simavi Bey, advised the Sultan,

“... for a famous former Marshal and Generalissimo like Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa must have an inherent influence over the disorderly military”.²⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the resulting appointment of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa on 21 July 1912 and his formation of the Grand Cabinet (*Büyük Kabine*) on the 22nd, seems to have done away with the existing military and political contradictions or, at least, with attempting to reconcile them. To this effect, not only were the majority of Cabinet members appointed anti-Unionists but also, as a consistent policy measure, representatives of the military were included. In line with this main impulse, Nâzım Paşa, the new Minister of War, was considered as “... being materially and actually the most powerful ...”²⁰⁵ member of the Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa Cabinet.

An instance of the formal ousting from power of the Committee of Union and Progress is revealed in one of the first steps which the new Government took. The abolition of martial law on 24 July 1912²⁰⁶ would have been seen only as a symbolic step toward the consolidation of the anti-Unionist policies, were it not for its wider implications. The political and, more importantly, professional resentments of the Saviour Officers found public outlet as soon as the freedom of the press was restored. In certain newspapers of the day there appeared for the first time the “Programme of the Saviour Officers Group” which had been circulating secretly prior to the resignation of Said Paşa. On policy matters, their immediate demands, such as the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of new elections, were intended to intensify the already apparent anti-Unionist trend and were put forward as a means of procuring “... the observance of the fundamentals of real constitutionalism in the Government administration [... idare-i hükümette Meşrutiyeti hakikiye esaslarına riayeti temin]”.²⁰⁷

Commendable as this goal may seem, an inherent contradiction is evident which undermines belief in the officers’ understanding of the theory of constitutional government. For while the Saviour Officers were denouncing military participation in partisan politics, they were simultaneously exhorting the Government to run affairs of state in conformity with their own wishes. Moreover, detailed consideration of professional grievances in the second part of the document shows that the political views of the Saviour Officers were not entirely unconnected with their personal interests. For this reason, in explaining the stimuli motivating the Savours’ conscious political acts, that of individual self-interest or the social advancement of a few must be taken into consideration.

The combination of attitudes revealed by such an assessment, though it may have had immediate relevance for this disillusioned group, also had implications for anti-Unionist civilians with their own interests.²⁰⁸

The second part of the document demonstrates quite clearly the origins of the Saviour Officers' discontent. For the purpose of this study, however, it is sufficient to note that their discontent was obviously a response not only to the disturbed political conditions of the time but also to the infiltration of Unionist ideology into the officer corps. Thus the whole thrust of the Saviours' thinking was against those who had become prominent in the restoration of the Constitution. The document implies that what this disillusioned group needed was just too difficult to obtain under the régime of the Unionists and their main support, the officer corps. And yet as long as the interests of these two groups of officers converged, the total officer corps would keep up the pressure on the constitutional government on behalf of their military prerogatives and right to dominate. Up to a point the two groups could work together and reinforce one another. But they were fundamentally incompatible in their attitudes towards policy. This incompatibility between those who had been the power behind the scenes during the Unionist régime or who were not necessarily opposed to the aims of the Unionist policies but had not been active in support, and those who had not had any share of power, was becoming more and more plain. However, the latter, having partially achieved their objective, went into the attack just as their views first found public expression. In the evening of 24 July 1912, what are known as the "red-sealed letters", signed by the "Saviour Officers Group", were received by such persons as Halid Ziya (Uşaklıgil) Bey, Chief Secretary to the Sultan,²⁰⁹ and Halil Bey, the President of the Chamber. In view of subsequent events, it can be assumed that the letter to Halil Bey provoked important developments. The Saviours threatened the President's life for his "harmful" and "underhand" activities. They further warned him not to attempt to obstruct

"... the dissolution of the present Chamber of Deputies or, more accurately, the Club and Theatre of Fındıklı, which constitutes the most important [and] just demand of the military . . ."²¹⁰

The feelings, needs and aspirations of the "Group" were thus inherent in the political message of their denunciation. Their derogatory reference to Parliament as a nightclub-cum-theatre seems to have derived from their resentment of the ineptitude and

bickering of the politicians and from the soldiers' natural desire for coercive politics.

The situation thus created is a particular case of the general tendency to be found when a representative constitutional superstructure is erected on an authoritarian foundation, a foundation with which soldiers usually identify themselves by virtue of their professional outlook. Following this pattern, the political character of the Saviours not only illustrates their dissentient attitude but also throws light on the whole set of political circumstances which they were attempting to manipulate in the interests of civilian politicians as well as of advancing their own ideas. As the impotent *Meşrutiyet* found itself unable to accommodate the turbulent political parties, so the Grand *Vezir* too perceived his inability effectively to control the machinery of government, while the Saviours' attitude was reflected in their continual pressure on his Cabinet. Thus, the policy of appeasing the Saviours became a matter of priority for the Government.

The example of a military faction exploiting popular discontent in Albania and imposing its will in the capital provided an opportunity for the Government to nullify the election of deputies who owed their seats to the undue influence of the Committee of Union and Progress.²¹¹ A form of hegemony whereby military arbiters dominated the political scene was eventually established. Their major demand – the dissolution of the Chamber – suited the Grand *Vezir* because he thought it would check the growing power of the soldiers. And yet, paradoxically, what had begun as an effort to get rid of parliamentary control in order to weaken opposition to the Government ended in the strengthening of the position of Nâzım Paşa, the Minister of War. Here, one piece of evidence vividly reveals the considerations governing the behaviour of the Saviour Officers and inspiring their precipitous actions in an open gesture of defiance. And in so doing, it clearly emphasises Nâzım Paşa's patronage and indicates the deep sense of frustration in Parliament at its inability to control the unruly officers. On 3 August 1912, a group of deputies moved a motion (*takrir*) to interpellate Nâzım Paşa. The motion exhibited a strong awareness of the issue:

“Under the name of the Saviour Officers Group, some officers, although [they] have the audacity to issue regulations and manifestos and to publish them in the press, to date have not even had any legal action taken against them; on the contrary, on the night of the formation of the Cabinet, the officers who are known to be attached to this group, having been invited to the Sublime Porte by Nâzım Paşa and entertained, were afterwards sent to the administration of the police stations; and the officer who had brought the threatening letter to the home of our

President has still not been arrested; those detachments who had been ordered to protect Parliament for some considerable time have been replaced, contrary to constitutional law, without obtaining the legal consent of the Presidency of Parliament, on the allegation that they have been deprived of training; through the agency of the officers who had been sent to Parliament by the officer appointed as the District Commissioner of Police, another group of Saviour Officers were brought into Parliament; the officers, after having escaped from Manastır, been caught up in the mountains, arrested and sent to İstanbul, despite official denials that have appeared in the newspapers, were permitted to wander here and there and even in the corridors of Parliament; it being that this number of deplorable incidents have taken place, either under force and pressure or under favour and patronage, we propose an immediate interpellation on these viewpoints from the Minister of War."²¹²

In effect, what this interpellation was asking about was a complex historical process by which day-to-day politics were being subjected to the supervision of the military. The motion also indicated that, in any event, even if the Saviours allied themselves with the Minister of War, there was still sufficient ground for arguing against their political interference in Parliament. But, as might be expected, the Government responded coolly to the motion because the publicity given to it would affect the Saviours' confidence in the Government. Hence, the Minister of War, summoned before the Chamber to give his explanation under the interpellation, replied that as the Cabinet was in session he could not provide any explanation and asked that the interpellation be postponed until a later date. The postponement seems to have been a political manoeuvre designed to win enough time to obtain the dissolution of Parliament by constitutional means. Tactics as vague as these, however, were not what the Saviours wanted. And an immediate dissolution became likely once it was known, as *Şeyhülislâm* Cemaleddin Efendi wrote, that the Cabinet,

"... in order to pacify the uprising [by the Saviour Officers Group] which the military seemed unable to put down, saw no other option than to allow events to take their course".²¹³

So when the struggle for political ascendancy between the Saviours and the politicians was at its height, the Grand *Vezir*, determined to take advantage of the mutiny-fever, dissolved Parliament on 5 August 1912.²¹⁴

The evidence just reviewed indicates quite clearly that there was a repressive element in the swift application of constitutional procedure. This, I would urge, is the key, rather than a mere desire on the part of the Government to retaliate against the Unionists.

For their part, the Unionists were playing the same game and expressed all too plainly the conviction that an instrument of coercion is necessary in a political struggle. During the debates on the day of the dissolution, for instance, the prominent Unionist, Cavid Bey, Deputy for Selânik, emphatically endorsed this view in a long speech that alluded to a victim of another revolution, Madame Roland:

"O holy Ottoman Army, come and see! Come and see what crimes are being committed in your brave and noble name! [Gel de senin nam-ı celâdet ve asâletine ne cinayetler icra edildiğini gör!]." ²¹⁵

From this standpoint, the political implications of the Unionist Deputy seem fairly obvious. Yet to imply that a reactionary stance existed does not mean that a conflagration was about to break out. One does not, in fact, come upon evidence that the Unionist civilians were about to do anything effective on their own accord. Just as in the pre-constitutional period, they needed the backing of an armed force before they would turn against the existing political régime. But these observations do not imply that the Unionists lacked political initiative, merely that they realized their position to be insecure as long as they lacked the support of the majority of the officer corps. It was their spokesman in the Assembly who reasoned, with this consideration in mind, that

". . . the Government [was] under the constraint and duress of the Minister of War, [and] the Minister of War [was] under the constraint and duress of a handful of officers . . .". ²¹⁶

On the other hand, the Unionists were not alone in their reaction. The pressure of the Savours was the catalyst for change in the attitude of the other interested party. In fact, the officer corps found it necessary openly to repudiate the Saviours. Evidence of this may be found in the number of clearly-expressed views by officers. For example, at a protest meeting organized in İstanbul on 4 August 1912, some 400 officers and cadets were quick to declare their dissociation from the Saviours and were even anxious to show that

". . . legal actions [were] the only means to be taken against these men [the Saviours] in order to save the honour of the army". ²¹⁷

Moreover, an earlier declaration in Selânik, to which 116 officers put their names, spoke of their having received

"... with great regret the news that a few officers attached to the units at Manastir and Debre ... have taken to the hills".²¹⁸

The remainder of this declaration deserves further consideration because of the insight it provides into the working of the contemporary military mind.

The most obvious theme in the officers' repudiation was their stubborn antagonism to the excessive interference by the Saviours in partisan politics. To them, the military was "... above all kinds of political greed ... [and] could not become a tool for any political aim". So the officer corps in general opposed this faction and, on the ground that it was beneath their dignity, refused to ally themselves with "... the treacherous and loathsome acts of a few officers". They were repeating to the Saviours what they had said many times since the restoration of the Constitution in 1908: that they had then performed a function which was vital to the survival of the Empire; they had made the decision that the goals and values of the Empire were congruent with, or at least not inimical to, their own; for this reason, therefore, they could never accept that

"... the military should blemish its honour by a rebellious behaviour which does not accord with the present constitutional régime".

It had been the proud boast in military declarations on various occasions that the military was outside politics. But, as I have sought to stress right from the beginning of this study, there is no realm of human endeavour that never involves politics. So Ottoman political life, like that of any other state, extended far beyond the ambit of mere party conceptions, elections and such like, to encompass the whole process by which social goals, values and resources were allocated authoritatively. And Ottoman soldiers, like those of any other state, as a body of sustained aggression and resistance against the norms and attitudes supposedly outside their theoretical frame of reference, either participated – even, at times of firm state control, in the negative sense of refraining from active participation – or were called upon to participate, or both, in this process. They did so mostly as advisers to the civilians, as advocates of policies or, more importantly, as executors of final political decisions.

The statement quoted above from the Selânik declaration is, in effect, a searching criticism of the use of the Saviours by the politicians as executors of their own political decisions. While the officer corps did not elaborate on their charges, they did point out the acute problem created by this factionalization of the military. In

their assumed role as arbiters of the state's destiny during the political convulsions, they conceived ideological fragmentation as detrimental to the unity of the corps. These officers were reaffirming what was the military's most strongly-held political tenet – that they had an absolute moral right and responsibility to exercise “. . . protection of religion and of the country”. But to perform this obligatory duty they had to be united. Hence, the importance which the declaration attached to unity was significant. It actually meant the placing of considerable power in reserve, at the disposal of the officer corps, so that it could be used by them to further their political mission. It was, however, this very conviction of political right and responsibility and their potential as a source of political rewards that accentuated the gulf between the different sections of opinion. The whole officer corps participated in the movement already described, but their individual attitudes ranged from apocalyptic zeal to ordinary political considerations. It follows that all officers, or groups of officers, would not have had a common idea of what was to be done. Nonetheless, the intrinsic politicization of the officer corps was revealed in a diversity of military and political grievances which had been subsumed into the Unionist régime but emerged when the Unionists were ousted from power.

Meanwhile, the differing public statements of the factions reflected the fact that there was serious rivalry within the military. The experience of the Saviours' threat, especially, seems to have provided a strong impulse towards the civilian control of the military's conscious political acts through what I call, first, specific measures towards insulation and, secondly, implicit and explicit infiltration. To this end, the civilians prepared the ground and the Grand *Vezir* succeeded in inducing the Government to take the necessary steps to seize the political initiative. Notably, on the day Parliament was dissolved, the Cabinet passed a resolution to reintroduce martial law which became effective on the following day, 6 August 1912.²¹⁹ Thereupon it seems to have been felt that the loyalty of the officer corps as a whole had to be assured without delay. Yet on the surface, this plan seems to have been envisaged by the Government chiefly as a way of insulating the military from partisan politics. For this, two specific measures were immediately taken. An oath of loyalty and obedience and a written promise to the same effect were exacted from “the whole of the armed forces”, including senior officers, commanders, officers and every one of the men, by an *irade* of 10 August 1912. The administered oath was further to bind them to the extent that while in the services they could not

"... enter or take refuge with any political party or society or interfere in any way whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of the state [. . . fırka ve cemiatı siyasiyeden hiç birine intisab ve dehalet ve Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin dahilî ve haricî umur-u siyasiyesine veçhen minelvüchü kat'iyen müdahale etmiyeceğime . . .] . . .".²²⁰

Secondly, two courses may be discerned in the Government's attempts to control the military's conscious political acts. Much effort had been directed toward emphasising implicit and explicit infiltration, and yet the demarcation between the two made them mutually exclusive. On the one hand, through implicit infiltration, as the implicit interests of the Government coincided to a certain extent with those of the Saviours in their joint stand against the Unionists, there developed a considerable degree of harmony between them. However, this harmony was brought about not by any formal change in the hierarchy of the executive authority but simply by the willingness of the Saviours to apply the power of their arms to immediate political ends. The appointment of a serving, senior military officer, General Nâzım Paşa, to the post of Minister of War in the Cabinet showed the bond produced by a coincidence of political interests. While the appointment of serving officers to this post had been a customary practice, the choice of Nâzım Paşa was clearly due to the pressure of the Saviours. On the other hand, explicit infiltration occurred in the Government's formal attempts thoroughly to penetrate the officer corps in order to build up and ensure a core of loyalty – loyalty that was initially perceived, paradoxical though it may seem, as being to the Government, despite the entire military having sworn an oath "... to the Sultan and the Country . . ." ²²¹ The application of this policy may be seen in, for example, the appointment of Major-General Mehmed Hadi Paşa to the position of Acting-Chief of the General Staff. As the known representative of the Saviours, he supported the same interest and thinking as the Minister of War.²²² And the corollary, the assumption of authority by the Minister of War, extended the open infiltration by the General Staff through control of training and education. For example, the Commandant of the Artillery War College, Staff-Major Vehip Bey, despite his renowned professional standing and his

"... forming the College into an impeccably disciplined [body] . . . had been sacked . . . because of the changes in the party in power and in the Government".²²³

At this point I would contend, first, that many of the attempts to establish insulative controls over the military's conscious political

acts were characterized by their indecisiveness. It may be noted that as a direct consequence of the intrinsic politicization of the total officer corps, establishing such insulation proved difficult to achieve, mainly because it contravened the high level of latent and active political interests and aspirations of the corps. The anti-Unionists' policy of trying to divorce the corps from their position as arbiter of politics therefore met with resistance.

Secondly, the situation of heightened conflict, in relation to the first point, was perpetuated because the intrinsically politicized officer corps were far from being in accord with the views of the politicians; they wished to continue their political mission despite attempts to control them through implicit infiltration.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the factionalization within the corps, stimulated mainly by the Saviours, faithfully reflected an equivalent factionalization among the civilians, exacerbated by the Unionists. In the final analysis, the actions of the Saviours and the anti-Unionist civilians were counter-productive to the extent that they antagonized many of the officers who were not necessarily sympathetic towards the Unionists' activities, and thus provided the Unionists with a great deal of exploitable political and military capital.

From a close reading of Cavid Bey's diary, it is not difficult to construct a somewhat similar picture from the Unionist politician's response to the repressive measures of the anti-Unionists. Assuming that their activities could only be carried on outside the capital, Unionists like Cavid Bey had begun to move from İstanbul to Selânik:

"We found that the psychological conditions of Selânik were bad [he admitted, having arrived there on 6 August and remained] . . . neither a union in the Committee nor a concord in the army nor confidence nor courage in the people. A little heated discussion, vigorous publication [and] a few meetings might have inspired fresh spirit and life. But the sudden proclamation of martial law eliminated this hope and expectation."²²⁴

Yet towards the end of his stay in Selânik, Cavid Bey had become quite sanguine, writing:

"When I was about to return from Selânik, a great change had begun in the officer corps. They were expressing this in words and thoughts."²²⁵

Furthermore, the Unionists, acutely aware both of the precariousness of their position, given the current political mood, and of the increasing concern of the Government at their resurgence, were attempting to accelerate the pace of this "great change". Here, the

implication of the report submitted by the Central Committee to the 1912 Unionist Congress, which opened on 2 September in İstanbul, demonstrates the significance that was now being attached to the officers and the realization of the potential of an armed force. That part of the report relating to the continuing war with Italy consisted solely of praise for the military. Despite the obvious partisan bias with which it appears to have been drafted, and the imprecision of much of its phraseology, the report makes it quite clear that the Unionist leaders, for their own ends, stressed the necessity of the military's sacrosanct position. Reasoning in this fashion, the reference to the existence of forces capable of implementing the aims of the Unionist civilians underlined the political investment which the latter had made in the armed forces. Noting that

“... the Government of Union and Progress succeeded in upholding the honour of both Ottomanism and the army ...

the report observed,

“... *the devoted sons of the Committee* have not held back in dashing to the fields of *gaza* and in demonstrating their self-sacrifice”.²²⁶

However, any hopes that the Unionist leaders may have had of their capacity to exploit developments with the help of their “devoted sons”, or to foment

“... the dissatisfaction [that] had begun in a great part of the military against Nâzım Paşa's arbitrary conduct”,²²⁷

soon evaporated. The Grand *Vezir* had, as a last resort, further continued the process of insulation by putting into force two provisional laws on 8 October 1912.²²⁸ The first of these prohibited all military personnel from voting. The second enacted wider proscriptive measures on the officer corps: those who joined a political party, or stood as candidates, or wrote political articles, or were even present at the meetings of political clubs and parties, would be summarily dismissed from the service. Although idolized by popular adoration and protected by Sultanic patronage, the military might have been brought to comply with the aims of the Government had not the desires and drives of the corps themselves been incompatible with the Government's plan. On the other hand, those desires and drives that determined the officer corps' reaction tended inevitably to undermine their fighting qualities precisely because they were using their political weight to maximize their own power, authority and influence. Indeed, as I postulate, future

events were to demonstrate that these two dilemmas which had faced the Ottoman Government and the military respectively had not been resolved simply by the enactments of 8 October 1912.

III. Professional ineptitude and political instability

It may be conceived as a historical coincidence that on the day the disciplinary measures were passed, the ominous changes which had been occurring in the Balkans manifested themselves in the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by Montenegro (Karadağ).²²⁹ For, as Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa recognized, with the descent of the Ottoman state toward political and military defeat in Trablusgarb, “. . . all the Christian peoples living in European Turkey began to be carried away with the idea of deliverance being close at hand”.²³⁰ It was, however, no coincidence that the impairment of the fighting qualities of the Ottoman armed forces, mainly due to the decline in standards and discipline within the officer corps, was made abundantly clear during the course of the ensuing Balkan War (*Balkan Harbî*) of 1912–1913.

While the shifts in coalitions and alignments among the Balkan states and their subsequent mobilization on 30 September completely altered the emphasis in political debate from domestic to international, military considerations became vital to Ottoman foreign policy. The first concrete evidence of this development was the declaration of full mobilization of the Ottoman armed forces on 1 October.²³¹ On the same day, the Government enforced complete censorship on news about military movements.²³² Yet if the Ottoman response was immediate, it in no way implied a desire for war nor, indeed, that the military had any confidence in their own strategic thinking. The General Staff were well aware of the Empire's military weakness. In a report to the Porte, dated 29 September 1912, the General Staff, having considered the developments in the Balkans, pointed out that:

“. . . owing especially to the exhaustion of our soldiery who have been kept under arms for some years, and in order to make up the shortcomings of the military in terms of armament and ordnance, a period of at least five years away from domestic and international troubles must be gained; it is [therefore] submitted, with the utmost importance, that the Government bear this aspect in mind . . . and do everything in its power to annul those reasons which would force the military to fight on its own against several enemies.”²³³

Yet the military's political power notwithstanding, its coming to prominence because of war was more a reflection of the need for its fighting than for its political power. Hence, while in a condition of complete mobilization, the military were able to take measures to enlarge the area of their dominance. As the threat from the Balkans appeared more general and enduring, so the military's political role necessarily became more salient. In other words, the more the security of the state was menaced, the more dominantly the military's conjunctive role, beyond its immediate sphere of professional reference, manifested itself. On the other hand, the fact that the armed forces had technical defects, while important, is insufficient for the full appreciation of their fighting qualities. More significant for our purpose here, is the disruption of the unity of the officer corps and the corresponding corrosion of its fighting effectiveness.

It was during the emergency following the mobilization and related measures that the Government gave greater scope to the armed forces, who thereby accumulated authority and influence far surpassing anything they had previously possessed. The foremost political positions inevitably became open to the officer corps. In addition, military necessities placed the real power in the hands of the Minister of War, Nâzım Paşa, who now also became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the forces which took the field – with all the outward signs of full confidence as to the successful outcome of a war which had been thrust upon an unready and unwilling Empire and which, in his heart of hearts, he must have known his forces could not win.²³⁴

The Government, hitherto so absorbed in its struggle with the officer corps over political control and loyalty, was suddenly alarmed for the readiness of the corps. One of the basic issues which appears to have been raised was: how can the armed forces demonstrate their efficiency in the field when this, first and foremost, requires the professional efficiency of the officer corps?

On this question, informed and succinct evidence comes from the memoirs of *Şeyhülislâm* Cemaleddin Efendi. At a joint meeting of the General Staff and the Cabinet before the states entered upon the conflict, Cemaleddin Efendi, as his memoirs relate, expressed “especially” his and his Council of Ministers’ desire to avoid war in the Balkans:

“I emphasised . . . the undesirability of the occurrence of a war owing to our domestic and financial situation and, in particular, [to the fact that] since the time of [the restoration of] the Constitution, as the officers in the imperial forces have been occupying themselves mostly

with partisan politics [. . . orduyu hümâyün zabitanının ekseri siyasiyat ile iştigal ederek . . .], the essence of the military institution, which is its hierarchy, has unfortunately been disturbed [. . . askerliğin ruhu olan emr-i itaatın maatteessüf muhtel olmasına nazaran . . .].²³⁵

While this aspect seems particularly significant in assessing the will for war, the crux of the matter is indeed that the difference in the political attitudes of the officers impaired the hierarchical cohesion of the corps. For the intrinsic politicization of the officers was compounded with the effects of their extrinsic politicization – the inculcation of extra-military values by the civilian authorities for their own ends. And although politicization may not yet have been all-pervading, it had major consequences in reducing their fighting qualities.

By the time Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia intervened in the war (18–20 October) between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro, the inability of the Ottoman military to defend their country's interests in the Balkans had been clearly revealed on more than one front.²³⁶ The state of the officer corps was likewise revealed. The effect is best described in the measured words of Lieutenant-General Zeki Paşa, Commander of the Vardar Army Corps, whose forces had been routed by the Serbs at the battle of Kumanova (northern Macedonia) on 23–24 October 1912. In his memoirs, Zeki Paşa has contributed significant evidence in this respect:

“Despite the very limited number of our losses and casualties, our defeat resulted mainly from the officers’ remaining indifferent to their duties . . . and particularly from the ineffectiveness of their decisions and influence in the chain of command, and instead of devotion to duty, [their] occupying themselves with things other than military.”²³⁷

To argue thus is not to hold that the mere fact of there being political factions in the officer corps somehow inevitably caused the complete Ottoman failure on various fronts, especially in the opening phase of the war.²³⁸ The unprepared condition of the military when facing the combined forces of the Balkan states proved disastrous on several counts. The poor operation of the mobilization scheme and the slow despatch of an insufficient number of troops, the low level of staff and unit training, imperfect knowledge of tactical and strategic operations, an inadequate system of transport and supply, relatively scarce quantities of warlike stores and the mostly out-dated equipment – all these were responsible for the initial routs and subsequent defeats.²³⁹

Nevertheless, the disruption of the unity within the officer corps just prior to the War produced basic organizational disorders. It not only helped to undermine the Empire's security but distorted

the military perspective and judgement of the corps and confused them about their initial responsibilities and duties. Indecision, defeat and withdrawal were reflected in Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa's Government. The apparent loss of the fighting qualities of the military was closely matched by the ineffectiveness of the governing qualities of the civilians and, as public indignation mounted, changes in government were demanded. It was symptomatic of a readjustment of the popular outlook when Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa resigned, to be replaced by the former Grand *Vezir*, Kâmil Paşa (29 October 1912).²⁴⁰

Kâmil Paşa was by now in his eighties, too old to be really effective even by indirect methods. He had not the decisiveness, the single-mindedness, that were the essential qualities for a Grand *Vezir* in such a crisis. Like his predecessor, he had no Parliament on which to rely nor political base (that is, party) on which he could depend. Nâzım Paşa, who had long appeared arrogantly complacent about his armed forces and his own military ability, was retained in the new Cabinet as Minister of War and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. This retention was the most conspicuous sign of his, and the military's, continuing political power despite changes in the character and composition of the Government. But with the change in the military situation came a complete change in the position of the military High Command. On the day that Kâmil Paşa's Government was sworn in, attention was focused on the Bulgarian offensive in Trakya (Thrace) because of its strategic importance. For the moment, concern was concentrated on that and away from all other fronts. In the battle of Lüleburgaz (28 October-2 November 1912), Ottoman forces were routed. The collapse at Lüleburgaz dwarfed all other operations as the disorderly retreat began towards Çatalca, only twenty-five miles from İstanbul, the most vital line in the outer defences of the capital.²⁴¹ In the confused ill-temper of the retreat, without any notable success to restore self-respect, there were mutual recriminations among the Ottoman commanders. More importantly, however, the rout at Lüleburgaz seems to have unhinged the mind and morale of the military and filled the Ottoman High Command, including Nâzım Paşa, with the conviction of defeat. Although the details of the battle of Lüleburgaz belong to military history rather than to military politics, the political consequences of the battle were substantial. For the Ottoman High Command and the Government the episode was decisive and from it sprang their subsequent divergent attitudes and actions. Lieutenant-Colonel Mehmed Nihad Bey writes on the basis of direct observation:

"How well the Council of Ministers . . . , in comparison with the General Headquarters of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, had understood the essence of the war, and its relation to politics: the Grand *Vezir* was indicating very clearly that the present war was one of attrition, that perseverance and endurance were essential and that, unless these were shown, to end the war by political means would be to sign the death warrant of the country; (on the other hand, since until now only failures have occurred in battle, the High Command was convinced that no hope remained any longer, almost as if there were no other means but to surrender arms)."²⁴²

The Grand *Vezir* appears to have been swayed by this conviction of the High Command, since we find that he applied for the first time (on 3 November 1912) for ". . . the intervention and mediation of the Powers".²⁴³ On this point, the evidence is conclusive that it was the Ottoman High Command and not the Government, as is so often inferred, who was the initiator of such moves. The evidence of Mehmed Nihad Bey may be used more generally and is no less conclusive for this purpose. The demand of the High Command to the Government for the opening of negotiations shows that despite the loss of prestige involved in military defeat, they could still exert considerable political pressure. Furthermore, it now appeared that the civilians were embroiled with the military in more than simply domestic politics. During these periods of the battles in the Balkan War, the civilian leadership realized that the military leaders had a tendency to regard war as a zone to which they alone had access, that they were reluctant to admit the authority of civilian ministers to influence the course of operations, and that they continued to regard the issues of international politics as within their sphere. This was so, as the Lüleburgaz episode first indicated, to the extent of rendering it virtually impossible for the Kâmil Paşa Government to act without its permission, and brought the civil-military relationship to an unviable condition. In passing, it should be remarked that at such a time these relations ought to have remained at their closest for the sake of mutual benefit, not to mention that of the country at large.

Military reverses, indeed, intensified emotions and also created opportunities and raised expectations about the possibility of change. There already existed a disposition to see all problems in terms of personalities and personal relationships rather than of well-defined political principles. This was now accentuated by the war and the consequent breakdown of political society into competing factions, when the struggle amongst political parties, tolerable during peacetime, should have been muted if not

eliminated. The situation, a classic case of political instability, produced conditions in which the Government was unable to fulfil its functions. I would aver that this was mainly due to three features.

To begin with, by mid-November, the Kâmil Paşa Government's position had become precarious in the extreme. On every front the war was going very badly. Public criticism of the Government was becoming more and more vehement, especially among the Unionists. Added to this were the effects of food-shortages, the stream of distraught Muslim refugees from the Balkans and the outbreak of cholera among the general population.²⁴⁴ As a result, the Unionists' agitation was beginning to affect numerous men holding offices of importance in the Government and in the High Command. The Government seemed to have lost all support, yet it was unwilling to resign. Nor was it slow to take strong measures against the Unionists. With the appointment of a new Commander of the Martial Law Council, "... renowned for his hostility towards Union and Progress",²⁴⁵ the Government and, in particular, the Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Reşid Bey, procured the arrests of Unionists in large numbers as well as the suppression of their clubs and newspapers.²⁴⁶ Such measures, although effectively carried out, aggravated the already marked polarization and, in turn, increased the degree of conflict between the Government and the Unionists. Yet these measures were unable to interrupt the forms of thinking or to control the thoughts of, notably, the educated Unionist youth as their nationalistic and patriotic fervour began to rise. This was occurring in a constantly varying situation in which the rational element of interest was intensified by emotions of rage and grievance for the unexpected loss of Ottoman heartland and by hopes of mobilizing the power of the state in order to reverse the situation. A verse of the young poet, Emin Bülend (Serdaroğlu), then in his mid-twenties, vividly illustrates the extent to which such sentiments had captured popular imagination:

"...

I feed the barren soil of my heart with my grudge
With a gun in my hand I wait for the morrow.
O my ancestor, sleep at ease in your grave
Your son's name of today is solely vengeance."²⁴⁷

Sentiments of this nature, of course, took their colour from the appeal of the Unionists, to which kind of appeal the elder statesmen were unaccustomed; and they were able neither to comprehend, let alone comply with, its demands nor to provide any alternative. The implications became apparent. At about this time, Celâl (Bayar)

Bey, then the Committee's chief delegate at the *Vilâyet* of Bursa, describes the Unionists' persistent stand against the repressive measures of the Kâmil Paşa Government, and adds:

"Against the common peril, the perseverance and courage of our trusty comrades had increased. We were [now] closer to each other."²⁴⁸

The second feature came into play as the domestic political situation became more fluid. For wartime tension gave increasing impetus to its deterioration, while signs were being made by the Unionists that they were contemplating resistance, so that the Government began negotiations out of desperation. The only weapon left to the Ottomans, so the Government reasoned, was diplomacy. But having tried unsuccessfully to obtain the mediation and intervention of the Great Powers on three consecutive occasions between 3 and 7 November, it seems that the Government realized there would be no hope by this means. A frank admission of this diplomatic failure, at a Cabinet meeting of 13 November 1912, further substantiates quite clearly that the Ottoman Government was incapable of dealing with the demands made on it or the "load" it had to carry. An instance of the Government's position in relation to particular demands, internally, and "loads", externally, is apparent on close reading of the minutes. The Government was trapped by its inability either to meet the demand of the High Command for an immediate armistice or to withstand the weight of the Bulgarian advance, already as far as Çatalca on the way to İstanbul. Thus the combined military and diplomatic efforts to mitigate the effects of this ". . . deplorable state of affairs and immense dangers . . ." forced the Cabinet to resolve that ". . . it was absolutely impossible to continue the war [. . . ahvâl-i elîme ve muhatarâtı azîme ile harbe devam edilmesi kat'iyen gayr-i câiz . . .]".²⁴⁹ Indeed, as the minutes show, the Government sought to communicate directly with the King of Bulgaria in an appeal to end hostilities by declaring a cease-fire and resolved to give Nâzım Paşa discretionary powers to this end. In this respect, the proximity of the capital to the seat of war not only had a deep effect particularly on the Thracian campaign, but also disturbed the Ottoman domestic political strategy. Only when their attempt to force the line of Çatalca was decisively repulsed on 17–18 November, were the Bulgarians obliged to discuss an armistice.

Negotiations began on 28 November and were concluded on 3 December on condition that all the remaining belligerents open peace negotiations within twenty days in London.²⁵⁰ The armistice of Çatalca was an event which was more important in its

consequences than in its immediate impact. As the formal effect and final recourse to the arbitrament of war had centred on the besieged town of Edirne and, with it, Thrace, the armistice was followed by a period of supposed reconciliation in domestic politics.

The outcome, at any rate during the short period with which we are concerned, was a compromise which satisfied neither the zeal of the Unionists nor the aims of the Government, but it allowed the Ottomans to rally and reinforce the troops behind Çatalca and to hold Edirne which was withstanding a Bulgarian siege. Indicative of this reconciliatory trend was the release of prominent Unionists on 28 November, the replacement of the Chief and members of the Martial Law Council²⁵¹ and, more significantly still, the reassignment of officers with known Unionist sympathies to various tactical and strategic positions. For example, Staff-Major Mustafa Kemal Bey was appointed, on 21 November 1912, to the Directorship of the Operations Branch of the Corps holding the Gelibolu peninsula at Bolayır. Its Chief of Staff was another Libya veteran, Staff-Major Ali Fethi Bey. Subsequent appointments with strategic importance were those of Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey as General Inspector of the Lines of Communication and Chief Administrator of the Army [front at Çatalca] (offices in İstanbul) on 26 December 1912, and of Staff-Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey as Chief of Staff of Xth Army Corps (1 January 1913) which had assembled in İstanbul during the armistice.²⁵² And yet the compromise involved the neglect of the views and interests of the Unionist politicians at a time of a relatively low consensus about governing values. There appeared a conflict between the holders of and the aspirants to political power. But, probing a little, one may perceive the depth of the real political schism between the two. Among the members of the Government, as we have noticed, there was a growing sense of despondency. It took the form partly of dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war on all fronts and partly of discouragement over the prospects for peace which, because it had to be negotiated in London under the auspices of the Great Powers, seemed in itself to be a humiliation. Then the attempts of the Government to promote a united front appeared to act as an obstacle to the aspirations of the Unionists. Nevertheless, the Government seems to have thought that they were doomed unless they could produce a major diplomatic success at the negotiations. The united front was supported partly for political reasons, but the Unionists' conviction that their own security depended on that of the state no doubt also played a part. The problem posed for the Unionists by external military pressures was an equally delicate one. But from the successful defence of Çatalca and the ensuing armistice, domestic

political instability reached a peak, accentuated by the effects of our third feature, to which we may now turn.

As I have noted, the initiative had passed from battlefield to conference table. A conference between the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents met at St. James's Palace on 16 December 1912, with a view to reaching a decision about the conditions for a final peace and, particularly, to settle the question of the besieged city of Edirne. At the same time another procedure provided for a meeting of the ambassadors of the Great Powers, held on 17 December under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, who was also acting as a mediator in the conference.²⁵³ On the one hand, disastrous battles at various fronts on land and sea had demonstrated that an ultimate acceptance of defeat was likely, if not inevitable; and this harsh reality seems to have forced the Ottoman Government to consider the possibility of ending the war by negotiations with the idea that, as a Turkish proverb says, "Whatever is retrieved from loss is gain [Zararın neresinden dönülse kârdır]". But on the other hand, the Government appears to have recognized as early as November that the prospect of trouble between Bulgaria and Serbia over central Macedonia was sufficiently obvious to make it determined to procrastinate as long as possible before reaching a solution.²⁵⁴ And yet despite the Ottoman adoption of dilatory and opportunist, not to say tortuous, tactics, it was soon made clear to the Government what the British Premier had already declared on the night of 9 November at the London Guildhall:

"The map of Eastern Europe has to be recast . . . Upon one thing I believe the general opinion of Europe to be unanimous – that the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which have cost them so dear [loud cheers]."²⁵⁵

Coming from those Great Powers who, initially anticipating Ottoman gains, had declared that the *status quo ante* must be preserved whatever the outcome of the war, this was a duplicitous *volte-face*. And a further instance of this kind of attitude was the advice given to the Ottoman Government by the German, French and Russian Ambassadors not to permit the breakdown of the London negotiations on account of Edirne. For example, the German Ambassador saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Noradounghian (Noradunghian) Efendi on 20 December 1912 and outlined the situation, recommending that the Empire

". . . would act wisely if she would give up Adrianople, not only in the case that Bulgaria should make it a condition of a peace treaty, but

also in case the Turkish delegation in London should gain the impression that Turkish ownership of this citadel would preclude the establishment of a lasting friendship with Bulgaria . . .”

He added,

“Noradounghian replied to me that the projected policy which I had sketched agreed with his own views. But he had little hope of being able to win over his colleagues for such modern ideas. In the Council of Ministers he would not have any luck, solely for the reason that Turkish public opinion, *particularly the officer corps, would insist on the maintenance of Adrianople* which is a holy Turkish city and in which several former Sultans are buried. *Unfortunately, the Government does not have any means of power available to make the army comply.*”²⁵⁶

As the first two features continued to operate, and with increasing force, in domestic politics, Ottoman statesmen found themselves also under the growing threat of further diplomatic pressure from the Great Powers. And their greatest difficulty lay in solving the problem of pursuing negotiations which could only remain viable if certain major concessions were made, while aware that such concessions were bound to provoke popular resentment. By itself, popular resentment could not have any significant effect but it did increase as the more prudent patriotism of the Government, in terms of their peace proposals, led to deadlock.²⁵⁷ In fact, one immediate outcome was the complete obstruction of the decision-making process of the Government. This, in turn, resulted directly in the Government being unable to achieve a workable and effective policy when, on 6 January 1913, the Balkan delegates suspended the Conference at its tenth meeting.²⁵⁸

By this time, the Ottoman Government's inability to act was reflected in domestic politics. The hesitations of the Government's foreign policy appeared both unworthy and futile to the Unionist opposition, civilian and military alike. It appears they had then reached a position where they judged that an attempt to displace the Kâmil Paşa Government contained a strong possibility of success.²⁵⁹ The moment was, therefore, highly propitious. But, as they realized, even in conditions of extreme political instability within a more general social collapse, only if and when they coalesced with the military could they hope to bring the Government down. In other words, as long as the interests of the two converged the military could keep the politicians well aware of their existence and of its meaning, but not necessarily on behalf of the Committee's policies, despite the fact that from its earliest days the Committee had owed its strength to the military; its being,

ethos, performance – all depended on them. In a régime that was principally dependent upon the reliability of the military, the Unionist takeover depended on the effective threat of that force, but the success of such a takeover depended on more than the coercion that was going to be employed; it also had to show that it was inspired by serious political ideas. When the Unionists decided to stage a *coup d'état*, they emphasised the inevitability of using the military as a fulcrum for achieving their purposes. To be convinced on this score, we may look at a letter written by Talât Bey to his three Unionist comrades, then in Vienna, and dated 14 January 1913, outlining the overall strategy and timing of a coup.²⁶⁰ He informed and assured the recipients that every necessary measure to overthrow the Government had already been taken. But despite this, for the time being, they would not interfere while the Cabinet was still negotiating simply because, as the letter suggests, whoever decided to make a peace which in all probability would include the surrender of Edirne was going to have to bear the punitive response of the military. Here, the letter provides firm evidence not only of the Unionists' appreciation of the international situation but also of their talent for comprehending the military's mind and timing its reactions. This was due, in large part, to the influence of their military partners. And I must emphasise that the overall evidence is compelling: that the young officers in tactical commands, caught up in the fervour of their personal and national motivations, had no hesitation in urging that forcible usurpation was a feasible, nay admirable, desirable and even essential military operation. This is evinced particularly in Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey's private thoughts, expressed in a series of letters from the beginning of January to his German woman friend – allowing for a certain amount of self-adulation – and, more importantly, in his reported assurance, in confidence on 22 January, to a Unionist sympathiser and confidant.²⁶¹ On their side, the Unionist civilians were influential in keeping up the tensions already aroused. In the words of Talât Bey they had, at a meeting (whose date is not given), resolved by majority vote that:

“At the resulting peace, the military [ordu] would naturally demand to punish those who have instigated this situation, that is to say, the Cabinet – this too has been prepared.”²⁶²

It was against this background that the stage was now set. To continue the narrative, the immediate incentive to action came from a Collective Note imposing the will of the Great Powers, by *de facto* intervention, on the suspended St. James's Conference. In it,

the Empire was clearly reminded that the prolongation of war would jeopardize its possession of Istanbul and perhaps even of its Asiatic provinces ["Il n'aurait qu'à s'en prendre à lui-même si la prolongation de la guerre avait pour conséquence de mettre en question le sort de la capitale et peut-être d'étendre les hostilités aux provinces asiatiques de l'Empire"]. At any rate, the Empire would need the moral and material support of the Powers to remedy the ravages of war and consolidate its remaining territories. All these could only be guaranteed if the Porte accepted their advice [". . . déferé à leurs avis . . ."] to cede Edirne to the Balkan allies [". . . aux alliés balkaniques . . ."] and leave the Aegean islands to the disposition of the Powers. The Collective Note was communicated to the Ottoman Government on 17 January 1913.²⁶³ This forcible diplomatic intervention, amounting to an ultimatum, was an event of no little importance and, by virtue of its contents, had an immediate impact. Moreover, it had a lasting effect on Ottoman domestic politics.

IV. *Coup d'état*: the Raid on the Sublime Porte

On 18 January, at 10.40p.m., a telegram from the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, Noradounghian Efendi, was despatched to Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, Ambassador to Britain, with the aim of drawing "his and the British Government's attention" to certain points before deciding on an answer to the Collective Note of 17 January.²⁶⁴ A document exists showing both the text of the telegram and the original draft. The original provides valuable clues as to the Government's state of mind when confronted with the ultimatum. Their presentiment of public, and especially the military's, reaction to the loss of Edirne may be discerned and also their calculations, even at this late stage, in weighing the pressures from within against those from without, and their fervent hope that the Powers might even now be prepared to take notice of the great odds against the survival of any Government that might cede Edirne. On a close reading of the draft, one might even go so far as to suggest that the Ottoman Government feared the threat from the military far more than the ultimatum from the Great Powers. In other words, the Government seems to have calculated that it might be better not to yield completely because the cost of yielding seemed greater than the cost of whatever the Powers might do. However, what the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself, or the Government, genuinely felt about ceding Edirne – or the islands or both – whether they were prepared to give it away

or whether they were merely using the threat of force as an excuse, may not now be ascertainable. But at any rate, the content of the telegram, when compared with the draft, is interesting as much for its omissions (supplied here in parentheses) and corrections as for its direct statements:

"Yet the Ottoman Government cannot give a positive reply indicating that she would surrender Edirne . . . The news of this *vilâyet* having been ceded would create such a reaction that it is our duty to bear in mind its dangerous outcome. (The party which had been governing the country in recent years, and the cliques, are now active.) Already public opinion is forcing the Government to resist and accusing it of weakness and timidity (and even treachery). Under these conditions, we think it is necessary . . . to apply one more time to Sir Edward Grey.

The following solution has entered our minds. To make Edirne a neutral and independent town under a *vali* . . . who would be selected from the Muslim world by the Great Powers.

(A second solution might be to make the Maritza river, which passes through Edirne, a border. Then the Eastern side, where there are mosques and shrines, would remain Turkish and the Western side would be ceded to Bulgaria . . .)." ²⁶⁵

Thus a way of reaching agreement through concessions by both sides, a compromise, was sought. Evidently the Government had concluded that it would be better to yield in part, as otherwise the Great Powers would in all likelihood carry out their threat and this would result in further losses,

"because, having discussed the matter in great detail in the Council of Ministers, it was accepted that it was not possible to refuse this proposal completely. [However] it would be regarded as a success to adjust some of its clauses in the interest of the state . . ." ²⁶⁶

This entailed, more or less, the first solution offered as a counter-proposal by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his telegram to the Ambassador in London. ²⁶⁷

On the basis that such a crucial matter should be made the collective responsibility of the whole Government, the *Şeyhülislâm*, Cemaleddin Efendi, proposed that a consultative council (*heyet-i istişare*) be assembled for the purpose of reaching a collective decision regarding the proposal of the Great Powers. However, the Minister of War, Nâzım Paşa, objected on the grounds that this was a matter solely of Cabinet responsibility, and the Grand Vezir, Kâmil Paşa, and one or two of the Ministers also tended towards this view. But under pressure of the threat of resignation by the *Şeyhülislâm* if his recommendation were not accepted, all, except the Minister of War, agreed. Hence, what has come to be known as

the Grand Council was summoned and met at Dolmabahçe on 22 January 1913. It was composed of former Ministers, members of the Senate and military, civil and judicial dignitaries. After the proceedings,

“... it was decided by a great majority – apart from the Chief Public Prosecutor, Hakkı Bey, who had expressed the absolute necessity for continuing the war, and three of four of his supporters – that it was essential to accept peace and settle the matter”.²⁶⁸

On the one hand, the outcome appeared as a kind of commitment to peace. It purported to convince the Great Powers that the Government would maintain its current position, as provisionally communicated on 18 January and subsequently accepted by the Cabinet and now almost unanimously supported by the Grand Council. On the other hand, it seems it was the predominant view of the Ottoman statesmen that the maintenance of the process of negotiation might change the demands of the Powers. Further, it could entangle the Powers so much in an obligation not to interrupt it that they would desist from any further threats which they might otherwise have put forward.

The balance of evidence at present available confirms that after the ending of the Grand Council meeting, a protocol (*mazbata*) prepared by Kâmil Paşa for presentation to the Sultan was given to the Chief Secretary, Ali Fuad Bey. It read:

“The administration of the city of Edirne, together with its environs, being an independent and free city, with the acceptance and affirmation of the Great Powers, will be adjudged to a Muslim governor, and to look after the holy mosques and pious foundations . . . and to supervise the canonical affairs of the Muslim populace, a *kadı* . . . will be appointed from the office of the *Şeyhülislâm*, and an administrative assembly elected by the populace [under the governor, with the *kadı* as deputy chairman, including other denominational leaders as members]. There will be the necessary amount of police and *gendarmérie*, whose salaries and also those of the governor and the officials attached to his retinue will be paid from local revenue . . . Regarding religious and official holidays, established customs will be maintained. After having been vacated by the Ottoman soldiery with their equipment and stores, the remaining unnecessary fortifications to the city will be demolished.”²⁶⁹

And the Minister for Foreign Affairs was instructed to draft the reply “... in the recognized way in accordance with the initial discussion . . .”²⁷⁰ to be considered the next day in the Council of Ministers.

On this basis, in the afternoon of 23 January 1913, the Ottoman

reply to the Collective Note, drafted in French by Noradounghian Efendi and translated for inspection at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, arrived at the Council of Ministers. The process of reading and scrutiny began, because it had to be communicated that same evening to the ambassadors of the Great Powers. It was during this session, at about 3.00p.m., that the final and fatal clash occurred.

A *coup d'état*, later coming to be known in the annals of Ottoman Turkish history as the Raid on the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli Baskını*), was effected through the collaboration of Unionist civilians and officers. However, its speed and the relatively smooth execution of its immediate goal – the seizure of governing power by force and the paralysing of resistance, was made possible by the presence of “the man [actually] on horseback”, Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey, and a small group of radical junior officers loyal to Enver Bey and clustered around him.

The attack phase of the story of the Raid on the Sublime Porte has been told too often to bear more than a summary in this analysis.²⁷¹ Yet the picture is still somewhat clouded by a general tendency to interpret the coup merely as a successful conspiracy on the part of Unionist politicians, taking very timely advantage of a crisis for merely party purposes. Since this debate carries a heavy freight of political implications, such as the appointment of Kâmil Paşa as Grand Vezir and his subsequent anti-Unionist stance, it will be well to bring out into the open the essential points of the military reasons for intervention. It has to be remembered that they were operating against the background of a politically unstable régime, realization of which should clear the way towards an understanding of this phase by attempting to explain why the military were disposed to intervene in domestic politics at this point. Thus the military reasons for the Raid will now occupy our attention. So let us commence with a sketch of the scene of the Raid on 23 January 1913, in order to assess the role played by the military in the legitimation and justification of the coup.

First, however, reviewing the process as a whole, we may discern more clearly that the Government of Kâmil Paşa failed to attract the officer corps' allegiance or to make them recognize the Government as the legitimate source of authority. Indeed, the situation was one in which it was difficult to identify what exactly constituted the centre of the Empire's authority.²⁷² During the insurrection, the military seem to have thought that their action was not illegitimate, because their claim to moral legitimacy was based on an appeal to the general sense of crisis and was couched in terms that the men in the streets leading to the Porte were brought to

accept. As Enver Bey and his group approached the Porte, one of them, Ömer Naci Bey, was busy delivering a speech:

“Fellow countrymen! The Government is ceding Edirne. At this moment – pointing to the Sublime Porte – the notes are being signed in there. The Turkish nation will never accept this . . . Here is the fighter for liberty [1908], Enver Bey, going towards the *Bab-ı Âli* . . . Join him. End the administration of incompetents.”²⁷³

This appeal to the people, clearly an attempt to simplify the origins of the coup, that is, to prevent the ceding of Edirne to Bulgaria, was only a *casus belli*. And yet the scale of agreement on this particular point was far greater than the numerical strength of the participants in the Raid. The effects were far-reaching. A situation had previously been created to ensure that the officers had a free hand in attacking the Porte without any opposition from the troops – the Uşak *redif* battalion – guarding it, whose commander “. . . a Captain Osman Bey was well-known for his Unionist support”.²⁷⁴ But generally, the legitimacy of the action seems immediately to have been recognized, not only by Captain Osman Bey but by a significant section of the armed forces. The Grand *Vezir* Kâmil Paşa’s reaction both at the time of his resignation and in its aftermath provides ample corroboration of this judgement. When his resignation was demanded by Enver Bey and Talât Bey, who had joined the officers, he was in his study adjacent to the Chamber. Kâmil Paşa immediately wrote thus:

“The esteemed presence of the Padişâhî [sic]. Please be so kind as to comprehend with your exalted knowledge that I was, in this respect, forced to submit my humble resignation to the Imperial Presence on the proposal made to me by the military authorities . . .”,

which he was asked by Talât Bey, and indeed immediately compelled, to alter by adding the word “people” before “military authorities”, to read “. . . by the people and the military authorities [ahâlî ve cihet-i askeriyeden]”.²⁷⁵ The mere addition of the word “people” could not detract anything from the fact that the soldiers, not the civilians, were the real arbiters of power without whose support the coup could not have been accomplished. And support there certainly was. When he was in Cyprus not long after the Raid, Kâmil Paşa wrote a *risâle müsveddesi* (manuscript treatise). In it, he reluctantly admitted that after the occurrence of these, as he called them, “tragic events [vekayi-i fecial]”,

“... the opposition party officers [i.e., the Saviours], whatever they wanted to do, they should have done immediately. However, no-one, whether from among the officers or from among the people expressed any remorse over the incident, not even by holding a demonstration”.²⁷⁶

Here also lay the essence of earlier disunity in the shape of the Saviour Officer division, magnified not because, but in spite, of the Balkan War. For the moment it is enough to keep in mind that the immediate military radicalism was quite obviously a response not only to the disturbed conditions of international politics but also to the intrusion of manifest partisanship into the ranks. Though I shall have further to point out the military implications of this division, I note here that the whole thrust of the officers was against those who had gained prominence by taking advantage of the fluidity and lack of effective controls. Two incidents which took place in the corridors of the Porte at about the time of the Grand Vezir's resignation also help to explain why there was almost no proper resistance to the Raid (except for some shooting that broke out, costing lives among the personnel of the Porte). The first involved the killing of an Adjutant-Major, Nâfiz Bey, one of the aides-de-camp to the Grand Vezirate, and the second the killing of Nâzım Paşa, Minister of War and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. And both incidents prove that the involvement of the two men, despite their differences in rank, in the politics of the military had inevitably left scars on military minds which, in the case of Nâzım Paşa, the successful Çatalca defensive and his conciliatory attitude in domestic politics could not heal. Nâfiz Bey was shot by one of the attackers and later died of his wounds in an adjacent room. It may be recalled that he was one of the first officers who had taken to the hills in Manastır (at the Tented Headquarters), was arrested and sent to İstanbul. Yet later he was taken under Nâzım Paşa's protection and raised to the position which he held at the time of his death.²⁷⁷ Nâzım Paşa, who confronted the attacking officers at the door of the Chamber – known as the Inner Hall of the Porte – was shot by Captain Yakub Cemil Bey. His remark, reported by Türkgeldi, “You bloody [pimps], you have deceived me; is this what you promised me?”, suggests complicity.²⁷⁸ He had, after all, shown himself placatory towards the Unionists, as witnessed in his release of arrested Unionist civilians and his appointment of officers like Enver Bey to their existing positions.²⁷⁹ Yet his rise to the position of chief spokesman and figurehead of the Saviours from the obscurity into which he had fallen after the 31 March Incident seems to have prompted the antagonism felt towards him by the officers in general. Added to this, the opinion of military

circles had tired of the St. Cyr-trained Nâzım Paşa with his strategy of *l'attaque à outrance*, which had proved totally unworkable and been the cause of the series of unprecedented defeats within a very short time span against the supposedly weak and small, formerly-subject Balkan states. On this score, moreover, his assassination may be seen as a punishment which an individual officer might, on the spur of the moment, have wanted to inflict upon "... those who [had] instigated this situation".²⁸⁰ Whatever the real reason may have been, despite my inclination to accept the second, one thing became certain with his assassination. "Technically"²⁸¹-speaking, one of the main and immediate goals of a *coup d'état*, that of the elimination of the potential leader of resistance, was secured in no time.

The notion that what happened at the Porte was proper was explained to the crowds by Enver Bey, holding the resignation letter of Kâmil Paşa in his hand:

"Kâmil Paşa has resigned. I am now on my way to the Palace [Dolmabahçe]. I will inform His Excellency the Sultan. A Government able to defend the nation's rights will be formed."²⁸²

It was now, having amply demonstrated their capacity for intervention, that three officers of the original coup, headed by Enver Bey, took the letter to the Palace, and Enver Bey presented it to the Sultan, Mehmed Reşad, in person. The Sultan played his part, first by accepting the resignation and secondly, by meeting all the demands of Enver Bey "... on behalf of the people and the military", including the appointment of Mahmud Şevket Paşa as the new Grand *Vezir* and Minister of War, General Ahmed İzzet Paşa as the new Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Talât Bey, provisionally, as Minister of the Interior.²⁸³ Thus, the Sultanic legitimation of the *fait accompli* in turn not merely helped to deter those who might otherwise have decided to resist but, rather, speeded up the legalization of the coup.

As Mahmud Şevket Paşa was being summoned to the Palace in the afternoon of 23 January 1913, the Governor of Bursa *Vilayet* received a telegram from the Porte, signed by the "Provisional Minister of the Interior, Talât". It read:

"On the basis of the Note, Kâmil Paşa's Government has decided to abandon the *Vilayet* of Edirne entirely, and the Aegean islands partially, to the enemy; and the Palace also, having organized a Consultative Assembly exclusively composed of the members of the Council of State and some heads of the civil service, under the name of the Grand Council, [and] by compulsorily obtaining their unanimous consent for the decision which it had itself already reached, transgressed the sacred

rights of the nation. As the people had become agitated because of this and demonstrated in front of the *Bab-ı Âli*, the Cabinet has resigned, [and] until the new one is formed I have assumed provisionally the running of the Ministry of the Interior.”²⁸⁴

“His Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, İzzet Paşa”, also received a note, signed “Enver”. It read:

“It is the requirement of the Imperial Rescript of His Highness the Sultan that you assume provisionally the Deputy Command of the Imperial Armed Forces. The public order has been rendered secure.”²⁸⁵

On the same evening, as the new Grand *Vezir*, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey and the Chief Secretary, Ali Fuad Bey, arrived back at the Porte:

“The People, crying out together, ‘O Mahmud Şevket Paşa, save our Edirne!’, lifted the car from its wheels and carried it into the courtyard of the Sublime Porte.”²⁸⁶

The formation of a new Cabinet was ready by 8.30p.m.; a new period of the Young Turk era began; yet still the reply note on Edirne and the islands to the ambassadors of the Great Powers had not been sent.²⁸⁷

Indeed, the Edirne issue had aroused public feeling and, to this extent, justified the Unionist civilians’ tactics of disorder in pursuit of political goals; and they and the soldiers had joined together in the Raid. This had been the political matrix of the intervention, a coherent interpretation of the revolutionaries’ desire for change. The psychological moment pinpointed two features of their thinking: first, an emotional predisposition to total denunciation of the Government and, secondly, an approach to the question of political change in a spirit of millenarian prophecy, albeit military. They conspired together in an atmosphere of crisis which stimulated the expectation that a satisfactory outcome would mean major changes. In order to attain these goals, the military had to dominate and, in order to dominate, they had to be the foremost pillar of the state. Now, on 23 January 1913, their action was justified and legitimized, just as that of 23 July 1908 had been.

In tracing the major stimuli which motivate the military’s conscious political acts towards intervention, one finds a diversity which may obscure their common origin. It must therefore be borne in mind that expressed motives may not be the only ones actuating à coup, especially where there is ideological propaganda such as accompanied the Raid on the Sublime Porte.

In this case, I suggest that there were organizational as well as

social motives, national as well as egoistical. There was the hope of avenging their vicarious humiliation in the field and their injured professional pride.²⁸⁸ From this angle, the officers' political move seems to have been based on the idea of discrediting the civilians for their weakness and subservience to foreign powers. An alternative view might be that there existed a tendency for officers to lose themselves in ideals or visions of their destinies – preoccupation with the innermost stirrings of their own convictions, the surrender, too, to nationalist or organizational passions. But a no less essential part of the officers' attitude was the wish to break away from the abstractions of constitutional government, despite its having been imposed by themselves, and the desire to concentrate on political reality in the shape of the country's urgent problems. It is here that the military's political ruling group role was to become so very visible. Although the military's ascendance to this role was gradual, it looked as though it would be permanent. The officers' awareness of their dominance was quickened by the realization of the military reasons for intervention, both in the sense of possessing a combination of conscious motives disposing the military to act and in their inherent belief that they were the instrument for the unravelling of the process of history. The conceptions of organizational cohesion and of historical continuity had stamped a permanent seal on the mind of the officer corps and, through it, on the state. Indeed, the society's whole past had acquired a reality of its own, irreplaceable and equal to the present in value. What had developed through a historical process – the existence of a deep-rooted military tradition – had to be accepted and suffused throughout the state, not only as real and unavoidable but, more importantly, as valuable for the future.

And now, in 1913, the state appeared to settle down under the military dispensation.

Notes

- 1 Ali Cevad Bey, then the newly-appointed Acting-Chief Secretary (his definitive appointment: 9 August 1908), noted that on Tuesday, 4 August 1908:

"While I was in the presence of His Royal Highness [his first audience], in front of the Palace the shout of thousands of people was swelling with the cry of 'Long live freedom! Long live our *Padişah!*' . . . His Royal Highness looked at me and said, in an agitated manner, 'Cevad Bey, what is this? What is happening to us?'"

Ali Cevad Bey, *İkinci Meşrutîyetin ilanı ve otuzbir Mart hâdisesi: II. Abdülhamid'in son Mabeyn Başkatibi Ali Cevad Bey'in fezlekesi*. (Yayına hazırlayan) F.R. Unat. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.19. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1960;

[Hereafter, Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*]; p. 7.

Cf. the comment of the new British Ambassador at İstanbul:

"I thought that the Sultan, the greatest of Living Comedians, was unique when he posed before the crowds as the simple and loving father of his people who for 40 years had been deceived by his advisers as to their real wishes."

Lowther to Grey, (Private), *Therapia*, 4 August 1908, *B.D.*, V, No.205, Ed.Add., pp. 264-265, p. 265.

Also cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Hürriyetin ilânı: ikinci Meşrutiyetin siyasi hayatına bakışlar*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1959; pp. 53ff.; and T.Z. Tunaya, "İkinci Meşrutiyet'in siyasal hayatımızdaki yeri", pp. 75-121 in *Türk parlamentoculuğunun ilk yüzyılı, 1876-1976: Kanun-u Esasının 100. Yılı Sempozyumu* (9-11 Nisan 1976). (Hazırlayan) Siyasi İlimler Türk Derneği. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık Sanayii, [1976]; esp. pp. 76-77.

- 2 "In two and a half months, without becoming saturated with the drunkenness of freedom which we had only recently attained, we were beginning to sober up in an extremely bitter manner. The international and domestic policy-matters of the country had spilled out into the open with all their grave implications."

H.C. Yalçın, "Meşrutiyet hatıraları", *Fikir hareketleri*, III-IV:71-224, 1935-1937; IV:82 (16 Mayıs) 1935, pp. 53-54.

Another authoritative figure, the first Chief of the General Staff of the new régime, Major-General Ahmad İzzet (Furgaç) Paşa (from 15 August 1908), similarly opined: "But unfortunately the hope and joy that this great revolution gave rapidly came to an end." Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992; p. 43.

Further, along the same lines, the comments of: Hüseyin Kâzım Kadri, *Balkanlardan Hicaz'a İmparatorluğun tasfiyesi: 10 Temmuz inkilâbı ve netâyici*. (Sadeleştiren) K. Büyükoçşkun. İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 1992 (Originally published in 1920); pp. 20-21.

Cf. the comments of: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.15. 2nci basılış. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1951; pp. 1-4.

- 3 See, for example: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*. 2nd edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1968; p. 211.

To a "young official", a British Consular Assistant in the capital, it seemed that:

"No revolution was ever accomplished with greater ease. Crowds began to drift about the streets, at first incredulous, then, gaining certitude, shouting 'Death to the Spies!'. They sang over and over again 'Long live Freedom, Justice, Equality!'. Fraternity, which seemed to have been ousted by Justice, made its appearance at times in articles and speeches."

R. Bullard, *The camels must go: an autobiography*. London: Faber and Faber, 1961; p. 55.

On the other hand, an extensive exposition of the attempts to impose, through the Ottoman Turkish press, national, patriotic and religious sentiments, and especially those of "love of country" and "of the Turkish nation", during the second Constitutional period, is found in: C. Kavçar, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde edebiyat ve eğitim*. Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Yayınları:41. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974; esp.see pp. 208-242. For a general commentary on the "freedoms", see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*. 3 cilt. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984-1989. Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki:

bir çağın, bir kuşağın, bir partinin tarihi; [Hereafter, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3]; pp. 388ff.

- 4 F. Belen, *20nci yüzyılda Osmanlı devleti*, p. 84.

Perhaps the best encapsulation of such sentiments and misconceptions is achieved in the character of the quixotic Efruz Bey, hero of a short, satirical novel by the contemporary author, Ömer Seyfeddin: Ö. Seyfeddin. *Efruz Bey*. Ömer Seyfettin Bütün Eserleri:1. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1970; pp. 9–192. However, his more serious attempt to portray the atmosphere of 1908 is presented in a short story, called “Hürriyet gecesi”, in *ibid.*, pp. 220–229.

The fictional account contrasts well with the sarcasm of a disillusioned “revolutionary” reminiscing in the 1950s about those “early days”: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü 1908–1918*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1989; pp. 18–23 and pp. 29–36. And a frank admission of the general ignorance as to the meanings of the slogans being so enthusiastically endorsed is made by: S. Kocabaş, *Kendi itirafları Jön Türkler nerede yanıldı? 1890–1918 hayaller . . . komplolar . . . kayıplar . . .* İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1991; pp. 448–453.

The best source for the demonstrations, especially of the students, is: Y. Aktar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi öğrenci olayları (1908–1918)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990; pp. 63–70 and pp. 100–102. Yet the scepticism of the students of the military schools in general and the War College in particular is well attested in: *ibid.*, p. 68 and pp. 69–70.

- 5 Şemseddin, Yüzbaşı, Selânikli, *Makedonya tarihçe-i devri inkılâp*. İstanbul: Artin Asedoryan Matbaası, 1324; p. 116.

Further expressions in like vein, by military and civilians, may be found in: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*. Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1992; pp. 23–24.

To a foreign observer, a

“ . . . point on which great stress ought to be laid is that the Young Turks have the support of the Army. It was not in vain that the Committee devoted its first efforts to winning over the officers to the revolutionary cause.”

C.R. Buxton, *Turkey in revolution*. London: T.F. Unwin, 1909; p. 264.

Furthermore, in order to appreciate this contrast in outlook, it may be noted that during Abdülhamid II's reign the liberal intellectual was in a more difficult position than were the Young Ottomans of the preceding era. He had to direct his criticisms directly towards the Sultan. In an empire where the masses were directly attached to the Sultan on the basis of a not-so-easily breakable loyalty, such behaviour was not expected to produce a very speedy result. As time passed, the intellectuals perceived this and then directed their propaganda toward the officers whom they believed able to create and implement the desired movement. A detailed examination of the political ideas of these “Jeunes Turcs” may be found in: Ş.A. Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri (1895–1908)*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1964; esp. pp. 225–230, where Mardin concentrates on this point as “The problem of the creation of an ‘élite’”. Also see: Ş.A. Mardin, “Libertarian movements in the Ottoman Empire: 1878–1898”, *Middle East journal*, XVI:2 (Spring) 1962, pp. 169–192. In documentary detail: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Bir siyasal örgüt olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*. Cilt I: (1889–1902). 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989; pp. 9–74 and esp. pp. 604–650; and, more conveniently, his English version: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in opposition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; pp. 7–32 and esp. pp. 200–216.

- 6 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları:3-5. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970; p. 6. Also: N. Berkes, *Türk düşününde batı sorunu*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975; pp. 50-61.

Andrew Ryan, then Second Dragoman of the British Embassy, in a letter to his mother, dated 31 July 1908, commented regarding the “revolution” that “[i]t has all gone rather charmingly so far”. But he continued rather less whimsically:

“Few people believe in the sincerity of His Majesty, apart from the driving-force in Macedonia, i.e., insubordination in the army, which has hitherto been his great reliance. Some think that he may possibly hope to work a reaction, and personally I am not certain that he might not succeed. All one can say at present is that he is displaying no great alacrity in dismissing the more unpopular members of his entourage, and people are already growing dissatisfied in consequence.”

A. Ryan, *The last of the dragomans*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951; p. 53.

- 7 The admission of the Unionists on this point is well worth quoting here:

“But this power which endowed the revolution with success, was not showing sufficient courage to take charge of the administration of the state.”

C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım: millî mücadeleye gidiş*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965-1972. 8 cilt. Cilt 1, p. 142. Cf.,

“The Union and Progress, after the *Meşrutiyet* had been won over, had not shown the courage to take charge of the administration of the state immediately.”

K.D. Duru, *İttihat ve Terakki hatıralarım*. İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957; p.43.

A list of “prominent” figures in 1908 may be found in: *Lowther to Grey*, No.105, Conf., Pera, 17 February 1909, Turkey: Annual Report, 1908, *F.O.*, 195/2363, p.17.

For a sound assessment of the wary relationship between the Unionists and the Sultan, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 149-153.

- 8 Censorship of the press came to an end on 25 July 1908. See: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 160. Cf., H.C. Yalçın, “Meşrutiyet hatıraları”, *Fikir hareketleri*, III:73 (14 Mart) 1935, pp. 326-327. Also see, for a vivid review of cartoons in the Ottoman press satirizing the old régime and its various personalities, with the significant exception of the Sultan, as well as photographs of joyous demonstrators: “La caricature en Turquie”, *Revue du monde musulman*, VI:IX (septembre) 1908, pp. 160-179.

On the same day (25 July), apparently under pressure from the Unionists, the internal intelligence network was disbanded by a decree to all *vilayets* and *sancaks*: Ali Cevad Bey, *op.cit.*, p. 161. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, “1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyet’in ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar”, *Belleten*, XX:77 (Ocak) 1956, Ves.Sa.XVI, pp. 172-174, reproduces the Protocol of 29 July 1908 relating to the general amnesty and the abolition of internal intelligence. Cf., M.Ş. Bleda, “Bir canlı tarih konuşuyor”, *Resimli tarih mecmuası*, IV:40 (Nisan) 1953, pp. 2169-2174; IV:42 (Haziran) 1953, pp. 2392-2397; and IV:43 (Temmuz) 1953, pp. 2442-2446; see esp. IV:42 (Haziran) 1953, p. 2392; and *Barclay to Grey*, Tel.No.199, Conf., Constantinople, 29 July 1908, *F.O.* 371/544/26307.

On reactions to the reproclamation of the Constitution in Anatolia and other parts of the Empire, see: *Lowther to Grey*, No.105, Conf., Pera, 17 February 1909, Turkey: Annual Report, 1908, *F.O.* 195/2363.

The wild joy that spread to the farthest corners of the Empire is described by Gertrude Bell, as she set out from "Aleppo" to "Tell Ahmar":

"The populace had shared in the outburst of enthusiasm which had greeted the granting of the constitution – a moment of unbridled expectation when, in the brief transport of universal benevolence, it seemed as if the age-long problems of the Turkish empire had been solved with the stroke of the pen."

G.L. Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*. London: William Heinemann, 1911; p. 4.

Cf. an overall assessment: E. Kedourie, "The impact of the Young Turk revolution in the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire", pp. 124–161 in E. Kedourie, *Arabic political memoirs and other studies*. London: Frank Cass, 1974.

On 26 July 1908, a general amnesty was proclaimed for all political prisoners and exiles, and was communicated on the same day by telegraph to all *vilayets*. The amnesty was promulgated on 28 July 1908: Ali Cevad Bey, *op.cit.*, p.161; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*; and Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtrâtı*. [İstanbul]: Sabah Matbaası, 1328. 3 cilt. Cilt 2, Kısım 2; [Hereafter, Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtrâtı*, II/2]; p. 447 and p. 451.

Among the dismissed officials worthy of mention were the Chief Secretary, Tahsin Paşa; the Minister for Schools, Zeki Paşa; the former Minister for the Navy, Hasan Rami Paşa; *Mabeyinci* Arab İzzet Paşa; and the Minister of Forestry, Selim Melhame. The last two managed to escape to Europe; the rest were arrested and imprisoned: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 6.

It is significant that continuous demonstrations, especially those in the capital, were alien occurrences to the Palace and to the *paşas* of the *Bab-ı Âli*. Although these crowds were giving vent to their joy, both at Yıldız and the Porte forceful dispersion was seriously considered, and a declaration was issued prohibiting such demonstrations: Cemaleddin Efendi, *Şeyhülislâm merhum Cemal al-Din Efendi hazretlerinin hâtrât-ı siyasiyesi: 1330 senesinde Mısır'da tahrir eylemiştir*. [İstanbul]: M. Huvagımiyan Matbaası, 1336; [Hereafter, Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtrât-ı siyasiye*]; p. 5; and Said Paşa, *op.cit.*, II/2, pp. 451–452 and p.459.

- 9 The text of the *hatt-ı hümayun* of 4 Receb 1326 [19 Temmuz 1324] (1 August 1908) is in: *Düstur*. Tertibi sâni. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1329; [Hereafter, *Düstur*, 2]; 11 cilt. Cilt I, pp. 11–14. Also reproduced in full, in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 109–112. Further see: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*. İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1940–1953. 14 cüz. pp. 1066ff.; and A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 3.

- 10 R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, 1. Kitap: Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşundan inkırazına kadar. İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları:281. İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1968; pp. 253–257; Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 8–9 and pp. 111–112, for the tenth clause of the *hatt-ı hümayun*; Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtrâtı*, II/2, pp. 460–462; Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtrât-ı siyasiye*, p. 10; S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 8; F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics (1908–1914)*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; pp. 19–20; and Kiderlen an das *Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.239, Therapie, 7 August 1908, *G.P.*, 25.Band/2, Nr.8898, pp. 588–589.

It is worth mentioning that, according to the major provisions of the 1876 Constitution, the principle of Cabinet responsibility was not accepted; each Minister was separately responsible to the Sultan. In short, in view of Articles 7, 27, 28, 29 and 36, Cabinet Ministers could not enjoy any protection by the legislature. For example, Article 27 vested the appointments of the Ministers

of War and the Navy in the person of the Grand *Vezir*, to be ratified by the Sultan. Yet it was the Sultan who appointed the Grand *Vezir* and the *Şeyhülislâm*. The *hatt-ı hümayun* of 1 August ratified, as it were, the provisions of the 1876 Constitution; but it extended them, so that now the tenth clause of the *hatt-ı hümayun* gave the Sultan the right to make all four appointments directly – the Grand *Vezir*, the *Şeyhülislâm* and the Ministers of War and the Navy: R.G. Okandan, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*; and A.Ş. Gözübüyük-S. Kili, *Türk anayasa metinleri, 1839–1980*. 2. bası. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları:496. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1982; pp. 27–31 and pp. 67–70. Cf., H.C. Yalçın, “Meşrutiyet hâtıraları”, *Fikir hareketleri*, III:76 (4 Nisan) 1935, pp. 374–375.

Ahmad has emphasised that:

“The issue was not merely constitutional; its implications went much deeper. It meant that the person who appointed the two ministers of the armed forces controlled the armed forces themselves.”

F. Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

- 11 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 8; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 365. Cf., M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1068. Also: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrazamlar ve başvekilleri*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940–1948. 5 cilt. Cilt 5, pp. 168ff., where the contemporary comments are duly recorded.
- 12 *Hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 9 Receb 1326 [24 Temmuz 1324] (6 August 1908), appointing Kâmil Paşa as Grand *Vezir*, reproduced in full in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1391.

During the public reading of the decree on 1 August there was an immediate protest, even heckling and disruption of some Ministers, regarding the tenth clause in particular. Türkgeldi writes that the Cabinet then resigned for this reason. A new Cabinet was immediately formed, on the same day, again under Said Paşa. Yet because of the apparent incompetence displayed by some members – Turhan Paşa, who was appointed to the Presidency of the Council of State, had “. . . a very limited knowledge of Turkish!”* – and its similar inability to satisfy the press in general, it survived no more than a few days and dissolved itself on 5 August. Then a new Cabinet, under Kâmil Paşa, was set up on 6 August 1908.

* A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 3.

Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 8 and pp. 162–164, for the complete lists of the members of these successive Cabinets. On the resignation of Said Paşa, cf. Cemalettin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, pp. 9–13, with Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtıratı*, II/2, pp. 466–469. Further: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrazamlar ve başvekilleri*, Cilt 5, pp. 177–201.

- 13 F. Belen, *20nci yüzyılda Osmanlı devleti*, p. 84.
Such behaviour might better be understood from the words of a prominent Unionist, the journalist Hüseyin Cahid Bey. To him, as he first wrote in 1935:

“The idea of completely taking over the administration could not [in the following days of the second Constitutional period] be comprehended by the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress.”

H.C. Yalçın, “Meşrutiyet hâtıraları”, *Fikir hareketleri*, III:76 (4 Nisan) 1935, pp. 374–375.

Hüseyin Cahid Bey later, in 1943, went further and claimed that the

“. . . country could not have accepted a young man without rank, decorations, a beard, glory and reputation, rising to Grand *Vezirate* . . . In July 1908, the CUP could not make a captain or a major Minister of War, nor Talat Bey, a head postal clerk, Grand *Vezir*“.

H.C. Yalçın, *Talât Paşa*. İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1943; pp. 34–35.

The second statement is quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 17 (Ahmad's translation); and see his comments in: *ibid.*, pp. 15–18.

Cf., according to Berkes:

"In fact the Revolution of 1908 did not even aim at the deposition of Adbül-Hamid and hardly affected the composition or policies of the government until the new political movement reached maturity."

N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964; p. 328.

The deputation, which was authorized by the Cabinet resolution dated 16 Temmuz 1324 (29 July 1908), was composed of Staff-Majors Cemal Bey and Hafız Hakkı Bey and Captain Necib Efendi, together with Talât, Mustafa Rahmi (Evrano), Cavid and Hüseyin Beys. For a sample personal recollection, see: C. Kutay [edited, with commentary], *Şehit Sadriazâm Talat Paşa'nın gurbet hatıraları*. İstanbul: [the author], 1983. 3 cilt; [Hereafter, *Talât Paşa, Gurbet hatıraları*]; Cilt 1, pp. 272ff.

The Cabinet resolution is reproduced in full in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar*, Ves.Sa.XVI, pp. 172–174.

For the composition, date of arrival and interviews of the deputation, see: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 163–164; Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*. Cilt I – Giriş: Berlin muahedesinden Trablus-garp savaşına kadar. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.9. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, I]; p. 241; and a later work: K. Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, 1896–1909*. (Yayınlayan) F. ve E. Özerengin. İstanbul: Türdav Ofset Tesisleri, 1982 (Originally published in 1945); pp. 359–386.

- 14 The significance, and accounts, of the deputation's visit are found in: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 4–5; and M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*, pp. 1074–1075. These two accounts are related to the interviews with Said Paşa. Cf.,

"This latter appointment would imply the Sultan's surrendering the prerogative claimed by him in the Hattı Humayun of Saturday last of nominating the Minister of War without consulting the Grand Vizier."

Lowther to Grey, No.448, Conf., Therapia, 4 August 1908, *F.O.*, 371/545/27644.

Also see the account of Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtrât-ı siyasiye*, pp. 11–12, where the deputation is said also to have visited Kâmil Paşa with the same demands. This account is taken uncritically by: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *1908 yılında ikinci Meşrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edildiğine dair vesikalar*, pp. 148–151; and repeated in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 20, where the date of arrival and composition of the deputation are mistaken. Talât Paşa's own, later, account is not very enlightening: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 284–288 and pp. 292–297.

- 15 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 8–10, on the instatement of Kâmil Paşa; and also, more revealingly: Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtrât-ı siyasiye*, p. 12. The Sultan's "absolute confidence" in Ali Rıza Paşa is confirmed in: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, p. 385.

Although the evidence is not as conclusive as one might wish, it appears in the most reliable form in the *Fezleke* of Ali Cevad Bey. He records the arrival in İstanbul of Receb Paşa on 14 August, his starting in office the next morning,

participation in a Cabinet session in the early afternoon and subsequent audience with the Sultan. After the audience, Ali Cevad Bey relates that the Sultan summoned him and told him jovially:

"I granted Receb Paşa a lengthy audience. He himself is an Albanian. I know some Albanian myself. He gave me his *besa* [word of honour] that he would remain loyal to me . . . He is a naive-hearted man. May *Allah* help him to succeed."

Strange though it may seem, and it may have set a precedent for the ensuing period in which the silence of political opposition was often assured, when possible, by means of violence, the next day (16 August) Ali Cevad Bey was informed that the new Minister of War, Receb Paşa, had died suddenly while working in his office. This information he passed immediately to the Sultan whose comments, as recorded by Ali Cevad Bey, are I think worthy of note for the better understanding of the partisan politics of the day, and of days to come:

"Chief Secretary, my enemies have poisoned Receb Paşa. Do not doubt this. Because, up to now, this man was against me. And his being brought here was not based upon goodwill. Yet I had seen him. We had made promises to one another. He swore that he was going to remain loyal to me. He gave *besa*. Therefore [he] altered [his] opinion of me. This situation did not suit my enemies' interests. [They] have done away with the poor man."

Ali Cevad Bey, *op.cit.*, pp. 10–11.

Besa (*besë*) is an Albanian word. I have translated it here as "word of honour". It is similar to the oath of fealty of the feudal tenant or vassal to his lord in mediaeval England. Skendi also takes it as "word of honour". See: S. Skendi, *The Albanian national awakening, 1878–1912*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967; p. 38.

Apparently, on 16 August, Talât and Cavid Beys suddenly appeared at the residence of the Surgeon [General], Marshal Cemil Paşa, and asked him to come at once to attend Receb Paşa whom they heard had been wounded while working at the Ministry. They went together to the Ministry and found him just dead. Seeing no obvious cause of death, Cemil Paşa decided to call for an immediate autopsy; this, undertaken by Doctor Yusuf Rami Bey, discovered massive coronary swelling and haemorrhage with aortic aneurism and established a verdict of death by misadventure. However, the rumour that Receb Paşa had been murdered by the Sultan instantly spread, provoking huge demonstrations outside the Ministry. Cemil Paşa adds:

"When I left the Ministry I could get through the crowds only with great difficulty, [and yet] when our report was printed in the newspapers next day . . . the prominent personalities of the Committee, such as Talât and Cavid Beys, became convinced of the truth. All the demonstrations ceased."

And the vast funeral cortège, according to Cemil Paşa, indicated Receb Paşa's high esteem among the progressive elements of Ottoman society whom he had frequently assisted while they were in exile in North Africa or Europe. C. Topuzlu, *İstibdat – Meşrutiyet – Cumhuriyet devirlerinde 80 yıllık hatıralarım*. 2. baskı. (Yayınlayanlar) H. Hatemi ve A. Kazancıgil. İstanbul Üniversitesi Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi Yayınları:2971/96. İstanbul: Fatih Gençlik Vakfı Matbaa İşletmesi, 1982; [Hereafter, C. Topuzlu, *Hatıralarım*]; p. 69.

According to a foreign contemporary, the death of Receb Paşa

"... doit être considérée comme une perte énorme pour la cause du progrès. Personne en effet ne personnifiait davantage le libéralisme turc de la vieille école uni au patriotisme des Jeunes-Turcs".

- N. S[lousch], "Redjeb Pacha", *Revue du monde musulman*, VI:IX (septembre) 1908, pp. 154–157.
- 16 Ş.A. Mardin, "Historical determinants of social stratification: social class and class consciousness in Turkey", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XXII:4 (Aralık) 1967, pp. 111–142, p. 140. Also: Ş.A. Mardin, "Opposition and control in Turkey", *Government and opposition*, I:3 (May) 1966, pp. 375–388, esp.382.
- 17 The declaration appeared next day in the İstanbul press. The text used here is found in: *Servet-i Fünun*, 25 Temmuz 1324. Reproduced in full in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, Ekler Sa.6, pp. 114–115. Also see: *Lowther to Grey*, No.473, Conf., Therapia, 12 August 1908, *F.O.* 371/455/28469.
- 18 The text is reproduced in full, in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 164. Also: *ibid.*, pp. 9–10, where the occasion – the *Cuma Selâmlığı* on 7 August – is narrated. Talât Paşa is somewhat reticent on the subject of this oath: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, p. 321.
- 19 *İkdam*, 21 Temmuz 1324. Reproduced in full in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 113.
- Also see the vivid recollections of: S.S. Tarcan, *Hâtıralarım*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1946; esp. pp. 28ff. The author was then an Adjutant-Major attached to the *Hassa Ordusu* and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan. Further, the posturing of the junior officers – now in the ascendant, at the cost of military hierarchy – was particularly evident in their imposing of the oath on all and sundry. See, on the basis of various military memoirs: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutîyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 76–79. Cf. the less than penetrating report of the United States Ambassador, thus:

"During the last week the power of the Young Turks has unquestionably received an enormous impetus, especially since the arrival of the plenipotentiaries from the Committee at Salonica, who have apparently been able to negotiate directly and successfully with the Palace, and whose partisans have administered the oath of fidelity to the constitution to the troops at Constantinople."

- Leishman to the Secretary of State*, No.738, American Embassy, Constantinople, 8 August 1908, in U.S.A. Department of State, *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1870–1931*. (Several volumes for each year roughly in sequence). Washington, Government Printing Office, 1870– ; [Hereafter, *F.R.U.S.*]; 1908, pp. 747–748, p. 747.
- 20 For example, judging from the accounts of two contemporary junior officers, the *Hassa Ordusu* units were composed of those commanders and officers whose loyalties were still directed to the person of the Sultan. F. Belen, *20nci yüzyılda Osmanlı devleti*, p. 84.
- Staff-Captain İsmet (İnönü) Efendi, having graduated in September 1906 (59th class), was appointed to the IInd Army (Edirne) and became an instructor in gunnery there. He later remembered a visit of

"... two regiments from İstanbul, called Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments. Soldierly and officers used to glitter. All the officers [of the Regiments] were aides-de-camp to the Sultan [*Hünkâr yaveri*]. The two Regiments [between them] had two *mektepli* commanders and two instructors. Apart from these, among the officers there were plenty of illiterates".

İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım: genç subaylık yılları (1884-1918)*. (Hazırlayan) S. Selek. İstanbul: Burçak Yayınları, 1969; [Hereafter, İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*]; p. 34. Also see, on the aides of the Palace: N. Delilbaşı, *Hâtıralarım*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1946; pp. 4ff.

For the material conditions and criteria for the selection and recruitment of officers and men of the *Hassa Ordusu*, and especially of the 2nd Infantry Division (*İkinci Furka*), whose sole duty was the protection of the Palace and its vicinity (e.g., Beşiktaş, Ortaköy, Arnavutköy areas), see: İ.M. Mayakon, *Yıldızda neler gördüm: Yıldız hâtıraları*. İstanbul: Semih Lutfi Kitabevi, 1940; esp. pp. 125-141. Mayakon claims that "In the division there was a sufficient number of *paşas* [i.e., *alaylı paşas*] for the whole of the army" (*ibid.*, p. 129). The men were carefully selected, mostly from the Albanian (i.e., *Fesli*) or Arabian (i.e., *Zuhaf*) provinces, and were allowed to wear their local costumes (*ibid.*, p. 135). Also see: Z.Ş. Soko, *Tanzimat devrinden sonra Osmanlı nizam ordusu tarihi*. İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1957; esp. pp. 96-102, on "The Second Division".

Turning now to the events, it appears that the Committee was anxious for a public enunciation by the military of their stance. Corollary to this, the military were made overtly conscious of their pivotal position, for they had now come to be known as the "Guardians of the Constitution" (*Nigâhban-ı Meşrutiyet*). A striking example of this is that on 15 August, the day on which Receb Paşa started work as Minister of War, some very drastic changes were made in the higher command. The most relevant, I believe, were the appointments of General Mahmud Muhtar Paşa as the Commander of the *Hassa Ordusu*, Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa, formerly 14th Infantry Division C.O. in the Yemen, as Chief of the General Staff, and Brigadier-General Salih Paşa, who had been forced to live in exile at Sivas, as Deputy-Chief of the General Staff. Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 166.

Further, on 16 August 1908, 64 of the aides-de-camp of the Palace were dismissed from their positions and put under the orders of the Ministry of War. (According to *İkdam* of 19 August 1908 - 6 Ağustos 1325 - the total number of these aides was 390. Soko gives the maximum number as 441, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*). Their ranks ranged between Adjutant-Major and General, and those in higher ranks were mostly of *alaylı* origin or had been selected by the Sultan and given honorary ranks. Ali Cevad Bey, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.* The appointments of the Chief of the General Staff and his Deputy are also confirmed in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*. III. cilt, 6. kısım, 1. kitap. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmi Yayınları, Seri sa.2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1971; [Hereafter, S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1]; p. 250. The technical details of the seven Independent Army [Groups] and the two Independent Divisions of the Ottoman Regular Forces (*Nizamiye*), for the years 1907-1908, are found in: *ibid.*, pp. 120-127; and N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*. III. cilt, 5. kısım. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Yayınları, Seri sa.2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1978; [Hereafter, N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5]; pp. 231-246.

- 21 For the sake of accuracy, it must now be noted that the widely-known title of this political society, the Committee of Union and Progress (*Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) was, in fact, formally and finally acquired on 22 August 1908. A declaration in the İstanbul press on 23 August, signed by their İstanbul branch, stated simply:

"Since the Ottoman Progress and Union Society [Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti] has now reached full agreement and unity with the society which, up to now, has been active in Paris under the title of Decentralization and

Personal Initiative and Constitution [Adem-i Merkezîyet ve Teşebbüs-ü Şahsî ve Meşrutîyet], it is announced that from now on the said societies will be working under the title and programme of Ottoman Union and Progress Society [Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti].”

T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasî partiler: 1859-1952*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları Basımevi, 1952; pp. 176-177, N.8. Cf., A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*. [Rev.ed.] İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1959; p. 496; and see Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 167. For the two societies mentioned above, the most indispensable source is still: T.Z. Tunaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-145; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*. 3 cilt. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984-1989. Genişletilmiş 2. baskı. Cilt 1: II. Meşrutîyet dönemi (1908-1918); [Hereafter, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1]; pp. 19-127.

Further, I shall not attempt to improve upon the comment of Geoffrey Lewis regarding the title of the Committee of Union and Progress. Indeed, I am following his example, for the same reasons, except that I use the abbreviation “Committee”:

“Apparently on the basis of an early mistranslation, in English works on Turkey the Society and party have always been termed ‘The Committee of Union and Progress’, abbreviated ‘CUP’. Because of the familiarity and convenience of this abbreviation it will be used from now on, although not without some reluctance on the part of the author.”

G. Lewis, *Modern Turkey*. 4th ed. London: Ernest Benn, 1974; p. 62, N.1.

- 22 Here, the comments of Ahmed Rıza Bey, allowing for a certain amount of bias in view of his becoming the chief critic of the Unionists after about 1910, contain a grain of truth on the behaviour of the Committee during the first weeks of the second Constitutional period:

“The ‘Central Committee’ had not yet come to İstanbul. It was interfering with the affairs [of the state] from a distant location, from Selânik; and, according to what was said [at the time], it was issuing *fetvas*.”

Ahmed Rıza, *Meclis-i Mebusan ve Ayân Reisi Ahmed Rıza Beyin anıları*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988; [Hereafter: Ahmed Rıza, *Anıları*]; p. 26.

This view is backed up by Hasan Vasfî (Amca) Bey in: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü 1908-1918*, pp. 36-43. Also see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasî partiler*, pp. 175-176; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 20-21. Cf., Süleyman Külçe, who had worked for the Committee before the *Meşrutîyet*, especially in the organization of the so-called Fırzovîk Incident – a demonstration of workers in favour of the Constitution, supports the view of Ahmed Rıza Bey. His comments are found in: S. Külçe, *Fırzovîk toplantısı ve ikinci Meşrutîyet*. İzmir: Ticaret Matbaası, 1944; esp. pp. 8ff.

- 23 “Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti Beyannâmesi”, dated 24 Temmuz 1324 (6 August 1908), appearing in: *Servet-i Fünun*, 25 Temmuz 1324. Reproduced in full in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, Ekler Sa.6, pp. 114-115. Cf., A.F. Türkğeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 9.

Similar warnings were issued elsewhere; for example, the “declaration” circulated in Bursa on 16 and 22 August 1908. Reproduced in full in: M.T. Biren, *Mehmet Tevfik Bey’in (Biren) II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutîyet ve mütareke devri hatıraları*. (Yayına hazırlayan) F.R. Hürmen. İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1993. 2 cilt; [Hereafter, M.T. Biren, *Mehmet Tevfik Bey’in hatıraları*]; Cilt 1, p.465 and pp. 472-473 respectively.

- 24 Quoted from a document found among the private papers of Grand Vezîr Kâmil

Paşa by his grandson, the noted historian, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, and subsequently reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarp ve Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar; Kısım 4: Fikir cereyanları, inkilâp hareketleri, iç didişmeler, birinci genel savaşın patlaması. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.14b. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1952; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4]; p. 204.

On the same day, the Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy wrote privately:

"At present moment 'English Kiamil' is in power but there is a strong party who would like to see Herr von Ferid Pasha the ex-Grand Vizier return to office. Kiamil they think is too old to deal with a critical state of affairs like the present . . .".

Fitzmaurice to Tyrell, Private, Constantinople, 25 August 1908, *B.D.*, V, No.210, Ed.Add., pp. 268–270, p. 270.

- 25 Notably, in comparison with the military organization where the reduction in ranks and numbers of personnel was carried out according to the criteria of competence and proper qualification, in the civil service such criteria could not be found and applied with similar precision. For example, a commission, the Assembly for Important Military Affairs (*Meclis-i Mehamm-ı Umûr-ı Askeriye*), set to work on 13 September 1908 under the Minister of War, Ali Rıza Paşa. There were included in it two very distinguished old military figures, *Muşir Gazis* (Field Marshal) Ahmed Muhtar and Edhem Paşas; the head of the Imperial Arsenal of Ordnance and Artillery, General Rıza Paşa; the Commander of the *Hassa Ordusu*, General Mahmud Muhtar Paşa; and the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa. See, for example: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 54ff. In contrast, no commission with like authority and power was established for the civil service. As a result, grievances on a large scale appeared first among the civilian employees, and the dissatisfaction spread, influencing the society at large. S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 62; and Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 169. Cf.,

"In the interest of both efficiency and economy, Kâmil Paşa made large reductions in the administrative personnel in almost all departments. This measure caused considerable dissatisfaction, and even within the Cabinet not all members were in favour."

F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 23–24. For details of the reductions of, especially, the civilian personnel, mainly on the basis of Ottoman documents (i.e., *Düstur*), see: C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980; pp. 296–298.

A graphic example of the nature and extent of the reductions, on the basis of documentary evidence, is provided by the then Governor of Bursa, Mehmed Tevfik Bey: M.T. Biren, *Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 466–467 and pp. 469–471. For a more in-depth criticism of the Reorganization Law (*Tensikat Kanunu*) of 3 July 1909 by Mehmed Tevfik Bey in his later capacity as a member of the Council of State, see: *ibid.*, Cilt 2, pp. 87–96.

- 26 A full list of worker unrest and strikes during 1908 is given, with an analysis, in: K. Fişek, "Anayasal dönüm noktaları ve Türkiye'de işçi hareketleri", pp. 405–424 in *Türk parlamentoculuğunun ilk yüzyılı, 1876–1976*, esp. pp. 411–413. And, in general, see: H.A. Şanda, *Türkiye'de 54 yıl önceki işçi hareketleri*. İstanbul: Evren Yayınları, 1962. Cf., D. Quataert, *Social disintegration and popular resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: reactions to European economic penetration*. New York: New York University Press, 1983; esp. pp. 64–66 and pp. 80–93; D. Quataert, "Ottoman workers and the state,

1826–1914”, pp. 141–157 in D. Quataert, *Workers, peasants and economic change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730–1914*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1993; esp. pp. 147ff.; and Y.S. Karakışla, “The emergence of the Ottoman industrial working-class, 1839–1923”, pp. 19–34 in D. Quataert and E.J. Zürcher (eds.), *Workers and the working class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, 1839–1950*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995; esp. p. 31.

For a contentious study, see: P. Dumont, “A propos de la ‘classe ouvrière’ ottomane à la veille de la révolution jeune-turque”, *Turcica*, IX:1, 1977, pp. 229–251. But cf., O. Sencer, *Türkiye’de işçi sınıfı: doğuşu ve yapısı*. İstanbul: Habora Kitabevi, 1969; pp. 163–210.

- 27 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 169. Akşin analyzes certain motives of the opposition press in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 13–14. An informative first-hand account is provided by the publisher of *Hukuk-u Umumiye* of his newspaper’s style of criticism of the Kâmil Paşa Government, including details of an audience with Kâmil Paşa himself during which the Grand Vezir attacked what he evidently considered the irresponsible use of press freedom, and threatened closure: Mevlânzâde Rifat, *Mevlânzâde Rifat’ın anıları*. (Yayına hazırlayan) M. Martı. İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992 (originally published in 1912); pp. 16–19. Further:

“By 1908, only three Turkish dailies (supported by the government) had survived . . . and about 10 periodicals . . . One year after the revolution, according to some incomplete statistics, the total number of newspapers and periodicals published in the Ottoman Empire amounted to not less the 350. In 1911, there were 9 Turkish dailies published in İstanbul as well as 21 non-Turkish papers.”

K.H. Karpas, “The mass media: B. Turkey”, pp. 235–282 in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; pp. 265–268.

These figures compare reasonably well with those given in: O. Koloğlu, “Turkish-Arabic relations as reflected in the Arabic press during the period when the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating (1908–1919) and its impact on the present day”, pp. 96–121 in *Türk-Arap ilişkileri: geçmişte, bugün ve gelecekte*. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 1980; p. 100.

- 28 The international developments taking place in the Balkans since the Congress of Berlin (1878), leading up to 1908 and setting the precedents for the Balkan War of 1912–1913, are summarized, from the Ottoman side, in: R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)*. Cilt I. T.C. Genelkurmay Harb Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmi Yayınları, Seri Sa.4. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1970; esp. pp. 13–56; and are also, on the basis of a Parliamentary question and written answer by the Grand Vezir, Kâmil Paşa, on 12 January 1909, analyzed in: Ş. Turan, “II. Meşrutiyet dönemi parlamentosu ve dış politika”, pp. 209–244 in *Türk parlamentoculuğunun ilk yüzüylü, 1876–1976*, esp. pp. 224–227.
- Cf., M.S. Anderson, *The eastern question, 1774–1923*. London: Macmillan, 1966; pp. 278ff; and, more specifically, B.E. Schmidt, *The annexation of Bosnia, 1908–1909*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; and W. Zürrer, “Das Kreta-Problem 1908–1912: über die Unfähigkeit zur diplomatischen Konfliktlösung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg”, *Südostforschungen*, XXXVIII, 1979, pp. 40–87. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, I, esp. pp. 245–264, pp. 268–284, pp. 286–295, pp. 307–310 and pp. 324–325; and, in general, W.D. David, *European diplomacy in the Near Eastern question*. Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1940.
- 29 Cf., F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 25.
- 30 For a summary of these incidents, see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 25–26.

Contemporary accounts are found in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 15–16 and p.171; A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 11; and Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 364–367, despite the discrepancy in his dating. Also see: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin üçyüzü 1908–1918*, pp. 56ff.; D. Farhi, “The şeriat as political slogan – or the ‘Incident of the 31st Mart’”, *Middle Eastern studies*, 7:3 (October) 1971, pp. 275–299, esp. pp. 281–282; and T.Z. Tunaya, “Amme hukukumuz bakımından ikinci Meşrutîyetin siyasi tefekküründe İslâmcılık cereyanı”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 19:3–4, 1954, pp. 630–670. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *İslâmcılık cereyanı: ikinci Meşrutîyetin siyasi hayatı boyunca gelişmesi ve bugüne bıraktığı meseleler*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962; [Hereafter, T.Z. Tunaya, *İslâmcılık cereyanı*]; pp. 94ff., for an overall assessment of religious reactionary movements in this period.

As for the boycott of Austria, see: E. Yavuz, “1908 boykotu”, *Gelişme dergisi*, özel sayısı: Türkiye iktisat tarihi üzerine araştırmalar, 1978, pp. 163–181; and, in general, D. Quataert, *Social disintegration and popular resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1901*.

- 31 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasî partiler*, pp. 189–190, pp. 198–199 and pp. 206–208; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, p. 28. Cf., A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve milli mücadele*, pp. 495–496. Also: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 172. For a general assessment, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 227–229.

A “socialist” treatment of the programme of the Committee, which is assumed to have formed the basis for that sanctioned by the Congress of 18 October–8 November 1908 (wrongly attributed to September 1908), is given in: V.I. Spil’kova, “Pervyj proekt političeskoj programmy mladoturok”, *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 4, 1973, pp. 61–68.

The guarded response of the Sultan to the resolution, given in person to Talât Bey on 6/7 (?) January 1909, is narrated in: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 354–356.

- 32 Quoted from a document found among the private papers of Kâmil Paşa, dated 12 Teşrin-i evvel 1324, sa.22, and subsequently reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 204–206.

The political tutelage is firmly attested in: Mahmud Muhtar (Katırcıoğlu) Paşa, *Maziye bir nazar: Berlin Muahedesinde Harb-i Umumiye kadar Avrupa ve Türkiye-Almanya münasebatı*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmet İhsan, 1341; p. 104. For a general appreciation, despite some discrepancies in dates, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 29–32.

- 33 Quoted from a document found among the private papers of Kâmil Paşa, dated 17 Teşrin-i evvel 1324, and subsequently reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 206.

Cf., regarding non-changes in the Government: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 191. For interference by the Committee in foreign policy affairs (e.g., sending delegates claiming to represent the Ottoman Government to western European capitals), see the documents reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, p. 207. Cf., F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 31.

- 34 The incident at Taşkısla is narrated in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 19–20. This particular phrase belongs to: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 228. Also see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, I, p. 295. Cf., *Surtees to Lowther*, No.54, M.A., Constantinople, 2 November 1908, *F.O.*, 195/2290.

- 35 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 20. Moreover, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa’s intended exemplary action of hanging the corpses of men killed by the Macedonian troops for public inspection by other soldiery around the Palace could only be revoked by the intervention of the Grand Vezir, Kâmil Paşa:

- ibid.*, *loc.cit.* Also see: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 81–83.
- 36 The quotation is taken from the announcement to the press on 18 Teşrin-i evvel 1324, appearing the next day. See: *İkdam*, 19 Teşrin-i evvel 1324. Also reproduced in full in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, Ekler Sa.9, p. 120.
- 37 On the conditions surrounding the secrecy over the assassination of İsmail Mahir Paşa, see: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 21. Mahir Paşa's intelligence work in the Selânik area, on behalf of the Sultan, just prior to the reproclamation of the Constitution, is found in: E.E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: prelude to the revolution of 1908*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957; p. 134. Also see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 4; A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 464–465; and Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 164, on Fehim Paşa's lynching. An outline account is also provided by the then Governor of Bursa, Mehmed Tefvîk (Biren) Bey: M.T. Biren, *Mehmet Tefvîk Bey'in hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 453–454. Cf., Gilbertson to Eyres, No.11, Broussa, 8 August 1908, Enclosure in *Lowther to Grey*, No.483, Conf., Constantinople, 16 August 1908, *F.O.*, 371/545/29287. For Fehim Paşa's activities, see, for example, the account of a foreign journalist: S. Whitman, *Turkish memories*. London: William Heinemann, 1914; pp. 263–267.
- 38 Mehmed Âkif, "Süleymaniye kürsüsünde", *Safahat*, II. Kitap, pp. 141–174 in: M.Â. Ersoy, *Safahat*. (Neşre hazırlayan) M.E. Düzdağ. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1992; p. 161 (poem originally composed and published in 1912).

" . . .

Bir de İstanbul'a geldim ki: Bütün çarşı, pazar
Na'radan çalkanıyor! Öyle ya . . . Hürriyyet var!
Galeyan geldi mi, mantık savuşmuş . . . Doğru:
Vardı aklımdan o gün her kimi gördümse zoru.
Kimse farkında değil, anlaşılan, yaptığının;
Kafalar tütsülü hülyâ ile, gözler kızgın
. . ."

On Abdürreşid İbrahim (1853–1943), see: E. Edib, *Mehmed Âkif: hayatı, eserleri ve yetmiş muharirinin yazıları*. 2. tab'ı. İstanbul: Sebilürreşad Neşriyatı, 1962; 2 cilt. Cilt 1, pp. 359–361.

The admission of one of the original "Young Turks", who later became disillusioned, is apt here:

"The Committee had brought liberty to the nation. This was a big difference between the old and the new eras. Inability to see this difference was unfair. The people had forgotten the old era because [they] were not seriously enamoured of liberty; they could not appreciate the value of liberty, nor did they know how to use it."

Ahmed Rıza, *Anıları*, p. 41.

- 39 For the *Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası*, officially founded on 14 September 1908, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 239–254; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 142–170. On the elections on 1908: *ibid.*, pp. 164–165 and p. 181. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, "Elections in Turkish history", *Middle Eastern affairs*, V:4 (April) 1954, pp. 116–119; S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 10–12; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 161–164; and S. Armağan, "Türkiye'de parlamento seçimleri", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 33:3–4, 1968, pp. 45–95.

A contemporary insight into the emergence of the *Ahrar Fırkası* is provided by: Mevlânzâde Rifat, *Mevlânzâde Rifat'ın anıları*, pp. 20ff. For a general assessment, see: M. Sencer, *Türkiye'de siyasî partilerin sosyal temelleri*. İstanbul:

- Geçiş Yayınları, 1971; and R.G. Okandan, "Amme hukukumuzda Osmanlı devletinin inkirazına kadar parlamentarizm ve hususiyetleri", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 13:2, 1947, pp. 449–473.
- 40 It should be noted that at this stage the Turkism of the Committee was only incipient. Indeed, the Committee had to keep any such tendency under cover and to maintain its Ottoman stance, since an overt Turkism would have been interpreted as a public disavowal of the heterogeneous nature of Ottoman society. See: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 11. And also cf., D. Kushner, *The rise of Turkish nationalism, 1876–1908*. London: Frank Cass, 1977; p. 6.
- 41 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 158.
And, for example, according to Daver, "... Turkish political élite groups, in general, exhibit excessive hierarchical and centralist structural characteristics". B. Daver, "Az gelişmiş ülkelerde siyasi elit (seçkinler)", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XX:2 (Haziran) 1965, pp. 517–535, p. 533. Cf., F.W. Frey, "Patterns of élite politics in Turkey", pp. 41–82 in G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Political élites in the Middle East*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975; esp. pp. 43–49.
- 42 On the centralism of the Committee, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 8ff. and pp. 142–165; and, on its centralist policies, see and cf.: S. Akşin, "İttihat ve Terakki üzerine", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XXVI:1 (Mart) 1971, pp. 153–182. Also cf, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 167–174 and esp. pp. 181–189; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 9–15; and N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 330–332.
- 43 The term is adopted from: R. Michels, *Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy*. (Trans.) E. and C. Paul. New York: Free Press, 1962; p. 78. The use of the word "party" is particularly apt here, since in early 1909 the party (*fırka*) and the Committee were officially separated and subsequent changes in this duality were effected, details of which are best explained in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 200–214. Also see related documents in: *ibid.*, Cilt 1, pp. 80–83.
- 44 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 11. For example, one embittered Unionist, who had become an opponent of the Committee, complained that those who used the constitutional right of opposition were accused of being "unpatriotic", "treacherous" and "covetous": Şerif Paşa, *Bir muhalifin hatıraları: İttihat ve Terakkiye muhalefet*. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990; p. 23.
Also see the incisive comments of: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 326–328 and, for an analysis of the opposition, pp. 399ff.
- 45 When the results of the November elections seemed to be going in favour of the Committee's nominees (*müntehib-i sanî*), Kâmil Paşa, on 30 November 1908, made certain ministerial changes in what may be termed a policy of appeasement. The best example is the reappointment of the Minister of the Interior, Hakkı Bey, who now became Minister of Education (see p. 147 and N.24 of this Chapter). Further, he brought in Manyasizâde Refik Bey, the noted Unionist, as Minister of Justice and Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the former Inspector-General of Macedonia – known for his Unionist sympathies, as Minister of the Interior. Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 174; F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 31; A.F. Türkğeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 15; and A[hmet] R[eşit] Rey, *Gördüklerim yaptıklarım (1890–1922)*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945; pp. 105–106.
- 46 For the demand for the interpellation by Hüseyin Cahid Bey on 13 January 1909, see, for example: *Takvim-i vekâyi*, 3 Kanun-ı sâni 1324; and Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 176. On the vote of confidence and the favourable attitude shown to Kâmil Paşa in the Chamber of Deputies, see: A.F. Türkğeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 18. Cf., S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 15. In addition: H.K. Bayur,

"Babiâli baskını", *Tarih ve edebiyat mecmuası*, 2 (Şubat) 1981, pp. 38–43, and 3 (Mart) 1981, pp. 27–31; no.2, pp. 40–41.

47 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 33.

48 On the deputation's visit, see: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 15.

Cf.: the deputation informed Kâmil Paşa "... that the Committee as a body dissociated itself from the hostile attitude towards him taken up by some of its members". *Lowther to Grey*, No.29, Conf., Pera, 14 January 1909, *F.O.*, 371/760/2283.

Akşin also posits the idea, with regard to foreign policy considerations, that:

"One factor which led to the Union and Progress's indecision in the matter of the Paşa's overthrow was the fear that Britain and British public opinion might turn against the Union and Progress."

S. Akşin, *op.cit.*, p. 257.

49 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 33.

50 Cf.,

"I knew that these appointments were the correct decisions of Kâmil Paşa and the Minister of War, Ali Rıza Paşa, in keeping the young and valuable elements of the Army, whose names and identities were the expression of value in public, away from partisan politics."

From the diaries of Süleyman Tevfik Bey, quoted in: C. Kutay, "Uzaklardan yakın sesler: olayların öncesi de yaşamış bir kalem emektârının hususî deferinde; gün-gün, saat-saat, o kanlı-kinli geri dönüş ayaklanması", *Bilinmeyen tarihimiz*, Cilt 1 (Mart) 1974, pp. 85–123; Cilt 2 (Eylül) 1974, pp. 59–97; and Cilt 3 (Aralık) 1974, pp. 42–104 respectively. [Hereafter, Süleyman Tevfik Bey, *Bilinmeyen tarihimiz*]; I (Mart) 1974, pp. 85–123, entry for 13 Ocak 1909, p. 92.

Also see the similar comment of: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 45.

Years later Talât Paşa, who was obviously aware of the real motive for sending officers as attachés or for further training (some 30 in all), was still harping, ironically, on the theme of its being to keep the young officers "belonging to the Unionist wing of the army" out of partisan politics: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, p. 384 and pp. 392–393, where the names and a group photograph of the officers are given. For the date of the appointment of the military attachés, see: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 176.

An example of Kâmil Paşa's encounter with Staff-Major Hafız Hakkı Bey, in terms of the latter's condescending attitude during a visit as a representative of the Central Committee over an issue relating to the Bulgarian declaration of independence, is found in the account of Mustafa Rahmi Bey. Parts of Mustafa Rahmi Bey's papers are reproduced in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadnâzamlar*; this particular account, pp. 1395–1397.

51 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 178; A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 18–19; and S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 16.

It may be recalled that there had already been a constitutional dispute over the appointments of the Ministers of War and the Navy by the Sultan, according to the tenth clause of the *hatt-ı hümayun* of 1 August 1908; despite the implication that Article 27 of the 1876 Constitution vested this prerogative in the person of the Grand Vezir, his appointments had to be sanctioned by an imperial *irade* (See N.10 of this Chapter). It may then seem plausible that Kâmil Paşa, exercising his constitutional right in the appointments of these two Ministers and asking the Sultan to sanction them immediately, not only defied the Committee's *de facto* power but also implied that the Sultan's somewhat

- reluctant sanctioning, especially of the appointment of the new Minister of War, Major-General Nâzım Paşa, is mentioned in: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 35–36. See: H.K. Bayur, *Sadrazam Kâmil Paşa: siyasi hayatı*. Ankara: Sanat Basımevi, 1954; esp. pp. 294–299. Also: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1400–1403, which reproduces the minutes of the Chief-Secretary, Ali Cevad Bey, on these changes. Cf., Ali Cevad Bey, *op.cit.*, p. 36. Further, the comments of: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, I, pp. 284–285.
- 52 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 16; and M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1399–1400.
- 53 Resignations of this type included those of the Minister of the Interior, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Minister of Justice, Manyasizâde Refik Bey, and the President of the Council of State, Hasan Fehmi Paşa. A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 19–20; and Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 178.
- 54 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 16–18. In addition, there were 53 abstentions and three on leave. The events in Parliament on 13 February 1909 are best described in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 34–35; and the memoirs of one of the then deputies for Kastamonu, Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) Bey: Y.K. Tengirşenk, *Vatan hizmetinde*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967; pp. 110–111. Also see: A. Ryan, *The last of the dragomans*, p. 59; and F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*. London: Methuen, 1910; pp. 33–40.
- 55 There were alleged to have been armed insurrections at Yanya (Yiannitsá) regarding which the notables of the town requested, in writing, on 29 January 1909, an increase in the armed forces and also suggested certain changes among the commanding officers of the forces in the area. Kâmil Paşa had responded to this and, in a memorandum dated 8 February 1909, told the Ministry of War that the battalions around Yanya could be sent, as long as such a measure did not decrease the fighting power of the IIIrd Army. Otherwise, he offered to send the *chasseur* battalions, now in İstanbul, to the area. This communication, however, had increased the foreboding of the Committee and the officer corps and strengthened their fears that the removal of this bastion force might undermine the régime. It may be significant that two days after the offer of the Grand Vezir had met with a negative response at the Ministry of War the Minister was dismissed. Yet the same offer was made, on the same day (10 February) directly to the Commander of the IIIrd Army, Mahmud Şevket Paşa. He too refused. In his reply the next day, he added that the forces under him were capable and that there was no possibility of a major insurrection. Thus, the attempt to send back the Macedonian forces came to nothing.
- S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 16–17; S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, pp. 64–65; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, I, p. 285. Cf., İsmail Kemal Bey, *The memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey*. (Trans.), S. Story. London: Constable, 1920; pp. 324ff. Also see: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü, 1908–1918*, pp. 84–85. The relevant details of the debates in the Chamber of Deputies are found in: N. Ölçen, *Osmanlı Meclisi Meb'usanı'nda kuvvetler ayrımı ve siyasal işkenceler*. Ankara: Ayça Yayını, 1982.
- 56 A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 19, where the entire episode is narrated. Such direct interference, however, caused great resentment on the part of the new Minister of War. When he heard of it from Ali Fuad Bey, Private Secretary to the Grand Vezirate who had been the only witness, he vented his furious ill-feeling against those officers in his apparently customary foul language: *ibid.*, *loc.cit.* Cf., S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 18. Cf., A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutîyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 92–93. For his full assessment of the events, on the basis of parliamentary proceedings: *ibid.*, pp. 88–97. Notwithstanding the

variety of dates proffered by the different sources, I am confident that mine are the correct ones.

- 57 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 65. Cf., A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 19. Cf., M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1399-1400; H.C. Yalçın, "Deniz kuvvetlerinin zoruyla çekilen sadrazam", *Yakın tarihimiz*, II:14, 1962, pp. 46-47; and S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 18-19. For the relevant debate in the Chamber of Deputies, see: N. Ölçen, *Osmanlı Meclisi Meb'usânı'nda kuvvetler ayrımı ve siyasal iskenceler*, pp. 130-131. Also: F. Çoker, "II. Meşrutiyet Meclisi'nde Sadrazamın çekilmesine neden olan bahriyeliler", *Tarih ve toplum*, 12:67 (Temmuz) 1989, pp. 9-12, esp.p.12 where the statement to the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies is reproduced in full.
- 58 B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 214. An experienced civil servant's rather poor opinion of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa as the choice for Grand *Vezir* at such a time is provided by: M.T. Biren, *Mehmet Tevfik Bey'in hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 10-11. Cf. the comments of Ali Haydar (Mithat) Bey: A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım*, 1872-1946. İstanbul: Mithat Akçit Yayını, 1946; p. 207. Further: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 36-38; and A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 21. Also see: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1400 and pp. 1665-1666, where the *hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 22 Muharrem 1327 [1 Şubat 1325] (14 February 1909), appointing Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa as the Grand *Vezir* is reproduced in full. Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 56-59.
- 59 Even the Unionists accept this assertion. For example, Halil (Menteşe) Bey, then a Unionist Deputy for the *Sancak* of Menteşe (Muğla), reveals the military pressure in his memoirs: H. Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin anıları*. (Giriş) İ. Arar. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986; [Hereafter, H. Menteşe, *Anıları*]; p. 152. Also see: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 501-502, for an assessment of, and agreement on, the same point from an Ottoman Liberal point of view. And, for a similar opinion by a contemporary foreign observer, see: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, pp. 36-38. Further, cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 369-370.
- 60 Cf., A.M. Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'Empire Ottoman*. Lausanne: Payot, 1917; p.17. For the Committee's efforts to secure the election of their candidates in Macedonia, for example, see: Lamb to Lowther, included in *Lowther to Grey*, No.647, Conf., Therapia, 9 October 1908, *F.O.*, 371/546/36109. According to Mehmed Ali (Aynî) Bey, then an emissary of the Committee:

"The *Vali* of Beyrut [Beyrouth] Nazım Paşa had told [him] that the election of one of the Gürcü [Georgian] *beys*, Mir Muhammed Reslân from Lazikiye [Lattaquié] was desired [. . . matlup olduğunu . . .] both by the Government and the Committee of Union and Progress . . . I made Mir Muhammed Reslân win the majority."

M.A. Aynî, *Hâtıraları*. Canlı tarihler:2. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945; pp. 70-71.

- 61 Cf., for example: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 19.

- 62 By pursuing a similar argument, Akşin reaches the conclusion that:

"If the political influence of the Committee had been nullified at a stroke, Parliament would have followed the opposition by submitting to it through its docility. It may be said that the organizers of the 31 March uprising calculated thus . . . and their reckoning was relatively correct for a limited period."

S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 19.

Moreover, even if we do not accept the exact figures given in a study on the

Parliaments of the second Constitutional period, that 160 out of the 288 deputies in the 1908 Chamber were from the Committee ("... Cemiyetten ..."), the significance of Kâmil Paşa's resignation may be inferred. F. Ahmad-D.A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", *Güney-Doğu Avrupa araştırmaları dergisi*, 4/5, 1975/1976, pp. 245-284, p. 258.

- 63 I give here what I consider to be a most representative and striking example of this assertion. When Ali Haydar Bey, son of the late famous Grand *Vezir* Midhat Paşa, was invited to the *Bab-ı Âli* one day in February (?) 1909 by the Grand *Vezir*, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, to receive his *lettre d'agrément* as the new Ottoman Ambassador to Madrid, he was informed by the Grand *Vezir* that Staff-Major Enver Bey would shortly be arriving in order to discuss the direction of policy to be pursued; only then would his appointment be confirmed. On being lectured by Enver Bey as to his expected policies and told to present himself to the Central Committee of the Committee for directives, Ali Haydar Bey records that he rose from his seat without even answering Enver Bey and asked the Grand *Vezir* to accept his resignation, saying that "As an Ambassador, I should receive my directives only from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". He then left the room and refused further approaches by the Grand *Vezir* to return and discuss the matter; in fact, he was later to turn down the offer of the Stockholm Embassy too. A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872-1946*, p. 209.
- 64 This illuminating admission by an important Unionist civilian, Midhat Şükrü (Bleda) Bey, then Deputy for Serez, is found in: M.Ş. Bleda, "Bir canlı tarih konuşuyor", *Resimli tarih mecmuası*, IV:42, 1953, pp. 2392-2395, p. 2392. Cf., Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, *Maziye bir nazar*, p. 104.
- 65 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 242-254, for a general assessment of the opposition. Cf., D. Farhi, *The şeriat as a political slogan*, esp. pp. 280-281. See, in particular, the opinion of: Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani ve devr-i saltanatı*. İstanbul: Kütüphane-i İslâm ve Askeri, 1327. 3 cilt (Cilt 3 by Ahmed Refik). Esp. Cilt 3, pp. 1117ff.
- Further cf. foreign observations: *The Grey papers* (papers of Edward Grey, third Baronet and Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 1862-1913, Foreign Secretary, 1905-1916), esp. *F.O.*, 800/92 (1909-1911), Memoranda, and *F.O.*, 371/761ff.; and E.F. Knight, *The awakening of Turkey: a history of the Turkish revolution*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1909; pp. 315-324.
- 66 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 233ff.; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 31ff; for the dates of establishment, cadres, rules and regulations, and programmes of these parties and political societies. For an accurate assessment of the composition of the opposition, see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 42.
- 67 Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 266-269; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 182-196; and R. Nur, *Hayat ve hâtrâtım*. İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1967-1968. 4 cilt. Esp.see Cilt 2, pp. 335-346. A broad consideration of the Ottoman rank-and-file soldiery at this time is given in: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 28-30.
- 68 Cf., von der Goltz's comments (Chapter 2, pp. 65-66 of this work). Two earlier references on the position of the *alaylıs* are worth quoting here:

"The majority of the officers are from the ranks and their education is very deficient . . . The [military] schools furnish the Army annually with about 75 officers, who obtain certain advantages with respect to promotion."

Armed Forces of Turkey: treatise by Lieutenant E. Bearing, R.A.. Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office, 27 November 1870, Conf. *W.O.* 106/1; and

"The officers may be divided into two categories, namely, former pupils of the War School, and men risen from the ranks. They form two entirely distinct parties, each cordially hating and despising the other. The first ridicules the general ignorance and crudeness of the second, while the second ridicules the inexperience and practical unfitness of the first."

W.S. Cooke (comp.), *The Ottoman Empire and its tributary states*. Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner, 1968 (Reprint of the 1876 London edition); p. 18.

In addition, Captain A.F. Townshend, who was the British Military Consul from 1903 to 1906, has provided one of the most perceptive observations:

"When we come to consider the officers we are at once faced with the question as to which school of officers we are talking of – the old or the new, for they are as different as chalk is from cheese. The old school are ignorant and fanatical . . . their only two merits being their unquestioned courage and their loyalty. Some of them are absolutely devoid of education . . .

On the other hand the new school officer, or as he has now openly become the Young Turkish officer, is equally courageous and patriotic, and has a large knowledge of, and an even larger capacity for learning, European methods of conducting military affairs."

A.F. Townshend, *A Military Consul in Turkey: the experiences and impressions of a British representative in Asia Minor*. London: Seeley and Co., 1910; p.163. An impressive recent assessment of the officer corps is provided by: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 20–28 and pp. 49–50.

- 69 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 115 and p. 186. Also, in general: Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbinde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın hâtıratı*. [İstanbul]: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1336. As also quoted by Gen. Karatamu, according to the *Salnâme-i Devlet-i Âliye-i Osmaniyes* (official Ottoman yearbooks), the last intake of *alaylı* officers into the Ottoman armed forces occurred in 1901 (1317): S. Karatamu, *op.cit.*, p.187. On the recruitment of *alaylı* officers, see: N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, pp. 359–360. According to a French officer, Colonel Lamouche, for example, in 1894 only 15% of the total officer corps were *mekteplis*. L. Lamouche, *L'organisation militaire de l'Empire Ottoman*. Paris: Librairie Militaire de L. Baudoin, 1895; pp. 54–56.

- 70 On this point, the last *Serasker* of the Empire, Mehmed Rıza Paşa (on 22 July 1908 the *Seraskeriate* was abolished and replaced by the Ministry of War), complains about the political promotions of *alaylı* officers and the high number of *paşas*, especially in the pre-1908 period. Rıza Paşa, *Hulâsa-i hâtırat*. [İstanbul: n.pub.], 1325; pp. 22ff.

According to Çakın and Orhon, through unnecessary and untimely promotions the command cadre had swollen to a greater extent than the forces could absorb. Hence, in 1888, there were 23 army-marshals and generals, 90 major- and lieutenant-generals and 167 brigadier-generals, whereas 14 years later their numbers had nearly doubled, to 31, 184 and 284 respectively. N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, p. 263.

- 71 This assessment is drawn from: Freiherr von der Goltz, *Der Jungen Türkei Niederlage und die Möglichkeit Wiederherstellung*. Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, 1913; in addition to a close reading of contemporary, and very well-informed, military gossip by one of the officers, Cavalry-Major Asaf (Tugay) Bey: A. Tugay, *İbret: Abdülhamid'e verilen jurnaller ve jurnalciler*. 2 cilt. Cilt 1: İstanbul: Okat Yayınevi, [n.d.]; Cilt 2: İstanbul: Yörük Yayınevi, 1962; [Hereafter, A. Tugay, *İbret*]; esp. Cilt 2, pp. 60ff. Further, on the basis of reliable sources: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 22–28.

- 72 The revelation of Mahmud Muhtar Paşa in a Selânik newspaper, *Yeni Asır*, is quoted in: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, pp. 80–89. Also cited in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 38–39 and p. 225. Note that on 23 July 1908, the total number of officers in the *Hassa Ordusu* was 2492. *Harp Tarih Dairesi Arşivi*, Ankara, [Hereafter, H.T.A.], A1/69, Dolap: 10, Göz: 14.
- 73 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 63; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 371. In addition, on 12 November 1908, the Commander of the 2nd (Infantry) Division, *alaylı*-origin Army-Marshal Şevket Paşa, was dismissed and a *mektepli* officer, Major-General Cevad Paşa, appointed in his stead. Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 173.
- 74 Cf., V.R. Swenson, “The military rising in Istanbul, 1909”, *Journal of contemporary history*, 5:4, 1970, pp. 171–184, esp. pp. 171ff.; and S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 26 and pp. 225–227. Also: G.F. Abbot, *Turkey in transition*. London: E. Arnold, 1909; esp. pp. 171ff. on the discontent of the purged *alaylı* officers. For more graphic detail, see: S. Albayrak, *31 Mart gerici bir hareket mi?* İstanbul: Araştırma Yayınları, 1987; pp. 192–197 and pp. 207–211. Further: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, pp. 63–64.
- 75 Mehmed Murad, *Tatlı emeller, acı hakikatler*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Amedi, 1330; esp. pp. 67–70. The views of Mizancı Murad Bey are discussed in: B. Emil, *Mizancı Murad Bey: hayatı ve eserleri*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:2417. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1979; esp. pp. 664ff. Also: Şerif Paşa, *Bir muhalifin hatıraları: İttihat ve Terakkiye muhalefet*, pp. 48–49.
- The testimony of a theological lecturer from Bayezid Mosque, a certain Ahmed Rasim Avni Efendi, before a Commission of Inquiry makes the point quite explicitly: S. Albayrak, *31 Mart gerici bir hareket mi?*, reproduced in part on pp. 27–35, see esp. pp. 31ff.
- The dictated notes of an “observation [mülâhaza]” of Abdülhamid II, dated 4 Rebiül-evvel 1327 [13 Mart 1325] (26 March 1909), reflect his thoughts on military discipline. He suggests that the spiritual needs (e.g., *namaz*) of the soldiery should not be neglected, that these be incorporated into the written regulations and that commanders see they be carried out. B.V.A., Yıldız Tasnifi: 9/1198.
- 76 The reinstatement in 1908 of *kur’a imtihanları* (conscription exams), on the initiation of the Ministry of War, destroyed this right of full exemption, only those *medrese* students among the conscripts who passed their exam being released to attend their *medreses*. Here, I have used as my basis a reliable study: M. Ergün, “II. Meşrutiyet döneminde medreselerin durumu ve islâh çalışmaları”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi dergisi*, XXX:1–2 (Ocak-Haziran) 1979–1982, pp. 59–89, esp. pp. 73ff.
- 77 The Society, officially inaugurated on 3 April 1909, was also known by several variant titles, notably *Fırka-i Muhammediye* and *Volkancılar Cemiyeti*. I use the form *İttihâd-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti* as it appeared in the programme and its declaration as well as the inauguration speech, although Tunaya consistently calls it *İttihad-ı Muhammedî Fırkası*: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler*, pp. 261ff., p. 270 for the declaration, pp. 271–273 for the political programme and pp. 273–275 for the speech. Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 182ff. and pp. 199–205 for the related documents. The complete run of *Volkan* has been collected into a single publication by M.E. Düzdağ (hazırlayan), *İkinci Meşrutiyetin ilk ayları ve 31 Mart olayı için bir yakın tarih belgesi Volkan gazetesi, 11 Aralık 1908 – 20 Nisan 1909: tam ve aynen metin neşri*. İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1992; [hereafter, M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*]; see esp. 16 March 1909 (3 Mart 1325), pp. 361–364 for the declaration and political programme and 5–6 April 1909 (23–24 Mart 1325),

pp. 460–462 and pp. 465–466 for the inauguration details.

Further, on the Society and Derviş Vahdetî, who published *Volkan* and was most instrumental in the spread of the Society and its inauguration, see: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 20–24; and D. Farhi, *The şeriat of a political slogan*, pp. 283–285. Also see: “İTTİHAD-I MUHAMMEDİ DJEM’İYETİ”, Vol.IV, pp. 283–284 in H.A.R. Gibb [et al.] (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Leiden: Brill, and London: Luzac, 1960 to date. [Hereafter, *E.I.2*]. For the events relating to the inauguration of the Society, see: M. Baydar, *31 Mart vak’ası*. İstanbul: Milli Tesevüt Birliği Yayınları, 1955; pp. 15ff.

- 78 Düzdağ makes a convincing case on the basis of circumstantial evidence: M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*, p. xii.

- 79 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 43. Cf., D. Farhi, *The şeriat as a political slogan*, pp. 287–288. Also cf, the comments of the French Consul in Selânik:

“Si les chefs du parti jeune-turc, que j’ai eu l’occasion de connaître à Salonique, paraissent n’avoir aucun fanatisme, et semblent dégagés de toute preoccupation religieuse, ils sont cependant décidés à ne point laisser porter atteinte à l’hégémonie séculaire des musulmans dans ce pays.”

Séon à Pichon, *Dépêche* No.24, Salonique, 13 avril 1909, in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Commission de Publication des Documents Relatifs aux Origines de la Guerre de 1914, *Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914)*. 1re série (1871–1900), 2e série (1901–1911), 3e série (1911–1914). Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929–1959. 43 tomes. [Hereafter, *D.D.F.*]. Tome XII, 2e série, No.166, pp. 205–209.

Also: *Leishman to the Secretary of State*, No.941, [Extract], American Embassy, Constantinople, 15 April 1909, *F.R.U.S.*, 1909, pp. 563–565, esp.p.564.

- 80 In an open letter published in *Volkan* the unity of the “*ilmiyye*” and “*askeriyye*” was deemed necessary because as the correspondent, theological lecturer (*dersiâm*) Mehmed Emin Hayretî, reasons, “. . . since they protect and defend İslâm and şeriat both classes count as co-professions [. . . her iki sınıf dahi hemmeslek sayılır]”. M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*, 25–26 March 1909 (12–13 Mart 1325), pp. 408–409 and pp. 412–413; p. 409. Indeed, according to Derviş Vahdetî, the soldiers were the “natural members [âza-yı tabii]” of the Society: *ibid.*, 16 April 1909 (3 Nisan 1325), p. 516. As for *Volkan*’s derisory attitude toward and constant attacks on the outlook of those Unionists who had spent periods of exile in Europe or been sent there for educational purposes, or both, see, for example: *ibid.*, 23 March 1909 (10 Mart 1325), p. 396 and 24 March 1909 (11 Mart 1325), p. 400. Also, in general: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 188–196. Yet, for an interesting alternative interpretation of the role of *Volkan* and its, and its editors’, being a tool of the “Europeans”, see: S. Kocabaş, *Kendi itirafları Jön Türkler nerede yarıldı?*, pp. 208–213, esp. pp. 210–211.

- 81 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 40. The event is best narrated by: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 44–45.

- 82 M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*, 28 March 1909 (15 Mart 1325), p. 420. Also see: Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 182.

- 83 Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 182.

- 84 For example, a letter which appeared in *Volkan* on 31 March 1909 (18 Mart 1325), signed by nine soldiers (four of them *alaylı* officers) of the 4th Battalion of the 5th Regiment (2nd Division, *Hassa Ordusu*), expressed their attachment to the Society and ended with the words:

“We ask [*Allah*] to grant every aspiration and estimable aim of your honourable society, and request, on behalf of our Battalion, that you accept us . . . as your guardians in order to hold back those who are advancing

on the banner of [the Society] and to prevent their interference. Long live *İttihad-ı Muhammedi*."

M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*, 31 March 1909 (18 Mart 1325), pp. 437–438, p. 438. The Ministry of War, in a report to the Grand *Vezirate* dated 11 April 1909 (29 Mart 1325), No.313, claimed that the above-mentioned letter had been altered by the editors of *Volkan*, and went on:

"It is seen as absolutely improper for the newspapers to venture upon such unseemly attempts which would eradicate military discipline [and] it is requested, on the basis of recent reports from the *Hassa Ordusu*, that . . . certain legal measures be adopted against those publications which are desirous of destroying the military ethic and code of conduct . . .".

B.V.A., Defer; Harbiye Gelen, 229/6/37. The document is also reproduced in full in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 1, Belge Sa.23, p. 304; and is cited in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 27.

In the document it is also mentioned that the Regimental *Müftü* (similar to Chaplain) and the unit commanders had already been instructed to advise the soldiery not to pay any attention to these kinds of societies which would create disunity amongst the soldiery. Yet supposing that the letter had been altered by the editorial board – and, judging by the style, I am inclined to think that it was – the fact still remains that such a letter was sent and, further, that it was sent to the most ardent opposition newspaper of the day, *Volkan* – a fact which was never questioned by the report.

On the other hand, there were those military figures in the capital who also wanted to do something about what they considered the irresponsible press. One such figure, for example, appears to have been Field-Marshal Edhem Paşa. According to the account of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, Edhem Paşa asked for him and alerted him to the fact that the probable outcome of such publications as *Volkan* would be the soldiery getting out of control. Ahmed İzzet Paşa then took the initiative and went to see the Minister of War, Ali Rıza Paşa, and the President of the Chamber, Ahmed Rıza Bey. It was decided to have a meeting at the residence of the Grand *Vezir*. However, according to this account, during the talks censorship of the press was considered to be out of the question, because Ahmed Rıza Bey told them that the maintenance of press freedom was a requisite of the constitutional régime. Hence nothing came of the meeting.

Ahmed İzzet Paşa does not give a date in his account: Ahmed İzzet Paşa, "Müşir Ahmed İzzet Paşa'nın hâtrâtı", *Akşam*, 13 Nisan-7 Haziran 1928, see 7 Mayıs 1928. Also quoted in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 1, pp. 217–218. Cf., Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 62ff.

85 For the details, see: M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*, 4–5–6 April 1909 (22–23–24 Mart 1325), pp. 455–456, pp. 460–462 and pp. 465–466 respectively.

86 Süleyman Tevfik Bey, *Bilimniyen tarihimiz*, I (Mart) 1974, pp. 85–123, entry for 7 Nisan 1909, p. 97. Hasan Fehmi Bey, the editor of *Serbesti*, was the personal friend of Süleyman Tevfik Bey, then editor of *Tercüman*. Cf., Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, p. 46. As Ali Cevad Bey indicates, all the opposition papers held the Committee responsible for the assassination since, in his articles, Hasan Fehmi Bey was in the habit of attacking the Committee. For *Volkan*'s vehement response to the murder and accusation that an officer ("zabit") was responsible for it, see: M.E. Düzdağ, *Volkan*, 8 April 1909 (26 Mart 1325), pp. 475–479 and 9 April 1909 (27 Mart 1325), pp. 480–484. Also: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 27–28; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 39. Years later, Talât Paşa rejected all the insinuations: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 475–478. Further: Y. Nadi (Abahoğlu), *İhtilâl ve inkilâb-ı Osmanî*.

İstanbul: Matbaa-i Cihan, 1325; pp. 24ff. Cf., the accounts of the two contemporary observers: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, pp. 23-24, pp. 62ff. and pp. 72-74; and *Lowther to Grey*, No.259, Conf., Pera, 9 April 1909, F.O. 371/774/14539.

For a detailed account, see: S. Borak, *İktidar koltuğundan idam sehпасına: yakın tarihimizde siyasi anayetler ve idamlar*. İstanbul: İstanbul Kitabevi, 1962; pp. 228-236. Also a recent analysis, on the basis of existing sources: Y. Aktar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi öğrenci olayları (1908-1918)*, pp. 75-79, pp. 105-107 and pp. 122-123. Further: S. Albayrak, *31 Mart gerici bir hareket mi?*, pp. 211-226 and pp. 247-254.

- 87 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 27-29 and p. 294; while *ibid.*, pp. 31-138 provides the most detailed explanation yet to have appeared of the events of the first seven days (i.e., 13 April 1909 [31 Mart 1325] to 19 April 1909 [6 Nisan 1325]), which helped to form my own assessment of the Incident and, especially, of the stance of the Action Army following it. Cf., Z. Türkmen, *Osmanlı meşrutiyetinde ordu-siyaset çatışması*. İstanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 1993; pp. 23ff. For an accurate and convenient English summary, see: *Leishman to the Secretary of State*, No.949, American Embassy, Constantinople, 27 April 1909, F.R.U.S., 1909, pp. 569-572. I also found Tunaya's reliable overall assessment and survey of opinions most useful: T.Z. Tunaya, *İslâmcılık cereyanı*, pp. 117-145.

- 88 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 276-278 and pp. 283-284, clearly exposes the myth that the Action Army was synonymous with the Committee and the more commonly-held view that the soldiers were acting solely on behalf of the Unionist civilians. Close reading of the numerous telegrams of protest supports this assertion: İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-ı a'zam Tefvîk Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vak'ası*. 3. baskı. İstanbul: İstanbul Kitabevi, 1986; pp. 57-97, where they are reproduced in full.

As one of the staff-officers of the Action Army put it, "It was as if we were already awaiting a counter-move . . .". F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*. (Hazırhyan) C. Kutay. İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980; p. 32. Cf.,

"The news from the European provinces was indeed sufficiently serious. In all the more important military centres in European Turkey, Adrianople and Uscub alone excepted, the telegrams showed that the recent events in Constantinople were regarded as a coup d'état against the Constitution and that the troops were preparing to start for the capital. At Uscub and Adrianople, even, the soldiery seemed only to be awaiting further news, while from Asia Minor the chorus in support of the Constitution was almost equally unanimous."

Lowther to Grey, No.287, Pera, 20 April 1909, B.D., V, No.218, pp. 313-319, p.316.

It may be interesting to note the following:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency [wrote Colonel Surtees, British Military Attaché] that in the course of conversation with Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, this morning, . . . I presented Mr. Consul General Eyres to him, who acting on my previous suggestion, referred to 'the Committee'. Mahmoud Shevket Pasha at once said 'What Committee?' Mr. Eyres replied 'the Committee of Union and Progress', to which Mahmoud Shevket Pasha answered very stiffly to the effect that he did not know such a Committee and that the Army to which he belonged had nothing to do with Committees of any sort or description."

Surtees to Lowther, No.38, Constantinople, 12 May 1909, F.O. 195/2323.

- 89 See pp. 134–135 and N.7 of Part 3, Preamble.
Cf., according to one report:

“The Alaili . . . officers who had been dismissed since the establishment of the Constitution were invited by the soldiers to return and their reappointment was confirmed by the Sultan . . .”

Surtees to Lowther, No.26, Constantinople, 26 April 1909, *F.O.* 195/2323.

For example, according to Mevlânzâde Rifat Bey, who provides various lists of the demands, most of the time the rank-and-file were not even aware of them all. As the demands arrived from the principal participants (*amil-i aslilerden*) of the uprising and were relayed through the anti-Unionist press, the rank-and-file were used only as the executive, as it were, to see that the aims of the anti-Unionist religious and political factions were carried out. Mevlânzâde Rifat, *İnkilâb-ı Osmaniden bir yaprak, yahut 31 Mart 1325 kıyamı*, pp. 44ff. and Süleyman Nazif, *Yıkılan müessese: son zamana aid bazı müşahadat ve malûmat-ı tarihiye*. İstanbul: İlhami Fevzi Matbaası, 1927; pp. 9ff.

Further evidence is supplied in various accounts by prominent figures of the day, reproduced in full and in part, in: S. Albayrak, *31 Mart gerici bir hareket mi?*, pp. 53–64, pp. 65–73 and pp. 74–87. Also on this point, see: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 230–231 and pp. 242–245. Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler*, p. 266; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 188–191. Yet, of the various demands made under the slogan of *şeriat*, the most concrete appears in the shape of a petition to Parliament by the *alaylı* officers. This occurred on 15 April 1909 during the first open session of the Chamber when a Deputy, Zöhrab Efendi, brought the matter to its attention by producing the petition. It was not individually signed, but indicated the total number of those of the seven Armies of the Empire who had allegedly given their signatures (from *Hassa Ordusu* – 2,000; IInd Army – 300; IIInd Army – 700; IVth Army – 1,300; Vth Army – 179; VIth Army – 802; VIIth Army – 101). Although one may doubt the collection of so many signatures from the distant parts of the Empire (e.g., VIIth Army H.Q. in Yemen) in less than three days since the insurrection had broken out – and I tend to do so – the form of the demands made clear the deep cleavage between the *alaylı* and *mektepli* officers and the resentment of the *mektepli* domination of the military. The petition recounted professional grievances of the *alaylı* against the *mektepli* officers (e.g., high number of *alaylı* demotions and purges, introduction of examinations for promotion and inadequate provision for pensions) – all expressed in relatively poor Turkish – amounting to what a contemporary author called “an ultimatum to Parliament”. Y. Nadi, *İhtilâl ve inkilâb-ı Osmani*, pp. 56–57; and the petition appears in *Takvim-i vekayi*, 7 Nisan 1325 (20 April 1909). Similar kinds of complaints, this time signed by 30 relatively high-ranking *alaylı* officers, appeared on the same day in *Serbesti*. See: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 82.

- 90 From the second day onward (14 April 1909), the killing of *mektepli* officers turned into a general hunting down of *mekteplis* whether officers or not, as graphically described by Dr. İbrahim Temo, then Health Inspector of Beyoğlu District (*Mutasarrıflık*) and caught up in the events. Indeed, he narrates his own narrow escape while on the way to tend two wounded officers. İ. Temo, *İbrahim Temo’nun İttihad ve Terakki anıları*. [2nd ed.] İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987 (originally published as: *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin teşekkülü ve hizmet-i vataniye ve inkilâb-ı milliye dair hâtıratım*. Mecidiye (Romanya): [n.pub.], 1939); pp. 189–197.

Also: “Galip Paşa’nın (Pasinler) hâtıraları”, *Hayat tarih mecmuası*, I:6 (Temmuz) 1966, pp. 4–11 – II:9 (Ekim) 1966, pp. 80–88 [in four parts], esp. II:7 (Ağustos) 1966, pp. 20–26.

- According to the British Military Attaché's report, "... large numbers, possibly 200 of the 'mektebli' ... officers were slaughtered by the soldiery". *Surtees to Lowther*, No.26, Constantinople, 26 April 1909, F.O. 195/2323. Further, the personal recollections of: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 541-544.
- 91 Mahmud Şevket Paşa assumed personal command of the Action Army on 20 April 1909 (7 Nisan 1325), the seventh day of the insurrection. S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 155. But he seems – for reasons of caution perhaps – not to have used the formal title of "Commander of the IIIrd [and] Action Armies [3., Hareket Ordusu Kumandanı]" until the actual occupation of İstanbul on 24 April 1909 (11 Nisan 1325). See the documents, reproduced in full, in: M.T. Biren, *Mehmed Tevfik Bey'in hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 22-29.
- 92 B.V.A., Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatası, Cilt 127, 8 Nisan 1325. Also reproduced in full and in facsimile in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, Belge Sa.35, pp. 599-601; and cited in: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 162.
- The Government's response was the face-saving one of acceptance "in principle [esasen]". As to the demand concerning military matters (i.e., martial law), it would be considered through the responsible channels and the Paşa would be informed in due course. But Mahmud Şevket Paşa retorted that if his demands were not met within 24 hours then responsibility would lie with those "... who caused it [...] müsebbiplerine]" and the "... assembled forces [...] kuvve-i mutehasşide]" would be free to act. Mahmud Şevket Paşa also relayed the text of his reply to all *vilayets* and independent *livas* of the Empire. The text is reproduced in full in: C. Bayar, *op.cit.*, Belge Sa.41, pp. 610-611. Cf., the comments of and documents in: İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-i-a'zam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vak'ası*, p.109-126.
- 93 The text of the telegram from Edirne, dated 7 Nisan 1325 (20 April 1909) is reproduced in full in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, Belge Sa.45, pp. 622-623. Major-General Salih Paşa also included a copy of the telegram which he had already sent to the Chamber of Deputies. For my general line of thinking, three sentences from it are worth quoting here:
- "The military [ordu], as is now unfortunately the case in İstanbul, is never the tool for the ambitions of any political party. The military considers the absence of a soldiery that busies itself with politics better than its presence. The military is the guardian of the *Meşrutîyet* [Constitution] and *Hurriyet* [Freedom]."
- Also reproduced in full in: *ibid.*, p. 623.
- 94 S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 167-181; D. Farhi, *The şariat as a political slogan*, pp. 289-290; F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 44; and A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 30ff. In addition: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p.1709; and, especially on the ringleaders' behaviour, very revealing information may be found in: S. Albayrak, *31 Mart gerici bir hareket mi?*, pp. 275-297. The hypocritical attitude of the opposition press, in view of the advancing forces, is exemplified in extracts from *Serbesti* between 14 and 22 April, reproduced in: Mevlânzâde Rifat, *Mevlânzâde Rifat'ın anıları*, pp. 46-55.
- 95 The Resolution is in: *Takim-i vekâyi*, 11 Nisan 1325; and also reproduced in full in the memoirs of the then President of the Assembly: Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtıratı*, II/2, pp. 476-477. Cf., M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1080ff. Also see the memoirs of another prominent participant in the Assembly: Ahmed Rıza, *Anıları*, pp. 38-39. Further details in: İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-i-a'zam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vak'ası*, pp. 127-133, pp. 140-156, pp. 157-162 and pp. 191-194.

- 96 Cf., S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 231–232. Also see, for example, the account of one of the aides-de-camp of the Sultan, Captain Hasan Bey, in: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü, 1908–1919*, pp. 87–88. And, for a general assessment: C. Kutay, *31 Mart ihtilâlinde Abdülhamit*. İstanbul: Nilüfer Matbaacılık, 1977; together with that of: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 559–563.
- 97 In point of fact, according to the 1876 Constitution, such a state of emergency could only be exercised by the Sultan's Government (*Hükümet-i Seniyye*) (Article 113/1). Yet Mahmud Şevket Paşa took the decision personally and it was then duly sanctioned by the Ahmed Tevfik Paşa Government. See: B.V.A., *Yıldız Tasnifi*, Kısım 6, Sa.1754; B.V.A., *Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatası*, Cilt 127, 12 Nisan 1325; and Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın hâtıratı*, II/2, pp. 446–447. Also: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 203–204; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 375–376. Further, for a recent, documented, account: Z. Türkmen, *Osmanlı Meşrutiyetinde ordu-siyaset çatışması*, pp. 81ff., and details of the establishment and proceedings of the Martial Law court: *ibid.*, pp. 99–106. Cf., *Surtees to Lowther*, No.68, Constantinople, 13 June 1909, *F.O.* 195/2323, esp. "Interference by the Military Authorities in All Branches of the Government Service".
- 98 For the full details, see: İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-ı a'zam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikalar göre 31 Mart vak'ası*, pp. 134–139. Also: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 201–210. In addition: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, pp. 272ff. For the proceedings of the Court Martial, reproduced in full and in part: S. Albayrak, *31 Mart gerici bir hareket mi?*, pp. 324–350.
- 99 *Takvim-i vekâyî*, 15 Nisan 1325, for the decision of the General National Assembly on the deposition. Ali Cevad Bey, *Fezleke*, pp. 79ff. and pp. 145–153, includes the *fetva*. Cf., F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*, pp. 34–39, for the passage of events by a participant. Also see: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, pp. 216–222. For two, slightly differing, English translations of the *fetva*, see: A. Ryan, *The last of the dragomans*, p. 63; and D. Farhi, *The şariat as a political slogan*, pp. 292–293. For a personal account and disclaimer of responsibility for collusion between the Committee and the military, see: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 598–604, pp. 609–615, pp. 620–627 and pp. 632–638. As for the impressions of a foreign journalist, see: F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, pp. 265–271.
- 100 *Lowther to Grey*, Conf., Constantinople, 31 January 1910, Turkey: Annual Report, 1909, *F.O.* 424/250. Also, the similar impression of the American Ambassador in: *Leishman to the Secretary of State*, No.953, [Extract], American Embassy, Constantinople, 28 April 1909, *F.R.U.S.*, 1909, pp. 583–584; and the diary entry for "Wednesday, April 28" of a British visitor in İstanbul to the effect that "To-day was an idle time, so far as politics are concerned. Nothing took place." W.M. Ramsay, *The revolution in Constantinople and Turkey: a diary*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1909; p. 128.
- 101 İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*, p. 80. As Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote privately to the British Ambassador:

"I see that you are pessimistic. I was becoming so, on hearing that corruption was creeping into the Committee and the Young Turks. But I cannot help being impressed by the decision, purpose, discipline and strength which have characterized the leaders of the Army which is now in power.

It is clear that we have greatly underestimated the strength of the force at the disposal of the Committee."

- Grey to Lowther, Private, 30 April 1909, *B.D.*, V, No.219, pp. 319–320, p. 319.
 102 E.J. Dillon, "A clue to the Turkish tangle", *Contemporary review*, 95 (June) 1909, pp. 743–756, p. 748.

- 103 Şifre: Harbiye Dairesi, 6011, 25 Haziran 1325, Üçüncü Ordu Kumandanlığına, (8 July 1909). Reproduced in full in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, "II. Sultan Abdülhamid'in hâl'i ve ölümüne dair bazı vesikalar", *Belleten*, X:40 (Ekim) 1946, pp. 705–748, pp. 720–721.

It may be noted that Mahmud Şevket Paşa was the sole instrument in exiling Sultan Abdülhamid II to Selânik, communicating to the General National Assembly, on 28 April 1909, the claim that such was the desire of the military and that it should be debated accordingly. Forcing the issue in this fashion, he got the required response in that the Assembly, despite some feeble protestation, passed the motion unanimously. Cf., S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 221; and Ali Cevad Bey., *Fezleke*, p. 188.

The official title of the Paşa, as quoted, appears in a post-script to a communication endorsing the telegram, No.6011, dated 11 July 1909 (28 Haziran 1325); also reproduced in full in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *op.cit.*, p. 722.

In fact, Mahmud Şevket Paşa had been appointed to the unprecedented post of "Inspector-General of Various Military Detachments of the First, Second and Third Armies [Birinci ve İkinci ve Üçüncü Ordular . . . Kıt'aat-ı Muhtelif-i Askerîsi Müfettiş-i Umumiliği . . .]" on 16 May 1909; with this appointment the *Hassa Ordusu* was renamed Ist Army. The document is reproduced in full and in facsimile in: Z. Türkmen, *Osmanlı Meşrutîyetinde ordu-siyaset çatışması*, Ek.19.

The reason for the Sultan's formal communication to Parliament was mainly to request from it a written guarantee for the lives of himself and his family, the purchase of the residence in which he was living and the release of those of his household who had been arrested, and, concerning the first point especially, that this guarantee be made public and communicated back to him. The petition is dated 5 July 1909 (22 Haziran 1325), and is reproduced in full in: İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *op.cit.*, pp. 717–720, with facsimile on Lev.LXXXIV. For background commentary by the officer guarding the deposed Sultan at Alatini Köşk in Selânik, see: F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*, pp. 72–76.

- 104 *Hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 15 Rebiül-ahir 1327 [22 Nisan 1325] (5 May 1909), appointing Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, again, as Grand Vezir. Reproduced in full in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1671.

Also see, for a sound grasp of events: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 40–41; and the then Chief Secretary to the Sultan, Halid Ziya (Uşaklıgil) Bey: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatralar*. [New ed.] İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1965; p. 49; together with information on the Cabinet changes in the days leading up to this: İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadr-ı-a'zam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vak'ası*, pp. 195–208.

- 105 *ALBUM: de l'armée libératrice fête nationale*. [İstanbul]: Librairie Militaire, I. Hilmi-Librairie éditeur, 1909.

- 106 See, especially, the perceptive remarks of Halid Ziya Bey: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatralar*, pp. 28–31; and, in general: Z.Ş. Soko, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa*. İstanbul: Anadolu Kitabevi, 1944. Cf., M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1870.

- 107 This body, in the reign of Abdülhamid II, consisted of an army-marshal, four generals and major-generals, three brigadier-generals and eight other-ranking

- officers. S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 240; and N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, p. 304 and Ek.5, "Osmanlı Ordusunda emir ve komuta bağlantısı (1908)".
- 108 B.V.A., *Hazine Evrak*, Sa.66, 1 Ağustos 1325, "İrade-i Seniyye". Also see, on the workings of the *Dar-ı Şura-i Askerî*: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 246-248.
- 109 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 142-144, pp. 147-159 and, on Ahmed İzzet Paşa, pp. 250-253. In addition, for technical details of the reorganization, see: "Osmanlı ordusunda kolordu teşkilâtının kabulüyle masarifi için 1326 Harbiye bütçesinden münakaleten 300 milyon guruşun tahsisi hakkında kanun", *Düstur*, 2:III, Sa.25, p. 30, 26 Kanunuevvel 1326. Further: R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi (1912-1913)*, Cilt I, esp. pp. 94-99. For Ahmed İzzet Paşa's own, though not detailed, account, see: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 44ff.
- Also, the services of the German General, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, were sought. He arrived in İstanbul (12 July 1909) having agreed to assist with the modification of the army organization already under way. His condition was that since there were only two years left until his retirement he would remain in the German Army, serving four months a year with the Ottoman Army. Details of his contract and his services are best assessed in: S. Karatamu, *op.cit.*, pp. 144-146. Cf., J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, pp. 95ff. Also see: G.W. Swanson, "War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913: Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission", pp. 367-385 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1975; [Hereafter, G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*]; esp.see pp. 374-375 on the autumn 1909 exercises.
- 110 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 57-64, discusses the amendments in some detail. For the full texts of these constitutional amendments, see: A.Ş. Gözübüyük-S. Kili, *Türk anayasa metinleri, 1839-1980*, pp. 75ff. For an authoritative commentary, see: R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, pp. 285-333.
- 111 İ. Arvaş, *Tarihi hakikatler: İbrahim Arvaş'ın hâtıratı*. Ankara: Yargıçoğlu Matbaası, 1964; p. 13. Also see: R. Nur, *Hayat ve hâtıratım*, Cilt 2, pp. 309-310, on Mahmud Şevket Paşa's "militarism". Cf., the comment of the British Ambassador on his powers, in: *Lowther to Grey*, No.360, Conf., 18 May 1909, F.O. 371/776/19411.
- 112 "Berri ve Bahri Erkân, Ümera ve Zabitanın Takaüdü İçin Rütbe Askeriyelerine Göre Tayin Olunan Sinleri Mübeyyin Kanun", *Düstur*, 2:I, Sa.87, pp. 324-325, 13 Haziran 1325. Also: N. Eralp, "İkinci Meşrutiyet'te silâhlı kuvvetler ile ilgili üç önemli kanun", pp. 118-135 in Dördüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, *Bildiriler*. Ankara: Gnkur. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1989; pp. 124-125. Further: "Turquie", *Revue militaire des armées étrangères*, 77:1000 (mars) 1911, pp. 250-251.
- 113 For example, the Law authorized the age limit for second-lieutenants, lieutenants, captains and majors as 41, 41, 46 and 52 respectively. According to the *Military Yearbook (Salnâme-i Askeriye)* for 1908 (1324), among the *alaylı* officers there were 58-year-old second-lieutenants, 62-year-old lieutenants, 65-year-old captains and 80-year-old majors. In comparison, for the same year, the *mektepli* officers were considerably younger, the oldest age for second-lieutenants being 31, for lieutenants and captains 42 and for majors 59 years. Information is drawn from: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, esp.p.187, p. 189 and p. 354. According to this source, 7,500 *alaylı* officers

- were forced to retire in accordance with the Law: *ibid.*, p. 189. Also: N. Eralp, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'te silahlı kuvvetler ile ilgili üç önemli kanun*, p. 125.
- 114 *Tasfiye-i Rüteb-i Askeriye . . . Kanunıyesı, Düstur*, 2:I, Sa.114, pp. 421-427, 25 Temmuz 1325. For further details, see: N. Eralp, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'te silahlı kuvvetler ile ilgili üç önemli kanun*, pp. 123-124 and p. 131. The political significance of this Law is, I think, well attested in a popular but unusually informative work: S. Akşin, *Yüz soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980; p. 147.
- 115 One effect of the application of these two Laws may be observed in the following. On the basis of the effective force in December 1908, there were 26,310 serving officers in the Army, excluding the Navy and Gendarmerie, whereas in January 1911 this figure had been decreased by 10,189, leaving 16,121 serving officers in the Ottoman Army. Figures are calculated by: S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 189.
- 116 *Osmanlı Ordusu . . . İzin Nizamnâmesi . . .*, B.V.A., Hazine Evrak, Sa.121, *İrade-i Seniyye*, 24 Haziran 1325. Also: S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 331-335.
- 117 *Askeri Tekaüd ve İsti'fa Kanunu* (11 Ağustos 1325), in: N. Eralp, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'te silahlı kuvvetler ile ilgili üç önemli kanun*, p. 126. Also, for an informed view of the Law, see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 342-346.
- 118 S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 345. Also: *Siyah kitap: Türkiye Eski Muharipler Cemiyeti yayınları*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1963; pp. 3ff.
- 119 This assessment of the salary increases and fringe benefits is based on the information in: Hakkı, Piyade Kolağası, *Osmanlı ordusu ahvâl ve tensikât-ı askeriyesi*. [İstanbul]: Mekteb-i Funûn-u Harbiye Matbaası, 1325; pp. 90ff.; and S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 346-350.
- 120 All the names, specializations and locations of military educational institutions between the years 1908 and 1919 are found in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 388-391; and N. Çakın-N. Orhon, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/5, Ek.29, "1908'den sonra askeri okullar".
- 121 B.V.A., Hazine Evrak, Sa.12, *İrade-i Seniyye*, 7 Temmuz 1325.
- 122 In fact, the name Staff College (*Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi*) was given for the first time on 17 August 1909, and it moved to its separate premises at Yıldız in İstanbul on 24 October 1909. M.M. İşkora, *Harp Akademileri tarihçesi*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1966-1968. 2 cilt. Cilt I (2. baskı), p. 45 and pp. 47-57; see "Internal Regulations", Regulation 2, p. 47.
- 123 Here, it may be of some interest to note that although Artillery Staff-Major Vehip Bey proved extremely efficient in the running of the College, he was sacked, on 12 August 1912, just as the Committee was being formally ousted from power with the formation of the Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa Government (22 July-29 October 1912). His close affiliation with the Committee and with the Unionists in general was, according to a very reliable source, the main reason for his dismissal. However, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed to the Artillery Command of the İskodra Fortress. S. Karatamu, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 419-421, also assesses the achievements of Major Vehip Bey at the Infantry and Cavalry War College. Before he took up his appointment as its Commandant in August 1909, Vehip Bey was the Superintendent of Studies (*Ders Nâzırı*) at the Manastır War College. Indeed, he became one of the most reputed serving officers of the army, especially after delivering a speech in Manastır on 23 July 1908, proclaiming the Constitution. The text of this speech, which came to be known as the Manastır Speech (*Manastır Nutku*), is found in: Ahmed Refik, *İnkilâb-ı azîm*:

- 10 Temmuz 1324. [İstanbul]: Asır Matbaası, 1324; pp. 84–86. Also reproduced in full in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler*, pp. 141–142. A full, though perhaps somewhat biased, appreciation of the career and personality of Vehip Bey, in view of the events touched in above, is given in: A. Tugay, *İbret*, Cilt 2, pp. 225–244. Also see the less than favourable comment of: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 155.
- 124 The minutes of the proceedings, containing the speech, are found in: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, pp. 9598–9599. Also in: *Tanin*, 15 Ağustos 1325.
- 125 28 December 1909. See: İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 381.
F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 65–67, discusses the pressure by the Committee for his resignation somewhat reservedly. However, reliable sources, such as: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, I, pp. 318ff.; R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, p. 336; M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1672–1674; and H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*, pp. 152–161; support the assertion.
Cf., *Lowther to Grey*, No.8, Conf., Constantinople, 1 January 1910, *F.O.* 371/1000/928, for a contemporary, foreign interpretation.
For a critical assessment, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 59–65.
- 126 İbrahim Hakkı Bey was Ambassador to Italy. He received the civil rank of Paşa when he was appointed Grand Vezir on 12 January 1910. The formation of his Cabinet, and especially the inclusion of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, as well as the *hatt-ı hümayun* dated 30 Zülhicce 1327 [30 Kanun-u evvel 1325] authorizing his appointment, are found in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1766ff.; and “İBRAHİM HAKKI PAŞA”, Cilt V, p. 892 in *İslâm ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940–1986. 13 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.A.]. Also: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 68. A most impressive assessment of Hakkı Paşa is found in: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*, pp. 169–172.
- 127 Cf. Swanson’s comments on the
“... series of unexpected events [which] pushed Şevket into the foreground of military and political affairs and permitted him to exert his influence on the army’s modernization program.”
G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 374.
Also see his *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire: a study of war and revolution during the Young Turk period*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1970. [Hereafter, G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*]; pp. 91–127.
For a perceptive contemporary account, see: A. Chéradame, “The new Turkish army and the balance of power in Europe”, *The quarterly review*, 214:427 (April) 1911, pp. 454–472.
- 128 Cf. in this connection the comments of Count Léon Ostrorog, who worked as Judicial Adviser to the Ottoman Ministry of Justice between 1909 and 1911.
“This was the conviction that civilians were not conversant with politics at all, that the diplomatic and legal hair splitting of these frock-coated gentlemen missed fire, that an officer’s simple military common sense is more clear-sighted, and that henceforth not liberty merely, but politics, diplomacy, everything ought to rest in the shadow of swords; that the swords alone count.”
L. Ostrorog, *The Turkish problem: things seen and a few deductions*. (Trans.) W. Stephens. London: Chatto and Windus, 1919; p. 83.

- 129 The background source, using mainly materials in Turkish and Armenian, is: E. Uras, *The Armenians in history and the Armenian question*. (English translation of the revised and expanded second edition). İstanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988; pp. 810-829. In addition, the memoirs of the then *Mutasarrıf* of Cebel-i Bereket *Sancak* (now Dört Yol), of the *Vilayet* of Adana, Mehmed Asaf (Belge) Bey: Mehmed Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni olayları ve anıları*. (Yayına hazırlayan) I. Parmaksızoğlu. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.47. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1982; together with S.R. Sonyel, *The Turco-Armenian 'Adana Incidents' in the light of secret British documents (July, 1908-December, 1909)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988.
- A careful analysis may be found in: F. Ahmad, "Unionist relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire", Vol.1, pp. 401-436 in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the functioning of a plural society*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982. 2 vols.
- 130 This assessment of the nature of the revolts and the Government's policy towards them is based on the information given in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, I, pp. 318ff.; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarp ve Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar. Kısım 1: 1911 başından Balkan Savaşına kadar. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.13. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1943; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1]; pp. 34-54.
- Some specific works are: K.N. Duru, *Arnavutluk ve Makedonya hâtıralarım*. İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1959; E. b. V[lor], *Die Wahrheit über das Vorgehen der Jungtürken in Albanien*. Wien: K.u.k.Hofbuchdruckerei Carl Fromme, 1911; İ.S. Sırma, *Osmanlı devleti'nin yıkılışında Yemen isyanları*. İstanbul: Düşünce Yayınları, 1980; and, particularly for its use of British sources: J. Baldry, "Imam Yahyâ and the Yamanî uprising of 1911", *Annali del Istituto Orientale di Napoli*, 42:3, 1982, pp. 425-459. See, for detailed expositions by two of the Empire's experts on Arabia in general and Yemen in particular, one civilian and one military: M.T. Biren, *Mehmed Tevfik Bey'in hatıraları*, Cilt 1, pp. 265-369; and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 26-40 and pp. 84-107.
- 131 For example, according to one study:
- "The Chamber [of Deputies, which was elected in November and December 1908] had a total of 275 deputies of whom 142 were Turks, 60 Arabs, 25 Albanians, 23 Greeks, 12 Armenians, 5 Jews, 4 Bulgarians, 3 Servians, and 1 Vlah."
- K.H. Karpat, "The memoirs of N. Batzaria: the Young Turks and nationalism", *International journal of Middle East studies*, 6:3 (July) 1975, pp. 276-299, pp. 279-280.
- Also see: R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, p. 268, N.7. Cf., F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 28. Further: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 167-168 and p. 172; and F. Ahmad-D.A. Rustow, *İkinci Meşrutiyet döneminde meclisler: 1908-1918*, pp. 246-248. In addition, see the thoughts of Halid Ziya Bey: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*, pp. 148-149.
- 132 Lieutenant-General Belen quotes extensively from the unpublished memoirs, in his possession, of his close friend, Selâhaddin Bey, regarding their War College days in İstanbul during 1910. A Turkish officer-cadet's antagonism towards other *millets*, despite the bonds of common religion and official Ottomanism, emphasises the realism which was, in fact, to emerge after the disastrous effects of the Balkan War.

"At the War College, the Arab and Albanian officer-cadets, with an impertinence increasing day by day, were singing and reciting poetry in Arabic and Albanian."

F. Belen, *Tarih ışığında devrimlerimiz*. İstanbul: Menteş Kitabevi, 1970; p. 174. To an American diplomat, on the other hand, it appeared that

"A newly found Turanianism filled the younger soldiers with a new pride . . . It became a fashion particularly among army men to study Tchagatai . . ."

L. Einstein, *A diplomat looks back*. (Ed.) L.E. Gelfand. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; p. 70. Cf.,

"The greater freedom to speak and act after 1908, and the policy of the Young Turks, encouraged the growth of Arab nationalism, but also that of other nationalisms . . ."

A. Hourani, *Arabic thought in the liberal age: 1798–1939*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970; p. 285; and, in this connection, the brief but, in my opinion, one of the most perceptive comments in the growth of the Arab nationalist movement: E. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*. 2nd ed. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978; esp. pp. 59–60.

- 133 Details of the Government's policies towards Albania are found in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, I, pp. 318ff. Cf., S. Skendi, *The Albanian national awakening, 1878–1912*, p. 389 and pp. 391–406; and J. Swire, *Albania: the rise of a kingdom*. London: Williams and Norgate, 1929; pp. 92ff. Also: İ.H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947–1972. 5 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*], Cilt 4, p. 382; and C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, pp. 9636ff.

An Ottoman official's personal and perceptive view of the causes of the Albanian events is found in his memoirs: T. Uzer, *Makedonya eşkiyalık tarihi ve son Osmanlı yönetimi*. Türk Tarihi Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.25. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1979; pp. 97–102. The Unionists' "mistakes" in their Albanian policies are acknowledged by: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 672–678. Cf., the comments of two foreign observers: E. Jäckh, *Im türkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien: Bekenntnisse zur deutsch-türkischen Freundschaft*. Heilbronn: Verlag von Eugen Salzer, 1911; esp. pp. 202–216; and L. v. Chlumecky, "Die Jungtürken und Albanien", *Österreichische Rundschau*, XXVI (Januar-März) 1911, pp. 268–274.

- 134 The minutes of the Debate are reproduced in full, with comments, in: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, pp. 9643–9653. The following quotations are taken verbatim.
- 135 For the Grand Vezir's speech, see: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, pp. 9655–9656.
- 136 The closure is mentioned in a despatch from the British Vice-Consul, Geary, to the Ambassador, Lowther: Geary to Lowther, Manastır, 2 June 1910, enclosed in: Lowther to Grey, No.366, Conf., Constantinople, 7 June 1910, F.O. 371/1010/20903.
- 137 Details in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 294–302; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 234–246.
- 138 Further elaboration on this point, as applied to the political parties of the post-1908 period, is found in: F.H. Tökin, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler ve siyasî düşüncenin gelişmesi (1839–1965)*. İstanbul: Elif Yayınları, 1965; esp. pp. 42–52. Cf., A.T. Payaşoğlu, "Political leadership and political parties: B.

- Turkey", pp. 411–433 in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), *Political modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; p. 432.
- 139 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, I, p. 322. Cf., S. Borak, *İktidar koltuğundan idam sehpasına: yakın tarihimizdeki siyasi cinayetler ve idamlar*, see "Ahmet Samim", pp. 86–96; and also F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 82.

- 140 Quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 71. (Ahmad's translation). Cf.,

"The Minister of War had but one idea, to form a strong army, with the conviction that, with a strong army, all other matters would settle themselves. Where the money was to come from, he frequently said himself, was no concern of his."

Lowther to Grey, Conf., Constantinople, 14 February 1911, Turkey: Annual Report: 1910, F.O. 424/520; p. 22.

Cf., Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 109–110. And the incompatible attitudes of Mahmud Şevket Paşa and other members of the Cabinet regarding the financing of the Ottoman military, are discussed in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, esp. pp. 82–84.

- 141 See: *Lowther to Grey*, No.434, Very Conf., Therapia, 27 June 1910, F.O. 371/993/23954: ". . . he [Cavid] seems quite powerless in the hands of the military". Cf.,

"Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, strongly protested against these encroachments upon his domain, but he was not supported either by the majority in the Chamber or by the other Ministers . . ."

Annual Register, 1910, pp. 338.

Reliable figures for the Public Debts, allocation of financial resources to the military and the military budget figures, are found in: İ.H. Yeniay, *Yeni Osmanlı borçları tarihi*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları:1074. İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1964; and, for the years 1860–1912: J McCarthy, *The Arab world, Turkey and the Balkans (1878–1914): handbook of historical statistics*. Boston (Mass.): G.K. Hall, 1982; pp. 180–187 and pp. 194–201. Also, in particular, "Harbiye Nezaretinin 1326–1327–1328 Seneleri Fevkalâde Bütçesi Hakkında Kanun", *Düstur*, 2: II, Sa.138, pp. 620–622, 20 Haziran 1326.

- 142 The assertion was made some ten years later by no less than the Chief of the General Staff, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, in his: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 95.

- 143 Quoted in: C. Kutay, "Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası", Cilt 1, pp. 136–263 in C. Kutay, *Örtülü tarihimiz*. İstanbul: Hilâl Matbaası, 1975. 2 cilt; p. 262.

". . .

Başka nazır oldu mu 'vay vay' denir, lâkin O'nun
Fikrinin 'hay hay' deyü başlarlar ihtisanına!
Etse arzu Meclisi yüz kerreler açar kapar
Ser kumandan-ı hükûmet denmeli ünvanına!"

For a personal comment, see: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 127–129.

- 144 R. Nur, *Cemiyet-i hafiye*. [İstanbul]: Selânik Matbaası, 1330; pp. 186–189; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler*, pp. 287–288 and pp. 195–196; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 131–133. Also: *Tanin*, 7 Temmuz 1326. The heated debates in the Chamber relating to Dr. Rıza Nur's detention are reproduced and discussed in: N. Ölçen, *Osmanlı Meclisi Meb'usanında kuvvetler ayrımı ve siyasal iskenceler*, pp. 97–118. For an account of the *Cemiyet-i Hafiye* by an insider, see: Şerif Paşa, *Bir muhalifin hatıraları: İttihat ve Terakkiye muhalefet*, pp. 66–73.
- 145 Tyrell to Lowther, Constantinople, 21 July 1910, in: *Lowther to Grey*, No.507, Conf., Constantinople, 25 July 1910, F.O. 371/1010/27811. Also quoted in:

F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 83. See: R. Nur, *Cemiyet-i hafiye*, pp. 225–242, for the acquittals. Cf., *Lowther to Grey*, No.773, Conf., Constantinople, 25 October 1910, F.O. 371/1010/39486.

- 146 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasî partiler*, pp. 186–188; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 100–103; C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, p. 413; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 55. Also: Mehmed Selâhaddin, *Bildiklerim*. Kahire: Matbaa-i Hindiye, 1334; pp. 153–154; and, more recently, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 215–218.

- 147 Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1340. 2 cilt. Cilt I, pp. 141–142. On Sadık Bey’s motives, see: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 129–132. For a different interpretation, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 55–56. Cf., S. Akşin, *Yüz soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, pp. 183–185.

To the then “legal dragoman” of the British Embassy, it seemed that:

“Opposition to the Committee was growing, and a certain Colonel Sadik Bey’s name was in everybody’s mouth.”

And he adds, “But he disappeared”.

T. Waugh, *Turkey yesterday, to-day and to-morrow*. London: Chapman and Hall’s, 1930; p. 132.

The relatively moderate Halil Bey replaced the Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, who took Halil Bey’s place as President of the Parliamentary Party. The main concession given by the civilians was the endorsement of a ten-point demand (*mevadd-i aşerre*) by the Unionists, which was subsequently published on 23 April 1911. H. Menteşe, *op.cit.*, p. 22 and pp. 132ff.; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasî partiler*, p. 186; and C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, pp. 421–426. Also: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 220; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 88.

- 148 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 252; and Z.Ş. Soko, *Mahmut Şevket Paşa*, pp. 83–85. Cf., H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p. 134.

For the revolt in the Yemen, the military and political role played by the Chief of the General Staff in its suppression and the subsequent agreement with its leader, İmam Yahya, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 45–47.

For the account of a staff-officer, Adjutant-Major İsmet Bey, attached to the command of the Yemen General Forces (*Yemen Kuvayı Umumiyesi*, also known as *Yemen Kuvayı Mürettebesi*), see: İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*, pp. 90–103. Also: Ş.S. Aydemir, *İkinci adam: İsmet İnönü*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966–1968. 3 cilt. Cilt 1, pp. 68–76.

Cf., Ahmed İzzet Paşa’s own account, with its intimation of personal pressure being exerted by Mahmud Şevket Paşa, in his “curriculum vitae”, written at the request of İnal, reproduced in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*, pp. 1973–1993, pp. 1976–1977. Reproduced in a more circumspect manner in: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, esp. pp. 83–85. For details of the Yemen question, see *ibid.*, pp. 87–107.

- 149 As the British Ambassador had noted, this

“... prolongation of the state of siege in the capital [was] in virtue of a Ministerial decree, sanctioned by Imperial irade, but without the official imprimatur of the Chamber of Deputies”.

Lowther to Grey, No.171, Conf., Pera, 15 March 1911, F.O. 371/1246/10018. Also see: *Lowther to Grey*, No.181, Conf., Pera, 22 March 1911, F.O. 371/1246/11078. For a general commentary, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 267–270.

- 150 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 56–57. Also, the perceptive comments

of Tunaya, on the basis of parliamentary proceedings: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 266–267. Cf., some foreign observations: *Lowther to Grey*, No.614, Conf., Constantinople, 30 August 1911, *F.O.* 371/1244/34689; and *Lowther to Grey*, Conf., Constantinople, 31 January 1912, Turkey: Annual Report, 1911, *F.O.* 424/250.

- 151 E. Bourgeois, *Manuel historique de politique étrangère*. Paris: Librairie Classique Eugène Belin, 1892–1949. 4 tomes. Tome IV, (4e éd.); p. 564. Cf., Mahmoud Moukhtar Pacha, *La Turquie, l'Allemagne et l'Europe: depuis la Traité de Berlin jusqu'à la guerre*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924; pp. 115–135. Also cf. the comments of Giolitti, the then Prime Minister of Italy:

"[The Young Turks] . . . excited the political and fanatical feelings of the populations everywhere, turning them especially against those powers which they believed might give trouble in various zones of their empire. Naturally enough, the power suspected in Libya was Italy. For some years past, the Banca di Roma had established considerable interests in Cyrenaica and Tripoli which it was the duty of the Italian Government to safeguard . . . The existing state of things could not last and, given the attitude of the Young Turks, if we had not gone to Libya, some other power would have done so either for political or economic reasons."

G. Giolitti, *Memoirs of my life*. (Trans.) E. Storer. London: Chapman and Dodd, 1923; p. 251 and p. 254; and his remarks, along the same lines, to the French *Chargé d'Affaires*, reported by the British Ambassador at Rome: *Rodd to Grey*, Tel.No.65, Posilipo, 27 September 1911, *B.D.*, Vol.IX, Part 1 [Hereafter, IX/1], No.241, pp. 278–279.

Further, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 71–81; R. Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and nationalism: the Ottoman involvement in Libya during the war with Italy (1911–1919)*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987; pp. 47ff. and pp. 76ff; and T.W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911–1912*. Leiden: Brill, 1990; pp. 29–59.

- 152 The document is quoted in part in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 88–89. Cf., *Lowther to Grey*, Tel.No.211, Constantinople, 25 September 1911, *B.D.*, IX/1, No.237, pp. 276–277. Further: *Marschall an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.220, Therapie, 25 September 1911, *G.P.*, 30.Band Erste Hälfte [Hereafter, 30.Band/1], Nr.10832, pp. 52–53. Also: R. Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and nationalism*, pp. 58–59. Cf., T.W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911–1912*, pp. 62–65.
- 153 The final Italian ultimatum was delivered on 28 September 1911. The then Acting-Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy, Andrew Ryan, noted his impressions in a letter of 5 October 1911:

" . . . Events have moved very rapidly here since I last wrote. On Thursday last the Italians presented the Porte with an ultimatum announcing their intention of occupying Tripoli and asking for an assurance within twenty-four hours that the Turks would not oppose them. Next day, having got an answer a good deal short of what they asked for, they declared war. It was a most scandalous proceeding from a legal point of view. They had not even the decency to work up a strong case for attacking the Turks in order to cloak their transparent greed. The pity of it is that the Young Turks, who have richly deserved a lesson for their arrogant and provocative attitude towards all foreigners during the last two years, should now be given a good reason to regard themselves as the victims of a wanton spoliation."

A. Ryan, *The last of the dragomans*, p. 73.

The text of this ultimatum, the reply of the Porte to Italy and the latter's rejection of it and subsequent declaration of war, are found in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 93-98; and the documents in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, Belge Sa.49, pp. 644-648. Further: R. Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and nationalism*, pp. 59-64; and T.W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911-1912* pp. 66-70.

As for the very revealing reactions of the deputies in Parliament, see: Ş. Turan, *II. Meşrutîyet dönemi parlamentosu ve dış politika*, pp. 229-238. Also see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 92-94, and British and German documents cited therein, p. 92, N.1. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 384-386.

- 154 *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, dated 7 Şevval 1329 [17 Eylül 1327] (30 September 1911), appointing Said Paşa as Grand Vezir, reproduced in full in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzamlar*, p. 1083; and also *ibid.*, pp. 1083-1086 and pp. 1776-1777, for the account of the Minister of Justice and President of the Council of State, Necmeddin Molla, which provides a fitting background. Further: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*, pp. 284-286; İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 386; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 94. Also: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 140-142.

Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 109, suggests that pressure was exerted by the Committee for the appointment of Said Paşa through the mediation of İbrahim Hakkı Paşa. Cf., *Marschall an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.283, Therapie, 8 Oktober 1911, G.P., 30.Band/1, Nr.10877, p. 97. In addition: Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, p. 24; and M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 5, pp. 213-240, who sets out a range of existing accounts, often verbatim. For an eye-witness account by Halid Ziya Bey of the turmoil surrounding İbrahim Hakkı Paşa's resignation: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *op.cit.*, pp. 274-283.

- 155 The document is reproduced in part in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p.231.
- 156 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 231-232, reproduces in full the answer of the Said Paşa Government. Cf. my difference of opinion and interpretation, in view of that answer, with Bayur, *ibid.*, p. 231.
- 157 On the convening of Parliament and the vote of confidence, see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 98. For the effect of the initial Italian operations and general accounts of the war, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 99-133; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 384-386. Cf., G. Giolitti, *Memoirs of my life*, pp. 279ff.; W.C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912*. Durham (North Carolina): Duke University Press, 1942; pp. 83ff.; and T.W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911-1912*, pp. 74-75.
- 158 For the composition and strength of the vanguard Italian expeditionary force, numbering some 36,000 men, see: G. Giolitti, *Memoirs of my life*, pp. 271-272. Against this, the defending Ottoman forces in Libya at the time of the invasion consisted of about 4,000 ill-equipped men. For details, see: C. Erikan, *Komutan Atatürk*, pp. 97ff.; and H. Ertuna, *1911-1912 Osmanlı-İtalyan Harbi ve Kolağası Mustafa Kemal*. Ankara: T.C. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, 1984; pp. 39-44. Cf.,

"The Turkish garrison troops in the principal points of Tripoli and Cyrenaica did not amount to more than three or four thousand."

G. Giolitti, *op.cit.*, p. 270; and R. Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and nationalism*, pp. 33-40. Further, the "military errors" of the İbrahim Hakkı

Paşa Government, exposed by an Ottoman parliamentary enquiry, are outlined in: *ibid.*, pp. 82–86.

- 159 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 102. And cf. the admission of Necmeddin Molla in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1086. Cf. also the comments of Tevfik Paşa, Ottoman Ambassador to Britain, to Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office:

"If the Turkish Gov[ernment] could save appearances by some recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty and perhaps certain compensations Tewfik Pasha thought that his Gov[ernment] would be ready to negotiate on such bases with Italy. Suzerainty he said was merely a phrase and would not in any way restrict the liberty of action of Italy in Tripoli".

In "Minutes by Sir A. Nicolson and Sir Edward Grey", Foreign Office, 16 October 1911, *B.D.*, IX/1, No.287, pp. 310–311, p. 310. This document should be read within the context of a paper by C.J. Lowe, "Grey and the Tripoli War, 1911–1912", pp. 315–323 in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), *British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; esp. pp. 318ff. Also see, in view of Bayur's comments: T.W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911–1912*, pp. 77–81. Cf., the appraisal of Ottoman, and especially Young Turkish, relations with France, Germany and Russia during this time: S. Kocabaş, *Kendi itirafları Jön Türkler nerede yarıldı?*, pp. 384–404.

- 160 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve milli mücadele*, pp. 546–547, where he also gives the names of other ex-officer-cadets like himself. All were discharged from the War College of İstanbul and exiled, allegedly for their instigation of the 31 March Incident, according to the decision of a Court Martial following it. Yet they served in the guerrilla war against Italy. A list of volunteers of various junior ranks is provided in: Salahattin Âdil, *Hayat mücadeleleri*. İstanbul: Zafer Matbaası, 1982; pp. 122–124. Cf. the memoirs of one of the commanders of the *Urban* (Bedouin), Eşref Sencer (Kuşçubaşı) Bey, edited, with comments, by: C. Kutay, *Trablusgarb'da bir avuç kahraman*. İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1963; esp. pp. 86–97. Nevertheless, misconstruction of officers' motives for volunteering against Italian aggression still persists; see, for example: T. Çavdar, *Talât Paşa: bir örgüt ustasının yaşam öyküsü*. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1984; p. 169. Cf., Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 705–706.

- 161 For example, one of the officers who fought in this war, Mustafa Kemal Bey, recalled his motives in a speech, nine years later (25 November 1920), as the President of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, during a reception in honour of Şeyh Sunusî (Ahmed ibn-i Seyyid Muhammed eş-Şerif es-Sunusî) of Libya:

"I was then in İstanbul by chance. I had, as the result of a few days' enquiry, understood that our forces commissioned to defend Africa were too few. And I had also understood very well that the weakness of the state in various other places prevented it from sending sufficient forces to save Ottoman Africa . . . Through the knowledge of these bitter realities my heart too, like my friends', was beating with despair and sorrow. Under the influence of these feelings, because there was no other course or means, I departed from İstanbul."

C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, pp. 491–494, where the text of the speech appears on p. 491. The speech was made on 25 November 1920, not on 15 November as indicated there. See: U. Kocatürk (hazırlayan), *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi kronolojisi, 1918–1938*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları,

XVI.Seri-Sa.49. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1983; p. 215.

Mustafa Kemal Bey revealed his motives on a more personal level in a letter written at the time (8/9 May 1912) to one of his close friends, Salih (Bozok) Bey. The document is reproduced in full in: S. Borak, *Öyküleriyle Atatürk'ün özel mektupları*. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1980; pp. 28-29. As far as I have been able to verify, Staff-Adjutant-Major (later Major) Mustafa Kemal Bey, alias reporter Mustafa Şerif Bey of *Tanin*, left İstanbul on 15 October 1911, reached Bingazi (Benghazi) via Egypt on 8 December 1911 and, on 1 January 1912, assumed command of the eastern Derne (Derna) front. On 5 March, he became Commander of the whole Derna front and remained so until he left on 24 October 1912. (He had been promoted to Major on 30 November 1911.) See: S. Borak, *Ata ve İstanbul*. İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Yayınları, 1983; p. 37 and p. 157. Also see the documents reproduced in: H. Şıvgın, "Mustafa Kemal'in ilk savaşı", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi dergisi*, IV:10 (Kasım) 1987, pp. 187-195.

Among other prominent officers fighting at the same time or at another, mention may be made, for example, of Staff-Colonel Neşet Bey (later Brigadier-General Neşet Paşa), C.O. Trablusgarb Forces; Staff-Major Enver Bey (later Lieutenant-Colonel), who took over general command of the Bingazi front from Brigadier-General İbrahim Paşa; the Tobruk front Commander, Brigadier-General Edhem Paşa; Lieutenant-Colonel Halil (Kut) Bey; Staff-Majors Aziz Ali (al-Misri), Mehmed Nuri (Conker), Ali Fethi and Fuad (Bulca) Beys; Staff-Captain Mümtaz and Captain Ali (Çetinkaya) Efendis. Enver Bey, too, expressed his motives, in a letter written on 8 October 1911 to a German woman friend just before he left İstanbul for Trablusgarb, via Egypt:

"Ces italiens nous ont mis dans un état abominable, honteux, et je veux, moi, cet homme si faible, je veux, moi-même essayer d'effacer cette tache sur notre honneur et notre amour-propre . . . Personne ne sait où je pars. Je veux me faire entendre de la Tripolitaine. Je ferai tout ce que je vous avais écrit. Si même le Gouvernement cède, je resterai ferme jusqu'à ce que mon sang lave cette tache honteuse."

M.Ş. Hanioglu (yayına hazırlayan), *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989; pp. 78-79 and also pp. 190-191.

To a British journalist who had been in Trablusgarb since September 1911, one officer, Staff-Major Ali Fethi Bey, stood out as ". . . a quiet, pensive man, a politician, with the most charming manners . . .". He then adds that "Fethi Bey"

" . . . was until recently military attaché at Paris . . . [but that a]t the call of his country he cheerfully sacrificed the delights and comforts of the French capital for the hard stern life of the field."

H.C. Seppings Wright, *Two years under the crescent*. London: James Nisbet, 1913; pp. 5-144, p. 59.

As for Ali Fethi Bey's own account, see: F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bur adam*, pp. 133-137. Additional information on the Ottoman officers in Libya is found in: R. Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and nationalism*, pp. 111-150; G. Remond, *Aux camps turco-arabes: notes de route et de la guerre en Tripolitaine et en Cyrenaïque*. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1913; and E.N. Bennett, *With the Turks in Tripoli: being some experiences in the Turco-Italian War of 1911*. London: Methuen, 1912; for example, pp. 81ff. on "Nesciat Bey" (Neşet Paşa) and pp. 123-124 on Enver Bey. Also: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971-1972. 3 cilt. Esp.

Cilt II, pp. 218–240. And, for Enver Bey's own view, as expressed in his letters: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 79–211.

- 162 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 315–344; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 263–312. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p.234; F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 99; and T.Z. Tunaya, *op.cit.*, Cilt 3, pp. 452–455. For a most revealing source, see: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 145–146. For an extended study of the Liberal Union, see: A. Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası: II. Meşrutiyet devrinde İttihat ve Terakki'ye karşı çıkanlar*. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1990.

By way of example of the range of opposition, the profiles of two of its less principled figures are provided in: E. Tauber, "Sayyid Talib and the Young Turks in Basra". *Middle Eastern studies*, 25:1 (January) 1989, pp. 3–22; and T. Timur, "Bir İttihatçı düşmanı: Şerif Paşa ve Meşrutiyet gazetesi", *Tarih ve toplum*, 12:72 (Aralık) 1989, pp. 17–20.

- 163 Note, in this connection, that:

"By and large, a survey of the writings of the great majority of the Young Turks yields the same result: the good life is that of the brotherly, tight, cohesive community led by a fatherly Sultan . . . even more sophisticated Young Turks' thoughts did not leave the village of Ottoman society."

Ş.A. Mardin, *Continuity and change in the ideas of the Young Turks*. Ankara: Yenişehir Matbaası, 1969.

The point is also emphasised in: Ş. Mardin, "A note on the transformation of religious symbols in Turkey", *Turcica*, XVI, 1984, pp. 115–127, pp. 121–122.

- 164 A prominent civilian "Young Turk", Ahmed Rıza Bey, wrote a treatise in 1907 in which he made this point most succinctly:

"In a place where a fortune-telling, snake-charming şeyh is involved in the important affairs of the state, to deprive the motherland of the knowledge and competence of the honourable and zealous officers was an unforgivable mistake."

Ahmed Rıza, *Asker*. Kahire: [n.pub.], 1323; p. 48. Quoted, with further comments, in: Ş.A. Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasî fikirleri (1895–1908)*, p. 158.

- 165 Cf., in April 1914, Mehmed Nuri Bey, then a staff-major, in a book compiled from the conferences given by himself to the commanders and officers of the 1st Division during the winter term of 1913, was to maintain that:

"The Turkish nation [Türk milleti] today, more than ever before, is in need of protecting and guarding [. . . himaye ve muhafazaya muhtaçtır]. The procuring of the conditions of her life and the conditions of [her] existence [was], in the first place, entrusted to us, the soldiers [Esbâb-ı hayatiye ve bekây-ı mevcudiyetinin temini evvelâ bize, askerlere havale edilmiştir]."

Mehmed Nuri, *Birinci Fırka Erkân-ı Harbi Binbaşı: zabıt ve kumandan*. İstanbul: Tanin Matbaası, 1330. Reprinted as: *Zabıt ve kumandan: Nuri Conker*. Ankara: Doğuşt Ltd. Şirketi Matbaası, 1959; p. 24.

- 166 Cf.,

"The appointment of the Foreign Minister Rifat Paşa as ambassador to London left a vacant seat in İstanbul. In the resulting by-election, there were two candidates; the Minister of the Interior, Memduh Bey, for the Unionists, and the Liberal journalist, Tahir Hayreddin, for the Liberal Union. The liberal candidate was elected by a majority of a single vote of the electoral college."

B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 221.

Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, p. 322; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 271–272. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p.236; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 99–100.

- 167 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 100.

Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, p. 164.

- 168 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 237 and *passim*.

Further: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 5, pp. 240ff., on the basis of contemporary accounts.

“According to Article 35, in the case of a dispute between the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, if the Council of Ministers insisted on its own point of view regarding a certain matter and the Parliament refused to accept this, repeatedly, then the Sultan had the right to either change the Council of Ministers or dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections . . . The Union and Progress Party, under the impact of the fate of the first Parliament, insisted on the amendment of this Article with the purpose of making the dissolution of the Parliament a more difficult process. According to the amended form of Article 35, if the point of view of the Council of Ministers were to be refused repeatedly by the Parliament, then the Council of Ministers would resign. If the new Council of Ministers still insisted on the same point of view, then the Sultan would dissolve the Parliament after having received the approval of the Senate. As long as the Union and Progress Party commanded the majority of votes in the Parliament, it was in favour of this system. But when the opposition to the policies of the Union and Progress Party increased in the Parliament, this Party wanted to go back to the 1876 system of dissolution . . .”

S. Kili, *Turkish constitutional developments and Assembly debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961*. İstanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1971; pp. 161–17. Also see: R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, pp. 340ff. and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 372–383.

- 169 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 101.

Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 323–329; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 272–278.

- 170 M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzamlar*, pp. 1086–1087, where the *hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 10 Muharram 1330 [18 Kanun-u evvel 1327] (1 January 1912), authorizing the appointment, is reproduced in full. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 240–241; İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 386–387; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 102. Further accounts in: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 5, pp. 270ff.

- 171 The matter was concluded on 13 January 1912, and proved, on the other hand, an indication of the melting majority of the Unionists. There were, in fact, 125 votes for and 105 against the Bill, with four abstentions. Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 242. Also see: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 554, on the success of obstruction, from a Liberal account. Further, see: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 5, pp. 281–293, for the verbatim comments of Şeyhülislâm Cemaleddin Efendi and the jurist, Ahmed Selâhaddin Bey.

- 172 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 242–243; and M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzamlar*, pp. 1087–1088; and R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, pp. 355–356 and N.38, N.39 and N.40. Also cf., *Lowther to Grey*, No.66, Conf., Pera, 24 January 1912, F.O. 371/1487/3939.

- 173 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, p. 475. The author was then the responsible delegate (*murahhas-ı mes'ul*) of the Committee in the *Vilayet* of Hudâvendigâr (Bursa), *ibid.*, p. 474.
- 174 M.A. Aynî, *Hâtıraları*, p. 78. And, praising himself for his efforts during the canvassing for the Unionist success, he claims: "I got Süreyya Bey elected as a Deputy." *ibid.*, p. 78. His claim is also utilized, with comments, in: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 5, pp. 300-301.
- 175 Hürşid Paşa, "Hürşit Paşa'nın 1911-1912 Kabine hâtıraları", *Hayat mecmuası*, 1-11 (1 Ocak-12 Mart) 1964, 3 (15 Ocak) 1964, p. 11.
Cf., an alleged example of interference in favour of the Unionists during the election campaign in Üsküp (Macedonia) by the commanding officer of the area is told in: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 554-555. Corroborative evidence by Ahmed Salâhaddin Bey, among others, appears verbatim in: M.Z. Pâkalın, *Son sadrâzamlar ve başvekiller*, Cilt 5, pp. 304-307 and pp. 307-309.
- 176 On the restrictive legislative measures, see: S.R. İskit, *Türkiye'de matbuat rejimleri*. İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, 1939; pp. 104-109.
Indeed, the use of repressive violence during the campaign was instrumental in the 1912 election being called the "big stick election [*dayaklı seçim*]" in the history of elections. T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyâsî partiler*, pp. 188-189 and p.322; and also R.E. Koçu, "Türkiye'de seçimin tarihi, 1877-1950", *Tarih dünyası*, I:7 (Temmuz) 1950, pp. 299-302. A critical assessment is found in: S. Armağan, "Türkiye'de parlamento seçimleri", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 33:3-4, 1968, pp. 45-95.
A very frank admission, by a member of the opposition, of their mass of contrasts and confusions during the canvassing and their use of religious propaganda as a tool, despite the existence of a diversity of religions and sects in the Empire, is found in the account of: Şehbenderzâde Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Muhalefetin iflâsı*. 2 tab'ı. [İstanbul]: Hikmet Matbaa-i İslâmiyesi, 1331; see esp. pp. 24-26.
- 177 C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, p. 9833.
- 178 For my figures, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyâsal partiler*, Cilt 1, p. 272, N.25; whereas the earlier, generally accepted source was: R.G. Okandan, *Âmme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, p. 357, N.43; who gives the numbers of opposition deputies as six out of 270.
- 179 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 104.
Cf., C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, pp. 481-482. Also: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 27-28.
- 180 B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 222.
- 181 Reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 248.
For the entire proceedings leading to the motion, see: *Meclis-i Meb'usan Zabıt Ceridesi*, [Hereafter, M.M.Z.C.], II.Devre, 1.Sene, 2.İçtima, 21 Nisan 1328. Devre:II, Sene:1, İçtima:1-47. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1328; pp. 7-10. This archive, covering the duration of the second Constitutional period, has recently been published and is therefore also readily accessible as: Turkey, Meclisi Umumi, *Meclisi Umumi zabıt ceridesi, 1908-1920*. [Ankara]: T.B.M.M. Basımevi, 1990-1992.
- 182 See p. 176 and N.165 of this Chapter.
- 183 Further, it should be noted that while other officers who were also involved in the war in North Africa were mentioned as "other figures [*zevat-ı saire*]", those who were prominent or favoured partisans of the Committee and, by extension, the close link between the two, seem deliberately to have been emphasised. Moreover, the recently-promoted Brigadier-General, Neşet Paşa, despite his rank and position as the General Commanding Officer of the forces, was

mentioned only after the lower-ranking officers technically under his command, in a blunt breach of military hierarchy and code of conduct. Consequently, the Committee behaved as though the participation in and honour of the struggle against heavy odds was only identifiable with this (still) political society and its official members. Yet no evidence had been found to substantiate such claims in the case of officers who participated in the war with Italy. A representative example is: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 144–145.

- 184 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 105–106. However, Ahmad's comment should be seen in the light of a "Memorandum Respecting the New Regime in Turkey", Foreign Office, 16 May 1911, *F.O.* 371/1249/19795, esp. pp. 1–13.
- 185 T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler*, pp. 345ff; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 313ff.; and B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 223–224. Also commented upon, for example, by the British Military Attaché: Tyrrell to Lowther, Constantinople, 12 April 1912, enclosed in *Lowther to Grey*, No.371, Conf., Constantinople, 1 May 1912, *F.O.* 371/1486/19065.
- 186 Significantly, the Turkist movement acquired its first official platform with the foundation in İstanbul of *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Society) on 8 January 1908 (25 Kanunuevvel 1324), under the initiative of the noted Turcologist, Akçuraoglu Yusuf (Akçura) Bey. The Society, of which the neologism *Dernek* may be of some interest, pursued, in accordance with its regulations, scholarly and cultural aims and counted among its members Turkish writers and poets, Turkish Turcologists (both Ottoman and Russian), foreign, Turcologists and Ottoman Armenians. In 1911, *Türk Derneği* began to publish its own journal, bearing the same title. In the same year, on 31 August, a second society, *Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti* (Turkish Homeland Society), was established in İstanbul by several Ottoman intellectuals including the poet Mehmed Emin (Yurdakul) Bey, the doctor of medicine Âkil Muhtar (Özden) Bey, and the Turcologists Akçuraoglu Yusuf, Ağaoglu Ahmed (Agayev-Ağaoglu) and Hüseyinzâde Ali (Turan) Beys. Their journal, *Türk yurdu*, edited and published by Akçuraoglu Yusuf Bey, coincided with the disappearance of *Türk derneği* in November 1911 after seven issues and rapidly became the organ of a more systematic and overtly political form of Turkism. The journal acquired great repute, especially after the inclusion on the editorial board, in late 1912, of Gökalp Ziya (Gökalp) Bey (1876–1924), a member of the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress, who was becoming a major theorist of Turkism. However, from our present point of view, the most important establishment was that of *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth), initially conceived and founded on 3 July 1911 (20 Haziran 1327) by cadets of the Military Medical School. In a letter to Akçuraoglu Yusuf Bey, signed as "190 Turkish sons of Tıbbiye [190 Tıbbiyeli Türk evlâdı]", the cadets wanted a society to be founded to pursue a "new wave" towards the "social domination" of the Turks because the Committee and other political organizations, remaining Ottomanist and Islâmist, had not achieved these aims. Thus, the "new wave" must not exist merely as an abstract thought but become a living organism by establishing branches in Anatolia and Rumelia and even in foreign countries inhabited by Turks. Confining itself to national and social ends such a society would not associate itself with partisan politics. To this end, the unofficial student gatherings were followed by a meeting, on 3 July 1911, of two representatives of the cadets, now numbering 231, and seven intellectuals including, notably, Akçuraoglu Yusuf Bey, Mehmed Emin Bey, the poet Emin Bülend (Serdaroğlu) Bey and Ağaoglu Ahmed Bey. It was decided that preparations be made for the formal establishment of a society under the said name, *Türk Ocağı*, the following March (1912). By that time, *Türk Ocağı* had developed, through

Ağaoğlu Yusuf Bey, close links with the journal *Türk yurdu* which was to become its own organ. And another, Selânik-based journal, *Genç kalemler*, to which Gökâlp Ziya Bey was a major contributor, also associated itself with *Türk Ocağı*.

On 25 March 1912 (12 Mart 1328), the manifesto of *Türk Ocağı* was officially presented to the authorities, not by the military cadets but by four (?) civilians, Mehmed Emin, Ağaoğlu Ahmed, Ahmed Ferit (Tek?) and Dr. Fuad Sabit Beys (since, according to the Law of Associations, military personnel were forbidden to do so). Despite its claims, and even the inclusion of an Article (no.4) in its published regulations of 1912 that "the said society in the course of pursuing its aims will remain only national and social . . . and will at no time serve the political parties", it rapidly acquired a party political format, especially during the political convulsions in the Balkans (e.g., Balkan War, 1912–1913) and in the Arab provinces of the Empire (e.g., Arab national movements and societies). Formally, however, first with the admission of Gökâlp Ziya Bey to its Central Administrative Committee and, secondly and more importantly, with the acceptance of the Turkist doctrine by those connected with the Committee of Union and Progress – so that it then provided the Committee with its ideological platform, especially after the Balkan War – the inherently political *Türk Ocağı* became more overtly partisan. It rapidly increased the number of its branches and thus came to be referred to in the plural as *Ocaklar* (Hearths). These provided the main avenue towards the Anatolian Turkish nationalist policies of subsequent years and inspired similar minor associations along the same lines.

For the above assessment I have drawn my information from: Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, "Türkçülük", *Türk yılı*, I, 1928, pp. 289–455 (the whole issue for 1928 edited by himself). This volume comprises the major part of a later book edited by Öner, who also contributed in it a chapter on Akçura. Akçura Yusuf, *Türkçülük*. (Hazırlayan) S. Öner. İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1978.

Also: T.A. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler*, pp. 376–392; and, for additional material, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 414–492. Further, in general: T.Z. Tunaya, *Hürriyetin ilânı: ikinci Meşrutiyetin siyasi hayatına bakışlar*; B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, pp. 349–352; N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 337–427 and *passim*; and a useful presentation of source material, in English: M. Arai, *Turkish nationalism in the Young Turk era*. Leiden: Brill, 1992; pp. 6–82. Also, for the first prominent phase of Turkism in the 1908–1913 period: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 400–409; and H. Tuncer, *Türk yurdu (1911–1931) üzerine bir inceleme*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990; pp. 22–50. Further: Y. Sarımay, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin tarihi gelişimi ve Türk ocakları, 1912–1931*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyatı, 1994; esp. pp. 13–144. Cf., J.M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: a study of irredentism*. London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981; pp. 38–55.

The very literary and readable account by the well-known author and participant in the Turkist movement, Halide Edib (Adivar), on the "Phases and causes of nationalism and pan-Turanism in Turkey", is given in her memoirs: Halide Edib, *Memoirs of Halidé Edib*. London: John Murray, 1926; pp. 312–328. However in her later, Turkish, version this chapter is less clear: H.E.Adivar, *Mor salkımlı ev*. 2nci baskı. İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1967; pp. 148–149.

- 187 Freiherr von der Goltz, *Der Jungen Türkei Niederlage und die Möglichkeit Wiederherstellung*, is still the most reliable source. Also see: B.F. Schulte, *Vor dem Kriegausbruch 1914: Deutschland, die Türkei und der Balkan*. Düsseldorf:

Droste Verlag, 1980; pp. 21ff. For a variety of such motives, based on memoirs, see: A.T. Alkan, *İkinci Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 130–132.

- 188 Cf., one of the most prominent founders and theoreticians of the Liberal Union (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*), Dr. Rıza Nur, expressed this mentality succinctly:

“We wanted to have Colonel Sadık [Rtd.] in our party since he had very many supporters in the military. As the Unionists were always relying upon military force, for the opposition to struggle with them . . . it was necessary and unavoidable that the latter had its partisans. Owing to the behaviour of the Unionists, there was no other way of coming to power.”

R. Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf nasıl doğdu, nasıl öldü?* İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1334; p. 30.

Also, similar comments may be found in his memoirs: R. Nur, *Hayat ve hâtırâtım*, Cilt I, p. 277, and Cilt II, pp. 335–346.

Cf., the comments of Kuran:

“The points of view of the officers [in Üsküb-Skopije] were not inconsistent with the thoughts of the opposition.”

A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p.563.

And for the attempts to attract dissatisfied elements (e.g., the *alaylı* officers), see: Şehbenderzâde Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Muhalefetin iflâsı*, pp. 26–35.

- 189 On the Albanian uprising of 1912 and the counter-measures of the Said Paşa Government, information is found in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 261–272. For a criticism of the Government's measures, see: Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtırât-ı siyâsiye*, pp. 31–32. The full statement of Hacı Âdil Bey relating to these measures is also found in: *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene, 10.İçtima, 23 Mayıs 1328 (5 June 1912), pp. 126–134. Further see: *Grey to Marling*, No.382, Foreign Office, 21 August 1912, *B.D.*, IX/1, No.646, p. 633; and the comments of Cevad Bey, Councillor at the Ottoman Embassy in London, as reported by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary:

“Councillor said that . . . [t]hey intended to extend reforms and were in complete accord with the Powers on the subject but latter would render programme abortive by making representations.”

Grey to Marling, No.599, Foreign Office, 9 September 1912, *B.D.*, IX/1, No.709, pp. 682–683, p. 683.

- 190 According to a sympathetic contemporary, the ringleaders were Captains Tayyar and Mümtaz Efendis and Lieutenants İbrahim, Tahsin, Celâl, Kâsım, Melek Fraşeri, Hamza and Nafiz Efendis (the last two were later arrested and sent to İstanbul). They took to the hills on the night of 21/22 June 1912 and withdrew to what is known as the Tented Headquarters. A.B. Kuran, *İnkilâp tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945; pp. 302–303; and A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 563–564. Cf., R. Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf nasıl doğdu, nasıl öldü?*, p. 36, where Lieutenant Tahsin Efendi's rank is given as Captain.

Evidently, the basically different objectives but superficially similar demands of these two groups were aimed principally at the destruction of the Committee. They were, however, couched in patriotic terms. Hence they asserted that the resignation of the Unionist Cabinet, another general election to bring in a Parliament more representative of the peoples of the Empire, the acknowledgement of certain rights for Albania which were long overdue, and the bringing to trial of such “traitors” as “. . . Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Chief of the General Staff”, would solve all the ills that had been afflicting the Empire.

Two pieces of documentary evidence on these are reproduced in part and in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 252–256. Also see: C. Tayyar (Eğilmez), *Vesaik-i resmîyeye müstenit Arnavutluk harekâtı*. Bursa: [n.pub.], 1334; esp. pp. 40–44.

191 Cf.,

“We had no hope left in Sadık Bey or in the Party [i.e., *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*]. It was necessary to work according to the circumstances of the country”,

writes Dr. Rıza Nur. However, on hearing the news of the rebellious officers in Rumelia, he then adds:

“Well, then, we were on the way. The old and respected father of retired Captain Tevfik Hamdi Bey, a friend of ours, had won over to us the officers of the battalion attached to the garrison [İstanbul] and three other infantry battalions in Sarıyer [a district of İstanbul Vilayet] . . . Hereafter, many more battalions and detachments of troops from the cavalry and infantries had been won over. The participation of three destroyers [?] from the Navy in the movement was successful. In addition, we had found very many civilians and scattered officers and furnished [them] with arms. I also armed a number of cadets of the Military Medical School . . .”

R. Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf nasıl doğdu, nasıl öldü?*, pp. 36–37.

192 The circular is reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p.258. But cf., *ibid.*, II/4, pp. 210–211.

193 “Mensubin-i Askerîyenin Siyâsetle İştigalden Men’i Hakkındaki Kanun Layihasında”, *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene, 23.İçtima, 18 Haziran 1328 (1 July 1912), pp. 385–413; p. 387.

For details, on the basis of press reports, see: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutîyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 144–146. A typically unperceptive discussion of the related issue of the military’s being in or out of “politics” is found in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 253–256.

194 The quotation is taken from: Mahmud Şevket Paşa: *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene, 23.İçtima, 18 Haziran 1328 (1 July 1912), pp. 385–386.

According to one perceptive observer, in a speech during the manoeuvres of the IInd Army, after pontificating on the military’s involvement or otherwise in partisan politics with the French army as his example, Mahmud Şevket Paşa is reported to have said, “I, too, occupied myself with politics but that was against an illegitimate government.”

H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü*, pp. 99–100. Virtually the same wording and the same logic, long after the events, are used by: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 743. And no other than the soon-to-be-retired General Şerif Paşa, in his letter of resignation from the Committee (23 March 1909), employed the same manner of thinking: “The military, instead of carrying out its duty as guardian of the Constitution . . . [has been] making itself busy with political issues . . .”. Şerif Paşa, *Bir muhalifin hatıraları: İttihat ve Terakkiye muhalefet*, pp. 32–34, p. 34. Cf., the Prologue of this work.

195 However, in an editorial, a prominent journalist of the day asserted that:

“The military is not the guardian of the Constitution but of the motherland . . . If a nation is unworthy of Constitutional government, the military, which is an armed part of that nation, can in no circumstances gain and ensure their worthiness. Constitutional governments do not rely upon the swords of armies but upon the consciences of nations.”

Süleyman Nazif, “Kılıçlı siyaset”, *Hak*, 12 Temmuz 1328. Reproduced in full in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, pp. 554–556.

As far as I can discern from a reading of contemporary material, his was a voice crying in the wilderness. Yet the theme was to recur a year later in a treatise by Prince (*Prens*) Sabahaddin Bey which, however, was not properly published and disseminated until 1918: Sabahaddin, "Türkiye nasıl kurtarılabilir?", pp. 323–375 in N.N. Ege (hazırlayan), *Prens Sabahaddin: hayatı ve ilmi müdafaaları*. İstanbul: Güneş Neşriyatı, 1977; esp.p.362.

- 196 *Annual Register* for the year 1912, p. 347.

Also see, for details and various other contemporary views: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1871–1874. Cf., H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 147–148 and pp. 28–29. Also: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 147–149, who, however, fails to appreciate the full significance of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's resignation.

- 197 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 213–214. Cf., the explanation by: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 121–137.

- 198 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 214–217. Also: *ibid.*, II/1, p. 277; Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, pp. 70ff; and M. Cavit, "Meşrutiyet devrine ait Cavit Bey'in hâtraları", *Tanin*, 30 Ağustos 1943 – 22 Aralık 1946, Sa.1–304; [Hereafter, Cavit Bey, *Hâtraları*]; esp.see *Tanin*, 15–16 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.134 and Sa.135 respectively. In addition, for a readable summary of these developments, see: S. Akşin, *Yüz soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, pp. 202–203.

- 199 Cavit Bey, "Hâtraları", *Tanin*, 17 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.136, explains this atmosphere surrounding the Cabinet session and, especially, the attitude of the Grand Vezir. Also see Said Paşa's formal letter of resignation (*ariza*) to the Sultan, dated 16 July 1912 (3 Temmuz 1328), *Takvim-i vekayı*, 5 Temmuz 1328. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*; the text of the resignation letter, dated 1 Şaban 1330 [3 Temmuz 1328] (16 July 1912) is reproduced in full on p. 232. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 387–388; the date of the formal resignation is given as 16 Temmuz (i.e., 16 July) 1912 = 1 Şaban, Salı (Tuesday).

In addition, M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1089. Further: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 277; and Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, pp. 72–73.

- 200 Said Paşa, *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene. 33.İçtima, 2 Temmuz 1328 (15 July 1912), pp. 679–683.

In fact, years later, Halil Bey was still obfuscating: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p. 148. On the vote of confidence (198 to four) see, for example: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 107.

- 201 The founding and known names of the Saviour Officers organized in İstanbul, according to two reliable sources, were Staff-Major Kemal (Şenkıl) Bey, Staff-Adjutant-Major Hilmi Bey, Cavalry-Lieutenant-Colonel Recep Bey, Commander İbrahim Aşkı Bey (Navy), Captains Kudret and Rosinyol Hüsnü Efendis, and Lieutenants Hasan, Ali and Tevfik Efendis. In addition, another Lieutenant, Salih Efendi, and Staff-Lieutenant-Colonel, Yusuf Rasih Bey, had played some part in the activities of the Group. T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 345–358; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 313–344; A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 565–566; and the earlier A.B. Kuran, *İnkılâp tarihimiz ve İttihad ve Terakki*, pp. 273–274. Cf., A. Tugay, *İbret*, Cilt 2, pp. 60–74 and pp. 83–90.

It should, however, be appreciated that owing to the nature of the *junta* and to the secrecy surrounding the ranks and names of those either in the Group or in sympathy with its aims, these are not – apart from those of the founders – certain. Yet it may be suggested that their influence was in inverse proportion to their limited numbers. One major reason for this was their ability to

attract the support of those politically or professionally disaffected elements of the military, from rebellious officers in Rumelia to very senior commanders. For example, according to Dr. Rıza Nur who mentions the presentation of the manifesto to the Military Council:

"Nazım Paşa had a hand in the arrangements and he was the President of the Council [Nâzım Paşa tertipte zî-medhâl ve şurada reistî]."

R. Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf nasıl doğdu, nasıl öldü?*, p. 38.

It appears that General Nâzım Paşa, as a senior officer, was the ideal choice for the *junta*. Younger officers were apparently eager for a leader, senior in rank and in a key position, whom they could trust. For his part, Nâzım Paşa – the choice of Kâmil Paşa for Minister of War just before the latter's fall – had, following the 31 March Incident, been appointed Commander of the then *Hassa Ordusu* in İstanbul (15 April 1909). His unsuccessful attempts to prevent the Action Army from entering the capital resulted in his later dismissal which juxtaposed with his resignation (26 April). He was then sent to Baghdad as *Vali* and Commander of the VIth Army (April 1910 – February 1911), later taking up the position of the Presidency of the Military Council. Information on Nâzım Paşa, especially during the days following the 31 March Incident, is drawn from: S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*, p. 43 and passim.; which should be read together with: A. Tugay, *op.cit.*, Cilt 2, pp. 245–286. Cf.,

"Nâzım Paşa's aspiration was to take his revenge, at whatever cost, on those who had . . . caused his downfall from the War Ministry . . . Until he went to Baghdad, everybody, even the soldiers, believed him to be a capable soldier . . . He had selected his retinue, senior- and junior-ranking officers, and taken them there. Most of them were those dissatisfied with the policies of the administration."

Süleyman Nazif, *Yıkılan muessese: son zamana aid bazı müşahadat ve malûmat-ı tarihiye*, pp. 9–13.

Further see, for Nâzım Paşa's own views as expressed to the British Military Attaché: *Tyrrell to Lowther*, No.11, Constantinople, 27 January 1910, *F.O.* 195/2346. Cf., H. Mentеше, *Anıları*, p. 153.

For the episode concerning the delivery of the letter, its contents and the discussions that took place afterwards, see: "Hurşit Paşa'nın 1911–1912 Kabine hâtıraları", *Hayat mecmuası*, 4 (22 Ocak) 1964, esp.p.5. Cf., Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, pp. 80–82.

- 202 There is one point which requires explanation and accurate assessment in view of the discrepancy that shadows the existing scholarly literature on the action of the Saviour Officers and the immediate results of this action.

When events succeed each other in time and the earlier ones seem to produce the conditions through which the later ones are affected, there is a tendency to assume a causal relationship between them. This might be acceptable, provided one has taken into consideration the intervening relevant factors (i.e., variables) which themselves depend largely on the time interval between, say, Event A and Event B. In a longer interval, the intervention of additional factors may be quite extraneous to Event A. Yet if the time interval is very short, it may be asserted in retrospect that Event B was directly caused by Event A since B was reasonably predictable at the time of A.

Now looking back, as a non-historian but to the best of my knowledge, I can detect the application of such a train of thought to the formal resignation of the Said Paşa Government on 16 July 1912 (Event B) and the presentation of the Saviour Officers' manifesto on 18 July 1912 (Event A). Let us take two

prominent examples. First, Lewis (*The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 223) states that:

"The 'Saviour Officers' now went into action . . . a declaration sent through the Army Council to the Sultan, and above all, certain ominous military movements and preparations brought swift results."

Secondly, Ahmad, in his most detailed analysis of the period (*The Young Turks*, p. 107), uses the same quotation and adds:

"The situation deteriorated rapidly. Said Paşa lost heart and resigned on 17 July [*sic*]."

In fact, since Event B – that is, Said Paşa's resignation – preceded Event A – that is, the presentation of the Saviour Officers' manifesto, their analyses illustrate the existence of an historical discrepancy, if not the built-in bias of that profession, in favour of discovering meaningful patterns and thus sometimes exaggerating the one-way causality between two events that succeed one another in time. On the other hand, since the time interval between the two events was very short, within a 48-hour span, it may at first glance be accepted that, as discussed above, the pressures of the situation leading up to Event A provided the causal factors for Event B; in other words, that Said Paşa's resignation was, in effect, caused by the presentation of the Saviour Officers' manifesto.

And yet in view of the existing evidence, chronologically this was not so. The first piece of evidence is the manifesto itself, which was presented initially to the Military Council. In its preamble, Said Paşa's Cabinet is referred to as ". . . being provisionally in power at the present time [*halen vekâleten*] . . ." (reproduced in C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, pp. 534–535). "*Vekâleten*" is also the precise term used by Cavid Bey in his description of the events surrounding the resignation of the Cabinet: Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 16 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.135.

Secondly, Sultan Mehmed Reşad, in the proclamation which he issued to the soldiery, dated 19 July 1912 (6 Temmuz 1328), rebuked these officers:

". . . Yesterday [i.e., 18 July 1912], certain demands were made by some officers against the provisions of the Constitutional law and the Caliphate and Sultanate."

Hak, 7 Temmuz 1328 (20 July 1912), gives in addition the speech of Hurşid Paşa, following the reading of the proclamation. Also cf., Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, p. 74.

The third piece of evidence appears in an entirely independent source which also indicates the position of Said Paşa's Cabinet:

". . . while the Cabinet was provisionally [*vekâleten*] present at its post . . ."

wrote Hakkı Baha (Pars) Bey, Unionist Deputy for Ertuğrul (Bilecik) in a letter dated 25 July 1912 (12 Temmuz 1328) to his close associate, Celâl (Bayar) Bey, a member of the Committee's Bursa organization. He then informed Celâl Bey of the conditions surrounding the formal resignation of the Grand Vezir, the demands of the Saviour Officers and other related issues which, in fact, never appeared in the press or elsewhere at that time, and also enclosed a copy of the Sultan's proclamation. The letter is found in: C. Bayar, *op.cit.*, pp. 523–526.

Now, having noted the chronological inconsistency of the relationship between the two events, a tentative assertion may be made: that the sending of the

manifesto only after the formal resignation of the Government and the deliberate use of coercion to restrict the range of political discretion so as to impose the demands of the Saviour Officers seem to indicate a vital aspect of the mechanics of *coups d'état* – that is, being able to take advantage of the extreme vulnerability of governments. Because of its caretaking capacity, Said Paşa's Cabinet was unable to reach a prompt decision and take retaliatory repressive action. It could only pass on the communication to a higher authority, the Sultan, as if trying to evade responsibility.

- 203 On the approaches to Tevfik Paşa, his unacceptable conditions and the consideration of other candidates for the Grand Vezirate, see: Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, pp. 34ff.; and Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, p. 73. Tevfik Paşa's own, similar explanation is given in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1713–1714.

- 204 Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, p. 76.

For corroborative evidence on the decision to appoint Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*, pp. 321–322. This information is also supported by a detailed examination, emphasising the political considerations regarding the choice of a new Grand Vezir, by: R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa: bir Osmanlı Paşası ve dönemi*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayın Ltd.Şti. Yayınları, 1976; pp. 336–344. Cf., for partial, Unionist accounts of the selection: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 726–729; and H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p. 149.

- 205 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 289. Cf., Şehbenderzâde Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Muhalefetin iflâsı*, p. 43 and *passim*.

The title of Grand Cabinet (*Büyük Kabine*) referred to the inclusion in its ranks of three ex-Grand Vezirs – Kâmil Paşa, President of the Council of State; Ferid Paşa, Minister of the Interior; and Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, Minister of Justice. It was also known as the Father-and-Son Cabinet (*Baba-Oğul Kabinesi*) because of the presence of the Grand Vezir's son, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, as Minister of the Navy. M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1812–1816; for details and the *hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 7 Şaban 1330 [9 Temmuz 1328] (22 July 1912), reproduced in full. Also: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 108–109; and R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa*, pp. 344–345.

To the now Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey, writing from the Trablusgarb front on 24 July:

“Le cabinet [a été] remplacé par un cabinet sans couleur. Seul le ministre de la guerre est énergétique. Et j'espère qu'il fera bien des choses pour l'armée.”

M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 157.

- 206 *Takvim-i vekâyi*, 11 Temmuz 1328; and R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, p.356.

- 207 Significantly, the programme appeared in the press the very day after the official lifting of the state of siege. For example: *Yeni Gazete*, 12 Temmuz 1328 (25 July 1912) – “Halâşkâr Zabitan Grubu Beyannâmesi”; *Teminat*, 12 Temmuz 1328 – “Halâşkâr Zabitan Grubu'nun Programı” &c. Also reproduced in full in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler*, pp. 351–358, from where the quotation is taken, p. 354.

- 208 It may be interesting to note that, according to Dr. Rıza Nur:

“The Prince [Sabahaddin Bey, ideologue of the Liberals and leader of the anti-Unionist groups] had personally improved upon, and elaborated, a programme [i.e., of the Saviour Officers Group] which was written by the

officers, and got a few copies reproduced in his home; afterwards, in a certain publishing house in Beyoğlu [in İstanbul], a number of issues were secretly printed."

R. Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf nasıl doğdu, nasıl öldü?*, p. 37. The author then adds:

"It should also be explained that we, by keeping ourselves and the rest of the civilians out of sight, were giving this action an appearance of a purely military character."

ibid., p. 38.

- 209 In the letter sent to Halid Ziya Bey, the Saviour Officers demanded his immediate resignation on the basis of his exerting influence over the Sultan ". . . especially in the last few days". The text, and the context, of the letter are provided in: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*, pp. 317–318.

Such a demand seems to have been in line with the policy of the Grand Vezir, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, in the sense that the latter formally asked the Sultan for Halid Ziya Bey's dismissal. The Sultan, however unwillingly, bowed under the pressure and dismissed his Chief Secretary on 31 July 1912. In addition to the above reference, cf.: Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*, Cilt II, pp. 82–85.

- 210 The letter was read out in Parliament by Halil Bey himself the following day: Halil Bey, *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene, 40.İçtima, 12 Temmuz 1328 (25 July 1912), pp. 767ff. Also: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p. 150 and pp. 160–161, where the letter is reproduced in full. For further details about the letter and its delivery, see: *ibid.*, p. 32.

- 211 The then Minister of Justice in the Cabinet, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, who was still a popular figure with the Unionists, during an unofficial meeting with Cavid and Talât Beys, had made this point.

"Last night, Talât [and I] went together to Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa. We conversed for about three hours . . .",

wrote Cavid Bey in his diary for 15 Temmuz 1328 (28 July 1912). The Minister told them that:

". . . having regard to the news being received from Albania [and] from the military, it was considered imperative to dissolve Parliament [Arnavutluktan, ordudan alınan haberlere nazaran meclisi dağıtmak zaruri bulunduğunu . . .] . . ."

Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 21 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.140.

- 212 *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene, 46.İçtima, 21 Temmuz 1328 (3 August 1912), pp. 889–890.

An assessment of the debate is found in: H.C. Yalçın, "Meclis feshediliyor", *Yakın tarihimiz*, Cilt III, pp. 248–249. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 111–112. According to Bayur:

"He [Nâzım Paşa], after having been appointed to the Ministry of War as the most effectual member of the Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa Government, by placing his henchmen, or those who had been trusted by the Saviours [and] with whom he had cooperated, in the places of most vital interest from the viewpoint of the security and importance of the state machinery . . . had further reinforced his position and had got into such a situation that, whenever he wanted, he could categorically rule over the Government."

Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarp ve Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar. Kısım 2: Balkan savaşları.

Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.14. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1943; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2]; p. 259.

Indeed, according to Staff-Major Kemal Bey, the initiator and chief founder of the Saviours (see N.201 above), his appointees included Yusuf Rasih Bey (Staff-Lieutenant-Colonel) as the Director-General of Police (*Polis Müdür-ü Umumiyesi*), and Major Saffet Bey as the Garrison Commander of İstanbul (*Dersaadet Merkez Kumandanı*). K. Şenkıl, *Halâskâr Zabitan meselesinin hakikati nedir?*, 1947 (unpublished manuscript), quoted for the first time in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, p. 347. Also see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 324–325.

A contemporary foreign account of events also noted that:

“... military officers, not connected with the Young Turkish Committee, were appointed in the place of the District Commissioners of Police [i.e., Director-General of Police].”

Annual Register for the year 1912, p. 348.

For the connection of the Saviours with Nâzım Paşa, cf., Tyrrell to Marling, Constantinople, 29 July 1912, enclosed in: *Marling to Grey*, No.657, Conf., Constantinople, 4 August 1912, F.O. 371/1495/33863.

- 213 Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, p. 63.

The Grand Vezir maintained this argument on similar lines: Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, “Temmuz 1330'da Meclis-i Mebusanda geçen Divan-ı Âli bahislerine bir nazar”, (lithograph, n.d.), quoted in: R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, p. 362.

- 214 The constitutional procedure leading up to the dissolution of Parliament is extensively discussed in: R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, pp. 363–371. Also see: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 3, pp. 764–774; and the summary in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 110. Further: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 112–116. For a personal viewpoint: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p.150.

- 215 Cavid Bey, *M.M.Z.C.*, II.Devre, 1.Sene, 47.İçtima, 23 Temmuz 1328 (5 August 1912), pp. 913–919.

The *hatt-ı hümayun* of Sultan Mehmed Reşad, dissolving Parliament and ordering new elections, is reproduced in full in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1817–1818.

- 216 And Cavid Bey continued in the same vein:

“... even the great and esteemed *Padişah* of the Ottomans is under constraint and duress [... hatta Osmanlıların büyük ve muhterem Padişahları cebir ve ikrah ve tazyik altındadır].”

M.M.Z.C., II.Devre, 1.Sene, 47.İçtima, 23 Temmuz 1328 (5 August 1912), pp. 913–919.

- 217 The meeting, held, interestingly enough at the “Hill of Eternal Freedom [*Hürriyet-i Ebediye Tepesi*]” – so called after 1908, was given extensive coverage in the press, for example: *Hak*, 24 Temmuz 1328; as was also a similar meeting at the Tepebaşı Gardens Casino (*Tepebaşı Bahçesi*), for example: *Tanin*, 25 Temmuz 1328.

- 218 “Ordunun Beyân-ı Hissiyâtı”, *Hak*, 14 Temmuz 1328 (27 July 1912), p. 1, columns 3–4, from where the following quotations are taken.

For later meetings in Selânik, expressing similar sentiments, see: *Lamb to Lowther*, No.102, Salonica, 9 August 1912, F.O. 195/2390/3809.

- 219 R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, p. 371; and M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1816. Also in: *Tekvim-i vekâyi*, 24 Temmuz 1328 (6 August 1912).

- 220 H.T.A., Dolap:I, Göz:21, Dosya Sa:187. A copy of this *irade* and the Ministry of War's circular also appeared in: *İkdam*, 30–31 Temmuz 1328 (12–13 August 1912). The oath and the written promise are reproduced in full in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, p. 350, N.30; and partially translated in: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 224. Also cf. a copy of the written promise by two junior officers, reproduced in full in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, p. 345.
- 221 H.T.A., Dolap:I, Göz:21, Dosya Sa:187. The relevant part reads thus:

“Her hâl ve mekânda Padişahıma ve Vatanıma Kanun-u Esasî ahkâmı dairesinde sadakatla ifayı hizmet edeceğime . . .”.

Also see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, p. 350, N.30.

- 222 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 388. Also, according to Bayar, “Hadi Paşa, of Arab descent . . . was acting as the representative of the military junta.” C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 2, p. 556, N.2.

Major-General Mehmed Hadi Paşa, formerly Inspector-General of the IInd Army, had become the Acting-Chief of the General Staff on 13 March 1911, when the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa, was posted to assume temporary command of the Yemen General Forces, mainly to control the uprising there. However, Hadi Paşa retained his position and was still, therefore, Acting-Chief of the General Staff when the Empire found herself in the Balkan War. B.V.A., Harbiye İstizan Defteri, Dosya:300-989; cited in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 253.

- 223 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 420. Also see p. 166 and esp. N.123 of this Chapter.

In view of this it is interesting to note that Vehip Bey is reported to have participated in the meeting at *Hürriyet-i Ebediye Tepesi*. M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*. İstanbul: Akşam Kütüphanesi, 1933; p. 102. See p. 188 and N.217 of this Chapter.

- 224 Cavid Bey was in his constituency (Selânik) between 6 and 31 August 1912. His diary, covering this period, appears in: Cavit Bey, “Hâtıraları”, *Tanin*, 23 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.142, from where this quotation is taken.

Martial law extended to Macedonia on 8 August 1912: *İktilam*, 27 Temmuz 1328. See also the enclosed circular in in: *Marling to Grey*, No.695, Conf., Constantinople, 10 August 1912, F.O. 371/1482/35852. An example of the repressive measures, that of Nâzım Paşa's authorizing the arrest and court-martial of Ali Haydar Bey, is narrated in: A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872–1946*, pp. 240–242.

- 225 Cavit Bey, “Hâtıraları”, *Tanin*, 23 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.142.

- 226 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 3, p. 776; the report is reproduced in part on pp. 776–778 (emphasis is mine). On the 1912 Congress, the first to be held outside Selânik, see: *ibid.*, pp. 774–784; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler*, pp. 192–193. Also see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 103–106, for the full text of the “İttihat ve Terakki kongresinin mukar-reratı”. All these should be read in view of the illuminating account of the Congress by the commentator, Mustafa Ragıp Bey: M.Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 206–216. The tenor of the report notwithstanding, it is interesting to note the musings of one of those “devoted sons” in the “field of gaza”, Enver Bey – coincidentally in a letter written to his German friend on 2 September:

“Moi comme militaire je suis pour l'absolutisme de l'armée et comme système gouvernemental une constitution modérée comme chez vous. Alors il faut écraser toutes les têtes moyennes (mittelmässig) qui désirent partager

le pouvoir . . . Le gouvernement actuel n'est pas hamidiste quoiqu'il soit contre nous autres jeunes turcs."

M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 175.

227 Cavit Bey, "Hâtraları", *Tanin*, 26 İkincikânun 1944, Sa.145. These entries cover the period between 19 and 30 September 1912.

228 "Ordu Emirnâmesi", Sa.4, 28 Mart 1330, p. 80, in: *Ordu Emirnâmesi*, Sa.1-113. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1 Mart 1330-15 Nisan 1336. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, p. 301; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler*, Cilt 3, p. 166. The initiative of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa is emphasised in: R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, p. 375. Further see: "Bilumum Memurin ve Müstahdemin ile Mualliminin Furuk ve Cemiyet-ı Siyasiyeye Memnuiyet İntisabı Hakkında İrade-i Seniyye", *Düstur*, 2:IV, Sa.254, pp. 648-649, 15 Eylül 1328; and "Mensubin-i Askerinin Siyasetle Men'i İştigaline Dair Askerî Ceza Kanuna Müzeyyel Kanun-u Muvakkat", *Düstur*, 2:IV, Sa.256, pp. 650-652, 15 Eylül 1328.

Another provisional law of 28 September 1912 had already prohibited membership by officials and teachers in political parties or clubs: Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, p.301, which was based on the Council of Ministers' initial resolution of 7 August 1912 to extract sworn statements from them: Y. Aktar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi öğrenci olayları (1908-1918)*, pp. 130-132. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 257-258, on the publication of the said laws.

229 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 413-433, where the events and corresponding changes in the Balkans from the summer of 1912 are discussed on pp. 306ff.

Also: H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey: a diplomatic history, 1913-1923*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1966; pp. 19-23; and C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 3, Belge Sa. 67, 68, 69 and 70, pp. 1017-1020. Further, for the Montenegrin initiative in opening hostilities, see: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan wars, 1912-1913*. New York: Russell and Russell, 1939; pp. 138-145.

230 Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Temmuz 1330'da Meclis-i Meb'usan'da geçen Divan-ı Âli bahislerine bir nazar*, p. 27.

It is interesting to note that two such diverse authorities as the Grand Vezir, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, and the military historian, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, make the same assertion:

"The weakness of Turkey, and the example of Italy in occupying Tripoli, encouraged Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to claim autonomy for Macedonia as a step to ejecting the Turks from Europe."

B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the First World War*. New ed. London: Book Club Associates, 1973; p. 35.

Also cf., "Alliance between Serbia and Montenegro. Signed at Lucerne, 12th September/6th October, 1912". Article IV states:

"Inasmuch as the governments of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro regard the present situation in Turkey and the general conditions in Europe as very favourable for action aimed at the liberation of Serbs under the Turkish yoke, they have agreed that war should be declared upon Turkey at the latest by October 1 of the current year . . ."

M. Hurst (ed.), *Key treaties of the Great Powers*. Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1972. 2 vols. Vol.1 (1814-1870), Vol.2 (1871-1914). Vol.2, No.181, pp. 828-830, p. 829.

On the Balkan alliances, cf., Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtrat-ı siyasiye*, pp. 28-33.

231 Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Temmuz 1330'da Meclis-i Meb'usan'da geçen Divan-ı*

- Âli bahislerine bir nazar*, p. 57; R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, Cilt 1, pp. 227–228; and also Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 381–382.
- 232 B.V.A., Meclis-i Vükela Zabıtları, Defter Sa.169, Zabıt Sa.555. Also cited in: R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, p. 409. For further measures on the same day (e.g., controlling movements of shipping in the Straits &c.), see: *op.cit.*, Zabıt Sa.551 and 553.
- 233 H.T.A., Dolap:2, Göz:3, Dosya Sa:29. Reproduced in full in: R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, Cilt 1, p. 272, Ek.11.
- On 8 October 1912, at a private joint meeting between the Cabinet and the General Staff, after listening to the explanations of the Acting-Chief of the General Staff, Hadi Paşa, the military delegation reached the decision: "It is difficult to realize the defence capability of the Ottoman Armed Forces, let alone the capability of offensive." This decision, with a joint signature, was then officially presented to the Porte as follows:
- "Montenegro has now declared war. There is a very strong possibility that Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece will declare war. For this reason . . . while, today, in view of our strength and the political situation, the feasibility of defence against the Balkan states is difficult, it is submitted to your knowledge that the maintenance of the war with Italy is impossible."
- B.V.A., Hadi Paşa'nın tahkik evrakı, pp. 6–9, p. 12. Quoted in: *ibid.*, Cilt 1, p.53.
- A detailed account of the private joint meeting and the decision to end the war with Italy is also found in the memoirs of one of the soldier participants: Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbinde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın hâtratu*. [İstanbul]: Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1336; esp. pp. 12ff.
- This is further confirmed by: Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Temmuz 1330'da Meclis-i Meb'usan'da geçen Divan-ı Âli bahislerine bir nazar*, p. 50.
- In fact, a treaty with Italy, signed at Ouchy (Lausanne) on 18 October 1912, formally ended the war and virtually surrendered the North African provinces to Italy. A perceptive discussion of the treaty is found in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/1, pp. 433–440; and W.C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's acquisition of Libya, 1911–1912*, pp. 233–245. Also: H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, p. 20; and T.W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911–1912*, pp. 174ff.
- For a contemporary insight, see the comments of the British Ambassador to Italy on the significance of the treaty for the Empire: *Rodd to Grey*, No.328, Rome, 19 October 1912, *F.O.* 421/283/123, and Enclosure: Extract for the "Italie" of 19 October 1912, giving the integral text of the treaty: *ibid.*, *F.O.* 421/283/123/1.
- By 19 October 1912, the Ottoman Empire was at war with Montenegro, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece.
- 234 Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 20; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 389.
- As the then Grand Vezir admitted:

"The Government never interfered with the application of military operations, because it knew that this was the responsibility of the person [he does not even mention Nâzım Paşa by name] holding the offices of Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War."

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Temmuz 1330'da Meclis-i Meb'usan'da geçen Divan-ı Âli bahislerine bir nazar*, p. 57.

Nâzım Paşa's enthusiasm for war, though how genuine it is impossible truly

to ascertain, comes out clearly in the memoirs of the influential former Surgeon[General] and now Prefect (*Şehremini*) of İstanbul, Cemil Paşa. While Cemil Paşa, a great opponent of the war at any cost, was trying to persuade the Sultan – whose personal physician he was and with whom he had close personal contact – to do his utmost to prevent a war, the Sultan appears to have been convinced by Nâzım Paşa of a victorious outcome. In fact, Cemil Paşa recounts how, when he questioned Nâzım Paşa about the guarantee of victory he had given the Sultan in the event of war, the Paşa admonished him and added:

"I told His Highness yesterday and I tell you now that in less than a week after the declaration of war, the Ottoman flag will be flying in Filibe and Sofya. Don't force me to say any more than this."

C. Topuzlu, *Hatıralarım*, pp. 116–117.

Ahmed İzzet Paşa, on reflection, was "... convinced, too, that the late Nâzım Paşa thought of nothing but attack". Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 134.

- 235 Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, p. 43 (cf., N.242 above).

The *Şeyhülislâm*'s lack of enthusiasm may have been based on knowledge of the unpreparedness of the armed forces, knowledge which was obtained and passed to him by his son-in-law, Cemil Paşa. About two weeks before the declaration of war, and obviously before Cemaleddin Efendi's talk in the joint meeting, Cemil Paşa narrates how he had met one of the most influential officers of the army, then a member of the Military Council, Lieutenant-General Abdullah Paşa, who had convinced him of the impossibility of winning a war at this time and asked him to convey this message urgently to the Government through the person of Cemaleddin Efendi. C. Topuzlu, *Hatıralarım*, pp. 114–116.

The irony of Abdullah Paşa's subsequent appointment as Commander of the Eastern Army [Group], in view of his openly demoralized and defeatist attitude, was not missed by Ali Fuad Bey. A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 59.

According to Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, the disunity caused by partisanship had destroyed the hierarchical relations among officers to the extent that "[l]ower ranks, by relying upon their respective political parties, began to bare their teeth at their superiors."

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Temmuz 1331'da Meclis-i Meb'usan'da geçen Divân-ı Âli bahislerine bir nazar*, p. 73.

Also, in similar vein: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 177–178. Cf., Colonel Lamouche, *Quinze ans d'histoire balkanique (1904–1918)*. Paris: Payot, 1928; p.123.

- 236 On the declarations of war, see: R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, Cilt 1, pp. 51–56. Early operations are summarized in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 19–22; and cf., E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p.195ff. Fuller details are found in: F. Belen, *Balkan Savaşı (1912–1913)*. İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1971.

For naval operations, see, for example: A. Büyüktuğrul, *Balkan Harbi tarihi*. VIIinci Cilt: Osmanlı deniz harekâtı (1912–1913). T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harb Tarihi Dairesi Resmî Yayınları. İstanbul: K.K.K. Askeri Basımevi, 1965.

- 237 Birinci Ferik Zeki, *1912 Balkan Harbine aid hâtıratım*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1337; p. 36.

An observation along the same lines was made by a British war correspondent, writing barely a month after the battle of Kumanova:

"The political quarrels and constant intrigues of the Committee of Union and Progress had doubtless affected the discipline of his [Zeki Bey's] men."

A Special Correspondent, *The Balkan War drama*. London: Andrew Melrose, 1913; p. 119.

The consequences of the rivalry between politicized groups within the ranks of the Ottoman officer corps affecting their corporateness, level of skill and efficiency are also described in the accounts of two other soldiers. See:

Mahmud Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi: Üçüncü Kolordu'nun ve İkinci Doğu Ordusu'nun muharebeleri*. 2. baskı. (Hazırlayan) M.Z. Engin. İstanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi, 1979; [Hereafter, Mahmud Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*]; pp. 168–169; and Mirliva Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karagâh-ı Umumi*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1927; pp. 17ff.

In general: R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)*. 3ncü Cilt: Garb Ordusu; 1nci Kısım: Vardar Ordusu ile Usturuma kolordusunun harekât ve muharebeleri. T.C. Genelkurmay Harb Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları, Seri Sa.4. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1979; [Hereafter, R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, III/1].

However, the fullest, most authoritative and impartial analysis of the performance of the Ottoman officers during the War, is contained in a book by a then Staff-Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mehmed Nihad Bey, which has directly helped in forming my general assessment of the corps. Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *1328–29 Balkan Harbi: Trakya seferi*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1340. 3 cilt. (Cilt III – Askeri Matbaa, 1928).

- 238 Looking at the comprehensive chronology of the second Constitutional period up to the First World War, compiled by Bayur, one cannot help but be struck by the sheer extent of the Ottoman losses incurred during the first 12 days or so of the Balkan War, both on land and at sea, in Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean. “II. Meşrutiyet devri kronolojisi”, pp. 681–773 in Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4; see pp. 723–724 for the period mentioned.

- 239 I should like to offer two examples which will suffice to underline certain of these aspects. When the four Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro) entered the War against the Ottoman Empire, according to the contingency mobilization and war plan no. V, the total number of troops of the Eastern and Western Army [Groups] should have been 478,848 and 333,815 respectively, making a grand total of 812,663. And yet, although the War had been pending for some considerable time, on the day on which the Eastern Army [Group]’s offensive was decided (22 October 1912), only 115,000 troops were ready for combat, while the numerical strength of the Western Army [Group] was 175,000 on 19 October 1912. Thus the actual grand total realized was only 290,000 troops, as against a planned 812,663, when the Empire found herself at war against the combined strength of the Balkan armies of 482,000 troops at approximately the same time. The numbers are calculated in: R. Hallı, *Balkan harbi*, Cilt 1, pp. 132–133. His calculations are based on: *H.T.A.*, Dolap:2, Göz:2, Dosya Sa:17; Dolap:2, Göz:10, Dosya Sa:172/177; and Dolap:10, Göz:17, Dosya Sa:62.

The second example concerns logistics. While there were organized 14 cavalry divisions, consisting of 40 cavalry regiments, despite massive expenditure only one quarter of these forces could readily be utilized. *ibid.*, Cilt 1, p. 137.

These and other technical aspects raised above, are extensively documented and discussed, together with a general assessment, in: *ibid.*, Cilt 1, pp. 128–149.

However, it is worth noting that an example of how a factual distortion, presumably for the sake of analytical convenience, may be misleading, is to be found in Ahmad’s statement concerning the performance of the Ottoman military. The author quotes from Türkgeldi’s memoirs (*Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 60) about Nâzım Paşa’s response to him on the mobilization and war plans, prepared during Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s ministry, which he intended to obtain

and examine; Türkgeldi adds, "I understood that still he had not examined [them]." Ahmad then caps his quotation from Türkgeldi with the unsubstantiated statement, "But they were never used." (F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p.113)

In fact, there were 12 (I-XII) "mobilization-war" plans prepared by the Ottoman General Staff. Although the initial plan, no.V (against Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro) miscarried, it appears that even in its failure it dominated the general trend of operations under the combined no.IV (against Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) and no.1 (against Bulgaria) plans, issued at the beginning of mobilization to the Western and Eastern Army [Groups] respectively. Notably, all these had been prepared by the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa, who still remained in the Yemen in a kind of semi-exile. Now, under the cloak of Nâzım Paşa's authority, certain modifications in strategy and tactics were implemented, such as the change in the operations plans of the Western Army [Group] with the entry of Greece into the War. These, exemplifying the confused military thought over tactics, also contributed from the very beginning of the mobilization to the disastrous outcome. Here, of greater significance than Ahmad's sweeping statement would have been a consideration of such aspects, however briefly, for the sake of historical accuracy.

A full critique of the Balkan War, on matters relating to the "mobilization-war" plans, is found in: R. Hallı, *op.cit.*, Cilt 1, pp. 185–219 and pp. 226–230; pp. 220–225 includes Ahmed İzzet Paşa's own critique. Also: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 120–135. Further: R. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, III/1, pp. 117–130. In addition: Mahmud Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, S.176, pp. 194–195; and cf., Selâhattin Âdil, *Hayat mücadeleleri*, pp. 147ff. An important related example – the untimely demobilization of some 65,000 troops under the orders of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, starting from 29 July 1912 – is studied by: R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, pp. 401–409; and, more extensively, in: R. Uçarol, "Balkan Savaşı öncesinde terhis olayı ve seferlik ilanı sorunu", pp. 257–277 in Dördüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, *Bildiriler* (where he gives the figure as 75,000 on p. 267).

- 240 R. Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, pp. 434–442. Also cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 248–252; A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 59–69; and M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*, pp. 1826–1828, providing his interview with Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa on the latter's resignation. Also: *ibid.* p. 1410, where the *hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 18 Zilkade 1330 [16 Teşrin-i evvel 1328] (29 October 1912), is reproduced in full.

- 241 A full appreciation of the disorders facing the Eastern Army [Group] is found in: Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *1328–29 Balkan Harbi: Trakya seferi*, Cilt III, pp. 231–463; and his assessment on pp. 490–491.

A vivid description of the battle of Lüleburgaz and the subsequent retreat towards Çatalca is found in the account of a British journalist: E. Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace*. London: William Heinemann, 1913; pp. 139–216. For the technical details, see: Mahmud Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, pp. 62–129; and, for an example at a more personal level: Selim Bey (Lieutenant), *Carnet de campagne d'un officier turc (octobre-décembre 1912): de Sul-Oglou à Tchataldja*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1913.; esp. pp. 62–135.

- 242 Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *1328–29 Balkan Harbi: Trakya seferi*, Cilt III, p. 503. In fact, on the night of 1/2 November 1912, as the battle of Lüleburgaz was weighing heavily against the Ottoman forces, Nâzım Paşa informed the Grand Vezir by telegram that the Eastern Army [Group] had lost its vain attempt to contain the Bulgarian counter-offensive. His second telegram, on 2 November,

was more specific. He ended it by implying that the containment of the Bulgarians should be conducted by political means (“... bu işe devletçe bir netice verilmesi menut-u rey-i sami-i fâhimaneleridir.”). The documents are reproduced in full in: *ibid.*, Cilt III, pp. 454–460 and pp. 465–466.

The final telegram, which appears to have been received by the Grand Vezir in the late hours of 2 November, contained Nâzım Paşa's six-point answer to the suggestions (i.e., to carry on fighting) and questions of the Grand Vezir; it was precise and to the point:

“... .

6. According to these conditions, in order to end the war, without losing any time it is requisite to make the necessary political attempts [... muharebeye nihayet verilmek üzere icabeden teşebbüsât-ı siyasiye bilâ ifâte-i vakit icrası lâzımdır].”

ibid., Cilt III, pp. 501–503, p. 503.

Also cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 55–60.

Apparently it was as early as 28 October, in a special interview, that Kâmil Paşa told Mahmud Muhtar Paşa about the defeatist attitude of Nâzım Paşa, who was already pleading for peace. However, there is only Mahmud Muhtar Paşa's word, in retrospect, for this. Mahmud Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, p. 139.

- 243 Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.576, Conf., Constantinople, 3 November 1912, *F.O.* 371/1513/46564, and “ED. NOTE” in *B.D.*, Vol.IX, Part 2 [Hereafter, IX/2], p.89.

Cf., *Bompard à Poincaré*, Tel.No.541, Péra, 3 novembre 1912, *D.D.F.*, Tome IV, 3e Série, No.328, p. 328.

Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 63, reproduces a short telegram, dated 3 November 1912, sent to the Ottoman ambassadors instructing them to apply to the Great Powers in order to speed up their decision for mediation. For further diplomatic attempts, see: *ibid.*, pp. 73–86. Cf., E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 197–200.

- 244 Cf., *Wangenheim an den Kiderlen, Privatbrief*, Pera, 7 November 1912, *G.P.*, 33.Band, Nr.12364, pp. 319–323.

A Red Cross volunteer, working at the base hospital in İstanbul, recorded his impressions:

“The streets in Stamboul . . . were choked with the wagons of refugees, and it was said that there were eighty miles of them.”

A. Duncan-Johnstone, *With the British Red Cross in Turkey: the experiences of two volunteers, 1912–1913*. London: James Nisbet, 1913; p. 30; and *ibid.*, pp. 56–73, for an account of “How the Cholera Came to Stamboul”. Also see, on the cholera outbreak: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 70; and, more authoritatively, the account of the Prefect of İstanbul: C. Topuzlu, *Hatıralarım*, pp. 124–131. Further: R. Graves, *Storm centres of the Near East: personal memoirs (1879–1929)*. London: Hutchinson, 1933 (1975 reprint used here); pp. 279–282; H.C. Seppings Wright, *Two years under the crescent*, pp. 250–256; E. Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace*, pp. 250–262; and M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 351–353.

- 245 Cavit Bey, “Hâtıraları”, *Tanin*, 6 Şubat 1944, Sa.156; esp. entry in his diary for 23 Teşrin-i evvel 1328 (5 November 1912).

- 246 See the memoirs of Ahmed Reşid Bey for his actions against the Committee: A.R. Rey, *Gördüklerim, yaptıklarım (1890–1922)*, esp. pp. 178ff.

After the surrender of Selânik to the Greek forces on 8 November 1912 the Grand Vezir, Kâmil Paşa, is reported to have told Ali Fuad Bey, then the new Chief Secretary to the Sultan, that the Unionists “... were a revolutionary

party, their centre was Selânik. Selânik has gone, they too should clear out". A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 76.

The already peremptory attitude of Kâmil Paşa is admitted in: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 747-750. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 104-107. However, it seems that the loss of Selânik was not immediately made public, partly, presumably, in order to prevent the Unionists from taking advantage of the precariousness of the Government's position.

An interesting piece of evidence comes from a then young Reserve Lieutenant of the Serez *Redif* Division, Şükrü (Tezer) Efendi, who was among the troops routed at the Balkan front before the advancing Greek and Bulgarian forces and came to Çanakkale on 17 November 1912. He noted that:

"... Despite the occupation of Selânik approximately twelve days before we disembarked at Çanakkale, the local people, apart from the military personnel, were still unaware of the situation. In fact, as soon as we had disembarked, without being allowed to come into contact with the people at all, we were taken straight to the barracks and given strict orders not to talk to anyone about this [loss], and naturally we obeyed."

S. Tezer, *Atatürk'ün hâtıra defteri*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.16. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1972; p. 22.

- 247 Emin Bülend (Serdaroğlu) (1886-1942), "Kin", pp. 376-377 in R.A. Sevengil, *Eski şiirimizin ustaları*. İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1964; p. 377.

"... "

Ben şûre-zâr-ı kalbimi kînîmle beslerim
Pençemde bir silâh ile ferdâyı beklerim
Kabrimde müsterih uyu, ey nâmdâr atam.
Evlâdının bugünkü adı sâde intikâm!"

Cf. an earlier variant wording (i.e., *süslerim* for *beslerim* and *dinlerim* for *beklerim*): S.N. Ergun, *Türk şairleri*. [N.p.: n.pub., 1936-1945]. 3 cilt. Cilt III, p.1235.

- 248 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 3, p. 924.

It is not irrelevant to mention the attitude of another intellectual, as referred to by Bayar:

"Lawyer Şeref Bey, after the fall of Edirne into the hands of the Bulgarians, also had to take refuge, together with his family, in Bursa. Although well known for his critical writings against the Committee [of Union and Progress] in his newspaper, *Yeni Edirne*, he too, having observed the Grand Cabinet's attitudes and postures, ... had found it in accord with his patriotic sentiments to make common cause with us. The disasters which he had witnessed occurring to his country had made him a staunch Turkish nationalist."

ibid., pp. 925-926.

- 249 The copy of the Cabinet Minutes, and Protocol, is reproduced in full in: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 83-91: "I. Zeyil: Balkan Muharebesi Neticesinde Taleb-i Sulh Olunması Lüzûmuna dair Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatası Suretidir: 3 Zilhicce 1330 ve 31 Teşrinievvel 1329 [sic]" (13 November 1912).

It may be an interesting diversion to note that Arminius Vambéry, the eminent Turcologist, seems to have reached the same conclusion, for he commented in a private letter, dated 12 November 1912 - the day before this Cabinet meeting - that: "The fate of our poor Turkish friends is sealed ... Their collapse in Europe was inevitable, and it is only the suddenness of the fall which has surprised me."

S. Whitman, *Turkish memories*, p. 284.

- 250 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 109–123 and pp. 127–144, in general; and, in particular, the account of the Minister of Trade and Agriculture who was one of the delegates: Mustafa Reşid, *Bir vesika-ı tarihiye*. İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan ve Sürekaşı Matbaacılık Osmanlı Şirketi, 1335.
For details of the battle for the Çatalca line see, for example: Mahmud Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, pp. 153–163. Further: T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.25a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1955. 2 cilt. Cilt I, pp. 65ff. Also cf., E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 201–203; and E. Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace*, pp. 262–277.
- 251 Cavit Bey, “Hâtıraları”, *Tanin*, 20 Şubat 1944, Sa.170. Cf., M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 328–329.
- 252 The dates and the nature of these appointments are found respectively in: C. Erikan, *Komutan Atatürk*, p. 106 and p. 868; Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar: İttihat-Terakki ve Birinci Harbi*. (Tamamlayan ve tertipleyen) B. Cemal. İstanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959; [Hereafter, Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*]; p. 17; and Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 366 and Cilt III, p.693.
Also: Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman, 1913–1919*. New York: Arno Press, 1973; p. [9] (Introduction). Nâzım Paşa's admission of such appointments to, significantly, Talât Bey, appears in: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 764.
For information on the rationale behind the reorganization and reinforcement of the armed forces during the armistice period, see: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 140; and his accompanying memorandum to the Grand Vezirate, dated 13 Kânun-u evvel 1328 (26 December 1912), reproduced in full in: *ibid.*, Ek-2 on pp. 320–324.
- 253 In general: E. Grey, *Twenty-five years: 1892–1916*. New York: Stokes, 1925; esp. Chapter 14; and R. Poincaré, *The memoirs of Raymond Poincaré, 1913–1914*. (Trans.) Sir G. Arthur. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Doran, 1928; Chapter 5. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 185ff.; and E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 249ff.
- 254 *Paget to Grey*, No.3, Belgrade, 7 January 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.463, pp. 369–371; *Panafeiu to Poincaré, Dépêche*, No.1, Conf., Sofia, 4 janvier 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.174, pp. 207–210; and *Descos to Poincaré, Dépêche*, No.3, Belgrade, 6 janvier 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.184, pp. 224–226. According to “a Diplomatist”:

“Another inducement to the Turks to keep issues open was the intervention of Vienna which had mobilized considerable Austrian forces in protest against any Serbo-Montenegrin aggrandizement and possible with a view to preventing it. Such Austrian action promised a very present help to Turkey for it might even portend a war between the Austrian and Russian Empires, or, failing that, it must ensure the exclusion of the Serbs from Albania. This would divert the Serbs upon Macedonia . . . Besides this, . . . the efforts of the Greek armies and of the Bulgar contingent to assert their competing claims to Salonica and South Macedonia were so straining relations between these two countries that, unless the tension was relieved, a rupture was bound to result. Thirdly, Bulgaria was already threatened with a new complication from the Roumanian side; for Roumania, by now, had put forward a definite claim to ‘compensation’ at Silistra and on the Dobrudja frontier . . .”

A Diplomatist [George Young], *Nationalism and war in the Near East*. (Ed.) Lord Courtney of Penwith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915; p. 211. Also: *Bax-Ironside to Grey*, No.6, Conf., Sofia, 16 January 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.514, pp. 416–417; and *Bax-Ironside to Grey*, No.16, Conf., Sofia, 17 January 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.519, p. 419.

- 255 *The Times*, November 11, 1912, pp. 9–10. And *The Times* commented that this "... admirable speech ... contained one central feature which explains the essence of the British attitude towards the Balkan War and its problems." *ibid.*, p. 9.

See two related documents on the impact of the speech: *Goschen to Grey*, Tel.No.159, Berlin, 12 November 1912, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.178, pp. 136–137; and *Bertie to Grey*, Tel.No.204, Paris, 19 November 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.234, pp. 175–176.

Cf., R. Poincaré, *Au service de la France: neuf années des souvenirs*. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1926–1974. 11 tomes. Tome 2 (Les Balkans en feu, 1912), pp. 323–325.

Partisan explanations, lacking even the semblance of disinterest, may still be found in the literature. For example: A.L. Macfie, *The eastern question, 1774–1923*. London: Longman, 1989; p. 52.

If we may take Charles Hobhouse, the then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, at his word, the posture of the Asquith Cabinet is portrayed in the entry to his diary for 18 November 1912:

"Most of the recent Cabinets have been occupied by the Balkan War problems. Nearly all of us are anti-Turk, Grey being perhaps the only one who [would] like to hold the balance even, and that because he despises the Greeks and Serbians ..."

C. Hobhouse, *Inside Asquith's Cabinet: from the diaries of Charles Hobhouse*. (Ed.) E. David. London: John Murray, 1977; pp. 123–124.

- 256 *Wangenheim an den Bethmann Hollweg*, Nr.426, Pera, 21 Dezember 1912, *G.P.*, 34.Band, Erste Hälfte [Hereafter, 34.Band/1], Nr.12576, pp. 87–89. (Emphasis mine). Cf.,

"A tous deux, Gabriel Effendi a paru personnellement convaincu des dangers de complications en Asie au cas de prolongation de la guerre, mais il n'a pas moins persisté à déclarer que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'était pas capable de [surmonter] l'opposition des milieux militaires à l'abandon d'Andrinople et qu'en conséquence le rétablissement de la paix dépendait de la renonciation de la Bulgarie à cette place."

Bompard à Poincaré, Tel.Nos.697, 698, Péra, 20 décembre 1912, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.99, pp. 118–119.

Also: *Bompard à Poincaré*, Tel.Nos.701, Conf., Péra, 23 décembre 1912, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.111, pp. 132–133; and *Lowther to Grey*, No.1090, Pera, 20 December 1912, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.402, pp. 300–302.

Further, it is pertinent to note the impressions of Joseph C. Grew, First Secretary and, at that time, Acting-Chargé d'Affaires of the United States' Embassy in Berlin, as reported to his Ambassador, currently in Paris:

"To John Leishman, December 27, 12.

I received your letter of the 25th instant this morning and immediately made an appointment with Herr Arthur Zimmermann [Undersecretary of State] whom I saw at 1 o'clock ...

Now as to the Balkans and Vienna, Herr Zimmermann had very little to tell me, beyond the fact that they were urging – that is, the German Government was urging – Turkey to give in on the question of the retention of

Adrianople, Janina and Scutari. He thought that Turkey would take this advice though it was a bitter pill to swallow. He mentioned the fact of the Turkish lack of money, supplies and Generals as absolutely precluding the possibility of further resistance, though there were plenty of good soldiers to fight if the organization were not entirely depleted . . .”

J.C. Grew, *Turbulent era: a diplomatic record of forty years, 1904–1945*. (Ed.) W. Johnson. London: Hammond, 1953. 2 vols. Vol.1, p. 104.

Indeed, as the British Military Attaché reported from İstanbul on 26 December, most officers preferred to continue the war rather than submit on the question of Edirne because they felt there was little more to lose. The secure position of the Turks at Çatalca and increased morale in the Fleet strengthened their resolve. *Tyrell to Lowther*, No.91, Constantinople, 26 December 1912, *F.O.*, 424/241, p. 2.

Such a supposition is borne out by Enver Bey's own assertion, in a letter written on 28 December to his German friend:

“Aujourd’hui j’ai parlé avec le ministre des affaires étrangères, – je suis content du résultat de ma conversation. Je sens sûrement que nous sommes plus forts que nos ennemis, alors je ne veux pas que nous cédions. Si non, eh bien, nous mènerons l’armée, la flotte vers la victoire sans généraux. La flotte fera le premier pas en ce sens, et l’armée bougera après. Demain je verrai encore une fois la ligne de Tchatekdja, – ma conférence après avec le ministre des affaires étrangères décidera notre attitude définitive sur le tapis vert de la conférence de Londres.”

M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 217.

- 257 On 28 December 1912, for the first time, the Ottoman peace proposals were presented at the St. James's Conference (6th meeting). The most relevant one was that: 1) the *Vilayet* of Edirne would remain in the direct possession of the Ottoman Empire. Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 208.

On 1 January 1913 (8th meeting), the final Ottoman peace proposals were submitted, this time in writing:

1. All occupied territories to the west of the *Vilayet* of Edirne would be ceded, but the determination of the boundaries and status of autonomous Albania must be submitted to the decision of the Great Powers.
2. The *Vilayet* of Edirne would remain in the direct possession of the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey and Bulgaria would negotiate any rectification of the frontier recognized by them as necessary.
3. Turkey would not cede any of the Aegean Islands, but would discuss with the Great Powers questions relating to them.
4. Turkey would consent to any resolution that the protecting powers might come to regarding Crete.
5. The four points above form an indivisible whole.

F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 115; and Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit*, II/2, pp. 211–214, for details.

The complete protocol, “Conférence de St. James (Londres), Protocole No.8, Séance du 19 décembre 1912 (1er janvier 1913)”, is found in: *Hariciye Nezareti Arşivi* [Hereafter, *H.N.A.*]. Reproduced in full in B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.29/29a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1976–1982. 2 cilt. Cilt I (1912–1913), Cilt II (1913–1914). Cilt I, Belge No.456, pp. 383–390. Also, the comments of Reşid Paşa, Ottoman delegate to the Conference, dated 2 January 1913, in: *H.N.A.*, (Balkan Harbi), Karton 20/A.2. Reproduced in *ibid.*, Belge No.458, pp. 391–392.

- 258 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 214–224; F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*,

p. 115; and E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, pp. 260-261.

The complete protocol, "Conférence de St. James (Londres), Protocole No.10, Séance du 24 décembre 1912 (6 janvier 1913)", is found in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt I, Belge No.483, pp. 409-411.

According to Mustafa Reşid Paşa, writing on 7 January to Gabriel Noradounghian Efendi:

"Nous avons ajouté que si les alliés en dépit de toute idée de conciliation voulaient rompre négociations responsabilité des conséquences rupture sur eux."

H.N.A., (Balkan Harbi), Karton 20/A.2. Reproduced in full in: *ibid.*, Belge No.491, pp. 419-420.

Further, as Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Britain, reported on the following day, Grey had told him that:

"... he had just had a talk with Reshid Pasha and Tewfik Pasha and that he had left these gentlemen in no doubt as to the gravity of the situation and had impressed upon them that their position could only become worse if they were to suffer new defeats in the field. The Turkish delegates replied that it was impossible to give way not only on military grounds but also on grounds of internal policy."

K.M. Lichnowsky, *Heading for the abyss: reminiscences*. (Trans.) S. Delmer. London: Constable, 1928; p. 200.

- 259 Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 21 Şubat 1944, Sa.171. His notes cover the period between 23 December 1912 and 6 January 1913, and were written while he was in Vienna. They also include letters to Cavid Bey, the last of which (from Kara Kemal Bey) clearly indicates this idea.

In general, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 255-263; and *ibid.*, II/4, pp. 269-276. Also: T. Toros (Hazırlayan), "İttihat ve Terakkinin eski nafia nazırı Ali Münif Bey'in hâtıraları", *Hayat tarih mecmuası*, II:8 (Eylül) 1969-I:1 (Şubat) 1970, esp.see II:11 (Aralık) 1969, pp. 61-66.

- 260 The letter, dated 1 Kanunsâni 1328, first appeared as an annex to Cavid Bey's memoirs: Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 24 Şubat 1944, Sa.174. As Ahmad has also indicated:

"This letter of 444 words ... described Unionist activity over a period of about two months, from mid-November to mid-January ... It is a most valuable document."

F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 117.

It was reproduced in 1952, almost in full, for the first time since its appearance in 1944, by: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 277-280; and is also quoted in part, with comments, by: F. Ahmad, *op.cit.*, pp. 117-118. It is further reproduced, in facsimile, as being "Top secret [Gayet, gayet mahremdir]" with an apparently coded mixed-European and Turkish date which seems not to have been solved by Aydemir in: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt III, pp. 60-61.

In fact, a week later, most likely on 21 January, Talât Bey employed Ali Haydar Bey as a go-between in offering the Grand *Vezirate* in a Unionist Government to Mahmud Şevket Paşa. Ali Haydar Bey spoke to Mahmud Şevket Paşa that very day at his *konak* in Üsküdar, but was rebuffed by the Paşa's nervousness and lack of enthusiasm for a coup at that time in view of both the next day's scheduled Grand Council meeting at the Palace to deliberate on the question of Edirne and his own stated opinion that the war could not be won

militarily. Indeed, he urged Ali Haydar Bey to visit Enver Bey immediately to dissuade him from an immediate coup. A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872-1946*, pp. 243-244.

According to the memoirs of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, recently returned from Yemen, "one night" during the armistice period Talât and Hacı Âdil Beys visited him at home in Feneryolu (near Kadıköy). They offered, provided he was in favour of an offensive to retake Thrace, to force the Cabinet to resign and get him appointed Grand Vezir and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. He, however, had "cold feet" and fobbed them off. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 142.

- 261 Eight letters, written between 3 and 23 January, bear witness to Enver Bey's thinking: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, pp. 218-225. As for his confidential assurance, this comes out clearly from Ali Haydar Bey's secret talk with Enver Bey at the latter's home in Beşiktaş on the morning of 22 January. A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872-1946*, pp. 245-246.

However, my general assessment is based, in the main, on information given in the following:

Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 263-264; A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 586-594; Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, especially the revelations of his son, B. Cemal, who edited the memoirs, pp. 17-18; H. Ertürk, *İki devrin perde arkası: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu teşkilât-ı mahsusasında ve mütareke yıllarının M.M. Grubu Başkanlığında bulunan Hüsameddin Ertürk anlatıyor*. (Yazan) S.N. Tansu. İstanbul: Pınar Yayınevi, 1964; esp. pp. 90-100; C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1087-1093, who also reproduced, in part, the private papers in his possession of Midhat Şükrü Bleda (*ibid.*, *loc.cit*); T. Toros, *İttihat ve Terakkinin eski nafia nazırı Ali Münif Bey'in hâtıraları* II:11 (Aralık) 1969, pp. 61-66; Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'da Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, pp. 365ff.; İ.H. Danışmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 397-401; T. Uzer, *Makedonya eşkiyalık tarihi ve son Osmanlı yönetimi*, pp. 318-324; M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 257ff.; C. Kutay, "Bab-ı Âli baskınına dair bilinmeyen ibret vesikaları", *Tarih sohbetleri*, 7 (Şubat) 1968, pp. 148-192; H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü 1908-1918*, pp. 121-128; and Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 770-793.

- 262 "Netice-i musalahada ordu bittabî bu ahvalin müsebbiplerinin cezasını talep edecek ki (bu da hazırlanmıştır) o da kabine demektir."

Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 24 Şubat 1944, Sa.174 (Annex); and Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt III, p. 60.

The later, far more unrestrained, admission of Talât Paşa appears in: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 770-775.

According to Staff-Major Ali Fethi Bey, he actually received an invitation from Talât Bey on the evening of Sunday, 19 January 1913, which informed him of the impending action, including the date set for it. F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*, pp. 182-183. However, I cannot verify this.

An account was reported

"by an Englishman at the front . . . on Red Cross duty with the Turkish forces . . . stationed since the early part of November a few miles behind the Chataldja lines".

He stated that:

"In the middle of December . . . thousands of boxes of sweetmeats were sent to the soldiers in the lines, ostensibly as a patriotic gift, but each box contained a warning that the army was being sold by Nazim and the

Cabinet, and that if they wanted to go on fighting they must back the Young Turk party."

"At the Chataldja lines: by an Englishman at the Front", *The Near East*, IV:91 (31 January) 1913, pp. 349-376, p. 363.

On 12 January 1913, the German Ambassador reported that a "Lieutenant Zeki Bey . . . the most influential leader after Enver Bey, of the Unionist officers . . ." visited him and told him that

" . . . his comrades condemned Kamil Pacha's vacillating attitude in the peace question and wished to overthrow the cabinet in order to go on with the war".

Wangeheim an das Auswärtige Amt, Nr.17, Konstantinopel, 12 Januar 1913, G.P., 34.Band/1, Nr.12670, p. 185.

- 263 "Note Collective des Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople à S.E.M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman", in *H.N.A.*, (Balkan Harbi), Karton 20/A. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.544, p. 465.

Also: *Grey to Lowther*, 17 January 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.516, p. 417; and *Bompard à Poincaré*, Péra, 17 janvier 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.230, pp. 290-291.

Helmreich analyzes the "ultimatum" on the basis of the Collective Note, with additional documents: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, pp. 260-263. Cf. the comments of: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 229-243.

On the day of the presentation of the Collective Note, the British Foreign Secretary reminded the British Ambassador:

"I certainly wish to encourage Porte to make peace, but it is very undesirable to take action that would give the impression at Constantinople that there is division between the Powers. You can however use in speaking to the Grand Vizier or Minister for Foreign Affairs the same argument as I have used here that none of the Powers will intervene to save Adrianople, that Turks cannot save it by continuing the war, and may lose other things that are not lost already."

Grey to Lowther, Tel.No.39, Foreign Office, 17 January 1913, *F.O.* 424/241/297.

- 264 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 247-248.

- 265 Y.H. Bayur, "Yeni bulunan bir belge dolayısıyla", *Belleten*, XXX:17 (Ocak) 1966, pp. 103-114, pp. 106-108. The sentences in parentheses are those of the draft which were excluded from the final version.

"Extraits" of the telegram are found in the archive of the Turkish Embassy in London, but do not give the full text of the final, sent version let alone any hint of what had been included in the original draft. *Londra Büyükelçiliği Arşivleri*, [Hereafter, *L.B.A.*], Karton 512/1. Reproduced in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.553, p. 472. Cf.,

"I learn privately from the grand Vizir that H[is] H[ighness] intends before answering the collective note having a telegram sent to Turkish Amb[as-sado]r in London instructing him to set forth to you the difficulties of the Cabinet and the danger that its surrender of Adrianople may lead to civil war and worse calamities than the present and to beg you to endeavour to induce the Balkan States to agree to town of Adrianople and its environs being neutralized and placed under a Moslem governor of any nationality chosen by the Powers . . .

The army does not seem to be really under the control of the Minister of War and it's doubtful whether the Cabinet reposes on any real authority or whether it can assert itself against the committee forces should they come out into the open and become active on carbonari lines . . ."

- Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.28, Conf., Constantinople, 17 January 1913, 11.50 P.M., B.D., IX/2, No.521, pp. 420–421. (Emphasis mine).
- 266 Cemalettin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, p. 50. The author's recollections appear to be borne out by the more immediate evidence of a "Télégramme chiffré" from Noradounghian Efendi, giving "Grande urgence, Très confidentiel" directions to the Ottoman delegation in London, dated, again, 18 January 1913. H.N.A., (Balkan Harbi), Karton 20/A. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.554, pp. 473–474.
- 267 Cf., *Tevfik Paşa à Gabriel Effendi*, No.36/26, Londres, 20 janvier 1913, L.B.A., Karton 512/1. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, pp. 479–480. Also: *Grey to Lowther*, No.22, Foreign Office, 20 January 1913, F.O. 424/241/349; and *Grey to Lowther*, Tel.No.47, Foreign Office, 21 January 1913, F.O. 424/241/358.
- 268 Cemalettin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, p. 51; and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p.144. Cf.,

"General sense of proceedings at the palace today was in favour of peaceful solution . . . Sheikh-ul-islam and some Ulemas spoke at length in a moderate (gr[oulp undeclypherable]) and convincing strain . . . Ministers subsequently met at the Porte and submitted to imperial sanction their decision in favour of peace and a (?) favourable reply to the Powers concerning Adrianople and islands. I shall use my best endeavours to ensure its being as unequivocal and as free as possible from usual Turkish ambiguities."

- Lowther to Grey*, Tel.No.38, Constantinople, 23 January 1913, B.D., IX/2, No.544, p. 438; and the detailed account, by letter, of the Grand Council, in: *Lowther to Grey*, No.58, Constantinople, 24 January 1913, F.O. 424/241/506. Also: *Bompard à Jonnart*, Tel.Nos.42, 43, Constantinople, 22 janvier 1913, D.D.F., Tome V, 3e Série, No.242, p. 306.
- 269 A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 75; and also the protocol, reproduced in full: *ibid.*, pp. 97–98. "4. Zeyil. Edirne'nin terki hakkında Devletler tarafından verilen nota üzerine îtası tasavvur olunan cevabın esaslarını mutazammın Kâmil Paşa tarafından kaleme alınan varaka suretidir."
- 270 Cemalettin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*, pp. 51–52.
- 271 See, for details, the works cited in N.261 above.
- 272 Cf. the comments of: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 262; and also, in general, cf., Y.H. Bayur, *İkinci Meşrutîyet devri üzerine bazı düşünceler*.
- 273 See: G. Vardar, *İttihat ve Terakki içinde dönenler*. (Yazan) S.N. Tansu. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1960; p. 114; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 399, for one Unionist (the first) and one anti-Unionist eye-witness account. In addition, a reliable, journalist's account: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 268ff. Also: A.F. Türk geldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 78–79, who was then at the Porte and heard the "noise"; Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 383; and C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1094–1095, N.2, who heard about the events from Ömer Naci Bey himself when the latter went to Bursa ". . . a few days later". Bayar adds, "His voice was still hoarse." *ibid.*, p. 1095.

The poet, Yahya Kemal, who happened to be in the vicinity, has left one of the liveliest impressions of the crowds and of the dominating presence of Ömer

Naci Bey. Yahya Kemal [Beyathı], *Siyâsî ve edebî portreler*. İstanbul: Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü, 1968; pp. 103–106.

- 274 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılap hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p.587 and N.2; and M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 305–306. Cf., M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, Note on p. 1412. Somewhat vainglorious and therefore not altogether accurate comments from Enver Bey on the behaviour of the Uşak *redif* battalion, are found in a letter of 28 January to his German friend: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 230.

It is interesting to note that even a scholar as perceptive as Tunaya misses the point here: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, p. 427; and its “supporting” evidence: G. Vardar, *İttihat ve Terakki içinde dönenler*, p. 120; whereas Talât Paşa’s statement fully endorses the assertion: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, cilt 2, p. 775.

- 275 Both the Latin- and Arabic-script versions are given in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1102. In the Arabic script, the addition of the word “ahâlî” is clearly visible.

Talât Bey’s account may be found in: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 786–787. Kâmil Paşa related this incident to Ali Fuad Bey immediately after it had taken place. A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 78.

It may also be noted that in the letter of resignation, Kâmil Paşa wrote “. . . Sultan [. . . Padişâhî]” instead of “To the . . . Sultan [. . . Padişâhiye]”, indicating his haste or, as a sceptic might conclude, his agitation. And indeed a sceptic might have good cause. The clue may lie in an inside account of the Porte, given by Ali Fuad Bey, which is the best yet to have appeared in the literature. He starts narrating from the morning of 23 January 1913.

“. . . His Excellency, while Prince Abdülmecid Efendi was in his presence, called for me. He handed me a telegram which had been despatched to the Prince by a Major from Çatalca about the army’s being in a rage [. . . ordunun galeyanda bulunduğu dair . . .], [and] ordered me to go to the Bab-ı Âli and show it to the Grand Vezir [and tell him] to hasten with vigilant precautions. Since, apparently, Abdülmecid Efendi had said, ‘Let me see the draft of the reply once more before its formal presentation; should there be any remark to make let me express it’, [the Sultan] in this respect, wanted me to ask the Grand Vezir’s opinion. I took a carriage and went to the Porte. There I was told that the Cabinet Ministers had just finished their lunch and resumed their meeting in the Chamber, and the Grand Vezir was informed of my arrival. A quarter of an hour later, the Grand Vezir came to his study and sat down. I too sat, in the armchair in front of the window, just beside him. First, I delivered the oral decree about the draft reply. The Grand Vezir told me that this could not be executed [. . . kabil-i icra olamayacağını bildirdi]. Then, presenting the telegram, I said, ‘Permit me to deliver the imperial command’. While he was reading the telegram, a noise was heard from outside. When I turned my head, I saw a number of turbaned and unturbaned men affirming *tekbir* [i.e., repeating ‘*Allahu ekber* (Allah is great)’], some children in front of them, coming towards the Porte. I said to the Grand Vezir, ‘Is there a meeting today? Some men are coming towards the Porte with flags in their hands.’ Saying, ‘There is no such thing’, he carried on reading the telegram. But the noise was continually increasing. Then I turned my head again and said, ‘Sir, they are climbing up on the railings and jumping over them to get in’. He said, ‘Order the doors to be closed’. Then I thought; these people are rebels; no doubt they will attack the Grand Vezir’s room straight away; in this case, staying here is extremely dangerous for me. Under the pretext

of ordering [that the doors be closed] . . . I immediately left the room . . . [He hides himself in the ambassadorial room].”

ibid., pp. 77–78.

- 276 Kâmil Paşa, *Risâle müsveddesi*. Reproduced in part, relating to this period, in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 241, p. 261, pp. 287–289 and pp. 291–293. See esp.p.288.

This “manuscript treatise” (still in its draft form) had been sent by Kâmil Paşa to his Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Reşid Bey, then in Paris, to be published after Ahmed Reşid Bey’s opinion on it had been obtained. Then Kâmil Paşa died (14 November 1913). The only copy, which Bayur used, is this one which remained in Ahmed Reşid Bey’s possession (apparently Kâmil Paşa’s own copy was burned after his death by one of his sons). *ibid.*, II/4, p. 675 and II/1, p.XXIV.

- 277 See p. 180 and N.190 of this Chapter.

Also: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 587; C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1096–1097; and M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 271–272. Cf., *Tyrrell to Lowther*, No.3, Constantinople, 24 January 1913, F.O. 195/2451.

- 278 Quoted in: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 80.

Cf., M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 273 and esp. pp. 298–299.

One of the participants in the Raid, Hüseyin Kadri Bey, who had been standing beside the assassin, also recalled Nâzım Paşa shouting, just before he was shot, “What is this villainy? Is this what you promised me?” – more or less exactly the same words. Reported in: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü 1908–1918*, p. 122.

Capping all this, a letter by Enver Bey on 10 January, again to his German friend, indicates his close relationship with Nâzım Paşa and indeed his – perhaps as yet undisclosed – ideas for Nâzım Paşa’s future role, unpopular though he was, as Grand Vezir and Minister of War in a post-coup Government. M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 221.

Also see: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 784.

- 279 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 256 and pp. 259–262; and *ibid.*, pp. 270–276. Also, for particulars, see the account of the Unionist politician: Cavit Bey, “Hâtıraları”, *Tanin*, 21 Şubat 1944, Sa.171 and 23 Şubat 1944, Sa.173.

Cf. the account of the then Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Reşid Bey: A.R. Rey, *Gördüklerim, yaptıklarım*, esp. pp. 192–196; with M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 304–305. In addition, of course: Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 764.

- 280 See p. 204 and N.262 of this Chapter.

- 281 My emphasis on the “technical” element in a *coup d’état* is based on: C. Malaparte, *La technique du coup d’état*. 2e éd. Paris: Grasset, 1948; Chapitre 1. Cf., A.J. Janos, *The seizure of power: a study of force and popular consent*. Princeton: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1964; pp. 28–35.

- 282 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1103.

Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 400. Also: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p.79; M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 275; and M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1411.

- 283 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1104; and A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 79–80.

According to the later revelation of Midhat Şükrü Bey, Mahmud Şevket Paşa had been fully informed by the Unionists of the planned Raid and had already

- agreed, albeit after some hesitation, to accept the post of Grand *Vezir*. M.Ş. Bleda, *İmparatorluğun çöküşü*, pp. 74–75. Indeed, cf. N.260 of this Chapter and A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872–1946*, p. 247.
- 284 His own copy of the telegram is reproduced in full by: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1109.
Also see: T. Uzer, *Makedonya eşkiyalık tarihi ve son Osmanlı yönetimi*, p. 323; and Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 788.
- 285 The note (*tezkere*) is reproduced in full in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p.1110.
Ahmed İzzet Paşa records his angry reaction to this affront: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 144. Also see, for the Paşa's "irritation" on receiving the note, see: Ziya Şakir [Soko], *Yakın tarihimiz üç büyük adamı: Talât, Enver, Cemal Paşalar*. 2nci basılış. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1944; pp. 106–107.
- 286 A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 80–81.
A copy of the *hatt-ı hümayun* is found in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1875–1876. Cf., M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 282.
- 287 The British Ambassador despatched "Tel.(No.39) Urgent" to his Foreign Secretary, at 9p.m.:

"While Cabinet was sitting this afternoon, Enver Bey, at the head of some forty armed men, appeared and called upon the Cabinet with threats of violence to resign owing to their having given way to the advice of the Powers. This they agreed to do, and Enver Bey, proceeding to the Palace, returned with a chamberlain, who, by order of the Sultan (?), demanded the seals of office.

Enver Bey was accompanied by Talaat, and demonstration gradually increased to about 2,000.

Mahmoud Shefket has become Grand Vizier, Izzet Pasha Minister of War, and Talaat Minister of the Interior.

Enver Bey is said to have declared that he was [group undecipherable: ? commissioned] by the whole army at Chataldja, who demanded continuation of the war. The troops who were detached to guard the Porte declined to act. The reply to the collective note was actually being drafted. It is reported that Nazim, Minister of War, was killed."

Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 23 January 1913, *B.D.* IX/2, No.545, pp. 438–439.

Cf., *Bompard à Jonnart*, Tel.No.44, Péra, 23 janvier 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.246, p. 315.

These reports should be read, for the sake of accuracy, alongside the most reliable eye-witness account of Ali Fuad Bey: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 81–82.

- 288 Maurice Baring, writing for *The Times* of London from İstanbul on 21 November 1912, had already observed the mood just before the successful Çatalca defensive.

"You felt that every Turk . . . was walking about with a heavy heart, and probably every thinking Turk was feeling bitterly that the disasters which had come were due to the criminal folly of a band of alien and childish incompetent political quacks."

M. Baring, *Letters from the Near East*. London: Smith and Elder Co., 1913; p.145.

Towards the end of December, the British Military Attaché reported that ". . . patriotism combined with the desire for revenge . . ." provided the vision

of the military. *Tyrrell to Lowther*, No.93, Constantinople, 27 December 1912, F.O. 424/241, pp. 4–5.

And a young officer, then on his way to the Çatalca front from the Yemen, was still able to reminisce about his and his fellow officers' injured professional pride years after the event:

"In Mersin, I received the first indication from a Customs Officer. During the customs proceedings, he rebuked one or two officers and myself, who were returning to the motherland, for some reason or another for some professional deficiency of ours. Because of these kinds of irregular activities [of ours], namely, 'the faulty activities of officers', he was saying, the disasters had befallen us. I then understood the extent to which the esteem of the military had decreased in the eyes of the citizen. Ashamed, we went on our way without making a fuss."

İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*, pp. 115–116.

At the close of the Balkan War, a young boy of about seven years old, later to become a prominent soldier himself, asked his brother who was a War College cadet why he was wearing his sword concealed, with only the handle showing. The short answer was:

"We were beaten . . . in the Balkan War. Now we must not forget the shame of the event. [So] we have been ordered from now on to wear our swords in this way, out of sight."

C. Madanoğlu, *Anılar (1911–1938)*, I. İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982; p. 10.

The military as the political ruling group

I. Military ratification as a requisite for government policy

In the previous chapter I attempted to indicate the extent to which the officer corps regarded the military as the sole and true custodian of the interests of the state. It was a corollary that the officer corps should proceed further and assume that soldiers were also better than civilians at determining the policies which would best serve those interests. There was, however, a significant paradox in the position of the military: the longer the military struggled for the preservation of the state, the further apart it drew from the civilians and yet the nearer it came to acting the role of a political ruling group. Indeed, whenever the military took a conscious stand against the civilians, the politicians, it became *ipso facto* a formidable political power in the hands of its leaders whose chief political asset was always their claim to be above politics. Yet as long as the military saw itself as both an integral and as the most powerful – and no less needed – institution in the social order, any sense of ambiguity in its role as the political ruling group could hardly occur to it. Inevitably, the officer corps regarded their role as a perfectly natural one. The “role” concept is important for the present Chapter because it reveals the social order within which the officer corps became involved in political issues. As these issues

became more acute and far-reaching and dominated every aspect of society, so the role of the military was automatically extended. Here, the "role" concept sheds light on the officer corps as well as the Ottoman military institution within which they acted. Nevertheless, the individual officer subordinated himself to the perceived needs of his vocation. As I have already asserted, this was a vocation sanctioned by his uniform. His individuality had transcended into a supra-individual reality through which the awareness of individuality had, by 1913, intensified. The conscious political acts of the military were consequently accelerated and shifted from the previous interventionist role to the ruling group role.

Both in explaining and assessing the nature of this transformation, I shall begin with a somewhat loaded and perhaps presumptuous statement which, I hope, will gain more subtlety during the course of the argument. To assume that the soldiers overthrew the Government of Kâmil Paşa merely to reinstate the Unionist politicians in his stead is a common delusion. The *coup d'état* of 23 January 1913 was, as the following developments were to prove, a prologue establishing the military as the political ruling group. In this capacity the officers were actively engaged in making major policy decisions and in cooperating, but on their own terms, with the politicians. Evidently, although the officers became the *de facto* executive, it was their amalgamation with the Committee that gave rise to this general misapprehension. I have shown that the role-expansion of the military made possible the successful staging of the coup, mainly because of the operational orientation of the military, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Unionists' belief that the military possessed the ability to handle it speedily and efficiently. From the standpoint of the questions raised in this study, the process fed upon itself. A task, in this case domestic, needed to be accomplished. The military had the manpower and the resources available and was thus the natural candidate for its completion. Given the task, the military required expertise in order to accomplish it. This, however, it had already built up. Once the military had completed its task it was, as the civilians were to realize, more effective to leave the military to enlarge its operational sphere than to hand the task over to another organization, a political party, which would have been constitutionally more appropriate. The military in this fashion became the logical candidate for the accomplishment of new tasks in related fields as the need arose. And since such tasks became increasingly "political", the military inexorably gained operational political expertise, having already acquired political attitudes. This process, furthermore, seemed to be irreversible because of the way in which

the goals, values and organization of, especially, Unionist opinions were reflected within the officer corps. We must not neglect this consideration. Nor, indeed, did the Unionist politicians. They realized that in the existing political realities of the day, no other course of action than cooperation was viable for them if they wished to have a share of the governance of the state. In fact, all they did was to manage to capture the ethical momentum, so to speak, and to build up a monopoly of zeal. They appear to have believed it unjust that a group of civilians such as themselves could not, on their own, introduce the changes which they had at heart. The military offered the necessary instrument at the cost of submission to the military's protective power. As social psychologists would have argued, for instance, much of the Unionist politicians' behaviour may be traced to frustrated personal ambitions in terms of upward mobility into the Establishment. At this juncture, the close connection between the normative and the utilitarian interests reasserts itself. The point is, of course, that overthrowing the Government was a means to an end. It involved chiefly two judgements – that the end was good and that military action was the only way to achieve it.

Here, it may be advanced as a plausible historical hypothesis that events of this nature are usually affected, or even determined, by chance combinations of circumstances, whereas the broad and gradual transformations in soldiers' ideas, beliefs and aspirations are essentially independent of momentary accidents. Such a hypothesis is necessary to account for the events which were to follow. These events, as I shall try to show, were closely linked with the political conceptions of the military – that is, “politics” dominated society, but it was partisan politics based on military power, so that those who held this power determined policies and thus dominated the society as well. From 1913 onwards, this exalted image of the military has persisted – it was not an image which appeared suddenly with the Raid on the Sublime Porte, but was firmly rooted in the military tradition. Moreover, as the new *Grand Vezir* and Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, was to admit, after the formation of his so-called “non-partisan Cabinet”¹ the politicians were continually reminded and informed of this image.

When the Government of Mahmud Şevket Paşa took office, two of the most important issues which it faced were questions of domestic order and foreign relations. Having first tried to secure a base for “the restoration of public order”² through key military and civilian appointments,³ the Government turned its attention to the

issue of foreign affairs. This was the still unsent Ottoman reply to the Note of the Great Powers. The Grand *Vezir* had this to say in his *Daily notebook* (*Not defterî*):

“From that day on [24 January 1913], the Cabinet met every day. The majority of the Ministers were disposed to war. Enver Bey and the young officers were also thinking in this way. I, with regard to our military and political situation, disapproved of the war. I said that if it were decided in favour of war, I would resign. Because of this, a calming down of the Cabinet resulted.”⁴

Evidently, as the Grand *Vezir* put it, a “calming down” was needed in the political arena. The need arose in order to rally public support for the new Government and thus to gain a free hand in the wording of the reply to the Great Powers while employing certain delaying tactics.⁵ It was not solely the fact that the Cabinet was composed of discordant elements which created disunity on the foreign policy issue. The conflict was partly due to the way in which political and military considerations were intermingled. When, on 25 January, the Grand *Vezir* summoned the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa, to a Cabinet meeting, he asked the latter to explain the military position to the Ministers:

“The Paşa did not advise war; he intensely [*şiddetle* (*sic*)] desired peace. But the Minister of the Interior, [Hacı] Âdil Bey, and the Minister for Education, Şükrü Bey, were just as intensely disposed to war. They did not even bother to listen to İzzet Paşa’s explanations.”⁶

To the Grand *Vezir*, the balancing of a range of political and military interests had by now become essential. There were “Enver Bey and the young officers” who favoured war. There were those Unionist civilians who felt the need for an immediate military success in order to consolidate their position. Finally, there was the Chief of the General Staff who had to be brought in to relieve the pressure on the Grand *Vezir*. The Chief of the General Staff had no intention of letting the young officers influence him.⁷ At this time, therefore, it seemed as though the argument of the Chief of the General Staff and the persuasion of the Grand *Vezir* would provide a breathing space during which the official reply to the Great Powers could be prepared. In a sense it did, but it cost the Government several vital days. And on the day that the official reply was submitted to the Austrian Ambassador, a telegram was received from the Bulgarian commanding General (30 January 1913) which made all the political negotiations academic.⁸ General Savov informed the Ottoman High Command, in writing, that the armistice

would be lifted as from 19.00 hours on 30 January 1913 and, in accordance with the armistice agreement, operations would commence at 19.00 hours on 3 February.⁹ Despite the manifested intention of Bulgaria, the Grand Vezir, on the day after the Bulgarian note was received, assured the German Ambassador that the Empire “. . . would only take defensive measures”.¹⁰ In the face of such a palpably explosive situation, his leanings towards a defensive policy necessitated the assertion of his authority over the two parties who demanded an offensive. Hence, the trepidation of Mahmud Şevket Paşa with regard to the now inevitable resumption of hostilities may be seen as coinciding with his “insistent pressure”¹¹ on Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa to accept the still-vacant position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief as a counterpoise to the war party. In fact, Ahmed İzzet Paşa’s extreme opposition to taking the offensive is evident even in his much later decision that “. . . by shouldering the responsibility for this grave war, on 31 January [1913] *I was compelled to assume the general command of the armed forces.*”¹² This admission may not explain all the factors in his reluctance to assume the general command in the field, arising perhaps from a lingering resentment of the young officers’ disregard for the military hierarchy. His quoted words, written with hindsight, are a striking verdict on his fixed attitude. Such an attitude by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, especially in view of the impending renewal of hostilities in a diplomatically-isolated international atmosphere, could only have invited his loss of grip over the military. Added to this was the policy of procrastination which now dominated the thinking of the Grand Vezir. This policy provided an opportunity for the Unionist civilians who wanted war. For Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s Cabinet, as well as the bureaucracy, contained Unionist civilians who “. . . still bore the moral responsibility for the Raid on the Porte . . .”,¹³ and even the least sincere among them were therefore obliged to appear in a warlike posture. It thus became apparent that there was a dominant theme in the Unionists’ policy – the desire for an offensive. And their mobilization of patriotic feeling among the predominantly Turkish and Muslim section of the populace bears witness to their attitude. For example, the formation of the Committee of National Defence¹⁴ (*Müdafaa-ı Millîye Cemiyeti*) on 1 February may be ascribed to rational calculation as well as to their own emotional involvement. It is doubtful, however, whether this offensive spirit would have made any difference in the face of the prevailing mood of the Government had it not been for the military insisting upon the inevitability of an offensive. Now, simultaneously with the renewal of hostilities with Bulgaria, the young officers – in the

Grand *Vezir's* words – not only wanted to have their views considered but attempted to press them and even to assume the lead in realizing them. Such evidence as exists indicates very clearly that the determination for an offensive was first crystallized by these young officers. Moreover, high-level decision-makers, whether in their civilian or their military capacity, were requested to comply with the wishes of their subordinates. It is worth emphasising this point because our evidence further demonstrates that the young officers of 1913 had become the major driving force in the policy-making not only of the Government but also of the military institution. Their approach was deliberately aggressive and, apparently, they fully appreciated the importance of gaining a name by pressurizing men in positions of power, military or otherwise. The specific piece of evidence I shall now proffer is as striking and reliable as one could wish.

In a complete breach of military hierarchy and code of conduct, and evidently thereby in full confidence of their own indispensability, two staff-officers attached to the Mediterranean [Çanakkale] Straits “Allotted” Army [Corps] (*Bahr-i Sefid Boğazi Kuvây-i Mürettebesi*), Majors Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys, submitted a joint report direct to Mahmud Şevket Paşa in his capacity as Minister of War. A copy was also sent to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. In the report, misdated – no doubt in haste – “4/5 Şubat 1328” but actually 4/5 Şubat 1913, they first dwelled at some length on the political and military situation since 23 January and then proceeded to a

“. . . discussion of the afore-mentioned situation and the results obtained thereof:

In order that the nation and public opinion be not deceived and that the Cabinet not contradict its own credentials, the decision must be seen to have been taken for the elimination of the enemy [Bulgarian] forces' numerical and strategic superiority through a resolute and decisive offensive action. In fact, any other kind of decision than this must not be taken [Filvaki bundan başka türlü karar verilemez] . . .

Consequently, to reach Edirne, first of all it is necessary that the total Bulgarian forces in Çatalca be defeated, secondly, the siege must be lifted by force [and] thirdly, to avoid the destruction of the besieged, abundant provisions should be sent speedily to the town. For all these [purposes], therefore, an offensive operation is required. This offensive must either be launched directly from Çatalca, by land, or from both the land and – in order to threaten the rear of the main body of the Bulgarian forces through landing operations – from the sea, or simultaneously from the Gelibolu peninsula.

The postponement for even a moment of the offensive is not acceptable. Day by day Edirne is losing her strength and nearing a fall . . .

Consequently the forces that are in the Gelibolu harbour must be

brought speedily to Çatalca and orders given to the forces that are to remain in Gelibolu for an outright attack jointly with the Army [Group] of Çatalca. Otherwise, those matters in which the [present] Cabinet differ from the fallen Cabinet will not become clear, and the reasons for the exaltation and commendation of those who effected the *coup d'état* of 23 January 1913 will be considered inexplicable, and who knows what kinds of things will happen next [Aksi halde kabinenin sâkit kabineden inhiraf eylediği cihetler taayyün edemeyecek ve 10 Kânun-u sâni 328 darbe-i hükûmetini ika' edenlerin esbâbı takdir ve sitayışı gayr-i kabil-i izah bulunacak ve kimbilir daha neler olacaktır]."¹⁵

The assertion of such strategic thinking implies more than at first appears, because it sketches, even at this early stage, the main outlines of a political ruling group role. It can be argued (and with justice) that the strongly-worded demand to open an offensive – or, as the Grand *Vezir* had put it, “officers wanting war” – had deeper connotations. Bluntly, when the officers wanted something to be done, for example, a policy to be followed, they did everything to secure it; and in the course of their efforts they resented interference of any kind. In this sense, they could not avoid reinforcing the idea that political power derived from coercive might. If they wanted to expand their political power in the state and to preserve the remains of the state then, as their reasoning suggests, they felt justified in bringing any pressure to bear on successive governments. Thus, at the outset, the advocates of *l'attaque* gained control of the military in a constantly deteriorating military situation in which the highest command hesitated and prevaricated but finally submitted to the will of their subordinates.

In effect, however, the Şarköy-Bolayır offensive of 8 February 1913, launched simultaneously from sea and land, more or less exactly as the report had urged, was a failure. And for this, apart from an overall lack of preparation, efficient execution and coordination between political and military strategy and a disregard for superior authority, the ambitions and professional jealousies of the young officers were largely responsible.¹⁶ This last aspect was the crucial symptom of the frustrations of the officers – such as Mustafa Kemal, Ali Fethi and Enver Beys – in the face of their unattained military objectives against the enemy. It may be indicative of the constant but occasionally curious inter-relationship of war and politics that the undoubted political victory of the young officers in procuring the acceptance of their offensive plan should now, when put to the test, have been upset by an unforeseen military failure. It was this failure that had the effect of creating personal quarrels; the leading personalities seem to have had no

compunction about violating military discipline by mutual accusations, threats of resignation and demands for changes in the command structure.¹⁷ In the face of these disruptive factors in the delicate balance between freedom and subordination, had the Government applied the disciplinary means of control which in theory it possessed, the importunity of the officer corps might have been curbed. But the failure to apply these legal restraints, such as a penal code and administrative regulations, or even normative restraints, as in the nurturing of a military code of conduct, implies a lack of governmental ability rather than a lack of desire.

This suspicion of mine is amply borne out by a secret letter, dated 22 February 1913 (9 Şubat 1328), from the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, to the Grand *Vezir* and Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa. This document is, therefore, important as conclusive evidence for the magnitude of the officer corps' accomplishment in extending the scope of the military's power and the marked recognition of military personalities. The concluding paragraph contains a passage which deserves especial mention, for it is the frank, even pathetic, admission by Ahmed İzzet Paşa of his and the Government's inability to take the initiative in implementing legal measures to control the young officers. It reads:

"If it is absolutely impossible that these irresponsible persons who are toying so carelessly with the fate of the motherland be disciplined under military law [. . . kanûnen itâ'at-ı askerîyeye alınmaları . . .] by the Government, [then] at the very least, those of their friends who have personal influence over and standing with them should be put forward as mediators. [Meanwhile] I am hastily submitting this petition on the matter to Your Highness' August Offices with the conviction that it is fitting that there be requested of them a little self-sacrifice, a little moderation and compassion for this poor motherland; in short, respect for and obedience to the [military] laws and regulations."¹⁸

These words, written in the despair of the moment, forecast the whole predicament now facing the "old" *mektepli* officers, just like that which had previously faced the "old" *alaylı* officers. A state of political helplessness now reigned among the senior officers – not that it was quite as intense as it had been among the "old" *alaylıs*. Of course, only when seen from a distance does the assertion I have made reveal its overall validity. If we approach more closely and study the details, we may notice some features which do not seem to fit the picture presented here. Nevertheless, though these may appear as the analysis proceeds, they will not nullify the self-image of the officer corps: an image which presented itself to, and was likewise utilized by the civilians. And they, too, acted in accordance with the emotions it aroused.

From what has been said so far, it will doubtless have become clear that the predominance of the officer corps was the destiny of the state, which had all along been fated to become involved with the young soldiers of destiny. The more the “elders” and the “youngers” had struggled for control of the destiny of the state, the more the distinction between the two had tended to develop; and the greater the distinction, the greater the desire of the elder to restrain the younger. For the truly “young” officers – young in age but old by professional experience – stealth and guile were unworthy methods and, above all, too slow. And so they charged on, inevitably making mistakes but succeeding in much that they thought necessary, and leaving in their trail a regiment of indignant critics who were repelled less by the actions themselves than by the initiators and their methods. These critics, indeed, formed a potential opposition, hostile to the activities and the energy which the officer corps, especially now in the person of Enver Bey, so completely exemplified. Bearing these considerations in mind, we may now turn to trace their reflection upon the sequence of events.

After the offensive was marred by faults in tactical coordination and breakdowns in command efficiency, “. . . from the second half of February it was understood that Edirne could not be saved”.¹⁹ As we have observed, the renewal of hostilities had not been of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's seeking and he was now doubly anxious for peace. The military's failure had given the Grand Vezir the opportunity to secure agreement for an attempt at a peace settlement; and this, judging by my reading of his *Daily notebook*, led him to renew his efforts to reopen diplomatic talks with the Great Powers. As he wrote, his despondency stemmed from the aftermath of the unsuccessful Şarköy-Bolayır offensive. The news from Edirne and other military positions in the Balkans was not encouraging. The soldiers defending Edirne were in despair and cases of cholera had appeared in the town. The Governor was worried about food supplies, informing the Grand Vezir that provisions would last only until the end of February.²⁰ Moreover, the two other remaining fortresses, İşkodra and Yanya, were also under siege. If peace were not concluded within two or three weeks, Mahmud Şevket Paşa feared that it would be impossible to save the fortresses with all their men and *matériel*. Finally, a split in the military command following the failure in the field made it inconceivable to continue the war with such a force.²¹ Mahmud Şevket Paşa's diagnosis seems to have derived not merely from the reasonings of a soldier-turned-politician, but also from a kind of intuitive recognition of the policy of the timely concession – a concession which mainly

entailed giving up Edirne to Bulgaria. Despite his official attitude, which was one of no compromise on Edirne, "the Great Powers had already understood that the Ottoman Government was . . . seeking peace and if appearances were to be maintained, she would be willing to give up Edirne".²² Although the propitious moment for such a concession seemed to have arrived, it was for the Grand *Vezir* still a notable exercise in political legerdemain, because he now considered the question of foreign policy an arcanum, managed and understood only by himself.²³ Yet foreign policy was tied up with a vital domestic issue. Already, two very prominent Unionists, the former President of the Chamber of Deputies, Halil Bey, and the former Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, were putting pressure on Mahmud Şevket Paşa to prevent him from moving towards a peaceful settlement which they considered totally unacceptable.²⁴ Henceforward, not strong enough to unite the Unionist politicians under his own sway and disappointed at the niggardly support they had given him, it appears that Mahmud Şevket Paşa was determined to lean upon the support of the military. Amid such political circumstances as these, even if the quest for peace had been untrammelled by immediate military considerations it is very doubtful whether any satisfactory conclusion could have been reached; most important of all, the officer corps could not be excluded from the final decision. Now, on this immediate issue of peace, if he came to terms with the powerful young officers, the Grand *Vezir* would become powerful enough to overcome any opposition. Moreover, he would not have doubted the validity of the image of the officer corps or of the continuous tradition of its acceptance by governments. The decision for, this time, peace – however much he desired it – still had to be ratified, as it were, by the officer corps. In brief, the Grand *Vezir* had to persuade the Unionists of the necessity for an immediate peace, but he could only do so with the assent of the officer corps.

In the evening of 19 February, Mahmud Şevket Paşa left for Gelibolu on board the Imperial Yacht, S.S. Ertuğrul. The official pretext for his visit was to reconcile the dispute which had broken out between the commands of the Xth Army Corps and the Mediterranean [Çanakkale] Straits "Allotted" Army [Corps] in the aftermath of the unsuccessful Şarköy-Bolayır offensive. However, bearing the circumstances in mind, a careful reading of the entries covering this trip in Mahmud Şevket Paşa's *Daily notebook* reveals a second aim.

Landing in Gelibolu on the morning of 20 February, the Grand *Vezir* was met by the Commander of the Gelibolu Combined Forces, Major-General Hurşid Paşa, his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel

Enver Bey, and a Staff-Major from the Xth Army Corps H.Q., Sabih Bey. After the official inspection of troops, the group proceeded to Bolayır on horseback. On the road, according to the Grand *Vezir*'s account – the only account we have – Mahmud Şevket Paşa spoke to Hurşid Paşa about the disputes and was reassured by him. Yet when they were joined by Major-General Fahri Paşa, Commander of the new Bolayır Army Corps, the latter provoked a furious argument with Hurşid Paşa over their respective professional competence; they were duly quashed by Mahmud Şevket Paşa. However, the argument flared up again at the Bolayır Headquarters to be silenced, with ease and contempt, by the Grand *Vezir*, who admonished Fahri Paşa in particular, saying, "At a time when the [Ottoman] nation is expecting service from us, I deplore such behaviour on your part that can only benefit our enemies." He then dismissed both Commanders.²⁵

It is precisely from this point on that Mahmud Şevket Paşa's narrative reveals more than it intends. For instance, when he summoned Staff-Major Ali Fethi Bey, Chief of Staff of the Bolayır Army Corps, the latter's argument did not confine itself simply to the strictly military matters concerning which his commanding officer had himself become embroiled on the road to Bolayır and been subsequently silenced by the Grand *Vezir*. "The Government", Ali Fethi Bey told Mahmud Şevket Paşa, "has been led into a blind alley with the Raid on the Sublime Porte."²⁶ The Paşa did not silence him but, in fact, discussed the matter with him. Another officer followed Ali Fethi Bey. This was Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey.

"In order to settle the problem [i.e., the dispute among the officers]", Enver Bey proposed to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, "take me to İstanbul, to the Operations Section at the Ministry of War, and give Fethi Bey the position of Chief of the General Staff. As for Mustafa Kemal Bey, appoint him Chief of Staff of the Bolayır Army Corps."²⁷

Again, the Paşa did not silence the young officer, but found rather that "I liked Enver Bey's proposal".²⁸ Later, the Paşa assembled all the Corps and Division Commanders and, having sharply criticized the overall incompetence of "our" leadership and administration, drove the point home by saying:

"From every aspect I see the need for peace. But at the very least, until such time as peace is concluded, do avoid provoking any regrettable incident. Do your best to perform your duty well. Show some sacrifice, so that we do not have to make peace under even more adverse conditions than these."²⁹

After further inspections around the Gelibolu peninsula, that evening Mahmud Şevket Paşa sent a telegram to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, ordering the replacement of Fahri Paşa by Brigadier-General Mehmed Ali Paşa, Commander of the Maydos Army Corps. Subsequently, during the night (20/21 February) he sent a second, coded, telegram, dated 21 February, giving a fuller account of his intentions – most notably and significantly for us, that Enver Bey was to be moved to the Operations Section of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters. Early the following morning (21 February), the Grand Vezir received a letter from Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys, in the same provocative language as before, urging against taking Enver Bey to İstanbul on the grounds that such a move would provoke great rivalry among the officers, and proposing instead that Fahri Paşa and Enver Bey be transferred to some other part of the front. It was after this that Mahmud Şevket Paşa, according to his *Daily notebook*, determined to move the Xth Army Corps to İstanbul and remove Hurşid Paşa and Enver Bey from Gelibolu in this way, as otherwise when Fahri Paşa, Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys reached İstanbul they would adopt an antagonistic stance which might be utilized by the opposition; moreover, by separating Ali Fethi Bey from his friends, the Grand Vezir reasoned that he would be weakened and thus further trouble avoided. He summoned Hurşid Paşa and Enver Bey and briefed them; Enver Bey was in favour of transferring the Xth Army Corps to İstanbul.³⁰ The Grand Vezir then left Gelibolu and returned to İstanbul.

To recap, amidst the plethora of detail I have felt obliged to narrate here, the thrust of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's intention becomes clear. For the first time, the suggestion of peace had found explicit expression. Yet it may be perceived that on this still critical issue, the course which the Grand Vezir adopted, humiliating though it must have been for a man in his high office to have to follow, accrued ultimately to his own advantage. He not only tried to settle the dispute by seeming to comply with the wishes of the young officers but also gained, in return, good ground in acquiring their vital support for his persistent and main aim. However, judging from the content and tone of the young officers' comments and proposals, by now their ascendancy was clearly such that their views had to be taken into account by whoever was in charge of the Government.

Against this background, Mahmud Şevket Paşa applied himself to resolving the difficulties of his position. The Government was as yet ill-provided with military support upon which it could depend, and military support at this moment would have rallied to the

Grand *Vezir's* peace policy many who had not so far declared themselves, and, at the same time, would have made him strong enough to subdue the most ardent opponents of his policy. Subsequent events proved that the peace itself and the question of support for a peace policy had to be pursued simultaneously; and for the Grand *Vezir*, the sooner this occurred the better. This did now occur.

Mahmud Şevket Paşa's decision on 21 February to bring the Xth Army Corps to İstanbul was immediately put into effect, and the Corps transferred over the next few days to its new position at Yeşilköy on the Çatalca front, just outside the capital. The immediate consequence was that the bulk of the forces which, according to the projected strategy, should have been used to save Edirne were now transferred to İstanbul. In other words, ". . . the possibility of sending reinforcements to Edirne had been considerably reduced".³¹ On the other hand, we should not fail to appreciate that henceforth the Government had a force at hand wherewith to quell any domestic threat.

When the Cabinet met in the afternoon of 22 February 1913, the principal preoccupation was Edirne and the related issue of peace. This, as the Grand *Vezir* realized, was bedevilled by the persistent inability of the Cabinet to reach any firm decision. As we have noted, from the beginning the Cabinet was an uneasy, suspicious and divided confederation and by now the divergence of attitude on the issue had become plain. During discussion, Mahmud Şevket Paşa vindicated his position on the basis of reports prepared by the Minister of the Navy, Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, and by a German military expert. All the reports specified the lack of offensive capability by the Ottoman forces. Moreover, Ahmed İzzet Paşa had written to the Cabinet that unless peace were decided upon he intended to resign. But yet again, the ardent Unionist Ministers of the Interior, Hacı Âdil Bey, and of Education, Şükrü Bey, who were the leaders of the "war party", openly objected to a peace which involved the cession of Edirne to Bulgaria.

Now the Grand *Vezir*, having acquired ratification, as it were, for his aim, was able to say to the Cabinet that he was an independent man and not the ". . . plaything of the Committee".³² He argued that the Empire needed peace even at the cost of losing Edirne to Bulgaria. The opposition of the influential Unionists must also have had some effect in strengthening the Grand *Vezir's* resolve, for he threatened to resign if the Cabinet did not decide on peace the next day. Realizing that the Grand *Vezir* had secured the backing of both the young and the elder officers, the Cabinet

yielded “unanimously [ittifakla]” to Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s carefully-composed peace plan on 23 February. Matters then proceeded to a decision of the sort that Mahmud Şevket Paşa wanted – that the still resisting city of Edirne be surrendered to Bulgaria.³³

In a realm where constitutional forms existed, although their spirit – already faint – had disappeared, and where the state was not only shaken by war but was rent by political feuds which vented themselves in the proscription and exile of the losers, not unnaturally politicians appear to have been inspired by mutual suspicion and antagonism. The Grand *Vezir*, having for the moment persuaded all those whose opinions counted of the wisdom of his policy, was still not eager to let the offer he had made about Edirne be known in the capital. As the days passed, however, rumours concerning the fate of the besieged city became rife. His policy was opposed by some Unionist politicians, as I have indicated, on the grounds that the Grand *Vezir* had failed to achieve the deliverance of Edirne. Others, such as the Director-General of the Police, Azmi Bey, and the Guardian of İstanbul, Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey – whatever they felt about the offer themselves – were wary of the potential reaction of the populace, especially the mainly Turkish and Muslim émigrés and refugees from Rumelia now that the news of this offer was spreading.³⁴ More important than these, and for whose activities they had unconsciously prepared the ground by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension, were the anti-Unionist groups. Such an atmosphere was certainly expedient for the hard-line opposition, simply because they could manipulate the fluidity of the kind of state in which to lose political power was to lose everything. Hence, those who had lost it in the aftermath of the Raid on the Sublime Porte had become desperate and now sought to overthrow the Government by secret conspiracy at home and by intrigues abroad “. . . as far apart as Paris and Cairo”.³⁵

Here it is unnecessary to give a detailed description of the secret conspiracy involving a committed but motley collection of dissidents. Sufficient information has been given by one of those dissidents, Ahmed Bedevi (Kuran) Bey and, in an almost identical way, by the account of the then Guardian of İstanbul, Cemal Bey.³⁶ All that need be noted here is that this conspiracy forms a link in the chain of historical causation and fits smoothly into our recognized family of sequences. At the same time, it is another episode proving that the officer corps were becoming more and more aware that they were indispensable and, indeed, were bound to dominate any group, political party or Government – Unionist or otherwise. The immediate result was, and had to be, the adherence of these bodies

unconditionally and even enthusiastically to the military. In this connection, certain accessory facts are worth mentioning.

As he has told us, when the movements of some anti-Unionist figures became known to him, the Grand *Vezir* travelled by car to Yeşilköy in the early hours of the morning of 2 March. He adds:

"My purpose was to see Enver Bey. I met him. I said to him, 'Prince Sabahaddin Bey is working *against us*. We have seized the proclamations that they have printed for publication. It is understood that these people cannot keep from fidgeting. *We must take the necessary measures.*'³⁷ . . . [The next day] while talking with Enver Bey at the Babîlî, the Guardian of İstanbul, Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey, also came [and joined us]. He said that apart from Prince Sabahaddin Bey two more groups were working against us. He explained that at the head of one of these groups was the second heir-apparent, Prince Vahideddin Efendi and, at the head of the other, *Damad* [nephew-in-law of the Sultan] Salih Paşa."³⁸

His words would be sufficient proof, without any other evidence, that the opposing factions were restive and that there was activity among those who were displeased with the policy of the Government and who wanted to force a change. From the angle of this study, it suffices to point out that had the opposing anti-Unionist factions been united and had the support of the military materialized, something might have been achieved by those who were depicted by Kuran as wishing ". . . to make a windfall gain (lit., to catch the government bird [*devlet kuşu*])" and for this, admits Kuran, ". . . they appeared to have united".³⁹ One might further argue, on the basis of evidence given at some length in Ahmad, that the opposition operating from Cairo were forced into an all-too-frequent modification of their policies. Because of a lack of military support they were not able to take an effective part in the politics of the Empire and, in fact, spent more time abroad than they would have desired. For instance, in the case of the former Grand *Vezir*, Kâmil Paşa, this deficiency meant that he could in no way have been provided with the consolation of success in requite for the odium which he seems to have incurred by his continuous attempts to collaborate with Britain.⁴⁰ Similarly, at home, whatever progress Prince Sabahaddin Bey and his clique may have made in their preparations for a coup in the capital, they could not have taken over the Government. This is not all surmise. First, they were thoroughly infiltrated by Cemal Bey's agents and consequently became impotent when prolonged pressure was put on them.⁴¹ Secondly, the heterogeneity of the civilian opposition was matched by the lack of solidarity among the disillusioned but reckless, though mostly retired, military spirits. What appear to have been

their individual motives of self-interest,⁴² stemming in the main from grievances of a professional character, did not even bring together a coherent group of military opposition. All it did was create a number of separate, little and private cliques, sometimes repelled by the civilians but unable to establish a basis for action independent of their civilian sympathizers. For they were too divided in their aspirations to unite through an ideological or professional bond despite their profound disagreement with the bulk of the officer corps and the Grand Vezir. Their divisions may, then, help to explain their lack of cohesive support for any civilian group but, on the other hand, their variety and divergency was such that it endowed them with an elusiveness difficult to keep tabs on. Finally, but most importantly, all the opposing factions at home and abroad were able to make virtually no headway because there was, arrayed against them, a greater power in the Ottoman realm – the power that was now able to instigate, motivate and manipulate policies and push them smoothly to their conclusions, at least as far as was possible in the circumstances of the time. Yet the officer corps directed their energies toward their ends with such extreme smoothness that their power is not always easy to detect. And this has barely been appreciated by historians. Even the common designation of this period as that of the Committee of Union and Progress, with political rather than military overtones, may be taken as proof of my assertion. In short, the officer corps knew what they wanted and were able to anticipate the moves of any opposition and, therefore, neutralize them in advance.

Now, if we turn to the domestic conspiracy, we shall recognize both the indispensability and independence of the officer corps and their untrammelled actions, so well exemplified by Cemal Bey and his organization – manned wholly by officers – in uncovering the conspiracy of the Prince Sabahaddin Bey group, proclaiming their activities in the press and subsequently rounding up the offenders. A court martial, under Major Nafiz Bey, found the conspirators guilty and delivered various sentences.⁴³ Yet despite the elimination of the ringleaders of this group, Sabahaddin Bey, who provided the “moral protection”,⁴⁴ remained at large – due apparently to the conciliatory attitude of Talât Bey, who asked Cemal Bey to postpone the Prince’s arrest until irrefutable evidence of his guilt had been secured. By the time Cemal Bey obtained this evidence, Prince Sabahaddin Bey had left the country.⁴⁵ What is more important, however, was the position of some hard-line opposition figures and cliques who had managed to lie low, undetected, mainly because of their alienation from the Prince Sabahaddin Bey group over the tactics of a *coup d’état*. On the other hand, their divergent

positions made their detection difficult, and concentration on the Prince and his group meant that there was not time nor effort enough to detect other dissidents.⁴⁶

All now seemed settled in and around the capital under the aegis of the officers, who had made themselves the political ruling group – a role which, having once created, they were compelled to pursue.

Away from the capital, however, the fall of the fortress of Yanya after a protracted struggle to overwhelming Greek forces on 6 March,⁴⁷ was followed by a defeat on the diplomatic front. For the reply of the now morally and materially superior Balkan allies, on 14 March, to the proposed mediation of the Great Powers was not at all congruent with the Grand Vezir's aspirations for peace.⁴⁸ Nor were their attached conditions likely to be acceptable to the officer corps, whose *de facto* position in the state meant that its ratification was deemed necessary. What now occurred as a result was the agreement of the officers and the Grand Vezir on the idea of increasing the number of offensive reconnaissances (*keşf-i taarruz*) against Bulgarian forces. For the Great Powers' seeming calculation of a waiting game "... for the fall of either Edirne or the Cabinet"⁴⁹ had, in fact, created an adverse effect on the Grand Vezir's hopes for peace, while the officer corps had always at heart believed that the issue could only be resolved by war.⁵⁰ So when these two sides had realized the identity of their views they were both, this time, prepared to be aggressive – an aggression which was felt to be crucial since the "... war in Thrace ... had entered the secondary phase when war is only a means of forcing on some political purpose of a more or less national character".⁵¹ But although such a policy ought to have borne fruit, by this stage the Empire seemed not to possess effective means to pursue it. Thus, for example, a general offensive reconnaissance along the Çatalca front on 18 March, prepared and commanded personally by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, was checked by the Bulgarian forces within three days.⁵² By 30 March the futility of continuing this kind of policy, apart from creating a convergence of civilian and military views, must have become apparent to the Government since it was decided to invite and to accept the Great Powers' proposals for mediation.⁵³ But it was too late to expect a favourable response – for the news had already arrived that Edirne had capitulated to the combined forces of Serbia and Bulgaria on 26 March 1913.⁵⁴

On the afternoon of 31 March, the Grand Vezir received the

conditions for mediation now officially communicated to the Government.⁵⁵ As he wrote in his *Daily notebook*, in accepting the mediation of the Great Powers:

"My Cabinet colleagues did not show any desire to discuss the peace conditions, nor even to talk about them. I wished to read the report of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, İzzet Paşa, on the latest military situation. They did not even want me to read it out."⁵⁶

Yet there was greater discussion by the public among whom an atmosphere of anger and panic was developing, even if the more informed section of public opinion understood the evolution of social and political forms which had been shaping alternative policies. As a contemporary foreign observer aptly stressed: "In Adrianople the Ottoman Empire had lost the sacred city of Old Turkey, a shrine of its glorious past."⁵⁷ And the news of the loss had "... created a deep grief in the whole of the armed forces".⁵⁸ This loss was a turning-point rather than another indication of the political and military crises that could be conceived as being limited to momentary reverses. In its essence, it epitomized the growing awareness of international isolation and of helplessness – an awareness which was continually increasing, which had produced and now kept on producing intellectual remedies for the ills of the Empire. The ills were diagnosed by some, but the prescriptions they prepared proved to be useless. Others knew, or at least thought they did, how to administer prescriptions already prepared elsewhere and only recognized those parts of the ills which fitted these ready-made prescriptions. And finally, there were those who neither diagnosed the ills nor were able to prescribe solutions, but did not like anyone to allude to their inability. On the other hand, all of them recognized the appalling dilemmas which faced the country. This, at least, provided a modicum of agreement.

II. Strategies for survival

Without doubt the Ottoman Empire was in a condition of transition, of restlessness and of political dislocation which, naturally, created an intellectual ferment. A strategy for survival had to be sought. The choice would determine future political philosophy. Hence, an avid interest in the so-called "schools of thought"⁵⁹ which all arose from an urgent and practical problem – the need to understand the political situation which was producing such unhappiness and difficulties for those trapped within it. This situation was an example of Edmund Burke's dictum that:

"The bulk of mankind on their part are not excessively curious concerning any theories whilst they are really happy; and one sure symptom of an ill-conducted state is the propensity of the people to resort to them."⁶⁰

Indeed, it is difficult to resist the contention that the presence of a propensity to resort to schools of thought indicated an unstable political situation, in Burke's terms. These schools of thought were, without exception, visions of political order (*nizam*), fashioned mostly in contrast to the "ill-conducted state" in which the schools themselves existed.

The loss of Edirne, as the symbol of the military reverses suffered by the Empire, created the impulse to search for a policy. This was a reaction which would result in the coming to the fore of a policy based on the preservation of the Empire but centred on the recognition and accentuation of its essential, Turkish core. Such inspired Turkism.

Ziya Gökalp's *Three currents of thought* (*Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*), serialized from 20 March 1913 – just before the loss of Edirne,⁶¹ was an exposition of a policy which would combine both aspects. In point of fact, however, Gökalp's thinking was not exclusively determined by considerations as theoretical as the preceding statement might suggest. The practical urgency of the problem at that time need hardly be stressed. To this must be added Gökalp's own political standing. As he was an influential member of the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress, his writings may be taken as representative of the official thinking of the Unionists.⁶² From this perspective, "the task . . ." was not, as Berkes claims, only ". . . to analyze the self or the consciousness of the society and to discover the new orientations towards which its aspirations were turned".⁶³ It was also to work out a practical strategy and then apply it, step by step, as political circumstances might permit. From the standpoint of the issues that will be discussed here, this is, after all, the decisive point. It is often thought that Gökalp's thinking was evolved without too much regard for realities; but this is a fallacy. Gökalp, in his first article, made it plain that he was basically concerned with practical considerations:

"Today the West as well as the East shows unmistakably that our age is the Age of Nations. The most powerful force over the mind of this age is the ideal of nationalism . . . If our statesmen and party leaders do not hold this ideal, they cannot establish a spiritual leadership over the communities and the peoples constituting the Ottoman state. The experiences of the last four years have shown that the Turks who, in order to maintain understanding between the nationalities [under

Ottoman rule], denied Turkism and proclaimed Ottomanism have, at last, realized bitterly what kind of a conciliation the nationalities would accept. *A people moved by the sentiment of nationality can only be ruled by men who have the idea of nationalism in themselves.*"⁶⁴

This view assumed the guise of a political ideology and as such lent itself to an indoctrination pattern – a pattern of extrinsic politicization toward which the officer corps were to be attracted. Gökâlp's tendency to regard even Unionist Governments as irrelevant was all the more significant because it coincided with a changing attitude to Ottoman politics.

"Psychologically, the survival of the Ottoman state came to be regarded as equal to national survival . . . [and] culminated in the idea that the state could be saved and eventually reformed by giving it a Turkish national character."⁶⁵

At the same time, the avowed purpose of such an ideology within the political context of civil-military relations was to encourage and emphasise the values of the officer corps. In itself, this was only to be expected. In the time and circumstances of the spring of 1913, Turkism and nationalism were not conceived as antagonistic to Empire or religion. As Gökâlp wrote:

"Turkish nationalism is not contrary to the interests of the Ottoman state; in fact, it is its most important support . . . [hence] Turkism is the real support of Islam and of the Ottoman state, and is against cosmopolitanism."

He went on to stress that there was " . . . no incompatibility between Turkish nationalism and Islam, since one is nationality and the other is internationality".⁶⁶

From these fragments it is clear that the concept of Turkism was conceived as complementary to that of Ottomanism and as a support to "Islamism". Equally, it was not just a programme for action. It was more of a combination of themes which had originated at different times and which now had to be re-stated with fresh emphasis. Turkism, above all, was an ideology of the last resort in that Ottomanism and "Islamism" on their own now seemed to offer an inadequate basis for survival. Its success, however, depended not only on what it meant to its supporters but also on what it meant to its opponents. It was in this sense a reaction to the nationalist claims of the *millets*. As Berkes has pointed out:

"The more the voices of nationalism were raised among the non-Turkish nationalities, the more the sound began to appeal to Turkish people."⁶⁷

Although the "... appeal to Turkish people" might seem, at first sight, rather vague, its application to Ottoman society had a dual significance. First, military reverses in the Balkans, paradoxically enough, aided the growth of military influence, principally because they created the need for a strong military in order to repair the losses. Secondly, it may be asserted that Turkism and the power of the military developed hand in hand until a position was reached in which "... men who have the idea of nationalism in themselves", as Gökâlp put it, were able to utilize even military defeats to expand their influence. Yet the rule of these men would have been no more than simply the ever-rising power of the young officers had not influential thinkers like Gökâlp been able to draw large numbers of their countrymen to adopt an objective, like Turkism, which was probably far from clear to them.

This had important consequences for the cultural aspects of civil-military relations. By the spring of 1913, military preponderance extended beyond the confines of the military and other key political institutions. We know, of course, that the future lay in this direction, and we may ask why. The simple answer is that the intellectuals of the society, notably the "mass educators",⁶⁸ appear to have found a military posture socially and, especially, politically alluring. It was attractive because of the domestic and international circumstances of society; more importantly, it was attractive to the "mind" of society – a society in which most members' thoughts tended not simply to be concerned with, but rather to be dominated by, matters pertaining to military phenomena.

I cannot hope to deal here with all the ramifications that would need attention if this view were to be discussed in full. However, one essential aspect must be considered. In whichever direction the Ottoman citizen's temperament led him, he found himself at every turn directed and animated by the imponderable pressure of the military *imperium* and the almost total devotion to and faith in all things military.⁶⁹ Indeed, they cut across the boundaries of intellectual formulations, of more formal thinking and modes of feeling about ultimates and of literature, including the children's variety of which the lessons were probably intended to be shared with adults. Not even the prominent figure of the so-called "Westernist" school of thought, the Ottoman "liberal" poet Tevfik Fikret, remained immune; in fact, he exemplified the military posture most strikingly for the time:

“ . . .

Your tiny little shoulders
 Tomorrow will bear a rifle.
 No, not a rifle, the motherland tomorrow
 Will be shouldered on to that back.
 Little soldier! Little soldier!
 The motherland demands zeal from you.”⁷⁰

Whether reflected in children's literature or in adults' thought, in society at large or in the political arena, the era was one of transition under an increasingly authoritarian régime from the military's interventionist role to its political ruling group role. These conditions allowed the militarization of literature as well as of political thinking. For the present purpose, their magnitude may be gauged when one realizes that traditional Ottomanist ideology would necessarily, according to the logical reasoning of Gökalp, become subsumed under that of Turkism, on the basis that Turks could not all identify themselves with the Ottomans unless the Ottomans identified themselves with the Turks. After all, the Ottomanist commitment of such a man as Mahmud Şevket Paşa⁷¹ could not effectively be assailed from within the very framework in which he stood. Gökalp's nationalist point of view, from which I have already quoted, explains his preoccupation with ideology.

It might be said that ideological thinking, part of which is moral thinking, however much influenced by contemporary events, is primarily an expression of the ideologue's own preferences and interests. Moreover, he always endeavours to get others to share them. If I have interpreted Gökalp correctly, it would appear that those holding the reins of power ought to be Turks or, at least, ought to consider themselves Turks and be proud of their Turkishness.⁷² Likewise, according to the idealist philosophy which he holds,⁷³ the nation is the ultimate reality. As national ideals are taken to be an ultimate force directing the behaviour of the individual, so, for the Turks, the most urgent requirement ought to be their awakening and awareness of themselves as a nation.⁷⁴ Gökalp appears to be saying, in his discussion of nationalism, that its political function must not be superseded by mere theoretical contemplation. Similarly, I too would argue that awareness of nationalism is inseparable from its evaluation which varies according to the circumstances within which the state exists. For example, when the Ottoman Empire was an expanding state, mainly through conquest, there was no particular stimulus to overt nationalist sentiment. But in the circumstances in which the Empire found itself in 1913, tensions between the young Turkists

and the old Ottomanists would recur naturally because the more conscious the Turkists, the more convinced they were of the importance of their political mission.⁷⁵

For the predominantly Muslim Turkish young officers of the period who felt themselves morally responsible for the country's destiny, the more this responsibility was imposed upon them, in Gökalp's ideological format, the higher the value they placed upon their political mission. So they became anxious to discharge it at every opportunity and thereby tended to lay claim to excessive recognition for their function within the overall structure of the society.

There is, to my mind, little doubt that the young officers' social function, namely that which established them at the apex of the social hierarchy, was determined by a consensus. This was a tacit agreement which derived from the conditions of Ottoman society in 1913. As I intend to posit later in this work, the social order based on this tacit agreement continued to exist in the post-Ottoman period. Further, it could do so for a number of years independently of the special political circumstances that gave it birth. As far as the discussion here is concerned, however, two factors may be said to have perpetuated this situation. The first was the gradually evolved bond between the social order and the Ottoman Turkish intellectual formation that lent it rational justification. Secondly and I think more importantly, such justification in the long run induced a habit of mind which made it increasingly difficult to conceive of any other social order. This was mainly due to the powerful motive for accepting that there was a national interest in the general adherence to an overall vision of politics and in the commitment of the officer corps in getting this idea to prevail.

Nevertheless, by April 1913, one symptom of the response in the political thinking of the old Ottomanist to the challenge of the young Turkist could quite accurately be discerned in the manner in which the Grand *Vezir*, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, appears to have contemplated the notion of contradiction in his relations with the officer corps. In these relations, increasingly imbued with ideological differences, he sought to control the corps while the corps, in its turn, sought control over government policy and, in fact, achieved this on almost all occasions. The Paşa must have realized that they could not both be in control on the same issues, although they might succeed in achieving parity with each other. In justification of this kind of reasoning, analogous to the Aristotelian logic of contradictory proposition, must have lain the Grand *Vezir*'s realization that political methods, not law, would be the effective way of

controlling the military's partisan political activities. Past experience had proved that in successive Governments' attempts to apply legal and normative restraints, the military, especially in times of domestic and international crisis, were able to anticipate and evade the moves of the Governments. Secondly, there was the realization, also based on past experience, that the prospect for any worthwhile control by Government would be bleak indeed if it depended upon specific actions, such as forbidding the military to join political parties, to vote or to stand as candidates. Finally, control by means of implicit actions, through a common ideology, presented still more intractable problems. Such control was indeed impossible; in the first place, a common ideology did not exist because of fundamental disagreement as to the best methods of ensuring the survival of the Ottoman state. But for the Government, one other avenue still seemed to be open, namely, explicit actions, by which the officer corps might be penetrated. In so doing, the officer corps' loyalty to the Government might, to a great extent, be secured and thus parity between the Government and the corps achieved.

If, starting from this point, we go on to enquire how and by whom this concern for the politics of controlling the military's partisan political activities was conceived, we find some very revealing information. Only then is it possible to apprehend reason and order in events which appear not to have possessed any. Their significance, despite the main facts being familiar, has never been appreciated let alone assessed. According to the level of generality upon which I am basing my argument, the said reason and order may be understood in the phrase that the "Real Cause" of the Grand Vezir's wish to invite a "prominent German general"⁷⁶ to "reorganize" the Ottoman Army, was his prevailing aspiration to establish explicit control over the officer corps. If we are to avoid misunderstanding and try to discover whether there is any justification for this assertion, we must try not only to view the military politics of the period as men viewed them then but also to understand the sense in which men viewed them.

The bringing of foreign officers as advisers, instructors and reformers had precedents in earlier times and in most respects – for example, after a major military setback – and on each occasion the procedure tended to follow the same pattern.⁷⁷ However, in the period now under review, the idea of inviting a new military mission from abroad was fundamentally the expression of political concern for the establishment and maintenance of governmental control over the officer corps. All the more so if one considers that after the military reverses in the Balkans the existing

“... German military mission ... had fallen to its lowest level of value and influence”.⁷⁸ Yet it is not essential for our purposes to establish whether the wish expressed by Mahmud Şevket Paşa to invite, once again, a “prominent German general” was justified on technical grounds; the main concern here is to trace the predominant motive behind the policy of seeking German military assistance.

It is worth dwelling a little on the circumstances which made the recurrence of the issue of German military assistance significant. The decision is explicable on several grounds but it was by no means inevitable. For example, a report by the German Ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim, dated 2 January 1913, may help us to see into the minds of Ottoman statesmen and may illustrate my point. Three days previously, during talks between the German Ambassador and the Ottoman Foreign Minister, the latter, Noradounghian Efendi, had inquired about the conditions of employment of the French General Eydoux, then attached to the Greek armed forces. The Foreign Minister had wanted to be told, very confidentially, in exactly what position the French General was employed.⁷⁹ As Bayur has observed:

“This wish did not seem as though it were aimed merely at finding out; but it indicated that, in inquiring about General Eydoux’s conditions of employment, the intention of the Ottoman Government was to invite a military mission accordingly and, judging by the inquiry being made of the German Ambassador, that the thought of bringing an officer from Germany had been entertained.”⁸⁰

A similar idea, indeed, was entertained by Wangenheim on 5 January in a telegram (supplementary to that of the 2nd). He expounded on the reasons for being asked about the powers of General Eydoux in the following words:

“The Porte is considering a request for a German general to act as a supreme commander in peacetime, a major purpose being to keep the Turkish army out of politics.”⁸¹

In a further despatch, dated 21 January,

“Wangenheim was able to report a general feeling in ruling circles favouring requests to foreign governments for aid in reforming the Ottoman Empire. Without specifying who wanted it, he continued that one man hoped the Kaiser would place at Turkey’s disposal a *German general, who, aided by German officers, would reorganize the army.*”⁸²

A “general feeling in ruling circles” was important, no doubt, and made the reasoning of Wangenheim plausible, but nowhere in his

report was the Ambassador able to refer to a person or persons in “ruling circles” as his source. Nor was he able to specify whom exactly he meant by “ruling circles”. However, the underlying assumption nurtured in his reports is that of the Great Powers’ concern for their own national interests. It was this philosophy of self-interest which was so dexterously harnessed by, for example, Germany⁸³ against the crumbling Ottoman Empire, through a military-political alliance. Here, the significance of the last-quoted report lies precisely in that its author seems to have had an incipient idea of the actual “ruling circles”. These had to be manipulated if the desired changes were to come about in all the areas affected by the alliance. It was in the preparation of the soil for the reception of their aims that the manifestation by the Great Powers of “. . . aid in reforming the Ottoman Empire” became politically and historically significant. If it were not so, it would be hard to explain why the foreign aspect of the anxiety about “reorganization” of the army should coincide with the native aspect about control of it. One suspects, therefore, that behind the concern about the “reorganization” was another, less tangible but equally real, anxiety. Indeed, Wangenheim himself, whose contacts with the actual “ruling circles”, the officer corps, were presumably few, seems not to have taken much cognizance at first of what was occurring with regard to those “circles”. More importantly, neither has the real anxiety of Mahmud Şevket Paşa attracted the attention of scholars. As far as I have been able to discern, the “Real Cause” for the invitation of a new military mission has never been examined and certainly not assessed. In short, the need to “reorganize” the military institution, specifically the Army, and the desire to bring a “prominent German general” to do the job appear to have been conflated.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not suggesting that the issue of foreign military assistance, as we see it, was clear to all the contemporaries concerned, still less that the possibilities it provided were weighted in favour of what was to happen, least of all that what was to happen was the only possibility. The more a historical theme, such as that of the German military mission, is concerned with abstractions, the more the study of it must depend upon direct and critically detached observation.

Following this line of approach, we shall see that the Ottoman Army had been “reorganized”, in the true meaning of the word, exactly ten months before the arrival of the German military mission on 14 December 1913⁸⁴ – initially a group of ten officers headed by *Generalleutnant* O.V.K. Liman von Sanders (promoted a month later to *General der Kavallerie*), which became known in foreign literature as the Liman von Sanders Mission⁸⁵ and designated in

Ottoman military parlance as *Alman Hey'et-i Islahiyye-i Askeriyyesi* (German Delegation for Military Improvement).⁸⁶

In fact, it was as early as 14 February 1913 (1 Şubat 1329) that the Regulation for the General Military Organization (*Teşkilât-i Umumiye-i Askeriyye Nizamnâmesi*) was distributed as “top secret” to the Ottoman Army and began to be put into effect. It had been prepared jointly by the Ministry of War and the General Staff, confirmed by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the Sultan but not officially announced until 11 December 1913.⁸⁷

As an example of the magnitude of the changes engendered by this “reorganization” scheme, affecting all facets of the military from the recruitment of personnel to the regional distribution of units, before the arrival of the Liman von Sanders Mission, let me offer those changes applying to the land forces. These were to be composed of four Army Inspectorates, 7th Independent Army Corps (Yemen), 21st Independent Division (Asır) and 22nd Independent Division (Hicaz). First Army Inspectorate (H.Q. İstanbul) was to consist of five Army Corps; Second Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Şam) of two Army Corps; Third Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Erzincan) of three Army Corps; and Fourth Army Inspectorate (H.Q. Baghdad) of two Army Corps. Thus, the whole Ottoman army appeared, on paper, as consisting of a total of twelve Army Corps, one Independent Army Corps and two Independent Infantry Divisions, all attached directly to the Ministry of War, with the exception of 22nd Independent Division which was attached to the Second Army Inspectorate. In addition, the Regulation proposed the formation of two new Infantry Divisions (23rd and 24th), making a peacetime force of a grand total of thirty-eight Divisions.⁸⁸ A second example relating to the “reorganization” was a consideration of what could be done to improve the appearance and uniformity of the soldiery so that they might fit the needs of the new structure. On 23 February 1913 (10 Şubat 1329), the first major addition in the Service Dress and Uniform Regulation (*Elbise-i Askeriyye Nizamnâmesi*) of 18 June 1909 came into force.⁸⁹ The Ministry of War made a change in the Regulation by which, for instance, all officer ranks were to wear only one kind of khaki (*hâkî*) dress; they must also wear, at all times, the khaki-coloured *kalpak* (sheepskin headgear).⁹⁰ The latter step, with its stress on uniformity, was characteristic in that it combined “reorganizational” and strictly military advantages. But it was also significant in being one of the most physically obvious and politically controversial. As a German officer observed, before the change in the Regulation, the wearing of the khaki *kalpak* was prominent among those officers whose allegiance lay with the Unionists, while anti-Unionist officers (i.e.,

the Saviours led by Nâzım Paşa) favoured the black *kalpak*.⁹¹ It was therefore in the interests of efficiency and uniformity that the wearing of the khaki *kalpak*, with its implicit ideological symbolism, was made obligatory exactly one month after the Raid on the Sublime Porte.

But to any observant mind, it was manifest that an organizational change of far deeper and wider scale than any “re-formation” and “re-outfitting” of the forces was impending. And this constitutes a third example – one which had, as I have noted, been anticipated by an officer during the aftermath of the loss of Edirne.⁹² The then concerted feeling of growing “militaristic nationalism”⁹³ was to make itself all the more visible, and the military’s ruling group role all the more prominent, as conditions became favourable for its complete realization. A most timely evocation of this was Staff-Major Mehmed Nuri Bey’s assertion, in a conference given to the Commanders and officers of the 1st Division during the Winter Term of 1913, that:

“The Turkish nation [Türk milleti] today, more than ever before, is in need of protection and guarding. The procuring of her life and the conditions of her existence [was], in the first place, entrusted to us, the soldiers.”⁹⁴

To return to the impending organizational change, it was in fact on 10 December 1913, four days before the Liman von Sanders Mission arrived in İstanbul,⁹⁵ that the General Staff was to put into effect, on its own initiative, the appointment of the Commanders of all thirteen of the Corps and two of the Independent Divisions to their new posts, which were all subsequently located in accordance with the “reorganization” carried out by the 14 February Regulation.⁹⁶ Nearly a month later, an imperial *irade*⁹⁷ (7 January 1914) was to promulgate all these appointments, including the names of the officers appointed to the command of the four Army Inspectorates, the Army Corps, Divisions and recruiting zones. Moreover, the *irade* was to contain certain changes in relation to the General Staff and the direction of the army. Lastly, but no less importantly, the *irade* was to provide a comprehensive list of officers of the ranks of General and Colonel to be placed on the retired list. Most of these, some 280, were, as one source has stated, “. . . the commanders responsible for the dreary series of defeats in Macedonia, along with most generals over fifty-five”.⁹⁸

Having commented on the *irade* in a report a few days later, the British Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen, added

“... as a general conclusion that, whatever may be the side issues involved in these very drastic changes, Enver's first aim in my opinion is to strive for the efficiency of the army.”⁹⁹

This document is worth quoting because I find it typifies an unclear and even confused understanding of the sudden disappearance of the military and political tensions which had previously been increasing and come more to the fore, and which needed strongly purgative attention. Had the Military Attaché pondered more carefully over the “side issues”, he would presumably have formed a very different opinion regarding the priorities of the aims of “Enver”, so far, in the present work, mentioned only as Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey. By the time the despatch was drafted he was Brigadier-General Enver Paşa, the Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff, aged thirty-four¹⁰⁰ – the youngest serving officer to be appointed Chief of the General Staff and, more interestingly, Minister of War in the Empire since the records of *Seraskers* (later Ministers of War; *Harbiye Nazırı*) began on 17 June 1826.¹⁰¹

All these “very drastic changes” made possible something which only a few clear-sighted prophets, such as Mahmud Şevket Paşa and Baron von Wangenheim, had foreseen might be necessary, and even fewer, such as Enver Paşa, had believed would be feasible: the control of the military as a prerequisite to the restoration of governmental power. In attempting to apply this fundamental tenet of Ottoman state practice, there appears to have been background knowledge that no increase in the fighting efficiency of the military could be achieved without first obtaining control of it. The political interpretation of this knowledge further entailed an equally important corollary: he who could command the officer corps could control them. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of these two contentions. For they involved the essential difference in thinking between the two Ministers of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa and Enver Paşa, and further determined their respective attitudes towards the Liman von Sanders Mission. Yet it seems to me that the intention of Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not so much to make changes in Ottoman society as to influence and reorient minds, especially the minds of those themselves most influential in society. He could do this through the control of military training and education by a third party – a “prominent German general”. In taking this explicit action, he would then be able to enjoy a plenitude of governmental power. Momentarily, indeed, more or less adequate restraints upon the officer corps might be contrived, but the expectation of generally and permanently workable results was to be prevented by his constant neglect of the vitiating effect of his

inability to command the officer corps. In the circumstances of 1913, the Grand *Vezir* and Minister of War Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not the same General Mahmud Şevket Paşa of 1909 – the popular “Commander of the [victorious] Action Army” in İstanbul and “Inspector-General of the First and Second Armies”. Nor was he ideologically suited, especially after the loss of Edirne, to the aspirations of the young officers who, as implied earlier, comprised the core of the actual “ruling circles”.

On the other hand, by 1914 one of the former and no less, possibly even more, popular officers of the Action Army, Staff-Major Enver Bey,¹⁰² had become the head of the “ruling circles” as both Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff – Brigadier-General Enver Paşa. For the first time since 1908, and I shall try to analyse the reasons for it, the military command was to knit together under the leadership of Enver Paşa, following those “very drastic changes”. Then, as the most prominent member of the “ruling circles”, Enver Paşa was intimately related to the military institution and was able to carve his own personality in the military seal. Briefly stated, control of the military’s partisan political activities was fully realized under his leadership.¹⁰³ This, paradoxical though it may appear at first glance, was obviously the most important issue and not a “side issue” involved in those “very drastic changes”. It was an end which was to be reached by means of those “changes” and could be justified by the young officers as being a prerogative of supreme political power and professional privilege. It was, in other words, to be a voluntary restraint, induced of their own accord and on their own terms. It is this aspect which is depicted, as a generalization in the literature of the military politics of, particularly, the so-called developing nations, as “the politics of wanting to be above politics”.¹⁰⁴

Here, it is opportune to digress in order to examine this tendency, regardless of the classification of nations, and to consider with perhaps exaggerated scepticism the arguments of those scholars who take the view of “above politics” being “out of (i.e., above) politics”, either by inclination or as a practical principle. Whatever the motive, it seems to me that an ambiguity arises from the employment of the term “politics” only in the narrow sense that links it indissolubly with the formal governmental institutions of the state. For, as I have already made clear, the disadvantage in associating “politics” exclusively with the formal institutions of governance is that it dissociates the term “politics” from other political institutions, such as the military, or from modes of its expression, such as “wanting to be above politics”. Moreover, it blurs the crucial distinction between state and society. Most

important of all, it completely misses the point, already made, that “politics” forms an aspect of all collective social activity, public and private, in all human groups and institutions, including the formal governmental variety.¹⁰⁵ Now, suppose we see “wanting” as the operative word to be used by the Enver Paşa of 1914, intending, broadly, to get the officer corps to do as he wants them to do, for example, “to be above politics”. Then the doings of the officer corps and the means used by Enver Paşa to influence them will, indeed, constitute “politics” by definition and his and the officer corps’ thoughts and acts be called “political”. Moreover, Enver Paşa’s “politics of wanting to be above politics” will conform with a political formula, solely prescribed in order to show the difference between partisan politics and political ruling group politics – the politics of *imperium in imperio*.

These reflections raise problems affecting the theory of military politics which, here, might almost be reduced to one: what is the implication of the rapid rise to prominence by the young officers in the process of shaping the body politic? A theory based on the suppositions of the military being “in politics”, “out of politics” or even “above politics” may seem to give suggestions but it cannot answer this question. Moreover, the Ottoman state and its military, in all their various stages, did not deliberately conform to patterns of hypothetical statecraft. They were, as in every case, the outcome of their own experience. Our question, therefore, cannot be answered without reference to the changes resulting from the interplay of thought and circumstance. It ought not to be answered in terms suggested by those who see nothing valuable about history save as a short introductory background for their static political analyses. There had long been, as I have emphasised, the impression of the military seal in the context of the Ottoman phase of Turkish political history, going back some 600 years pre-Enverist days, penetrating and influencing the practice of the state. We were to see its full imprint once again, with the *irade* of 7 January 1914. Accordingly, our question will only be answered, in so far as it can ever be answered, if we attest the fact that the officer corps responded to the changes in circumstances and shifts in thought while their own power enabled them to play the ruling group role in shaping the body politic.

III. Attempts at civilian control of the military

Having witnessed this course of events, the then Chief Secretary to the Sultan, Ali Fuad Bey, also commented, as had the British

Military Attaché, on those “very drastic changes”. Yet unlike his contemporary, his attitude to the “changes” is expressed in general terms, terms which indicate the Chief Secretary’s close familiarity with the subtleties of political reflection:

“Henceforward, the reins of government [zimam-ı idare] passed from the hands of the Sublime Porte to those of Enver Paşa.”¹⁰⁶

For clues as to what is implicit in this generalization, it is time we turn back to a survey of developments or “changes in circumstances”, as I have labelled them, and start from where we left off – the fall of Edirne to the combined forces of Serbia and Bulgaria on 26 March 1913.¹⁰⁷

The fall of Edirne, like the political theorizing which it prompted, marks the beginning of a new stage of developments. These, in turn, set in motion the forces which, with regard to the external and internal politics of the Ottoman state, were permanently to affect the balance of power both in the Balkans and in civil-military relations.

The impending danger from Bulgaria, the principal adversary of the Empire among the Balkan allies, had already made itself felt. It reached a peak with the fall of Edirne and the renewal of the Bulgarian offensive at the Çatalca line of defence with the aim of entering the Ottoman capital. On 1 April, judging from the *Daily notebook* of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, a visible halt on the long road of territorial aggrandizement on which Bulgaria had set foot occurred when that offensive was repulsed.¹⁰⁸ But not until 7 April did this aggrandizement show signs of lessening, when it was definitely understood that the Bulgarian Government was anxious to conclude an armistice bilaterally and immediately.¹⁰⁹ By then, as one commentator had written, “the Ottoman Empire was at the end of its easily realizable resources in men and money. Bulgaria . . . was even worse off”.¹¹⁰ It was clear that, under the circumstances, neither side was able to inflict upon the other a defeat as would be decisive in ending the war. Moreover, for Bulgaria, there appeared the ominous signs of a latent conflict within the Balkan alliance which would become “fratricidal”¹¹¹ once the major unity of interest were exhausted, and separate nationalist interests would try to realize themselves at one another’s expense. Major-General Fuller’s maxim aptly expresses this kind of situation which, by April, took precedence over all other problems that Bulgaria faced:

"War alliances against a common enemy are proverbially ephemeral, for once the enemy has been defeated the alliance's centre of gravity is destroyed."¹¹²

As the war gained a new momentum in Macedonia, away from Thrace, in the middle of March 1913, perennial Graeco-Bulgar rivalry in Macedonia erupted in the form of armed clashes:

"By the beginning of March the Greek militarists seem to have assured themselves of Serbian support sufficiently to make a forward policy in Macedonia safe in view of the preoccupation of Bulgaria with Adrianople . . . On March 14 the attempt to encircle the Bulgar contingent in Salonica brought about the first serious collision between the Bulgars and Greeks at Nigrita; which was followed by others . . ."¹¹³

The *Realpolitik* of the irredentist policies of Greece and other Balkan states, such as Romania, are questions that lie outside the purview of our inquiry.¹¹⁴ What lies inside is the fact that as a direct result of these, "Bulgaria desired a rapid conclusion of an armistice so that it might transfer its army from Thrace to Macedonia".¹¹⁵ On 13 April, the Grand *Vezir* received a message from the Ottoman Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, that the Ottoman and Bulgarian field commands had reached agreement and that the firing had ceased.¹¹⁶ Two days later, having negotiated directly, both countries finally suspended hostilities for a ten-day period.¹¹⁷ This informal armistice, extended several times bilaterally, provided the Empire with a period of two months free from fighting at the major fronts – for the first time since the war had been reopened on 3 February.

Until the fighting ceased, there had been no proper breathing space in the domestic affairs of the state since the Montenegrin Chargé at İstanbul had presented the declaration of war on 8 October 1912. The actual fighting was no longer, at least for the time being, the leading feature of the politics of the state, but the performance and quality of the Ottoman armed forces which did the fighting remained the most important, yet unsettled, question. The respite gained from the war was thus occupied, true to past experience, principally by attempts at improving the armed forces. This aspect appears to have been dominating the mind of the Grand *Vezir* even before the peace was realized. For Mahmud Şevket Paşa, as a careful reading of an entry in his *Daily notebook*¹¹⁸ for 19 March implies, the actual political, economic and especially military situation in peacetime would be conducive to the consideration of administrative improvement. The country, or what remained of it, was still suffering from the effects of war.

The economic situation was, partly also as a result of war, at a very low ebb. The political instability was tending to bring to the fore anti-Unionist elements, at the time basically devoid of any programme save that of factional opposition. That these circumstances precluded any other consideration than the strengthening of the authority and competence of the Government seems evident enough. But the characteristic, and indeed prevailing, belief of Ottoman statesmen that the power of states should be measured by the strength of their military institutions seems also to have been held by the Grand *Vezir*. As he recorded, he had told the German Ambassador that Ottoman weakness resulting from the Balkan War made the Empire unacceptable as an ally to either the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente. To rectify this condition, the most important work during the peace would be to strengthen the Army and Navy.¹¹⁹ And for this task, the overwhelming impression conveyed by Mahmud Şevket Paşa's *Daily notebook* is that Germany and Britain, respectively, were the countries to be approached.

This is by no means a full account of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning on the need to improve the strength of the Ottoman armed forces. Yet it is sufficient, I hope, to show its importance both in preparing the ground for the German military assistance and in setting in motion the Grand *Vezir*'s prevailing desire to seek such assistance.

It is opportune, I suggest, to speculate further on these aspects of the matter, since it was only within the context of the current propitious circumstances that such a conception could have taken definite shape. As the cease-fire with Bulgaria held, the Grand *Vezir* did not merely put on to paper his thoughts about foreign military assistance but spoke to the German Ambassador about it. Wangenheim, in his long report of 26 April, allocated most of the space, with additional comments, to repeating exactly what the Grand *Vezir* had said, in German, to him:

“... Hier muss das Ausland helfen. Ich werde mich daher an die verschiedenen Kabinette mit der Bitte um Überlassung von Reformern wenden. Für die Reorganisation der Armee rechne ich bestimmt auf Deutschland. Dies ist der wichtigste Punkt meins Programms. Die Armee muss von Grund aus reformiert, der politische Geist dem Offizierskorps ausgetrieben werden. Dazu wird die Tätigkeit von Instruktionsoffizieren, wie sie jetzt hier und da als blosse Ratgeber in unsere Organisation eingeschoben sind, nicht genügen...”¹²⁰

The political implications of the Grand *Vezir*'s “most important” consideration seem fairly obvious, yet not complete. On the basis

of this evidence alone, a sceptic might suggest that Wangenheim could have put these remarks into the mouth of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, with whom he was familiar, and in so doing could have hoped to serve the national interest of Germany in whose service he was employed.¹²¹ Therefore, we need another piece of evidence – evidence not selected in order to render direct support to our hypothesis, which might then run too smoothly to be trusted. Evidence of this type is supplied by the then Guardian of İstanbul, Cemal Bey. From his *Hâtıralar* it would appear that the Grand *Vezir* also spoke to Cemal Bey of his plans for putting the armed forces into proper order (“... ordunun tensiki ...”),

“... about the complete elucidation of which, since it relies upon the explanation given to me by himself personally, I ask that no one should doubt the truth.

The Paşa, during his term of office as the Grand *Vezir*, often used to spend the night at the Sublime Porte and sleep there. Since I too slept at the İstanbul Guardianship [Muhafızlığında], on some evenings, when he felt tired after having worked hard during the day, he used to order me on the telephone to visit him after dinner.

On these occasions he used to explain to me matters which he had thought of and initiated, and ask me what my thoughts and opinions were. On one of these evenings he spoke to me thus:

‘My son, ... as for our army, we cannot cut ourselves off any longer from the German methods of warfare. For over thirty years, in our army, there have been German instructors; our corps of officers have been trained entirely along German lines; in short, our army have gained familiarity with the spirit of German military skill and education. Now, it is not possible to change this. I am, therefore, thinking of bringing a German organizing mission [Alman tensik heyeti] on a grand scale and even, if necessary, by giving the command of an Ottoman army corps to a German general, of appointing German staff and field officers to its every unit; and of posting to a model army corps which would be formed in this way, all the staff and field officers of the Ottoman army for a period as trainees in order to increase their knowledge. Apart from these, I shall also call for many military experts, again within the improvement mission [işlah heyeti], in order to organize and, for a period, to administer the Ministry of War departments, the General Staff, the military schools and the military factories. I shall expend all my efforts, in their widest and most comprehensive meaning, for the organizing and improving of the army. From now on, I am in mind to avoid war for a long time.’¹²²

Although the *Hâtıralar* of Cemal Paşa has become a standard source for scholars in dealing with Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s thoughts on German military assistance or even for some Ottoman thought on such aid, none appears to have paid attention to their real significance. First, this lies not so much in what the Grand *Vezir* told Cemal Bey about his intention of bringing the mission but, on

the contrary, in what he failed to tell him but subsequently told the German Ambassador as the main justification for his action. Therefore, what such evidence does make perfectly clear is the existence of anxiety on the part of Mahmud Şevket Paşa as to how to control the military's partisan political activities. Secondly, if the complementary political relationship between the officer corps and the Government were to be compromised, the compromise would have to be at the expense of the officer corps' subsequently relinquishing military authority to a German general.¹²³ Thirdly, it again tells us something about the power of the young officers. Here was the Grand *Vezir* of the Ottoman Empire explaining to an Ottoman colonel, however prominent the latter may then have been, a policy issue which should have exceeded Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey's professional sphere of reference as the Guardian of İstanbul. The fact that it was not so is the very point that may help us to understand why the Grand *Vezir* felt inclined, or rather was obliged, to "explain" this particular "matter" to Cemal Bey. This incident also clarifies, I hope, an earlier proposition that it was just another "matter" on which the "thoughts" and "opinions" of a young officer had to be taken into account by whoever was in charge of government.¹²⁴ And, finally, one might further argue on the basis of the same evidence that Mahmud Şevket Paşa had no hope and, indeed, no intention of recapturing Edirne. It seems plain that for the Grand *Vezir*'s plan of "organizing" and "improving" the army, the avoidance of war "for a long time" was essential.¹²⁵ This meant that any idea of the recovery of Edirne should be quashed since it was known by all concerned that such a task could, under the circumstances, only be accomplished through war. Here again, the Paşa's judgement on this issue depended upon the view he took of the chief actors of whom, for example, Cemal Bey had to be convinced why there should be no occasion for war "for a long time".

Whether or not Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey was convinced when Mahmud Şevket Paşa induced him to accept his reasons for inviting a German military mission cannot be ascertained fully through reading the *Hâtıralar*. However, after explaining the circumstances of the arrival of the Liman von Sanders Mission, Cemal Paşa remarks, "We wanted to organize our army and therefore we had applied to Germany".¹²⁶ Reflection may make much of this reasoning seem invalid. But it is worth noticing that Cemal Bey's own position was not unambiguous. Following incessant domestic uprisings and foreign wars, it had become clear to those whose opinions counted that substantial changes in social institutions¹²⁷ were necessary if the remains of the Empire were to survive. The

political programmes of successive Unionist Governments, according to Cemal Paşa, were constructed so as "... to take heed of conflicts with foreign countries while devoting national energies to domestic reforms".¹²⁸ In justifying the attitude of the Unionists, Hüseyin Cahid Bey, in a contemporary editorial, pressed the point that:

"... the disease of apathy is worse than war. War is an examination, an examination our nation took and failed, proving that it has been a lazy student, one who has not acquired the knowledge necessary to graduate. We now have before us two goals: to repair the ravages of war and to reform our administration."¹²⁹

This article appeared on 26 April 1913, the same day that the German Ambassador informed his Government about the way in which the Grand Vezir viewed German help in reforming one of the major social institutions, the military. For our purpose, there is no need to discuss in detail the mechanism of reform which successive Governments devised in connection with the other social institutions. It is sufficient to note that they were a number of responses developed with the aim of anticipating and nullifying the domestic and international challenges.

The cataclysm of 1908 proved to have been a momentary regression in an evolution by which, while a militaristic fabric was permeated with increasingly Turkish-nationalist ideas, society was being unobtrusively indoctrinated in the ways of state control.¹³⁰ The need for state control increased with the weakening of the state and the danger of its dismemberment, a danger especially felt after the losses incurred in the Balkans. The notion of control therefore came to be of prime importance to Unionist Governments for the justification and maintenance of their governance. The close integration of the mechanism of political controls over the social institutions and the mechanism of reforms in them is a feature which still stands in need of particular emphasis.

Thus we come to another aspect, namely the effectiveness of political control, precisely because the logical pursuit of reforms involved the ability to control the social institutions. This partly explains why, having managed to pass a resolution in the Cabinet in favour of requesting from Germany a military mission under a prominent general (13 May), Mahmud Şevket Paşa envisaged that:

"... Uns sei die Reform der Armee unter der fast diktatorischen Oberleitung eines deutschen Generals zugeordnet und ebenso die Reorganisation des gesamten Unterrichtswesens."¹³¹

For the Grand Vezir, the idea of a German general with "almost dictatorial control" appears to have offered a way out of the impasse

created by two factors which had so far proved equally potent: the inability of the "elders", statesmen and soldiers alike, to control the young officers effectively and the belief that reform in none of the social institutions could be achieved without first realizing governmental control over their introduction. In the case of the military institution such control became all the more essential: first, because the military institution was hierarchical or, rather, had to be maintained in that shape for its professional efficiency. Secondly, as a prominent student of international politics has put it:

"Once security is destroyed, all the higher objects of politics are swallowed up in the struggle for self-preservation, a tendency seen in every war."¹³²

He might have added: a tendency particularly seen in the aftermath of a lost war. For to the Ottoman mind, the instrument which enabled states to assert themselves in international politics was, as I have emphasised, the strength of their military institution. Therefore, reforming and improving the efficiency of the military was representative among the desired institutional reforms not only for its practical necessity but also for its theoretical implications. At a deeper level of causation, the deliberations of the Grand *Vezir* and the resultant policy of reforming the Army with German assistance confirms a political plan of combining idealism and self-interest in balanced proportions.

There was, however, a drawback. This plan, more than any other for the reforming of the social institutions, depended upon the willingness of the personnel, that is, the officer corps, to comply with what the Government had agreed on. Certainly, Mahmud Şevket Paşa always had doubts about this, but if he were to proceed at all he had to act as if no doubts existed. As for the officer corps, there was every reason why they should be sympathetic toward and even support the Grand *Vezir's* declared aim of organizing the Army with German assistance. In the first place, the period of peace from mid-April was propitious for hastening the reorganization which had come so secretly into operation with the 14 February Regulations. The officer corps appears to have seen the German military assistance strictly in terms of what is implied by the word assistance. In the Empire, defeat had always prompted military reform and, since the eighteenth century, usually with outside help. Therefore, as we have noted in Cemal Paşa's account, after the defeat in the Balkan War, there was no reason for a demoralized officer to be suspicious of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's prevailing

desire in applying for German assistance. Under the circumstances, foreign military help seemed a natural way to reform the Army. Strictly on this issue, the only question would have been the possibility of the Government's searching elsewhere. Even that possibility, unless the Germans refused the request, appeared remote. After all, Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning to Cemal Bey on the necessity of not just foreign, but specifically German, military assistance, must have sounded logical enough. This is certainly the impression one gets from reading the latter's *Hâtıralar*.

In the second place, the Grand *Vezir* could hardly have declared to the officer corps that the kind of reform he had in mind was to ". . . remove politics from the officer corps" – the very words in which he had made his priorities clear to the German Ambassador. Had he done so, the officers would have removed him from politics. Nor did the Grand *Vezir* inform the members of the Cabinet about his main intention, except to talk about the need to invite German advisers as reformers. He managed to put through his proposal and to obtain a Cabinet resolution to this effect.

And yet, where we are impressed by the ease with which Mahmud Şevket Paşa's plan was accepted, he himself still felt the difficulty of obtaining a general assent to his decision, especially in view of one important obstacle, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa. Unpublished parts of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's *Daily notebook*, as revealed by Swanson, make this point clear. On the day the Cabinet decided to request a military mission headed by a German general, the Grand *Vezir* ". . . wondered about İzzet's opposition. He even considered giving İzzet a post that would separate him from the army command."¹³³ Four days later, on 17 May, when he talked to Wangenheim about giving "almost dictatorial control" to the German general, Mahmud Şevket Paşa ". . . recommended to the ambassador that no announcement be made while the army was at Çatalca".¹³⁴ In the face of this potential source of opposition, the Grand *Vezir's* power to make an official announcement was limited. Moreover, even in collaboration with the Ambassador, he was in a weaker position than the available documents would indicate. There had always been an active and firmly entrenched body of young officers' opinion on every matter concerning politics. More importantly, such opinion had to be taken into account by every politician before reaching any decision. All the more so, if the matter happened to relate directly to a policy aimed at curbing that body of opinion, while ". . . a sweeping reform which would remove politics from the officer corps" was the policy as Mahmud Şevket Paşa saw it. Yet he must have been aware of the restrictions on his actions and that he could not

openly acknowledge them without destroying his remaining power of government. But he could, without destroying his power of negotiation on the particulars of the authority which the German general would have, talk to the Germans as if he were able to enforce whatever settlement they both wished. This became apparent when the German Ambassador, on 22 May, transmitted to his Government Mahmud Şevket Paşa's official request to the Kaiser for a "prominent German general". The Ambassador noted that although the details had not yet been established, it was thought that the German general would have full authority, more or less similar to that of General Eydoux in Greece, in all military matters. He would head all other German officers and would therefore be responsible for the execution of reform in the "Turkish" army.¹³⁵

The moot question in this document was that of to whom the German general, invested with this degree of authority, would be responsible. Wangenheim does not provide any answer. Nor do the available Ottoman sources. However, Mahmud Şevket Paşa's assurance to the Ambassador, given privately on 17 May,¹³⁶ that the Ottoman Government would extend to the German military mission similar rights to those which the Greek Government had granted the French mission, would in practice mean giving a free hand to the Germans in deciding on the nature of the authority that the general would have. The political implications of the Grand Vezir's perception of the duties of the German general seem fairly obvious. He was attempting to execute a policy which in his heart he knew to be impossible, either because there was no alternative or because the sole alternative was the one he had so far refused to contemplate – surrendering to the young officers. This was the central dilemma for the Ottoman civilians in their efforts to impose some control over the officer corps before it was too late. But by May 1913 it was indeed late.

As we have seen, the various other means of restraining the officer corps had to be ruled out because of their ineffectiveness from the Government's point of view. If the remaining political solution of explicit action, through the control of military training and education under the powers of the Ottoman Deputy Commander-in-Chief as the highest military authority, were to be ruled out on the grounds of its futility, the only alternative would be to settle down under the young officers' dispensation.

Judging by his attempts, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not ready for this. Under the circumstances, then, there seemed nothing left for the Grand Vezir but to resort to German help – a kind of help which aimed at an exchange of benefits between parties who shared

no common base on which to conduct negotiations.¹³⁷ During the period of peace, from April to June, such negotiations apparently achieved a degree of success. Yet the position of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, regarding the German military mission was very different. His opinion, on the basis of what he later wrote, was not in accord with that of the Government until at least the end of June. All along, he appears to have thought that the Grand *Vezir* wished to provide the German general with the title and powers of, in effect, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.¹³⁸ This would mean the replacement of Ahmed İzzet Paşa by a German general. It was indeed so, not because the Grand *Vezir* wanted to check Ahmed İzzet Paşa's power by the employment of a German general in his stead, but because he wanted to check the power of the young officers. Had Ahmed İzzet Paşa possessed the power with which he was theoretically endowed by his position, the present argument suggests that there would have been no real need to seek a different source of power – a "prominent German general". On the other hand, Ahmed İzzet Paşa was in a position to incite his fellow officers to obstruct the project by revealing to them the real motive for inviting German assistance. It was this kind of power, the power of incitement, that Ahmed İzzet Paşa possessed, especially at a time when a considerable number of the forces were still at their defensive positions at Çatalca. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to understand, at least partially, why the Grand *Vezir* was anxious to keep the project quiet, as he recommended to the German Ambassador on 17 June. Therefore, the crux of the matter was that a German general, in the Grand *Vezir*'s mind, might be able to impose a radical solution to the problem regarding which the declared inability of Ahmed İzzet Paşa to do anything except offer advice to Mahmud Şevket Paşa¹³⁹ afforded a gloomy prospect. While he may have been an efficient Chief of the General Staff, Ahmed İzzet Paşa's performance as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief had been one of political inertia and military impotence. Conscious of the precariousness of his position, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief could not view with equanimity the policy of delegating authority to a German general. On 1 June, he confronted the Grand *Vezir*, arguing against entrusting the supreme command to a foreigner. He proposed instead that a maximum of forty German officers and men be brought in for a five-year period, to deal specifically with training, teaching and supplies and to take command of a model army corps and division, to be created, plus one model battalion and regiment in every inspectorate.¹⁴⁰ It is true, as Swanson has observed, that "there is unfortunately no clue about how Şevket reacted to İzzet's

statement".¹⁴¹ But it is also true to say that until equally comprehensive evidence to the contrary is adduced, Mahmud Şevket Paşa seems to have taken no notice of the opposition from Ahmed İzzet Paşa nor, for that matter, from anyone else – for example, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, the then Ottoman Ambassador to Germany.¹⁴²

As far as my present argument is concerned, the point here in need of reiteration is that the inviting of the German military mission was just another issue in which, once again, Mahmud Şevket Paşa needed to come to terms only with the powerful young officers. This should make the Grand *Vezir* capable of overcoming any opposition. But whether it would have made him so or, on the other hand, whether he would have succeeded in "removing politics from the officer corps" with German assistance cannot be ascertained but must ever remain a matter for speculation. In any case, although the Grand *Vezir* learned, on 6 June, the Kaiser's decision to appoint a general to head the military mission,¹⁴³ he was unable to pursue his preoccupation. As he was being driven through the streets of İstanbul to the Sublime Porte, in the late morning of 11 June, Mahmud Şevket Paşa fell victim to the pistols of "four persons".¹⁴⁴

In domestic affairs, the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the definitive appointment of his Foreign Minister, Mehmed Said Halim Paşa, as Grand *Vezir* from 12 June 1913,¹⁴⁵ are events that historians note as marking the beginning of the hegemony of the Committee.¹⁴⁶ This is simply because, as it is widely asserted, "[t]he assassination continued to provide the C[ommittee]UP with an excuse to crush the opposition".¹⁴⁷ The conventional interpretation rests upon study of the Committee alone – the party which happened for the nonce to be uppermost in the partisan politics of the country. It is rather like judging the size and shape of an iceberg solely from the part visible above the waterline.

For the purpose of the present political analysis, it would clearly be unrealistic to follow the conventional interpretation, mainly because it leaves out that which it seeks to explain. It takes account only of the formal partisan politics of a constitutional era in which governmental changes were occurring, be it after an assassination or after an election. The error lies in a mistaken assessment of the so-called Young Turks in general and of the locus of political power in particular. A hypothesis which fits more of the facts might be that of the fundamental continuity of the military's political power – power which had so far allowed the continuity of the military's varying role in politics and had allowed, too, the stimuli which motivated the intrinsically politicized officer corps.

I have argued that governance without the consent of the young officers was impossible; so was opposition. Thus, the military politics of this era were superimposed on partisan politics. It was the politics of power, prerogative, preponderance and, above all, order (*nizam*) – that key concept in Ottoman Turkish political philosophy and society as impressed throughout its history by the military seal. As for the multitude, whose conscious opinion is ever a matter of manipulation, the mere presence of the military was sufficient. It was sufficient for those whose very mentality had been shaped within the bounds of order, authority and history.¹⁴⁸ But it was not stimulating to the expectant; it was not satisfying for the dissident.

On the other hand, the power of the Committee, though it kept much of its imaginative appeal, had long ceased to be indispensable. Indeed, it may not be entirely wrong to say that without the backing of the military its power was a mere presumption. The Committee might plan and even pursue policies but it could only implement them through the goodwill of its military nexus. That this was so has been illustrated on a number of occasions. For example, it will be remembered that on the Cabinet decision involving the cession of Edirne to Bulgaria (just over a month before the city's fall), the Grand Vezir, having managed to get his aim ratified by the young officers, was strong enough to dispense with the Unionist opposition in the Cabinet. He could then say that "... he was an independent man and not the plaything of the Committee!"¹⁴⁹ In the realities of mid-1913, however, no-one in the realm except the young "men of the gun" was independent, and all without exception became the "plaything" of these young "men of the gun". It was on the basis of this logic that the Committee had, from as far back as its inception, become psychologically linked with the officer corps, responsible for its faults and dependent on its successes. Yet this had weakened the Committee's position as a civilian political body, while its military supporters had henceforth to count as adversaries all those who disliked the Committee's attempts at reforms of social institutions or at policies of far-reaching consequence. Still, political power would have been kept in the hands of the Unionist politicians had latitude, to be determined by their personal and collective judgement, been allowed them. We have seen that it was not, especially after the Raid on the Sublime Porte and during the Balkan War; both, in producing relentless political pressures, distorted a semi-molten social system as it set. All this may sound anarchic, and in many ways it was; but in this political confusion lay the military's political strength. The young officers were a class, as it were, perpetually rising, and the

appearance or disappearance of governments or of individual politicians scarcely impeded their general upward mobility – even, at times, accelerated its pace.

This is a matter on which the greatest emphasis must be laid. For the importance of such a factor in the Ottoman politics of the era is commonly misunderstood and therefore severely underestimated. Such may be said not only of historians but also of some contemporaries – the expectant and the dissident, who planned and attempted to effect a *putsch* but achieved nothing more than the deaths of the Grand *Vezir*, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, and his second aide, Lieutenant-Commander İbrahim Bey, and the wounding of the Paşa's batman (*uşak*), Kâzım Ağa.¹⁵⁰

In a telegram of 13 June, two days after the assassination, the British Ambassador wrote:

"It is not clear whether murder was a result of an opposition plot or of an act of revenge for assassination of General Nazım Pasha at the Porte on 23rd January. Despite denials there would seem to have been a participation of section of military element."¹⁵¹

This piece of evidence deserves especial mention, first, because it casts light on the motives of the assassins and, more importantly, on the area of military support. Secondly, the report may be taken as a fair representation of contemporary opinion on the significance and far-reaching consequences of the removal of a politician at a time when the young officers were actually dominant. That it was this interpretation which persisted may be illustrated by, for example, Kuran's remark, published as late as 1959, that:

"On the day of the event apparently some trouble broke out, but the Unionists had maintained their posts; they had not left the Sublime Porte like the Kâmil Paşa cabinet with their hands above their heads in surrender."¹⁵²

To retell the story of the "event" in any detail would take us too far from our main theme of who was holding the real power and who would, as they so desired, allow opposition or crush it. The aspect most emphasised in the various post-mortems and underlined by the two searching analyses of the assassination,¹⁵³ was the timely and prompt intervention of the Guardian of İstanbul, "Cemal [Bey who] reacted immediately and prevented the breakdown of law and order".¹⁵⁴ But was such an occurrence ever really on the cards? Or was there a possibility of the Unionists leaving the Sublime Porte ". . . like the Kâmil Paşa cabinet with their hands above their heads . . ."? No straight answer is possible unless the "participation" of either the whole or a ". . . section of military element . . ."

is considered. It may be asserted that, as the response of Cemal Bey exemplifies, the only section of any consequence within the "military element" of the era, the young officers, made their attitude quite plain; and they, at that time, more or less represented the whole. Had they not done so, Said Halim Paşa could not have become the Grand *Vezir* nor would the Committee have been able "... to crush the opposition", simply because by then they would have "... left the Sublime Porte ... with their hands above their heads ...".

The evidence for this claim, so important for the attitude of Cemal Bey at the time and for his marshalling of military forces against any opposition,¹⁵⁵ is unimpeachable. Reading his *Hâtıralar*, one is struck by the impression that he could not see himself as any other kind of officer than the one he had always been, one of the young officers with the last word in governance. The assassination of 11 June had placed him in an impregnable position, not merely as the Guardian of the capital but as one of the irreplaceable guardians of the Unionist régime. If the young officers were not regulating politics, what common man in the Ottoman realm would be safe in the street? And nothing, now, could have made them deviate from their path, whatever the opposition – be it from the expectant or from the dissentient. The expectant may be said to have been represented by an extremist faction of the Liberal opposition,¹⁵⁶ who generally sympathized with the motives inspiring the deed, if they shrank from outright support of that faction wishing to replace the Unionist Government by force.¹⁵⁷ The dissentient may have moved purely in revenge for the killing of Nâzım Paşa, and even have acted against those who it was thought should bear the odium of having "willingly" signed away Thrace, Edirne and the island of Crete to the Balkan allies in the preliminaries of the peace Treaty of London.¹⁵⁸

Gross as such generalizations on the motives for assassinating the Grand *Vezir* are, these motives can be reconstructed from the statements made by the defendants during their trial in the court martial that had been set up two days after the event; the actual hearing began on 21 June.

"You are asking me whether or not I had any personal grudge or enmity toward Mahmud Şevket Paşa. Certainly there was none. In fact, I used to admire him for certain of his characteristics. But Nâzım Paşa was an associate of his. He should not have connived at his [Nâzım Paşa's] cruel murder and, especially, he should not have taken his place."

So testified one of the principal defendants, Infantry-Captain Çerkes (Circassian) Kâzım [Bey], whose discharge for desertion was

pending.¹⁵⁹ With his co-defendants, he was charged with

“... setting up a secret revolutionary committee in the structure of a society of villainy in order to overthrow and replace the present government, using force and by illegal methods, and to achieve this goal by creating turmoil and general uprising in the country and by deciding that many people should be assassinated . . .”¹⁶⁰

Also testifying was the actual assassin of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, Topal (lame) Tevfik, a confirmed criminal who had been caught immediately:

“I believe Kâzım Bey is a brave and honest man and someone to be followed in every situation. They were telling me that the men at the top were responsible for the affairs of the country going wrong, for the defeats in the wars and for all those places slipping out of our hands. I reckoned the only way was to bring men to the top who could get us out of this mess. They were educated people. I only know how to handle a gun. So I took it on myself to kill the Paşa.”¹⁶¹

But if motives are deduced from the actions of the expectant as well as the dissentient, these may be considered to have been erratic, to say the least. Judging from their declared intentions, it may not even be asserted that opposition to particular policies of the Mahmud Şevket Paşa Government developed under the stress of resistance into a revolutionary assault upon the essential character of that Government. On the day of the assassination, and at about the same time, a declaration signed “Revolutionary Committee” was presented to the ambassadors of the Great Powers, a paragraph of which is particularly significant here:

“We have resolved, whatsoever may happen, to execute the plans we have prepared in order to crush and suppress the present cabinet, governed by a brigade [lit. battalion] of vagabonds [. . . bir tabur serseri ile idare olunan hükümet-i hazırayı . . .]”¹⁶²

With this enigmatic statement we again pick up our clue. For there seems to have been a misconception on the part of the expectant and the dissentient in their assessment of the locus of political power, which allowed Cemal Bey to begin rounding up some “three hundred and fifty opponents” the day after the assassination and to ship them to Sinop.¹⁶³ And it enabled the court martial to try not only those who were involved in the act of assassination but anyone implicated in the plot or even remotely associated with the Liberal opposition. The range extended from the sentencing to death of *Damad* Salih Paşa¹⁶⁴ to a Hakkı Efendi of Kayseri who, for sending Prince Sabahaddin Bey a Bayram

(festivity) greetings card, was considered a sympathizer, found guilty and given an eight-year sentence;¹⁶⁵ none of the sentences passed by the court martial carried any right of appeal. Yet it is a matter of misconception by historians in assessing the Young Turks which has persisted in the view that it was the Committee who crushed the opposition.

We are looking at the passage of an era of intense activity, when political ideas were being generated so much faster than they could be applied that they tended to neutralize one another in a voluble but sterile dialectic. But under the constitutional surface, to the young officers nurtured on Ziya Gökalp and "militaristic nationalism", even this dialectic appeared to have aggravated the discord – the conflict between partisan politics and the postulates of the patriotic paternalism upon which the moral authority of the young officers rested. It is then possible to see why the severe retribution of the opposition was extended, under pressure from the Guardianship of İstanbul, with the passing of a Cabinet resolution on 29 June. It now embraced

"... even those of the various branches of the civil service who were found technically 'not guilty' of responsibility [but who], owing to their being in suspicious circumstances and compromising positions [... meşkûk-ül ahval ve dai-i şüphe bulunmalarına binaen ...], it not being permissible that they return to office, ... [were] dismissed."¹⁶⁶

Such a move betrays a certain element of exasperation, a kind of professional gesture intended to show that the young officers were true to their principles. Moreover, although the opposition failed in their attempt, the effect of the assassination upon the course of the era was profound. The utter incapacity of the opposition had once more been displayed, while the opportune death of Mahmud Şevket Paşa had accentuated the steady rise of the young officers by removing the final civilian obstacle which the Ottoman political system could produce.

So sweeping an assertion must of necessity be limited in its application. It may not be applied to Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey's role alone in helping to install a new Government on 12 June, nor even to the Committee's designation of Said Halim Paşa as the Grand Vezir.¹⁶⁷ But it is entirely applicable to the "four or five days" spent over the formation of his Cabinet that ensued from the screening and ratification of its members by the young officers.¹⁶⁸ Here, once more, the cause of the young officers had indeed been strengthened. For once more, as in the case of the Raid on the Sublime Porte, they had asserted their power; moreover, with their decisive role in the formation of the Said Halim Paşa Cabinet, they showed

themselves the real masters of the régime – in the self-selected political ruling group role which was not necessarily coterminous with the young officers' implementation of the Raid nor with the number of seats they occupied in the formal structure of the Government of Said Halim Paşa. They in fact occupied none. Yet their role was the ultimate sanction behind the elaborate organization of a constitutional Government – a factor which any member of any Ottoman Government at any time so far had to ascertain and acknowledge and in which he had to acquiesce. For instance, the new Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, must have done so, for he expressed his concern to obviate as far as possible the difficulties and obstruction which he could foresee:

"I have received a letter from Talât [wrote Cavid Bey on 12 July 1913], He is talking about the need to recruit a minister of war from amongst us [Bizden bir harbiye nazırı yetiştirmek lüzumundan bahsediyor]. He says that until this recruitment we will always be subjected to difficulties [. . . müşkülâta daima mâruz olacağımızı] . . ." ¹⁶⁹

Talât Bey may well have said so, for the conjuncture of domestic and foreign events probably appeared to him as allowing a degree of opportunism in determining Unionist policies. Talât Bey, like the rest of the Ottoman civilians of all shades of opinion, had come to realize, as may be elicited from his admission, that the young officers were becoming positively indifferent to civilians, even Unionist civilians. It was Talât Bey, not Colonel Cemal Bey, nor Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey, nor even the less known but no less powerful young officers who, in the ideological but no longer symbiotic relationship between the military and civilian organisations, was the dependant in the pursuance of Unionist policies.¹⁷⁰ So, as is implicit in Talât Bey's letter, the Unionist politicians were desperate to gain the goodwill of the Unionist young officers and, for this, any opportunity had to be seized. An act of this kind might indicate that they were well-disposed towards the young officers and, at the least, might propitiate popular opinion meanwhile. Here, the chronology of foreign events had a significant effect. For Talât Bey and probably the rest of the Unionists, the initiative of one opponent, the then Bulgarian Commanding-General Savov, contributed towards what they perceived as being the opportunity they had anticipated. It was, indeed, General Savov's attack without formal declaration of war on the Serbian and Greek lines in Macedonia during the night of 29/30 June¹⁷¹ that had precipitated the Balkans into war in earnest for the second time. And from that moment the character of the Balkan War profoundly altered. It was no longer the "War of Coalition" but the "Wars of Partition" which

are said to have been "... caused by particularist interests of a nationalist or imperialist character".¹⁷² However one elucidates the causes or even orders them according to one's own scale of values, the immediate impact of the war became plain on the next day. With the commencement of Greek and Serbian counter-attacks on 1 July and Romanian mobilization on the 3rd, and with the formal Greek and Serbian declarations of war on the 5th and 6th respectively, the hastily-imposed peace Treaty of London was broken. As "the Greek and Serb armies pressed their offensive on the Bulgar forces, now immobilized in a helpless defensive",¹⁷³ Talât Bey, significantly, on 6 July, informed the French Chargé d'Affaires that the Ottoman army would advance up to the Enos-Midia line.¹⁷⁴ Still more significant, however, was a Cabinet resolution carried on the same day in favour of this move. In accordance with this, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, in his capacity as Minister of War in the new Cabinet, demanded from the Bulgarian High Command the evacuation of Ottoman territory up to that line.¹⁷⁵ And on 8 July, the Porte, having anticipated this sort of eventuality for a good fortnight, curtly

"... requested the Powers to take steps at Sofia to bring about the evacuation of the Bulgarian troops from the territory which had been guaranteed to Turkey by the Treaty of London. She threatened to send in her troops without waiting any longer for the Bulgarians to withdraw."¹⁷⁶

This threat indeed she took immediate steps towards implementing, while on 10 July Romania made formal declaration of war on Bulgaria, crossed the frontier and advanced on Sofia.¹⁷⁷

So, probably, by the time Talât Bey finished writing his letter to Cavid Bey, nearly all the states involved in the Balkan conflict stood out against each other in open hostility on the general principle of "the good old Rule ... the simple plan", ascribed by Wordsworth to Rob Roy,

"That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."

Hence, amid the scene of national aggrandisement and rapacity in the Balkans, there was passed, on 13 July, yet another Cabinet resolution to the effect that,

"... having met with the approval of the imperial *irade*, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, has been authorized to occupy the places belonging to the Ottoman Government."¹⁷⁸

Such a resolution must have been influenced by the caution expressed in no uncertain terms to the Grand Vezir by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War, largely on the basis of lack of confidence in his chain of command; for it implied only those places left to the Empire by the preliminary Treaty of London – a territory to the east of the Enos-Midia line, whereas “. . . the press clamoured for the recapture of Edirne”¹⁷⁹ which still lay beyond, under Bulgarian occupation.

How the matter might have ended, had it been left to the 13 July decision, it is impossible to say. But as the Ottoman forces reached the Enos-Midia line on the 15th,¹⁸⁰ Unionist sentiment began unmistakably to show itself. Talât Bey's opportunity had now arrived and he appears to have thrown himself zealously¹⁸¹ into an offensive of ambition and nationalism, aware that he was the real leader of the political party whose participation in the Raid on the Sublime Porte had been ostensibly for the cause¹⁸² of Edirne. But Talât Bey was no young officer and, lacking a young officer's ruling power, had to persuade where an officer would have commanded. Talât Bey, moreover, needed the support of the young officers for the realization of his policy. All the more so, since some members of the Government appeared irresolute, procrastinating and vacillating, for the reaction of the Great Powers was imminent; nor did the financial situation, at least on paper, warrant an offensive.¹⁸³ There was, by way of example, that “old” soldier, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, who wanted satisfactory assurances on two points before he was prepared to give the order for the forces to advance on Edirne:

“Would not the political events which might be born out of the advance of the army cause the country to fall into a very great danger; and is there the necessary money for the food supplies of the army?”¹⁸⁴

There was, too, an “old” civilian, the Minister of Public Works, Osman Nizami Paşa, who is reported to have said:

“If this time I succeed in persuading these people to abandon the idea of recovering Edirne, I shall count myself as having rendered the greatest service to my country.”¹⁸⁵

Yet on matters like rendering service to country the last word lay, once again, not with Talât Bey nor with Ahmed İzzet Paşa and certainly not with Osman Nizami Paşa, but with the young officers. The diagnosis of the British Ambassador to Germany on 16 July captured the situation accurately:

"The German Government have all along exercised all possible pressure on Turkey not to advance beyond Enos-Midia line and will continue to do so [wrote Lord Granville, and added] The Sec[retary] of S[tate] read me a very confidential telegram from German Ambassador at Constantinople expressing *serious fears that feeling in the army was too strong and that the Government would be overthrown if they tried to stop advance on Adrianople . . .*"¹⁸⁶

Indeed, a day later, at Çerkezköy, Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey substantiated the German Ambassador's "serious fears" by declaring, in defiance of both his own Government and his Deputy Commander-in-Chief, that

" . . . no one could, nor had the right to, stop the march of the Turkish troops on the Enos-Midia line, and that *even should the Turkish Government obey the Powers, he himself would order the troops to advance on Edirne and beyond.*"¹⁸⁷

The control of not only party politics but also military politics lay in the hands of the young officers. Yet such an extensive control, to maintain popularity, had to attract support with some more emotional appeal; this was now supplied by the march towards " . . . Edirne and beyond". Moreover, the emotional appeal in its turn had to be massive enough to inspire the hard-pressed multitude, of whom it was said by a contemporary observer that " . . . inexhaustible is the supply of men that still can be commanded by the Empire, and . . . unquestioning is their militarism . . ." ¹⁸⁸

It was on 17 July, coincidental with Enver Bey's declaration of intent, that there was published the call of Ziya Gökalp for a "New Attila [Yeni Attila]" – a call which was surely intended to stimulate and intensify patriotic emotion and throw down a challenge for the young officers such that, to paraphrase Gibbon, all the prayers of a St. Genevieve would not divert their march from the direction of Edirne:

" . . .
The fear of revenge has seized the West.
March! March! Turkish army!

O Europe, from this calamity
Whither shall you flee?
At the hand of a Second Attila
Many tears shall you shed.

" . . . " ¹⁸⁹

The more impetuous of the various counsels prevailed on the young officers, deeply affected by the scenes of deliberate carnage and vengeful destruction vented upon the local, predominantly

Muslim Turkish population and all their possessions; and the imagined offensive did not remain abstract. The barely controlled advance northward and westward by the [Bolayır] Allotted Army (*Kuva-i Mürettebe*) and Çatalca Army [Group] respectively towards Edirne and Kırkkilise (now Kırklareli) was preceded by attacks of volunteer raider detachments on the remaining Bulgarian pockets of resistance. According to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, Lüleburgaz fell on the 15th;¹⁹⁰ on the 17th, according to H.N[orman] of the British Foreign Office, "Unluckily the Turks have already advanced beyond the line".¹⁹¹ Meanwhile, according to our incontrovertible evidence, the Cabinet was still debating whether to authorize an advance beyond the Enos-Midia line – amidst the wildest consternation. Military pressure far more than inclination or policy appears to have played the key role in the long-awaited Cabinet decision on the 19th to advance and to inform the Great Powers that

"... the object of this initiative was the recovery of Edirne; [and] after this object had been procured, the army would halt and under no circumstances would the right bank of the Meriç [Maritza] be crossed."¹⁹²

Indeed, it was the Minister of the Interior, "Talât Bey [who, on the 20th] struggled and struggled to obtain the protocol from the Council of Ministers authorizing the imperial forces to advance on Edirne . . .",¹⁹³ which should have been prepared and transmitted immediately after the meeting; while the Guardian of İstanbul, Cemal Bey, is said to have exerted pressure by "... awaiting the decision of the Council of Ministers outside the door".¹⁹⁴ Yet even prior to this, it was the pressure and, apparently, threat of Enver Bey, attached to the left flank of the Çatalca Army [Group], that must have overruled the major obstacle – the still uncertain spirit of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa. For Enver Bey, like his fellow young officers, was increasingly impatient at Ahmed İzzet Paşa's continuing hesitancy and indecisiveness as late as 18 July – when the Ottoman forces were braced for attack all along the Enos-Midia line and, in his own case, already making unofficial forays across it only to be recalled and nervously admonished by the jittery Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Enver Bey, in addition to a short trip to İstanbul from the front, it was noted, had been heard to say on the telephone to Headquarters, "Tell the Commander-in-Chief that if he will not authorize the army's advance towards Edirne, he should resign".¹⁹⁵

Ahmed İzzet Paşa did not resign. Rather, he took up the cause of Enver Bey for want of anything better. As for Enver Bey himself, he now, at the head of the Independent Cavalry Division in the

vanguard of the Çatalca Army [Group]'s left flank, racing neck and neck with the 2nd "Nomadic" Independent Cavalry Division of the [Bolayır] Allotted Army, reached the outskirts of Edirne on 21 July, issued an ultimatum to the occupying Bulgarian forces, entered first and effectively reclaimed the city at 10.30 in the morning of 22 July 1913.¹⁹⁶

IV. Military supremacy, and self-control, under Enver Paşa

Thus seen, the reclaiming of Edirne appears as an incident in a conflict the nature of which we, perhaps, are no better able than those in 1913 to understand – the cleavage between a drilled, determined and self-conscious officer corps and the slow, ponderous and compromising institution which successive governments tended to be. It was obvious that the officer corps, having recovered its morale and fighting power anew¹⁹⁷ and now growing in unity and self-esteem, would encroach upon those politicians who were discredited and demoralized. All the more so since the young officers, aptly personified by Enver Bey, promptly responded to popular emotion yet did not permit it to get out of control. And this can have been no easy task, for popular emotion abounded. As Ali Fuad Bey remarked,

“. . . this success, by removing the nightmare woes which had descended upon the country as the result of defeat after defeat raised the morale of the people and was viewed in every corner of the realm with rejoicing.”¹⁹⁸

And yet, as a modern scholar has said, “. . . there was still the acquiescence of the Powers to be won”,¹⁹⁹ a warning which was, in fact, implicit in Ali Fuad Bey's further remark: “Now the matter has passed over to securing [Edirne's] retention diplomatically [. . . siyaseten temin-i muhafazasına kaldı].”²⁰⁰

This sentiment is noticeable for the strange contradiction it presents. While the civilian mind appears to endorse refraining from further military action, at the same time it alludes to a military success in a patriotic manner. Similarly, the Government, in the same vein, first wages war on Bulgaria with declarations that it is justified; then, when it comes to dictating peace, attempts to do so as a supplicant in the face of the intimidating Concert of Europe.²⁰¹ Yet if the Government's actions scarcely ever satisfied the public, their shortcomings should not entirely be attributed to themselves. But they were so attributed. The explanation of this phenomenon is not as simple as might appear at first sight. It is easy but

misleading to depict governments as being solely responsible for the ignominious defeats with which the country had met. However, as we have seen, the role of political ruling group which was played by the military entailed, logically, a corresponding degree of social responsibility. Paradoxically, while the full burden of responsibility and public disapproval had to be borne by the Government in time of defeat, when success occurred in the form of the retaking of Edirne it was hailed as a resounding victory for the military. Then the Government was unable to lay claim successfully to any of the general rejoicing and congratulations directed exclusively at the military. Not that the young officers deliberately looked for an occasion on which to re-establish their hold on society; it was rather that they were, like the society which had produced them, profoundly and half-unconsciously influenced by the military tradition that had long preceded the régime of constitutional monarchy and, indeed, continued to exist side by side with the formal civilian governments. Yet, from the conclusions reached above, it can be maintained with some confidence that the heightened awareness by the officer corps, both individual and collective, of their own abilities and rights allowed them to extend the limits even of the military tradition. It impelled them to embrace and personify unqualified social demands regardless of transient political movements. In this attitude, wherein lay the manifest weakness of the corps, lay also its strength. On the one hand, professional rivalry was almost inevitable if nothing else mattered but each young officer's conviction that he had to rise to the occasion whenever the need arose. On the other hand, the strong ties felt by a young officer to the political ruling group perpetuated his belief that no policy could be implemented without the consent of those like himself in whom the tradition had implanted the idea that his organization alone could find the solution to the country's problems. Enough precedent existed to prove how such an idea had been elevated into something approaching a *Weltanschauung*. Moreover, I would argue, it had conjoined with nationalistic fervour and acquired the support of the militaristic values with which the Ottomans were long familiar. These values, however emotive, affected the functioning of the military institution, and substantial changes in it, when they occurred, were therefore likely to be reflected in the balance of the political order. In so far as public attitudes, moreover, can be deduced from popular modes of thinking, I would aver that valour and heroism were the most pervasive ideals of the time – they appealed to all sorts of men. And the young officers appeared to fulfil those ideals. No doubt social stresses and discontent could at times assist patriotic

militarism, but it was not the motive of people seeking to destroy a constitutional régime. It was the only, and it seemed the last, resort of men alienated from governments by the latter's failures. It was not their individual grievances but rather their collective frustration in the face of military and diplomatic humiliations that found solace in one single military success which provoked an upsurge of popular enthusiasm and affection for those who had achieved it. For a single victory appears to have negated at a stroke any blame which might justifiably have been attributed to the military for the preceding losses in the Balkans, including that of Edirne.

The gist of my argument so far is implicit in the narration of a young *Tanin* reporter of the time. Falih Rıfkı (Atay) Bey, who was among the entourage of the heir apparent (*Veliahd*), Prince Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi, travelling by train to the Edirne area, recounts his first meeting with a member of the Ottoman royal family. According to the Master of Ceremonies who instructed the young reporter as to etiquette, the audience would end when His Highness rose to his feet. In a graphic description of the audience itself, Falih Rıfkı records:

“ ‘I am very happy’, he [the Prince] said. (Raising his hands in the air [i.e., in a gesture of praise to *Allah*], ‘We must thank the Ottoman Army; (knitting his brows) the fault, the guilt, lies with Kâmil Paşa.’

And preening himself as if he had found a solution: ‘He [Kâmil Paşa] told me that the Powers were going to protect the *status quo [ante bellum]* in the Balkans; I said to him, ‘Get a promissory note from the British Ambassador’, [but] he did not do it.’

And shaking his head, he stood up.”

Falih Rıfkı adds: “Because of this it seems we had lost Rumelia.”²⁰²

At the same time, it must be said that such irony as this which, presumably, the history of disaster and humiliation had stimulated in the Ottoman citizen, would not preclude him from giving formidable, if sometimes hesitant, support to an aggressive and untrammelled military. Nevertheless, we are not dealing merely with causes and consequences but with the development of human fortunes within the conditions of the time and under the impact of military personalities.

If the war situation helped soldiers, they also derived much advantage from the weakness of civilians. Indeed they developed the idea which, in the broadest interpretation, recognized that the services rendered by the young officers in military ventures or, on a more general level, in invigorating the power of the state constituted for the officers themselves a means of acquiring power.

Corollary to this, their interpretation of the existing situation was, in itself, cognitively and morally persuasive. All in all, they could exercise power at their own discretion and induce a sense of acceptance and political acquiescence in the public.

On the other hand, in the face of the officers' attitude the Government could not accept the terms which the Powers were pressing on them, a pressure amounting to intimidation.²⁰³ Behind the army lay an empty treasury but an over-enthused public. Had the Government possessed more of the spirit of calm and disinterested patriotism and the determination to oppose foreign pressure publicly, its standing would have been enhanced. But it was not so. Exceedingly precarious, therefore, was the position of the Said Halim Paşa Government. For the pressure from without had been a determining influence within, and it had forced the Government to seek comfort in the single victory achieved by the military and at the same time to appease the young officers. In consequence, the military increasingly felt its power – power which allowed the undue preponderance of the soldiers in every aspect of society. As the politicians realized quite clearly, their position owed hardly anything to the programme on which they had been voted in; it owed virtually everything to their being propped up by the soldiers. Out of this realization grew the policy adopted by the Government. To the advice of the German Ambassador that Edirne should be offered for bargaining, the response of the Grand *Vezir* was prompt. On 28 July, Said Halim Paşa told Wangenheim that no Ottoman Government had the power to evacuate the soldiers from Edirne. If the Powers were to continue to exert pressure it was feared, according to the Grand *Vezir's* argument, that the army would advance into Bulgaria.²⁰⁴

As for the Committee, the declaration of Talât Bey to the press, one week later, may be taken as an adumbration of their attitude:

"It is possible that partisans of the evacuation of Edirne exist. In that case it is impossible for persons holding such views to remain in the Cabinet. The ministers are all in accord about retaining Edirne . . . Therefore, in the name of all the members of the government I authorise you to publish a denial of rumours to the contrary . . . Edirne can only be bought at the price of the blood of our devoted and courageous army, prepared to sacrifice itself in order to defend the town."²⁰⁵

If the impact of the recovery of Edirne on the battered and splintered Ottoman state inspired civilians of the most diverse opinions to seek salvation in a faith in the military, it penetrated perhaps even more deeply into the military mind as the retention of the city became a matter for their own self-esteem. In

consequence, the officer corps would have regarded any concession made under foreign pressure as a sign of weakness not of the Government but of themselves. This attitude made it impossible for them to sustain harmonious relations with the Government, and they were therefore radical. Viewed from this perspective, a young officer might have felt himself isolated, despite his Unionist backers in the sphere of partisan politics; the existing framework of domestic and international relationships, the society, necessarily, did not conform to his ultimate ends because he did not wish to comply with it. Under this tension (a tension which had increased as the Powers stepped up their pressure) he conceived the generally desirable society to be that which he personally desired. From what has been said so far, it does not seem hazardous to postulate that the officer's inability to resist international pressure projected itself in the form of his own domestic power. The main point arising from this is that the more international pressure was exerted upon the Ottoman Government, the more powerful the officer corps appeared in the public eye and the further the credibility of the politicians waned. But this statement does less than justice to the Government which continually warned the Powers against persisting in their main demand, the Ottoman evacuation of Edirne²⁰⁶ – but to no avail. Indeed, on 31 July, the British Foreign Secretary wrote:

"I am not very sanguine about getting the Turks out of Adrianople by bargaining and diplomatic pressure; but we must see what can be done."²⁰⁷

Hence it appears that "a variety of schemes were . . . born"²⁰⁸ for the purpose of obtaining what the Powers wanted. But it was only after doing their best for about ten days to secure the evacuation of Edirne through both pressure and intimidation²⁰⁹ that ". . . the Concert of Europe finally produced on August 7th a collective *démarche* at the Porte".²¹⁰ Quoting Helmreich once again:

"The Powers now at least outwardly thundered in unison: 'Respect the Preliminaries of London!'; the grand vizier smiled and promised to refer the matter to the council of ministers. The day before Turkey had stolen a march on the Powers and had presented each of them with a long memorandum as to why Turkey could not possibly leave Adrianople. The answer to the collective *démarche* was the same."²¹¹

It is not easy to distinguish all the elements of influence which coalesced in the Ottoman answer of 11 August rejecting the collective *démarche*, as one commentator has put it, ". . . firmly but politely".²¹² The influence of military pressure is clear: no Ottoman

Government could act against the wishes of the military and the Said Halim Paşa Government was no exception. It had already stated this in the Memorandum of the 5th as one of the most important reasons “. . . as to why Turkey could not possibly leave Adrianople”.²¹³ Many other, yet less important, domestic concerns such as the loss of governmental credibility and prestige or the fear that opposing factions might exploit the situation may similarly be traced. There was, too, the influence of the international element which I believe was decisive in giving a shape to the Ottoman response. By now, the Said Halim Paşa Government appears to have had an inkling of the disunity that existed amongst the Powers.²¹⁴ According to the reports of the Ottoman ambassadors, the statesmen of Europe variously expressed indifference, caution or outright disapprobation but still guided their policies as their own national interests demanded.²¹⁵ They were, in other words, not whole-hearted in the common cause, if indeed there was one. This showed, once again, that no formal or informal alliances can be relied upon, particularly in a general condition of war, unless they make certain the sanction of a unified policy superior to the self-interested motives for overriding them. For example, Austria and Russia

“. . . were . . . united, both in maintaining that Adrianople would have to be returned to Bulgaria and in their inability to suggest how the Turks should be put out of the city.”²¹⁶

Meanwhile, concentrating on the supreme importance of gaining for their respective countries one district or one town the more, Balkan statesmen had become oblivious of their common adversary. The mood was reflected in the Romanian offensive of 10 July against Bulgaria, concluding with the peace Treaty of Bucharest (10 August), “. . . a peace which left Bulgaria despoiled and disarmed”.²¹⁷ Yet new interests had to be taken into consideration if diplomacy were to retain its superiority at a settlement. A further war, which could not fail to embrace the whole of the Balkans and, again, invite the involvement of the Great Powers to various degrees, was certain if things were left to take their course. Who could foresee what the results of such a war might be? For example, according to two Ottoman Ambassadors, Rifat and Mahmud Muhtar Paşas, writing on 12 August, it was dangerous to think that the Empire might gain more by further advance along the Maritza than she had already gained in the recovery of Edirne. For such a move would certainly provoke the Powers, and especially Russia, into acting together against the Empire.²¹⁸ It may have

been true, or so at least Ottoman political circles reasoned, that the Powers were not likely tamely to acquiesce in the rebuff that had been dealt publicly to their demands and that the fear of loss of prestige would urge them to act this time rather than remain passive in the face of an Ottoman advance on the right (west) bank of the Maritza. It should be remembered that when the Ottoman forces advanced on Edirne the Government had, in a note to the Powers, guaranteed that the river would not be crossed.²¹⁹ Therefore, despite the circumstances in Western Thrace appearing to be advantageous,²²⁰ the Ottoman Government in fact did nothing. It was, on 15 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey who, bypassing his corps commander, authorized a *çete* (raiding band) of 116 men to cross the Maritza and advance on a location called Ortaköy.²²¹ And on the general Balkan situation and the fortunes of "... some men who were then the spirit of the military's mentality [ordu zihniyetinin ruhu] ...",²²² the crossing of the Maritza exercised a considerable influence.

To narrate the progress of all the military and political consequences in the Balkans would be beyond our task; for one good reason, the Ottoman Empire was not a party to the Treaty of Bucharest. Bulgaria, with the cessation of the Ottoman advance by 21 August, "... was forced to enter into separate negotiations"²²³ to include the new territorial situation. To Ottoman statesmen it then seemed appropriate to pose as the champions of peace, forced by the diplomatic casuistry of the Powers to take up guns. Indeed, the Ottomans could afford to do so once they had become firmly convinced that the Powers, "... as France had intimated, ... were ready to close their eyes to the fate of Adrianople".²²⁴ These calculations took account of the attitude of the Bulgarian representative who had been sent to İstanbul before the recent hostilities and had remained there throughout. Načovič "... tried to impress upon his government the wisdom and necessity of dealing directly with Turkey".²²⁵ When the Bulgarian statesmen gave up hope of the intervention of the Powers²²⁶ and sent a delegation to İstanbul on 3 September, they were in effect compelled to choose terms that the Ottoman statesmen made available to them. This meant that while the Ottomans engaged in further bargaining in the protracted negotiations, they managed to make the Bulgarians prefer a peace treaty to no treaty and to dissuade them from entering the bargaining themselves. It appears that the Bulgarians, with the help of Austrian counsel, were made to believe that the consequences of non-agreement would be worse for them than the basic terms which the Ottomans were offering.²²⁷ The negotiations were concluded on 29 September with a

treaty of peace which provided a fitting termination to that part of the Balkan War focused upon in this study, as well as serving “. . . as a model for the later treaties to be made between Turkey and other Balkan states”.²²⁸ Broadly, it provided the territorial settlement by which the Ottoman Empire retained Edirne and Kırklareli north of the Enos-Midia line, whereas the lower Maritza formed the main boundary on the Aegean.²²⁹ The difficulties encountered during the coming months in Ottoman-Bulgarian negotiations or later Ottoman-Greek relations mainly emanated from the old-established doctrine that territories can be transferred like goods and chattels, without necessarily referring to the opinions of the inhabitants. In this respect, the Treaty of İstanbul was no more than a modification of the Preliminaries of London, with one most obvious difference – Edirne remained in Ottoman hands. Here we come to the point that is germane to my argument. It was made, bitterly, on 2 October by the Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy in İstanbul, in a report:

“It [the Treaty] is peculiar in that, for the first time since over 100 years, Turkey regains territory, lost as a result of her own military efforts, and in defiance of the decisions and pressure of Europe.”

The Chargé then went on to speculate that:

“The Collective Note of the Great Powers in January last promised Turkey financial and other assistance against the cession of Adrianople. Turkey now finds herself in possession of Adrianople and district, and practically assured of the promised financial help. This success of the Committee of Union and Progress has naturally increased their prestige in the country and ought, in the ordinary course, to ensure them a long lease of power. Their ‘victories over Bulgaria and Europe’ may, however, lead to a recrudescence of chauvinism and xenophobia . . .”²³⁰

But these “victories” had already done so, if the words of an acute, though clearly affronted, observer of the Ottoman social scene at this time may be cited. At about the end of September, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, travelling in south-eastern Anatolia, met, near Maraş,

“. . . khaki-clad soldiers back from the war . . . They were very cock-a-hoop, and had evidently been well ‘stuffed’ by their officers . . . These three fellows were well-dressed and sleek . . . From their talk, it was easy to see the way they were managed, and from their insolent sneaking manners. easy to understand how deep the Committee ideas have sunk into some of the rank and file.”²³¹

This observation indeed strengthens the point from which we started, that for the Ottomans the real significance of the war lay not so much in its disastrous results as in its indication of a phase in the evolution of their psychology. The course of history of the Young Turk era was ultimately determined by such attitudes of mind, whereby the people appear to have accepted the cost of war in a fatalistic spirit and so left the military free to act. At the base of this attitude lay a paradox – the combination of fatalism with intense and increasing effort. Hence, the enhanced prominence of the military and the unquestioned control of policy by the young officers became basic to their own understanding of their prerogatives. It was unlikely that the young officers would feel themselves fettered even by the change in the political structure of the Committee of Union and Progress, a change which was made when the fifth annual Congress of the Committee opened in İstanbul on 20 September 1913. At the Congress, General Secretary Ali Fethi Bey announced that the Committee was to be converted in its entirety from a society into a political party.²³² Article 1 of both the new Political Programme and of the Regulations marked the culminating point of the amendments made at the Congress. Indeed these, as Dyer has argued,

“... had the aim of shifting the centre of decision-making out of the secret Central Committee and in the direction of the general membership of the hitherto subordinate Parliamentary Party of Union and Progress; *the change was necessitated by the growing ascendancy of Enver and the army side of the C[ommittee]UP* . . .”²³³

But the change was of no avail against “. . . Enver and the army side of the CUP . . .”. The recovery of Edirne had brought together the man and the occasion: it signalled the rise of Enver Bey. In the flowery language of his biographer, it

“... added new rings, new halos around the fame of Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey. Enver Bey once again became the Hero of Liberty Enver Bey. They even called him the second conqueror of Edirne . . .
From now on all the doors before Enver Bey were opened.”²³⁴

The so-called conquest was no more the work of one man than any such operation can ever be; but without Enver Bey there would have been no Edirne.²³⁵ Yet it is equally important to realize that he turned out to be the only person who sought to monopolize this success and thus benefit from the consequences of his own audacity.²³⁶ By now he was famous and adored, at a time when “. . . jealousy of heroism was a disease in the armed forces, intermittent and remittent, like malaria”.²³⁷ If his ambition was overweening,

his undeniable dedication to his profession excessive, his career controversial and his strong convictions at times only damaging to the military hierarchy,²³⁸ this, needless to say, did not lessen his impact nor repel those who were willing to follow. The followers consisted of junior staff-officers, "volunteers" (lit. *fedâiler*; sometimes *silâhşorlar*, warriors) from the Committee and adherents of the Committee's policies.²³⁹ Among all those personalities, whose names are less important here than their deeds, the innermost had taken the title of *Aşere-i Mübeşşere*²⁴⁰ (the Ten Who Were Promised Paradise) and "... hitched themselves to Enver's star".²⁴¹ They were genuine revolutionaries, willing to follow not only Enver Bey himself but also his ideas to their logical conclusions. They were also truly desperate men, desperate because their recklessness exceeded their comprehension and because they were fanatical believers in their own rightness. Nevertheless, revolutionary, far-flung and influential as the *Aşere-i Mübeşşere* soon became, by itself it represented merely an instrument, not a driving force. As matters stood, such a force could only come from one source – from Enver Bey himself. On the other hand, Enver Bey appears to have believed that he would not be able to increase his impact on Ottoman political life without calling upon revolutionaries more revolutionary than himself. And of course, his ultimate aims were not all clear from the first.

In view of the favourable international situation of the moment, the Cabinet perhaps cannot be blamed for failing to see the weakness implicit in their position. The incompatibility between the politicians and the soldiers was admitted; but since this conflict ended in the victory of the soldiers, and their victory was the condition of progress, it was achieved at the expense of the politicians. After the Balkan War, the military clung to this justification for their actions.

Characteristically, if there were any politician who might have altered the balance, it was Ahmed İzzet Paşa in his capacity as Minister of War. There is, however, a real ambiguity in his position and this must be considered. For it was not merely the young officers that Ahmed İzzet Paşa was trying to control; it was the legitimation of their power as a part of the governing structure. Yet the chief means which the Paşa chose to employ for the attainment of his aims were inadequate. Although he intended to make the civilian Government's rule effective, the one legal restraint he proposed – to create a new "Ministry of the Commander-in-Chief [Başkomandan Vekâleti veya Serdar-ı Ekremlik]", separate from and not to be united in the same person as the Ministry of War, and to attach to it the offices of the Chief of the General Staff and

Directorate of Personnel ²⁴² – was a parochial measure and was, in fact, never carried out.²⁴³ What is also certain is that his other means, two explicit actions – trying to appoint Enver Bey as the Commandant of the Infantry War College and to discharge Cemal Bey from the Guardianship of İstanbul²⁴⁴ – not only involved the subjugation of military independence to himself but was also a general assertion of governmental predominance. But it was not possible to carry out such measures in a realm dominated by the young officers. Ahmed İzzet Paşa, recently promoted to the rank of General and further, as a great distinction, to the Palace as the *Yâver-i Ekrem* (General of the Highest Degree in the Palace) with an accompanying “Jewelled Ottoman Order of Special Merit, First Class”,²⁴⁵ still showed himself willing to make concessions to soldiers even though he thereby undermined the principle of hierarchy and, further, the prestige of the Sultanate, albeit symbolically.

Ahmed İzzet Paşa was no more successful at the purging of inefficient personnel. A comprehensive plan to set up a Purge Commission (*Tensikat Komisyonu*) was delayed until the Paşa gave his reluctant approval of that body's work in organizing the required lists. As one of the members of the Commission put it:

“... after one-and-a-half months [second half of October and November] of continuous work the required lists were prepared and presented to the Paşa. In spite of their being reasonably and moderately drawn up, İzzet Paşa could not free himself from his pangs of conscience so that he could not endorse [them], nor could he set [their] application in motion.”²⁴⁶

What frustrated Ahmed İzzet Paşa was not his pangs of conscience but a deep split in the officer corps, brought about by a kind of generation gap – something which he, unable to grasp the genuineness of the young officers' beliefs, never seems really to have considered.

“Whereas the young and fiery officers of the armed forces, with a zeal sustained by the revolution [of 1908 and] with a determination in opening up the road of progress, were strongly in favour of severing their links with the forces of those whom they counted as ‘elders’ in respect of themselves as soon as possible.”²⁴⁷

Ahmed İzzet Paşa's hopes of control must have evaporated in this atmosphere of contempt and disrespect. According to him, dwelling years later on the events, his opposition to “. . . the thirst for glory and advancement . . . of the youngsters [gençlerin . . . hırs-ı cah ve terakkilerine . . .] . . .” which had been “. . . concealed under the

pretension and claim of the rejuvenation of the armed forces . . . had inspired a great deal of discontent against me . . .".²⁴⁸

Plainly, Ahmed İzzet Paşa's own political and military authority did not assure even a measure of obedience. Out of this realization grew his timidity. The crisis in the fate of his control policy revolved around the person and the interests of Enver Bey, who now displayed powers of uninhibited manoeuvring. Enver Bey was, with the declared support of his *Aşere-i Mübeşşere*, intent upon only one thing: the elevation of his fame and the consolidation of his power. Congruent with the argument that in time of war those who prove themselves valiant have a tendency towards greater aggressiveness in victory, the more timid Ahmed İzzet Paşa became the more Enver Bey assumed the aggressive. No doubt, to some extent the contrast between timidity and aggression may be explained by common interests between the Unionist civilians and the young officers. The civilians obviously wanted to choose the way that offered the best hope of political success. It was in this task that the strength of the young officers' ruling group role becomes apparent. This role left plenty of room for development and for improvisation in policy. But it left the politicians with no choice but to accept the rule of the strong, and no hesitation about the submission it required. Still, contemporary opinion deserves to be heard. It at least indicates what was thought to be possible at the time, for instance, on the issue of the rejuvenation of the officer corps. Halil Bey, the then President of the Council of State, wrote:

"After the calamity of the Balkan [War] defeat the question of the rejuvenation of the military was suggested. İzzet Paşa was in favour too. He had already organized the list of former commanders whose pensioning off was necessary. 163 commanders were going to be pensioned off. But while İzzet Paşa was the Minister of War he showed hesitancy in executing this decision. The reason he put forward to explain his hesitancy was this: 'All of these are my friends; I will not be able to do this thing [Bunların hepsi benim arkadaşlarımdır, bu işi yapamayacağım]. Let me take leave; let someone else deputize for me and do this.' In this rejuvenation process it was very much desired that İzzet Paşa should be at the head of the military. But the thing went on and on, the decision could not be put into effect. One day, the late Talât said, 'Halil Bey, we will go to İzzet Paşa this evening. You know the problem. I will make one last offer to this gentleman. If he still shows hesitation I shall suggest that he resign.' . . .

We went together. Talât . . . saying [to İzzet Paşa], 'We are of the opinion that your remaining at the head of the armed forces would be very beneficial for the country. Do it and stay', was most insistent. When İzzet Paşa again said, 'Look, someone should deputize for me

[and] do it', Talât lost his patience. 'Paşa, it seems your resignation is inevitable. Do resign and let the man who will do it come', he said [. . . istifanız mukaddermiş. Çekiliniz de yapacak adam gelsin dedi]."²⁴⁹

This account, despite being written over thirty years later, reflects the Unionist civilians' pre-eminent concern with the formulation and enforcement of governing power. It was here that Talât Bey's understanding was keenest. At a time when the constitutional Government was to a large extent being ignored, the politicians fostered the notion of symbiosis with the young officers by which they could hope to retain some part in governance. In this way, they would be able to wield an executive power to which non-Unionists could not aspire.

Whether Talât Bey was as outspoken as Halil Bey would like us to believe or more indirectly invited Ahmed İzzet Paşa to resign, as a contemporary political commentator, Mustafa Ragıp (Esatoğlu), wrote,²⁵⁰ is of no importance. What is important, however, is to understand the extent of his arrogance; for here lies the root of the assertion of the Party (of Union and Progress)'s authority. Without the underpinning of the power to coerce, the Party's authority would have been negligible. Understandably, then, the authority of the Party, committed to the military through a common ideology, was an integral part of the civilians' theory of power, at least in the eyes of contemporary Unionist politicians. If this bond were to break, everything else would be shaken. Yet it is clear that the soldiers could not allow the civilians to exercise power at their own discretion; the politicians must have overseers, and the most important of these at the time was Enver Bey. It was the Ottoman constitutional struggles which gave rise to the conviction that victory might be ensured only by throwing the Party's full weight into every political battle. Success required that every weapon be used to promote the symbiosis in order to bring the recalcitrant to heel. This meant that, as a civilian, a politician was insignificant unless he could harness military backing to political ends. Yet this put the civilian into a dilemma. By deploying his military-backed strength he could win, but then he lost the prestige that made his victory worthwhile.

All this took place in day-to-day politics, but it did not happen all the time. Had it become a common practice, the politicians would have been supreme indeed in the land. But the process was stifled by growing awareness among the young officers of their own ability to exercise power and rely on politicians only to transmit orders and see that they were carried out.

We can see the whole process clearly at the end of 1913, when

Talât Bey is said to have confronted his fellow-Minister, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, and demanded his resignation – so that not the man who merely could but who “. . . [would] do it . . .” might come in the latter’s stead. Given the prevailing temper of the military, it was not a bad arrangement. Nor was it unworkable in that such an arrangement called for a kind of competence in which certain politicians, among them most notably Talât Bey, excelled. It satisfied their aspirations without offending the young officers’ susceptibilities. Little was needed to set things in motion, and that little had already been provided by Staff-Adjutant-Major Süleyman Askerî Bey of the Independent Government of Western Thrace²⁵¹ (*Garbî Trakya Hükûmet-i Müstakîlesî*) fame. His invitation to Enver Bey to become Minister of War drew from the Unionists a reminder that the candidate for this post must be adopted by the Party. Described, in an authoritative source, as “. . . the closest friend”²⁵² of Enver Bey, Süleyman Askerî Bey belonged to the *Aşere-i Mübeşşere*. Although there is no doubt that his actions had sometimes been impetuous,²⁵³ they were not out of the ordinary for his time – a point which has hardly been appreciated by historians. To another member of the *Aşere-i Mübeşşere*, guerrilla leader Eşref Sencer Bey, those who served Enver Bey could look with confidence to his protection; it was a point of honour no less than of policy with them to see Enver Bey as their leader. For, as Eşref Sencer Bey put it, “. . . in the circumstances of the day, no suitable person other than he could be found as head of the armed forces.”²⁵⁴

There is, in fact, no need to suppose that Enver Bey himself was out of sympathy with the role he was asked to play. On the contrary, he appears to have been convinced of his ability to command men and politics simply by the light of discipline and reason, little though his experience by late 1913 justified such belief. But this was no deterrent, for it was the kind of delusion common amongst nearly all the officers. That Enver Bey was a more persuasive and dominating personality than the others is vouched for by the support he was given and by the feats of daring with which he was associated.

This is not all surmise. We have direct evidence as to what went on in the mind of Enver Bey from his letters to his bride (*nikâhlî*), Naciye Sultan, still living at the Palace:

“My divine *Sultana* [he wrote on 26 November 1913], I informed, with your kind permission, Talât Bey and other friends of my final decision about yesterday’s problem. They were all pleased. Now Ahmed İzzet

Paşa will be nominated by us as a candidate for the Princedom of Albania . . . [and] your humble servant will take up [his] new duty.

Apart from the confidence which all the officers of the armed forces have in your humble servant, their belief that the only hope of reforming the armed forces lies in me will ease my job. Thus, *İnşallah*, I shall be able to succeed in performing a service for our country. Naturally, all these matters are top secret."²⁵⁵

We may believe that history cannot be advanced by human volition alone but that, as Enver Bey would have argued, it is in the nature of human psychology to become involved in history. For the introduction of fundamental changes, not only is power necessary but so also is the ability to use it. Enver Bey was possessed by this idea inasmuch as he shared his "top secrets" both with his fourteen-year-old *Sultana*, or perhaps with the House of Osman to which she belonged, and also with the Grand *Vezir*, extraordinary though it may sound.

One day, most probably in mid-December, we are told that Enver Bey walked into the office of Said Halim Paşa and demanded to be appointed Minister of War. What actually happened there remains unclear; it would be surprising if chroniclers who were not present could narrate it with precision. The fullest account was published some twenty years later and is followed here. The author, not an admirer of Enver Bey, tells us that all the astounded Said Halim Paşa could say was, "You are too young. It would not be a bad thing if you were patient for a while".²⁵⁶ Apparently, so vehement was Enver Bey's retort that the exasperated Grand *Vezir* tried to bargain with him by offering the position of Chief of the General Staff ". . . for the time being". This deceptive aside did not fail to provoke a lecture from Enver Bey on the organization of the Ottoman armed forces in which, as he pointed out, the Minister of War ranked higher than the Chief of the General Staff. As he made all too clear just before leaving, in a week or so he would be able to shake the hand of the Grand *Vezir* as the latter's colleague in the Cabinet. Nowhere are we told, however, what was the demeanour of the silent civilians, or how they applied legal restraints on conscious political acts of this kind. On the contrary, we see Enver Bey being elevated, as if his promotion to Colonel on 15 December²⁵⁷ would suffice; all the more so, as the available evidence indicates that his promotion was confirmed just after his visit to the Grand *Vezir*. He informed his bride of this on 21 December, three days before he left an İstanbul hospital where he had undergone an operation for appendicitis:

"You accepted me while I was a major [and] wedded [nikâhlandınız] me. Now I am a colonel . . . To this elevation of rank is now also added my excellent health."²⁵⁸

Yet Enver Bey seems to have been only superficially content. Possibly the way in which he dwells on this sequence of happy events still betrayed the inner impatience with which he is usually identified. Indeed, aggression rather than circumspection is the key to an assessment of his policy with its undeviating course.

But whatever the factional colour of the moment, the *Aşere-i Mübeşşere*'s overwhelming influence ensured that Enver Bey would be the moving power in both politics and war. Apparently, four of its members made this clear to Talât Bey on 25 December.²⁵⁹ Talât Bey bowed to the young officers' will but, as I have noted earlier, it was not long before he embraced their order out of conviction. For perhaps he found to his dismay that the "old" officers, grown impotent with age and fruitless opposition, had already surrendered the initiative to the "young" radicals amongst them. Still, the dominance of their young ones was a perpetual reproach to the consciences of the sensitive old, such as Ahmed İzzet Paşa, and was to remain with them throughout their lifetimes, which exceeded even that of the state they served.

Enver Bey, meanwhile, was not overly concerned with such sentiments, writing to Naciye Sultan on 30 December 1913:

"Conferred with Talât and Halil Beys about the form which would be given to the matter of Ahmed İzzet Paşa . . . Tomorrow the problem of the Ministry of War will be solved.

Tomorrow evening would you permit me to come, wearing my [new] brigadier-general uniform, [and] present my respects? . . ."²⁶⁰

By 31 December, the "problem" had not been solved; Enver Bey was still in his Staff-Colonel's uniform and, as all the available though scanty evidence suggests, had not been able to visit Naciye Sultan. Then, it seemed, to all intents and purposes his politics hinged on personalities; for example, his approval of the Unionists was confirmed by his close relationship with their leader, Talât Bey. And through Talât Bey, time and time again, he put out feelers regarding the outcome of his policy. His final stroke waited only upon the occasion. And this was not long in coming. In *Tanin* of 3 January 1914 (21 Kanun-u Evvel 1329) there appeared a "specially received news" (*müstahberat-ı hususiyesi*):

"[It is learned that] His Excellency the Minister of War, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, has resigned. Enver Beyefendi will be appointed to the Ministry of War."²⁶¹

The virtual surrender of Ahmed İzzet Paşa did not pass without comment by the spokesman of the Palace, an interpretation which captures the essence of the reason for his resignation:

“... İzzet Paşa, who received information that a coterie amongst the officer corps had taken steps towards bringing Enver Bey into the Ministry of War [... zabitan arasında bir hizbin Enver Bey'i Harbiye nezâretine getirmek üzere teşebbüsâtta bulunduklarını haber alan ...], resigned ...”²⁶²

The Paşa's own admission, however, was even more to the point: “... I was forced to resign [... istifaya mecbur oldum].”²⁶³ It was, to be sure, not the only instance of the politicians' submission in the face of the officers' pressure that had aroused vindictive feelings in the Paşa, as one detects from reading his own account. And for another Paşa, the docility of the Ottoman Sultan in comparison with his own German *Kaiser* must also have aroused some feeling and have represented a new experience:

“One day in January Izzet Pasha failed to make his appearance in the War Ministry in which the offices of the military mission were located and sent me word that he was sick [wrote General Liman von Sanders, who had arrived in İstanbul on 14 December. He added,] I visited him next morning in his konak [mansion] and learned from him that he had to resign ...

Next evening Enver came to my office in the Ministry; I had seen him but once before during German maneuvers. He wore a general's uniform and informed me that he was the new Minister of War.

The Sultan himself had not heard of the appointment of the new Minister of War much before I did. That morning he sat in his room reading the paper. Suddenly he dropped the paper and remarked to the only adjutant present: ‘It is stated here that Enver has become Minister of War; that is unthinkable, he is much too young.’

I have this from the adjutant who was on duty and the sole witness of the event.”²⁶⁴

In fact, the official *communiqué* in which Staff-Colonel Enver Bey was gazetted to Brigadier-General and was appointed to the Ministry of War appeared in the newspapers of 4 January. The *communiqué*, in its dry style, made it clear that his qualification for early promotion, in lieu of the regular seniority by length of service, was “... due to the devotion he had shown in the Balkan battles [Balkan muharebatındaki fedarkârlığına mükâfaten] ...” and that his “... appointment as Minister of War with the rank of Brigadier-General emanated from the imperial *irade* of the Exalted Sultan [mir-i mumaleihin mirlivalıkla harbiye nezâretine tayini hususuna irade-i senniye-i hazret-i pâdişahî sâdır olmuştur]”.²⁶⁵ But no *irade*, as Bayur has pointed out, was ever published in the *Official*

gazette (*Takvim-i vekayî*) where, for instance, in the issue of 5 January, the *irade* authorizing the promotion of Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey, the then Acting-Minister of Public Works, was published. As for Cemal Bey's qualification for promotion to Brigadier-General, "... the good services which he had rendered in the Balkan War [Balkan muharebesindeki hidemât-ı hasenesinden dolayı] ..." had likewise rendered him eligible for early promotion.²⁶⁶

The non-publication of any *irade* led some contemporaries to believe that Enver Bey's promotion to *Paşa* and, indeed, his appointment as Minister of War were made without the prior knowledge of the Sultan: a rumour to which Liman von Sanders also lent his authority. This should have been the end of the matter. That it was not was due to the dominating presence of Enver *Paşa* and all that was entailed in his dazzling rise and ruthless policy.

Enver *Paşa* had no sooner been appointed Minister of War (and in addition become, on 8 January, Chief of the General Staff) than he reversed the compromising policy of his immediate predecessors. Lest the full force of the point I wish to make be obscured in the welter of argument, it may be well to repeat it with as much precision as possible.

Enver *Paşa's* intentions were straightforward. His policy was the enhancement of military power, the imposition of efficiency and discipline, and the justification of Unionist ideology; and all this involved the legitimation of the political ruling group role. The rapidity and extent of the execution of this policy are perhaps no more remarkable than the speed with which it was formulated or the attention that was given to the problem of military organization – an attention which had consequences for society in general. For it was articulated by a young officer who actually ruled over the military sphere and dominated the civilian, who was held up as a symbol to be emulated by all soldiers and civilians, and who was the bearer of the revolutionary tradition. Admiration for Enver *Paşa* and the hopes for Ottoman revival raised by his exploits mingled with his own desire to strengthen the reforms he meant to carry out by inculcating military values in society at large. As I have indicated earlier, this kind of intellectual trait animated the ideal of complete and uncritical obedience to the military institution over and above the individual. It was wholly in accord with the ethics of the time – a period resembling that of the Hegelian phase in which the "social" aim absorbs all individual aims. And like Hegel, Gökâlp too proposed that the State was internally powerful when the private interests of its citizens were identical with the common interest of the State. But unlike him, Gökâlp the

moral philosopher at times clothed his ideas in plain, folkloric verse form, lacking in aesthetics yet instructive:

“ . . .

Don't ever say I have right,
There is no right, there is duty!

The right is the nation's, so is the glory
The body is yours, the soul is hers,

. . .

There is no you or I, there are we.

. . . ”²⁶⁷

Only when his verse was tempered in the exacting precision of military parlance did it convey serviceably the mentality of his environment:

“ . . .

I am a soldier, duty is my commander,
I obey its every order without questioning!

I close my eyes!

I do my duty!

. . . ”²⁶⁸

In this prevailing atmosphere, the Minister of War now faced a major decision. Hitherto, he had been a member of the political ruling group. But now that he had risen above his contemporaries, given the military hierarchy, he had to become the organizer and the leading actor in the political ruling group role. In the words of Liman von Sanders, “Enver quickly oriented himself in his high position . . . ”²⁶⁹ It would be wrong to suppose that he did not recognize both the paramountcy and the permanency of his role; he and his followers continued to think in terms of reforming the military as being equivalent to reforming the state. All this demanded uniformity – the existence of a monolithic military organization and general conformity to it.

It is against this background that the purges involving some 1100 officers, beginning with the *irade* of 7 January,²⁷⁰ must be seen. Purges are indeed as good a starting point for the period as can be found; less, perhaps, as a foretaste of what is to come than as a valediction to the era we are leaving. The notion that the purges were carried out against those officers whom Enver Paşa saw as political opponents is neither borne out nor required by the facts. Considered disinterestedly, the whole idea of such a correlation between Enver Paşa's assertion of power and his immediate purge of officers is spurious. It is an answer which has been devised

for a non-existent question. For, by December 1913, there were not sufficient opponents of Staff-Colonel Enver Bey. Of course, it is impossible to calculate the number of those with Enverist antipathies too timid, too placid or too disciplined to declare themselves once the issue of his becoming Minister of War was no longer in doubt.²⁷¹ Had these comprised sufficient “political” opponents – and the word “political” was quite inappropriate then – Enver Bey could not have become Minister of War Enver Paşa, let alone been promoted twice within a time-span of just over two weeks.

Certainly, many young officers must have found the new order attractive but, equally naturally, the purged ones must have felt resentful. In the words of Enver Paşa, they “. . . were all officers who had failed in the Balkan War, were inefficient or too old”.²⁷² As publicly expressed on 10 January, for him:

“The function of an officer [was] not merely to wear a colourful uniform. Being a soldier mean[t] exercise and education, science and art, and above all bravery and hard work. It [was] only the young who possess[ed] these virtues and [were] capable of learning and hard work.”²⁷³

The last qualification, especially, must have ruled out the retention of the old; indeed, as one commentator put it, the purge included “. . . virtually all officers who had reached field rank before the Revolution”.²⁷⁴ Such a measure was drastic, but was the expression not so much of repentance for the past as of a determination to seize the occasion of an appropriate political climate to bring the military up to date and to control it. It is important to note that such a political climate – to use a contemporary term – was called “revolutionary” or “reformist”. But it is equally important to point out that substantial changes in the traditional form of Ottoman political life do not appear even to have been envisaged by Enver Paşa; he wished to strengthen those existing forms. His policy of augmenting the traditional power of the military, a power acquired by long historical process, tended more and more to animate the political ruling group role played by the military. In this sense, his purges of the officer corps may be seen as the culmination of explicit actions. Only a superficial judgement would call such actions revolutionary, aimed as they were at reviving the “Sultan’s power over his *kapıkulus*” and thus restoring that “classical-*Yeniçeri*-like” officer corps.²⁷⁵ Enver Paşa’s explicit actions appear, therefore, rather to have been conservative. This kind of policy, in its turn, meant that new appointees would take their positions within the customary arrangements of Ottoman politics – appointees whose moral, political and economic interests

lay in preserving the military as the political ruling group now typified by Enver Paşa, while broadening its base under him. Enver Paşa always tended to see the officer corps as a homogeneous body all of whose members were animated by the same “absolute obedience” and high capacity for “. . . devotion to duty”.²⁷⁶ In these circumstances, the tendency for the majority of the officer corps to adhere to Enver Paşa rather than to the Ottoman state constantly intensified. Yet they may be said to have been better endowed with ideals and resolution than with sheer numbers. The Unionist bond which linked them to Enver Paşa, despite the nuances contained in their Turkist sentiments, strengthened their belief in the unbounded nature of the absolute power of command possessed by the Minister of War. The significance of the common ideology thus lay in the officer corps’ willingness to be unified under him. Professional experience and personal attachments became deeply intertwined in fashioning their outlook. In other words, it was through implicit actions that the officer corps allowed themselves to be controlled by Enver Paşa. It is, however, important to note that this voluntary restraint occurred at a time when the Balkan War had shattered complacency and jolted those concerned into a mood for reshaping military thought as well as organization. And those who felt most humiliated became the most ardent supporters of the reform, the main aim of which was the eradication of partisan political activities from the armed forces. Nevertheless, the “non-political” behaviour of the officers cannot be assessed without reference to at least one piece of evidence – evidence which may, I think, be more reliable in that it comes from a professional critic of Enver Paşa. Such a critic was Enver Paşa’s contemporary, Staff-Lieutenant-Colonel Şerif Bey,²⁷⁷ the author of *Sarikamış*.²⁷⁸ This work of Şerif Bey, while it bears the hallmark of severe criticism of Enver Paşa’s Sarikamış offensive (December 1914-January 1915), bears also the far more rare impress of profound thinking on Enver Paşa himself and considers, with an unusual detachment, his overall impact on the Ottoman military:

“The motherland had met with a great disaster [i.e., the Balkan War] and it had become an unavoidable decision to reform what must be the only pillar of national being, the military, anew and to remove from it the inefficient commanders . . .

Any commander or officer who dragged his feet with the old habit was put into retirement at once. The word objection could not [any more] be mouthed. A certain agility, speed and soldiership fell on everyone; the military was born into a new world.

The doors of the Ministry of War were closed. And nobody apart from those who had business could get in there. The German ‘Military

Mission' took charge. With the help of this 'Military Mission' procedures, freed from red tape, were carried out in a plain manner. And our military began to look like a military as our officers began to look like officers. Everybody had seen that on the road to wisdom and knowledge, rules and regulations, Turks too could be fellow-travellers.

Enver used to prevent the excesses of the 'Military Mission' and, despite their objections, go his own way. The Enver of the day was a reforming, hard-working, decisive and resolute Minister of War, of [the type] which Ottoman history has seen for the first time . . .

Both Enver's services in Trablus[garb] and his work up to the declaration of the General War [i.e., First World War] had given everyone the impression that he was a good organizer."²⁷⁹

This commentary on Enver Paşa commands considerable confidence in the literature.²⁸⁰ Less well known, perhaps, is the opinion of the man from whom one would hardly expect approbation, his ousted and humiliated predecessor, General Ahmed İzzet Paşa:

"It cannot be denied that Enver Paşa brought back obedience and discipline within the military . . . Come what may, this matter deserves to be counted as one of the good points to be written on the right side of Enver's performance book."²⁸¹

In addition, emphasis on his supreme ability to organize can be confirmed by the testimony of a number of officers who were his contemporaries. Some of them, unlike Şerif Bey, rose to the rank of General and, in the course of doing so, had opportunities for getting to know about Enver Paşa and, indeed, to know him personally, even to oppose him.²⁸² These writers, it would seem, are substantially independent of one another but they are united in voicing sentiments which served to link almost all the Ottoman officers of their time. Enver Paşa the Disciplinarian, the Rejuvenator and the Organizer became the symbol of the régime, through which the intrinsic politicization of the military institution occurred. And it increased in direct proportion to the unanimity of such sentiments among the corps. The major consequences of these developments were twofold. On the one hand, the institution tended more and more to play its role as a political instrument at the behest of Enver Paşa, not of the Government. This meant that although Enver Paşa extirpated the partisan political activities of the officer corps he did not, nor did he seek to, displace the institution under his control from "politics"; nor even did he mean to give the impression of any such heresy.²⁸³ On the other hand, once the tendency towards the realization of a monolithic officer corps had been strengthened it contributed to Enver Paşa, but not the Council for Military Affairs (*Dar-ı Şura-ı Askerî*) – the appropriate organ which

was duly abolished with the *irade* of 7 January – acting as the independent arbiter by indulging himself in the internal politics of the military. To Enver Paşa, the cohesiveness of the military became not only a matter of corporate pride but one of practical necessity, for it meant moral strength in the politics of the day. Moreover, as Enver Paşa may have known, any institution playing the political ruling group role tends to have an inherent shortcoming – that the ruling group comprises in itself the dissentient who might just as easily have remained outside, had there been any quarter left for effective dissent. And since the ruling group happened to be the Ottoman military, structural hierarchy and exclusivity was overtly emphasised and harshly observed.²⁸⁴ Thus, legal restraints on the conscious political acts of the military being, without guns, but words, the acquiescence of those bearing arms was for the first time ensured. To put it in the parlance of military politics, the military controlled the civilians while Enver Paşa controlled the military and thus commanded “politics”. In the words of a military writer:

“The destiny of the Ottoman state was under the control of the Committee of Union and Progress, the Committee of Union and Progress under the control of the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress, the Central Committee under the control of the Triumvirate [lit., *üçler*, i.e., Enver, Cemal and Talât Paşas (formerly Talât Bey); and] the Triumvirate under the strong will of the Minister of War, Enver Paşa.”²⁸⁵

It is easy to dismiss such a judgement as general or vague. Yet here is the authentic voice of a contemporary commander writing about one of the most representative aspects of Enver Paşa, and this description, designed to summarize the political situation from 1914/1915 onwards, is substantiated by the similar temper pervading the accounts given by the most fervent critics of the Young Turk régime.²⁸⁶

This belief in Enver Paşa’s personal authority might be said to colour all interpretations. The unanimity of this sentiment among writers of differing background gives prominence to the idea that what Enver Paşa accomplished was to establish a mutual sense of political restraint on the part of military and civilians alike, allowing the military a relatively wide but circumscribed area within which to function.²⁸⁷ In this respect, Enver Paşa’s control was the result of a short but intensive process covering the selection, recruitment and training of officers, and the indoctrination and manipulation of their personalities, values and ambitions. Consequently, the military, political, economic and cultural environment of the officers – all concurred to present them with a *fait accompli*: the omnipotence of the Minister of War in all decisions, military or

otherwise. Conversely, the willingness of the officers to accept Enver Paşa's control may have been facilitated by their personal allegiance to him, which may have overridden their political considerations or their better judgement.²⁸⁸ To assess the genuineness of the sentiment of allegiance that was so persistently and unequivocally expressed is extremely difficult. What is not so difficult, however, is to assert that even the limited financial resources, that ever-present anxiety of Ottoman governments, had been skilfully allocated to provide economic incentives to political loyalty. Enver Paşa appears to have resorted to every political expedient in order to secure the enhancement of the officers' economic position. Indeed, despite the Minister of Finance Cavid Bey's continuous objections to the incomparable financial advantages that accrued to the military, the Paşa always managed to obtain governmental approbation through the power he exerted over it.²⁸⁹ For, if one may so generalize, the military also rested their increasing status on an improvement in their finances, and improvement there certainly was. For example, this affords a basis for judging the enactment of two successive bills on 12 March and 9 April 1914 concerning the Army and Navy respectively, which increased officers' salaries and commutation of rations, and extended other benefits.²⁹⁰ Thus, this public act of Enver Paşa showed solicitude not only for the future of his fellow officers but also for his own future and, so far from being an unconsidered step, it had probably been very carefully thought out and was as "politician-like" as any that could have been devised in the circumstances. The result of the reciprocal relationship of obligation and favour is manifest in a striking feature of the time, though it seems never to have received the attention of later scholars. On the face of it, this was to do with the tremendous importance attached to questions of ceremony and precedence, a sentiment associated with the great respect always shown to royalty on state occasions. For a military decree of 14 March, breaking entirely with Ottoman tradition, ruled that henceforth, even in the presence of the Sultan (*Rikâb-ı Hümayun*) officers of all rank salute first their own regimental colours and standard (*sancak*).²⁹¹ By this means, the military literally displaced the Sultan as the symbol of the highest source of loyalty. Subjection of this kind to the military was to be strengthened further by soldiers taking the newly-instituted regular military oath of allegiance during the presentation ceremonies of *sancaks*, whereby duty of obedience to the Sultan and country through the *sancak* was solemnly reinforced.²⁹²

But that is not all. While the propitious circumstances made visible applications such as these of the military's rule, the internal

history of the Ottoman monarchy became coterminous with the manifold activities of Enver Paşa. And this process almost amounted to a transfiguration, for its by-products pervaded almost all aspects of the life of society. Indeed, with the whole military establishment unified in his person, Enver Paşa was now in the position to carry through changes – changes which meant contribution. It was a contribution of the highest significance since the fundamental function of the politics of the state which he came to dominate²⁹³ was transformed according to his own beliefs. Once again, the response of the Ottoman reformer, now personified by Enver Paşa, to a period of acute social crisis was but a reflection of traditional Ottoman understanding of the most basic political issues. The underlying problem, as he saw it, was how to regenerate the state effectively and reassert royal authority throughout the Ottoman possessions, even assert it beyond, “. . . in order not to see such dark days again, Allah forbid, and to be able to defend the honour of the Ottoman Caliphate . . .”²⁹⁴ The latter consideration in particular demanded that the state, true to tradition, have an effective military arm.

Of all the military reforms undertaken by the state, especially after December 1913,²⁹⁵ little concerns this analysis more than the improvement in the quality of the army officers carried out under the guidance of the German Military Mission. The basic concept behind this move was to identify men's military achievements with the men themselves, not with the *matériel*. The Balkan War had proved once more that the men who controlled the *matériel* lacked the faith, the imagination and the ability to make them prevail.²⁹⁶ The substance of the matter meant that in the coming trials the Empire would require all her remaining strength and resources as well, and as much, as the dedication and professional skill of the officer corps. Enver Paşa was in full accord with the technical and, obviously, political considerations, which formed his motivation in the revolutionizing of the training methods for all Ottoman officers from mere second-lieutenant to full general, including non-commissioned officer ranks.²⁹⁷ Secondly, and I think more importantly, Enver Paşa favoured, and indeed got adopted, a policy of officer selection and recruitment patterns which was specifically designed to maintain a monolithic officer corps²⁹⁸ within the traditions of prowess, performance and hierarchy as the apotheosis of the imperial nucleus.

The effect of such strategies was not immediate, but it was important. It was important because it indicated that an officer could fulfill himself without political endeavour, that he could become himself without political commitment and that he could be

a person of substance without participating in partisan politics. All this meant that he might be the sole arbiter of “politics” and still manage to maintain a distance, perhaps an objectivity, without being absolved by “politics” and dissolved in the sphere of political autonomy. The second, and in the circumstances of the summer of 1914 more relevant, conclusion to be drawn was that our officer could (or could not) analyze political facts devoid of any illusory vocabulary and deal with them as they existed, not as he wished them to exist.

And it was a fact that his country, to quote an American historian, “. . . at the time of Sarajevo [Bosna-Saray] had many enemies and no allies because no one thought her worth an alliance”.²⁹⁹ Now I believe that when we turn to consider the Ottoman “isolation”,³⁰⁰ we will find indications that it was affected, if not solely by foreign affairs, by the influences which compliance with custom transmitted. Ever since the wars with Austria in the seventeenth century, Ottoman foreign policy rested upon the constant assumption that it no longer possessed freedom of choice, partly because advocates of policy saw the problem only as being to do with the verdict of history given by Ibn Khaldun: the decay of *asabîyya* within the cyclical view of history. The Khaldunian idea of the law of genesis and decay from maturity to senility and death being inevitable and unavoidable and its arbitrary fabrication into corresponding periods of history induced a total, pessimistic negation of change, development and even initiative in many Ottoman minds.³⁰¹ After that “damned foolish thing in the Balkans”, conscience imposed feelings of anxiety and helplessness especially upon the politicians as their parochial political moves were often frustrated by chronic economic weaknesses of which they were well aware but felt incapable of resolving.³⁰² “From then on . . .”, as our American historian has observed,

“. . . the Turks felt creeping over them the shadow of the oncoming day when they would have to choose sides. Fearing Russia, resenting England, mistrusting Germany, they could not decide.”³⁰³

And yet, rebuffed by the Powers who accorded them diminished deference and with limited access to the opportunities afforded to imperialist interests, the “Turks” – or, to give their contemporary eponym, the Unionists – felt that they needed to adopt a close target for their aggression, culminating in what Cemal Paşa termed an “active policy”.³⁰⁴ Such a policy, avidly pursued under the aegis of Enver Paşa, comes across as an attempt to give a plausible alternative³⁰⁵ to the immutability of the customary Ottoman

fatalism. For the Unionists to achieve a decisive influence in international politics one solution alone offered itself: they must play an active part in those international politics. To do this they needed to make the "Eastern Question" a difficult one to answer. Only in this way could they hope to prompt "Western" re-posing of the problem before its settling upon the solution. But it was an illusion; simply because on the eve of the War the Unionists found ranged against them all the Powers, with fully-laid plans for the parcelling out of the Ottoman Empire ". . . should the final and expected dissolution come".³⁰⁶

How did it come? I do not intend to tell the old story but want to give to it, or rather draw from it, the significance which it seems to possess. It is not an unreasonable generalization to state that the War was imposed upon the Empire by its situation and by the behaviour of all the Powers; more importantly, it would have been so imposed whatever policy the Unionists had tried to pursue. Further, it was the attitude of the rest of the Powers that made entry on the German side increasingly unavoidable.

So much was plain then, but what was (and still is) not so plain what the time of entry into the War was to be. The choice, on the Ottoman side, lay solely in the hands of Deputy Commander-in-Chief (*Başkumandan Vekili*)³⁰⁷ Enver Paşa. This fact, once noticed, seems obvious and inescapable; and it is not surprising that his supporters, his opponents and, no less, he himself realized it at the time. As indeed did his biographer: "So much so that it would be no exaggeration to call this war Enver Paşa's war."³⁰⁸ For to paraphrase the greatest playwright in the English language, it may truly be said that Enver Paşa welcomed the plumed troops and the big war that made his ambition virtue.

And now, on 25 October 1914,³⁰⁹ with his order to attack Russia, "Enverland"³¹⁰ appeared to settle down under Enver Paşa's dispensation.

Notes

- 1 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish politics (1908-1914)*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; p. 123. However, despite the absence of the Unionist, Talât Bey, from the new Cabinet, four well-known Unionists – Said Halim Paşa, Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, Hacı Âdil Bey and Hayri Bey – were included. The names and corresponding posts of the members of the Cabinet, with the later adjustments, are in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1940-1953. 14 cüz. pp. 1875-1877; and especially *ibid.*, pp. 1875-1876, where the *hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 15 Sefer 1331 [10 Kanunsâni 1328] (23 January 1913), is reproduced in full.

Also: Cemaleddin Efendi, *Şeyhülislâm merhum Cemalüddin Efendi hazretlerinin hâtırat-ı siyasiyesi: 1330 senesinde Mısır'da tahrir etmişlerdir*. İstanbul: M. Huvagimiyân Matbaası, 1336; [Hereafter, Cemaleddin Efendi, *Hâtırat-ı siyasiye*]; pp. 52–53.

At the outset it seems plausible that, as Ahmad asserts, in its formation “. . . the aim was to have a non-partisan Cabinet which would end party politics and rally all elements in a patriotic alliance.” (F. Ahmad, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*) But, probing a little deeper, one may perceive that the content of the symbol (i.e., the Unionist Cabinet) had changed, but not the underlying reality of the almost complete assumption of administration with the character of Unionist philosophy. For instance, first, certain key administrative and military appointments in İstanbul epitomize my contention. During the preparation of the Cabinet by Mahmud Şevket Paşa – in the evening of 23 January 1913 – Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey was personally appointed by the Grand Vezir to the recently created post of Guardianship of İstanbul (*İstanbul Muhafızlığı*). The post carried the utmost importance from political, administrative and military aspects (e.g., he could issue proclamations on behalf of the Government, arrest or release anyone he wished). Shortly afterwards, another officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Halil (Kut) Bey, a supporter of Unionist ideals and uncle of Enver Bey, was appointed Garrison Commander of İstanbul. See: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarb ve Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar; Kısım 2: Balkan savaşları. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.14. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1943; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2]; p. 273.

According to the opinion of a close associate, Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey “. . . with this duty . . . had come to dominate not only the capital but almost the whole country”. F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*. (Hazırlayan) C. Kutay. İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980; p. 187.

A prominent Unionist civilian, Azmi Bey, who was personally involved in the Raid, was appointed Director-General of the Police. Instances of his partisan activities and extensive powers are found in: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*. [Rev.ed.] İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1959; pp. 590–591.

The power, prestige and authority of Cemal Bey and, further, the position of Azmi Bey are remarkably well portrayed by Yahya Kemal in: Yahya Kemal [Beyatlı], *Siyâsî ve edebî portreler*. İstanbul: Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü, 1968; pp. 132–140.

Further, in a memorandum, dated 30 January 1913 and signed by the new Minister of the Interior, Hacı Âdil Bey questioned the validity of a provisional law of 28 September 1912 which had been enacted during the *Vezirate* of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa. It may be borne in mind that at that time a written undertaking had been exacted from all civil servants (*memurin-i mülkiye*) to the effect that they would not enter any political party nor join political clubs. See Chapter 3, p. 193 and N.228 of this work; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarb ve Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar; Kısım 1: 1911 başından Balkan savaşına kadar. Türk Tarihi Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.13. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1943; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/1]; p. 301.

Now, a week after the Raid, Hacı Âdil Bey, as a prominent Unionist member and a key position-holder in the Cabinet, demanded from the Cabinet that this decision be reversed and that civil servants not be asked to give such a written undertaking. Nor should they be prohibited from joining clubs. Here lay the crux of the matter. In view of the circumstances, it may be appreciated that a week after the Raid, while arrests and detentions were being made

and when all anti-Unionist opposition associations, parties and individuals were being cautioned “. . . to abandon all ideas of untimely opposition” by Cemal Bey in a proclamation, there was no need for the Minister to mention the political colour of the clubs he had in mind. What he meant was that the connection of the servants of the state with the Committee should be re-established. And if one further considers the nearest literal equivalent meaning to “civil servant” in Turkish – *memur* (lit., an official who is commanded) – it becomes easier to comprehend the intention of the Unionists from the point of view of hierarchy. However, an *irade*, dated 20 February 1913, resolved the matter on a less partisan basis, in a conciliatory manner, and so abolished the obligation of a written undertaking. Yet it further resolved that while civil servants might attend party political functions or clubs, they might not assume official membership of such organizations.

Taken all in all, the evidence indicates that despite the caution shown in the formation and subsequent stance of the Cabinet (e.g., the Law of General Amnesty of 14 February for political offences to date), the Unionist tendency and, in fact, Unionist domination in the bureaucracy remained paramount.

The memorandum of Hacı Âdil Bey is reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarb ve Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar; Kısım 4: Fikir cereyanları, inkilâp hareketleri, iç didişmeler, birinci genel savaşın patlaması. Türk Tarihi Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.14b. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1952; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4]; pp. 311–313.

The proclamation of Cemal Bey is found in: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar, İttihat-Terakki ve Birinci Dünya Harbi*. (Tamamlayan ve tertipleyen) B. Cemal. İstanbul: Selek Yayınları, 1959; [Hereafter, Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*]; p. 23.

The edict of 20 February 1913 is found in: *Düstur*, Tertib-i sani. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1329. 11 cilt. [Hereafter, *Düstur*, 2]. Cilt V, Sa.66, p. 99, 7 Şubat 1329. Published in: *Takvim-i vekâyi*, 28 Şubat 1329 (13 March 1913), and reproduced in part in: Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, II/4, p. 311.

The Law of General Amnesty of 14 February 1913 is published in: *Takvim-i vekâyi*, 1 Şubat 1329 (14 February 1913). For a French translation of the Law see: *Lowther to Grey*, No.135, Conf., Constantinople, 18 February 1913, *F.O.* 371/1788/8666.

- 2 “Sadriazâm Mahmut Şevket Paşa’nın günlük not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.1–31 (1 Ocak 1965–29 Temmuz 1965; [Hereafter, “Not defteri”]; Entry for 6 February 1913.

- 3 See N.1 above.

- 4 “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.1 (1 Ocak 1965). Entry for 6 February 1913.

What Enver Bey was thinking, he was also writing freely to his German woman friend, for instance, on 27 January:

“Ah si la guerre éclatait, je suis sûr que nous gagnerons! Le cabinet prépare sa note, – je prie Dieu que les alliés la rejettent, alors c’est la guerre, c’est-à-dire la vie pour la Turquie.”

And again on the 28th:

“C’est drôle n’est-ce pas? Comme je suis devenu belliqueux, mais pour sauver tout nous n’avons pas d’autre moyen . . .

Je croyais sauver tout en culbatant Kiamil et en le remplaçant par M[ahmud Şevket Paşa] qui était un peu courageux, mais hélas notre chef d’état major que j’estimais tant est un poltron entêté qui a pu trainer tout avec lui . . .”

M.Ş. Hanioglu (yayına hazırlayan), *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989; p. 227 and pp. 229–230.

- 5 During this period it seems that Mahmud Şevket Paşa managed to persuade several foreign ambassadors that his entire Government did not desire the renewal of hostilities in the Balkans. See, for example: *Bompard à Jonnart*, Tel.Nos.48, 49, Péra, 25 janvier 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, No.254, pp. 322–323. And cf., *Grey to Buchanan*, No.46, Foreign Office, 27 January 1913, *F.O. 424/241/486*.
- 6 “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.1 (1 Ocak 1965). Entry for 6 February 1913. Cf., the account of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, with the same implication: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992; pp. 144–145.
- 7 It is to appreciated that at this stage, following the assassination of Nâzım Paşa, the position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief still lay vacant. As I have indicated previously, the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff to this position had been “requested” from the Sultan by Enver Bey, in person, and subsequently an *irade* to this effect was obtained. Judging from a reliable account, the method of obtaining the *irade* and, on the evening of the Raid, sending an informatory note (*tezkere*) to Ahmed İzzet Paşa under Enver Bey’s signature, must have injured his professional pride and thus played a major part in his initial refusal. As he afterwards said to Ziya Şâkir: “I refused it with great indignation.” Ziya Şâkir (Soko), *Yakın tarihin üç büyük adamı: Talât, Enver, Cemal Paşalar*. 2nci basılış. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1944; pp. 106–107. In his memoirs, Ahmed İzzet Paşa claims to have torn the note up and thrown it at the aide-de-camp who had delivered it: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 144.

Also see the relevant, but not altogether accurate, comments of the British Military Attaché in: *Tyrell to Lowther*, No.6, Constantinople, 28 January 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, Enclosure in: No.571, pp. 457–458.

- 8 Although the Bulgarian move towards the resumption of hostilities precluded a negotiated solution, the academic nature of the dispute requires elaboration because it has remained obscured in the bulk of the literature – Turkish or foreign.

Focusing our attention on the specific issue of the still besieged town of Edirne, the reply presented on 30 January 1913 to the collective note of the Powers indicated that the Mahmud Şevket Paşa Government

“... est disposé à s’en remettre aux grandes Puissances en ce qui concerne la partie de le ville d’Andrinople qui est sise sur la rive droite de la Maritza et en conservant la partie située sur la rive gauche.”

The left bank, with its mosques, mausoleums and other places of historical and religious significance, was considered essential to remain under direct Ottoman sovereignty

“... dont il ne peut pas tenir compte sans exposer le pays à une commotion qui pourrait entraîner les plus graves conséquences.”

The text of the Ottoman reply, signed by Said Halim Paşa, is found in: *H.N.A.* (Balkan Harbi), Karton 20/A. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.29/29a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1976–1982. 2 cilt. Cilt I (1912–1913), Cilt II (1913–1914); Cilt I, Belge No.583, pp. 497–499.

Also see: “ED.NOTE” in *B.D.*, IX/2, pp. 461–462; *Lowther to Grey*, No.81, Constantinople, 1 February 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.583, pp. 467–470; and *Bompard à Jonnart*, Tel.Nos.69, 70, 71, 72, Péra, 30 janvier 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome V, 3e Série, Nos.292, 293, pp. 371–374.

For the Turkish translation of the text, see: [Y.] H. Bayur, "Yeni bulunan bir belge dolayısıyla", *Belleten*, XXX:117 (Ocak) 1966, pp. 103–114, pp. 111–113. Bayur also published, for the first time (*ibid.*, p. 103 and N.1), the draft reply of the Kâmil Paşa Government to the collective note of the Powers, which was in the process of being discussed by the Cabinet when the Raid on the Sublime Porte occurred and had, as I have already noted (see p. 212 of Chapter 3), not been sent. According to Bayur, this draft reply appears to have been whisked shrewdly away by the Unionists after the coup in order to enable them to maintain the fiction that the Kâmil Paşa Government had decided to hand over Edirne to Bulgaria. Apparently, it was subsequently placed in the Archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (H.N.A.), İstanbul, where Hilmi Bayur, the author's brother, later found it.

Still focusing on Edirne, the Kâmil Paşa Government's draft reply had proposed the following solution:

"... de faire d'Andrinople une ville libre, indépendante et neutre, sous la protection des Puissances signataires du Traité de Berlin avec un gouverneur musulman, de n'importe quelle nationalité, nommé par celles-ci."

See: "Démarche collective des Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances – note responsive de la Sublime Porte", in: *H.N.A.* (Balkan Harbi), Karton 20/A.

Cf., [Y.] H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, p. 109, for the Turkish translation of the text.

Thus it would appear, basing our judgement on the above documentation, that the two Governments preferred different solutions to the problem of Edirne. Indeed, it was on the question of Edirne, rather than that of the Aegean islands and other appended matters, that the crucial difference between the written replies of the two Governments lies.

However, at this juncture, Noradounghian Efendi's telegram of 18 January to Ahmed Tevfik Paşa may be remembered, as it has been quoted in full with the draft version added in parentheses (see p. 206 of Chapter 3). It is noteworthy that the Kâmil Paşa Government had both solutions under consideration, but opted for Edirne as a neutral and independent town under a *Vali* who would be selected from the Muslim world by the Great Powers. This solution was endorsed in the protocol of 22 January, prepared after the Grand Council meeting as the basis for the reply note of the Kâmil Paşa Government, to be discussed next day in the Council of Ministers.

From a reading of the draft telegram, we see that the second solution posited by the Kâmil Paşa Government, which was omitted from the final version, was in fact the very solution proposed by the Mahmud Şevket Paşa Government in their reply note of 30 January 1913.

Which of the two solutions would have been more advantageous for the Ottomans is a value judgement that does not concern us here, and whether the outcome would have differed is a matter for speculation. On the latter, I incline to the opinion that whatever the Kâmil Paşa Government might have decided was really of no account other than in providing a *casus belli* for the Raid on the Sublime Porte. As for the former point, by way of example, the British Ambassador to the Porte opined on the Ottoman Government's reply that

"... the proposal of present Committee Cabinet in the matter of Adrianople and the islands does not differ much from that which their predecessors intended to make, and it is consequently difficult to divine their bringing off such a violent coup d'état."

Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.60, Conf., Constantinople, 31 January 1913, *F.O.* 424/241/565.

- 9 H. Süer, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi: Osmanlı devri, Balkan Harbi*. İkinci Cilt, 2nci Kısım, 2nci Kitap: Şark Ordusu ikinci Çatalca muharebesi ve Şarköy çıkarması. T.C. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları Seri No.4. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1981; [Hereafter, H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2]; p. 99. Also: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.1 (1 Ocak 1965). Entry for 6 February 1913.
- 10 *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.56, Konstantinopel, 31 Januar 1913, G.P., 34.Band, Erste Hälfte [Hereafter, 34.Band/1], Nr.12772, p. 289.
- 11 According to (Brigadier-General) Halil Sedes Paşa. His written observations on Ahmed İzzet Paşa appear in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 2021-2028; see p. 2024. Also, Ahmed İzzet Paşa's memoirs: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 144-145; and accompanying report to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, dated 17 Kânun-u sâni 1328 (30 January 1913), reproduced in full in: *ibid.*, Ek-4, pp. 328-330.
- 12 "Ahmed İzzet Paşa". The *curriculum vitae* of the Paşa, written at the request of İnal, is reproduced in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1973-1993; see p. 1976. (Emphasis mine). Cf., his slightly different nuance in: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 145.
- 13 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım: millî mücadeleye gidiş*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965-1972. 8 cilt. Cilt 4, p. 1203.
- 14 C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1203-1204. Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 29. Also see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 124. Cf. the comment of the British Ambassador:

"The Committee . . . has organized Special Committee on National Defence on the French Communist lines, and is attempting to work up a Chauvinistic feeling, as at the outset of the Italian War."

Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.60, Conf., Constantinople, 31 January 1913, *F.O.* 424/241/565.

In general, see: A. Özcan, "Balkan ve 1. Dünya Savaşlarında hizmeti geçen bir hayır kurumu: Müdafaa'a-ı Millîye Cem'iyeti", pp. 269-296 in İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi *Doğumunun 100. yılında Atatürk'e armağan*. İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1981. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*. 3 cilt. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984-1989. Genişletilmiş 2. baskı Cilt 1: II. Meşrutiyet dönemi (1908-1918); [Hereafter, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1]; pp. 448-456; and Cilt 3: İttihat ve Terakki: bir çağın, bir kuşağın, bir partinin tarihi; [Hereafter, T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3]; pp. 293-295, despite some discrepancy in the conversion of the dates.

- 15 This remarkable document is not to be found in the official archives in Turkey. It remained among the personal papers of Mahmud Şevket Paşa which were later transferred to the private archives of the publishers of a historical journal, *Belgelerle Türk tarihi dergisi*. The document was subsequently reproduced in full, with comments, in: M. Sertoğlu, "Balkan Savaşı sonlarında Edirne'nin kurtarılması hususunda hemen teşebbüse geçilmesi için Atatürk'ün Harbiye Nezaretini uyarısına dair bir belge", *Belleten*, XXXII:128 (Ekim) 1968, pp. 459-468, p. 468. It has also now appeared in the recently-published complete memoirs of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, but only as an appendix without comment or correction. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, Ek-3, pp. 325-327. However, what Sertoğlu appears to have missed is that the date of the report is incorrect, more likely – as I have suggested in the text – mistakenly than deliberately so. The year should be 1913, not 1328. More seriously, the same mistake occurs in a recent work by E.J. Zürcher, *The Unionist factor: the role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish national movement*,

1905–1926. Leiden: Brill, 1984; pp. 55–59. What is excusable for Sertoğlu and those authors who accept Sertoğlu as a source is not excusable in a contentious study such as Zürcher's in view of his non-use of the available archival, and particularly military, sources. Nor is it excusable in view of his own unnecessary criticism of what he dismisses as "Turkish works" for not succeeding in detailed analyses when they have not even set out to perform such. For blind acceptance of the date as it appears in the report leads Zürcher to baseless speculation regardless of the historical sense of the events pertaining to the Şarköy-Bolayır offensive – speculation, moreover, so vital to the case he is trying to build. What I mean to say is this. Had the report been written and sent on 18/19 Şubat 1913, as would have been the case if the inscribed date of 4/5 Şubat 1328 were correct, the aftermath of the unsuccessful Şarköy-Bolayır offensive of 8 February (Şubat) 1913 would render it wholly meaningless. Further, the report not only prescribes a course for that offensive which was more or less precisely followed, but also surveys events only up to 22 Kânun-ı sani 1328 (4 Şubat 1913). This is entirely reasonable if the report were sent on the same night (4/5 Şubat 1913) but inexplicable if not dated and sent for another 13 days, especially when those 13 days were so eventful. And internal textual evidence supports my case in that logically the authors of the letter should, since they were using the *Hicrî* calendar throughout the report itself, have remained within the sequence of, for example, 10 Kânun-ı sani and 22 Kânun-ı sani 1328 by dating the letter 22/23 Kânun-ı sani 1328 rather than switch over to 4/5 Şubat – unless they were thinking, momentarily, according to the Gregorian calendar with which they would have been equally familiar.

In fact, in my Ph.D. thesis I have already examined in detail the role of the young officers in instigating the Ottoman Şarköy-Bolayır offensive. See: M.N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics: political aspects of civil-military relations in the Ottoman Empire, with special reference to the 'Young Turk' era*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983; pp. 488–491, N.15. This examination I shall reiterate here, drawing heavily not just, as I did in the thesis, from the study of Ottoman naval operations in the Balkan War made by the naval historian, Vice-Admiral Büyüktuğrul (Rtd.), based on unpublished documents in the *Harb Tarihi Dairesi*. I here also use the detailed reconstruction of the operations by Air Commodore Süer (Rtd.), based on unpublished documents in the *Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı*, as it is now called.

On 3 February 1913, the Ottoman High Command (i.e., the Headquarters of the Ottoman Deputy Commander-in-Chief) informed, among other units, the Naval Command of the termination of the armistice. The Bulgarian 4th Army Group immediately set in motion its operations at the Bolayır front but no instructions were forthcoming from the Ottoman High Command.

By this time, the High Command was clearly interested in the outcome for the Şarköy area, situated above the base of the Gelibolu peninsula. Şarköy constituted the immediate rear of the Bulgarian forces. The High Command therefore assumed that the Bulgarians might seek to improve the efficiency of their forward operations on land by landings at the peninsula. Thus, on the morning of 5 February 1913, it instructed the Navy that if such a Bulgarian intention from the sea were observed, the fleet should proceed to contain it. With this aim in mind, the High Command further ordered that the Navy position destroyers just outside the Çanakkale Straits and that a battle cruiser, the Mecidiye, reconnoitre and provide support for the destroyers in preventing such landings.

At approximately the same time (5 February), the Straits "Allotted" Army

Commander, Major-General Fahri Paşa, was awaiting the permission of the High Command for a limited counter-offensive he had proposed, in the absence of any initiative to date from the High Command itself, to repulse the Bulgarian advance at the Bolayır front. For this, he informed them, he had already obtained the Navy's consent to threaten the left flank of the enemy from the sea. Instead, however, he and his Chief of Staff, Ali Fethi Bey, separately received notification on the same day (5 February) that if the Bulgarian troop movement seemed to threaten seriously to cut off the peninsula, a large-scale combined operation involving landings at Şarköy and a simultaneous offensive at Bolayır was under consideration. Despite the urgency with which Fahri Paşa stressed the need for immediate action if the Bulgarian advance were to be contained, especially as Şarköy was now in Bulgarian hands, the High Command, on 6 February, required that such an offensive be delayed in order to coordinate with the combined operation. All the evidence here reviewed supports the conclusion that Fahri Paşa was ignorant of his two staff-officers' report, which had by-passed him completely; nor was he at any time informed. Meanwhile, as Admiral Büyüktuğrul has put it, in the event, "domestic political reasons were effective in bringing the date of the Şarköy landings forward". It seems to me, now, that it was just as the author conjectures, although he formed his opinion – in the absence of hard documentary evidence – through political and not strictly military arguments. Nevertheless, he is right in his conjectures.

The crux of the matter lies with the report which I have quoted in the text, for it links the political with the military reasons and completes the jigsaw-puzzle of which the pieces have hitherto remained incompletely assembled. It was this report of Staff-Majors Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys which must have provided the drive and sense of urgency so that the long-term planning of a reluctant High Command was finally put into action.

This is what I wish to convey: the Xth Army Corps, now positioned between İzmit and Bandırma under Major-General Hurşid Paşa, had already been issued with orders as early as 4 January 1913 – to prepare a feasibility plan for landing operations along the northern coast of the Marmara Sea, should the need arise. This, it may be noted, was 19 days before the Raid on the Sublime Porte. As part of this plan, on 1 February 1913, the Xth Army Corps began to stage landing manoeuvres with the allocation of a motley collection of trading vessels now brought under the command of the Corps for use in transporting the units and aiding them in landing. During embarkation at İzmit harbour on the night of 4/5 February, the units already on board ship were suddenly ordered by the High Command to remain there and await second orders, and the units of the Xth Army Corps who were positioned in the Bandırma area instructed to await the arrival of the trading vessels and start to embark pending second orders.

It was only now, on the night of 4/5 February, that Şarköy was named as the destination and the manoeuvres transformed into an offensive. This must have coincided approximately with the arrival of Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report at the Grand *Vezirate* and the Headquarters of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. As a second stage, in addition to the Xth Army Corps, the İİnd "Allotted" Army Corps, under Brigadier-General Süleyman Şefik Paşa, was to be transported from the Çatalca front for use as a back-up force after the landing at Şarköy. At this juncture, on 6 February at 17.00 hours, orders for the Şarköy landing were issued by the High Command.

What were referred to as "domestic political reasons" for urging that the offensive of combined land and sea forces should be made immediately seem, I stress, to have been wholly due to the report, and the final plan to have been

recast accordingly. Indeed, the crucial part of the order issued complied fully with the second option of Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys, and read thus:

“... While the [Mediterranean] Çanakkale Straits “Allotted” Army Corps are attacking from Bolayır, the Xth Army Corps will be landed at Şarköy.”

Following this, the order stated that the combined operation commence on 8 February 1913 at 05.00 hours and the details of the operation be worked out between the two Corps.

The strictly military side of this *offensive à outrance* may further help us to perceive the standing of the young officers as discussed in the text. In brief, they were, as exemplified in this particular case by Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys, the sole driving force behind the decision; that is, not only that the date of the landing operations be brought forward and also the point of landing specified but, in addition, that the operation be conducted according to their own plan of a combined land and sea offensive. It should be remembered that while the High Command Headquarters had been working on long-term plans for nearly 20 days, they were quite unwilling at this stage for any immediate offensive, due mainly to the reluctance of both the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and the Grand Vezir. Nor had they decided upon any particular point of landing at the Gelibolu peninsula.

A. Büyüktuğrul, *Balkan Harbi tarihi*. VIİnci Cilt: Osmanlı deniz harekâtı: 1912-1913. T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harb Tarihi Dairesi Resmî Yayınları. İstanbul: K.K.K. Askerî Basımevi, 1965; pp. 202-206. The particular quotations appear on p. 204 and p. 206.

For the state of the fleet during the period immediately preceding the events discussed above, and which helped to form my overall assessment, see: H. Bayur, “Balkan Savaşında Türk filosunun durumu”, *Belleten*, XLII:165 (Ocak) 1978, pp. 95-104. In addition: Ali Haydar Emir (Alpagut), *Balkan Harbinde Türk filosu*. İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1932; M. İşin, *1912-1913 Balkan Harbi deniz cephesi*. İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1946; and A. Büyüktuğrul, “Balkan Savaşı deniz harekâtı üzerine gerçekler, 1912-1913”, *Belleten*, XLIV:176 (Ekim) 1980, pp. 717-752. Also, for a wider perspective: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, pp. 112-136 and pp. 187-203.

- 16 F. Belen, *20nci yüzyılda Osmanlı devleti*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973; pp. 164-165, gives a convenient summary of the operations. For details, see: A. Büyüktuğrul, *Osmanlı deniz harekâtı*, pp. 206-215; and, more extensively, H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, pp. 99-273. For an earlier work: H. Ersü, *1912-1913 Balkan Harbinde Şarköy çıkarması ve Bolayır muharebeleri*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1938. Further, “Ahmed İzzet Paşa”, pp. 1977-1978 in M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*; and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 146-148.

For a contemporary account by one of the two officers who played an important part in the planning and execution of the offensive, see: Ali Fethi, *Bolayır muharebesinde adem-i muvaffakiyetin esbabı*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1330. Cf., “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.2 (7 Ocak 1965). Entry for 14 February 1913; and Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 19 February 1913, for the comments of Mahmud Şevket Paşa.

- 17 For example, Mahmud Şevket Paşa recorded in his diary his thoughts about the dispute which emerged among the officers of the two army corps engaged in the Şarköy-Bolayır operations. He speculates along the lines of “envy”, “resentment” and “attribution of blame” to one another, all coming to the surface over the alleged responsibility for the unexpected defeat. “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 19 February 1913. Corroborating evidence is supplied by Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 147-148.

Cf., the incisive comments of: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, p. 255. Also see: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire: a study of war and revolution during the Young Turk period*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1970; pp. 195-198. Cf., G. Dyer, "The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey: 1908-1918", *Journal of contemporary history*, 8:4 (October) 1973, pp. 121-164, p. 130.

- 18 The document, possibly found among the private papers of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, was first obtained by Aktepe and reproduced in full in an article: M. Aktepe, "Atatürk'ün Sofya Ateşeliğine kadar İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile olan münasebetleri ve bu hususla alâkalı bir belge", *Belleten*, XXXVIII:150 (Nisan) 1974, pp. 263-294; the pages between p. 276 and p. 277 contain the manuscript facsimile.

In effect, the significance of this letter (dated 22 February 1913) with regard to the dating of Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report, which Ahmed İzzet Paşa discusses in some detail in justification of his appeal, may be elicited on a number of counts.

Ahmed İzzet Paşa writes that he received "today [bu gün]" Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report and, "following this [bunu müteakib]", a letter of resignation from each of them saying that they felt unable to serve in the new Gelibolu Combined Forces (*Gelibolu Kuva-i Umumiyesi*, created on 15 February) under the command of Major-General Hurşid Paşa. I have already established that Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report must have been written and sent on the night of 4/5 February and initiated the Şarköy-Bolayır offensive of the 8th. The letters of resignation could not have been sent before the 18th, when their commanding officer, Major-General Fahri Paşa, tendered his own, after his request for the three of them to be transferred due to irreconcilable differences between himself and Hurşid Paşa and their respective staff-officers.

Thus, the letters from Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys pertaining to the two different issues, one of 4/5 February and one on 18 February, cannot have reached the Deputy Commander-in-Chief together, or as late as 22 February. Incidentally, this circumstantial detail also strengthens the case for Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report to be dated 4/5 rather than 17/18 February (although at first glance, on reading Ahmed İzzet Paşa, the latter might appear – and may be intended to appear – more probable) since it is most unlikely that the two officers would have been pressing for an attack while at the same time seeking transfer away from that particular part of the front and even threatening to resign.

Moreover, Ahmed İzzet Paşa's dating of his own letter as 22 February is already suspect in view of the recipient, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, having entered in his diary for 19 February – three days earlier – that he had received a telegram from Ahmed İzzet Paşa reporting that Fahri Paşa, Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys wanted to resign on the grounds of differences with the newly-appointed Commander of the Gelibolu Combined Forces, Hurşid Paşa, and his Chief of Staff, Enver Bey.

Clearly, all this does not add up. To my mind, the most convincing scenarios are these. First, possibly Ahmed İzzet Paşa did not want it to become apparent that he had submitted to pressure from junior officers, even if they were Unionists; all the more so since the strategy they had urged and he had put into effect as his own had been so badly botched. Secondly, by conflating the two separate issues of Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report proposing action and their later complaints about serving under Hurşid Paşa, he may deliberately have been obfuscating the matter of their pressure for an offensive in order to cover himself. In this, he would have been aided and abetted by the existing (and, I believe, accidental) misdating of the report by its authors.

Further, there must, I suspect, have been a degree of collusion in this with the Grand *Vezir*, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, who, after all, had received his own copy of the report and would have been equally reluctant to let the affair become public knowledge. Indeed, though there is no record, to my knowledge, of his mentioning the report or discussing it with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Mahmud Şevket Paşa did record in his diary on 6 February, having vigorously opposed the "war party" for so long, that he had announced in the Cabinet on 5 February the possibility of an imminent offensive at the Şarköy-Bolayır front – coincidentally on the very day he must have received Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi Beys' report proposing just such a plan.

See: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.1 (1 Ocak 1965). Entry for 6 February 1913; and Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 19 February 1913. Also: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, pp. 244-261, for the extensive archival material on the development of the officers' dispute.

Ahmed İzzet Paşa's considered ruminations on the military situation appear in a secret report he prepared between 26 February and 5 March 1913 and submitted, with another document – undated but shortly after 6 March – to the Grand *Vezirate*, with copies to Talât Bey whom he believed to be "... holding the real strings of the administration": Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, Ek-5, pp. 331-335 and Ek-6, pp. 336-337 respectively, and p. 148 for the quotation.

- 19 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 289.

Judging from an order of the day issued to the "Çatalca Army Group" on 11 February 1913, it is quite clear that the offensive had, at least for the time being, been postponed. The second paragraph of the order reads as follows: "The bulk of the Army [Group] of Çatalca will not leave its main position." In: Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *Balkan Harbinde Çatalca muharebesi*. (Conference notes). İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1341; p. 66.

Moreover, implications beyond the strictly military are noted by the British Ambassador on the 16th:

"Reported failures so far of Enver Bey's expeditionary force to land on the north coast of the Marmora have helped to increase Government's anxiety to make peace.

An early peace would seem imperative in Ottoman interests, especially in view of financial straits, which require urgent relief, as bills for some £T.7,000,000 fall due next month."

Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.92, Constantinople, 16 February 1913, F.O. 424/242/308.

- 20 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.2 (7 Ocak 1965). Entry for 14 February 1913. The desperate situation within the fortified area of Edirne may be traced, in view of the military operations, in: Ş. Sükan, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi: Osmanlı devri Balkan Harbi (1912-1913)*. İinci Cilt, 3ncü Kısım, Edirne kalesi etrafındaki muharebeler. T.C. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları Seri No.4. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1980; [Hereafter, Ş. Sükan, *Balkan Harbi*, II/3]; pp. 262-263 and pp. 273ff.

- 21 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 19 February 1913.

- 22 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 288.

Cf., *Bompard à Jonnart*, Tel.No.97, Péra, 10 février 1913, D.D.F., Tome V, 3e Série, No.350, p. 433; and *Lichnowsky an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.77, London, 11 Februar 1913, G.P., 34.Band/1, Nr.12825, pp. 354-355.

For instance, by 15 February, the British Foreign Secretary, according to a German report, was convinced that the Ottoman Empire was ready to yield if an acceptable means were found:

"... the most important aspect for the Ottoman Government was secrecy because a reply which included reference to the collective note might lead to internal unrest."

Lichnowsky an das Auswärtige Amt, Nr.89, London, 15 Februar 1913, *G.P.*, 34.Band/1, Nr.12858, p. 383.

This opinion seems to have been shared by the French Foreign Secretary, Cambon, as revealed in a note communicated to the British Foreign Office on 15 February:

"De cette conversation, M. Bompard conclut que le Grand Vizir est disposé à conclure la paix et résigné aux sacrifices nécessaires à cet effet. Il demande qu'on voile de quelque manière la perte d'Andrinople.

M. Bompard ajoute encore que l'accord ne se réalisera que si les discussions avec Hakki et Tewfik Pachas sont menées rapidement et confidentiellement; car il faudrait mettre l'opinion turque en face d'un fait accompli."

From a "Résumé d'une conversation entre le Grand Vizir et l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople, le 13 février 1913", *FO 424/242/260*.

- 23 As he told the Minister of the Interior, Hacı Âdil Bey, in no uncertain terms, on the evening of 19 February 1913: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 19 February 1913. A very critical assessment of Mahmud Şevket Paşa's perception of foreign policy is found in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 289-290.

- 24 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.2 (7 Ocak 1965). Entry for 15 February 1913; for their visit and his harsh retort to Talât Bey. It is not surprising, in view of this, to find that two days later, on 17 February 1913, Halil and Talât Beys discussed their opinions even with the German Ambassador. They argued that Mahmud Şevket Paşa had to produce better peace conditions than Kâmil Paşa had done. See: *Wangenheim an den Bethmann Hollweg*, Nr.49, Pera, 18 Februar 1913, *G.P.*, 34.Band/1, Nr.12873, pp. 396-398.

Also see: M. Cavit, "Meşrutiyet devrine ait Cavit Bey'in hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 30 Ağustos 1943-22 Aralık 1944, Sa.1-304; [Hereafter, Cavit Bey, *Hâtıraları*]; 7 Mart 1944, Sa.186, which confirms the demands of Halil and Talât Beys from Mahmud Şevket Paşa. According to Cavid Bey's account, the Paşa lost his temper and told them that although he was not avoiding further war if Edirne fell, he had to consider the defence of Anatolia. As the Paşa argued, if the combined forces of Bulgaria and Greece attacked, it would be impossible to defend the mainland. Furthermore, the scarcity of financial resources had to be taken into account to the extent that "... there was no money to be found anywhere". Also quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 125.

- 25 H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, p. 261.
Also: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entries for 19 and 20 February 1913.

- 26 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 20 February 1913.

- 27 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 20 February 1913.

- 28 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 20 February 1913.

He also summoned Staff-Majors Mustafa Kemal and Sabih Beys "... in order that they should not feel slighted". Other than this he makes no comment.

- 29 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 20 February 1913.

- 30 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.3 (14 Ocak 1965). Entry for 21 February 1913. Also see: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 148.

It must be noted that the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ahmed İzzet Paşa, initially opposed Enver Bey's supposed move to his general Headquarters at Hadımköy, as he had been informed by telegram on the night of 20/21 February. He threatened to resign if this were carried out and argued that

Enver Bey would occupy himself with partisan politics. Even though his outburst came too late to be effective in Enver Bey's remaining Chief of Staff of the Xth Army Corps, now outside İstanbul, I would aver that this move provided Enver Bey with the opportunity not merely to "... occupy himself with partisan politics" but even to dominate them. One may speculate that had the Deputy Commander-in-Chief considered the full implications of such an objection, he would never have made it; for instead of becoming a mere staff-officer at the Deputy Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, Enver Bey remained Chief of Staff of the Xth Army Corps, just outside the capital. That is to say, he possessed considerable armed might.

- 31 M. Aktepe, *Atatürk'ün Sofya Ateşeliğine kadar İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile olan münasebetleri ve bu hususla alakalı bir belge*, p. 288.

In this connection, Talât Bey had visited the Grand Vezir at the Ministry of War on the morning of 22 February and expressed his anxiety about the weakened military situation in Gelibolu. But Mahmud Şevket Paşa was unwavering in his resolve (i.e., to give up Edirne) and tried to calm him down: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.4 (21 Ocak 1965). Entry for 22 February 1913.

Talât Bey's later account of a private talk with Mahmud Şevket Paşa at the Ministry one evening (no date given), at his own request, confirms almost verbatim Mahmud Şevket Paşa's anxieties: C. Kutay [edited with commentary], *Şehit Sadriazâm Talat Paşa'nın gurbet hatıraları*. İstanbul: [the author], 1983. 3 cilt; [Hereafter, Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*]; Cilt 2, p. 796.

- 32 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.4 (21 Ocak 1965). Entry for 22 February 1913.

Before convening the Cabinet, Mahmud Şevket Paşa had received a telegraphic message from Hakkı Paşa, a former Grand Vezir then in London, reporting that the British Foreign Secretary, Grey, had "recommended" the Ottoman Government's agreeing to the peace immediately, and stating that the situation in Edirne would worsen "... if we were to wait for the fall of Edirne". *ibid.*, *loc.cit.* This message, ironical though it may seem, was the official pretext for the Cabinet meeting.

C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1205; and Grey to Lowther, No.61, Foreign Office, 20 February 1913, F.O. 424/242/370. Cf., *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.121, Pera, 22 Februar 1913, G.P., 34.Band/1, Nr.12884, p. 407.

- 33 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.4 (21 Ocak 1965). Entry for 23 February 1913. Cf., Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları", *Tanin*, 9 Mart 1944, Sa.188 and 19 Mart 1944, Sa.198, for a similar account of the Cabinet meeting. According to the decision taken:
- those Ottoman forces who are under siege in Edirne will be permitted to leave the city with their arms
 - those Balkan states who have acquired Ottoman territory shall assume payment of the proportional amount of the Ottoman foreign debt
 - the rights and possessions of the Muslim population who remain in the surrendered territory will be protected
 - against these conditions, Edirne and Kırkkilise will be left to Bulgaria, whereas Babaeski and Lüleburgaz will still remain under Ottoman sovereignty.

"Not defteri", *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*

These summary decisions, together with a detailed outline, were on the same day sent "*Très confidentiel*" to Tevfik Paşa, Ottoman Ambassador to Britain. See: L.B.A. (Barış görüşmeleri, 1913), Karton 512/1. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.620, pp. 530-531. Also:

Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 291–292. Further: B.N. Şimşir, *op.cit.*, Belge No.622 and No.623, pp. 533–534 and p. 534 respectively.

- 34 The Grand Vezir was informed by Azmi and Cemal Beys that these people were ready to provoke disorder in the capital. Mahmud Şevket Paşa ordered that potential ringleaders be evacuated from İstanbul. He also wrote to the Governor of Edirne asking him to try to hold the city until 2 April: “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.5 (28 Ocak 1965). Entry for 4 March 1913. Also see: Ş. Sükan, *Balkan Harbî*, II/3, p. 288, for confirmation of the coded telegram. Already, on 26 February, the British Ambassador observed that:

“Tanin’, in an article today, appears to be preparing the public for the fall of Adrianople. Arrests of non-committee officers and the reported decking of four Maxims at the Porte would point to the internal situation being precarious.”

Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.111, Conf., Constantinople, 26 February 1913, *F.O.* 424/242/476.

I have no evidence concerning the opinion of Azmi Bey, but have the reliable comments of one of his officers as to Azmi Bey’s efficient surveillance of the régime’s opponents: A.R. Öge, *Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete bir polis şefinin gerçek anıları*. Bursa: Günlük Ticaret Gazetesi Tesisleri, 1982; pp. 143ff.

Regarding Cemal Bey, on the other hand, his memoirs reveal nothing save an intimation that French cooperation was hoped for and, it might be added, upon this impinged the fate of Edirne. He does, however, refer to the Government’s “. . . endeavour to save Edirne”! Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 30.

- 35 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 126. On the domestic conspiracy see, for example, the boasting of one of the participants, Hasan Vasfî (Amca) Bey: H. Amca, *Nizamiye kapısı, ve Yarıda kalan ihtilal*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1991; pp. 138ff.
- 36 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 595–602; and also his earlier account: A.B. Kuran, *İnkilâp tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945; pp. 318–327. Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 30–35.
- 37 “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.5 (28 Ocak 1965). Entry for 2 March 1913. (Emphasis mine).

According to the understanding reached on the same day between the two, Enver Bey was to obtain control of his Division and the Grand Vezir would then get it transferred from Yeşilköy to İstanbul. *ibid.*, *loc.cit.*

For details on the seizure of the proclamations see, for example: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkilâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 597; and Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 30.

Lütfî Fikri Bey, former Deputy for Dersim and one of the founder members of the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*, apparently read in the newspapers of 2 March the Government’s detailed declaration on the activities of a revolutionary conspiracy involving Sabahaddin Bey’s private secretary, Satvet Lütî (Tozan) Bey. Sworn opponent of the Unionists though he was, Lütî Fikri Bey recorded in his diary for that day:

“It is regrettable if Sabahaddin Bey has anything to do with this. For a start, I don’t at all like to see him as a ‘conspirateur’. Secondly, the fall of the Cabinet at this time would not be in the interest of the country’s security.”

Lütfî Fikri Bey, *Dersim Mebusu Lütî Fikri Bey’in günlüğü: ‘daima muhalefet’*. (Yayına hazırlayan) Y. Demirel. İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1991; [Hereafter, Lütî Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*]; p. 42, entry for 2 March 1913.

- 38 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.5 (28 Ocak 1965). Entry for 3 March 1913. He continues, "I also knew of Vahideddin Efendi's working against us". *ibid.*, *loc.cit.*
Also see: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1215–1219, on the anti-Unionist activities of Vahideddin Efendi.
- 39 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 595.
Lütfi Fikri Bey deplored, with barely concealed envy, the close relationship between the Unionists and the officer corps: Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, p. 44, entry for 4 March 1913.
- 40 See esp.: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 126–129; and also F. Ahmad, "Great Britain's relations with the Young Turks, 1908–1914", *Middle Eastern studies*, IV:2 (July) 1966, pp. 302–329. For a most readable background on Kâmil Paşa, see: R. Storrs, *Orientalism*. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937; pp. 125ff.
- 41 For example, Captain Hilmi [Bey], an aide-de-camp of Cemal Bey, was, by Kuran's admission, one of the infiltrators and passed on every piece of intelligence to his commander. A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 597. This evidence is fully corroborated, with further details, in: H. Amca, *Nizamiye kapısı, ve Yarıda kalan ihtilal*, pp. 146ff, esp. p. 192.
- 42 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 595–599 and pp. 600–602. But cf., A.B. Kuran, *İnkılâp tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*, p. 327.
Incidentally, as Cemal Bey, later Paşa, wrote in his memoirs, during the time of his inquiries regarding the conspiracy of the Prince Sabahaddin Bey group, the name of Lieutenant-General Abuk Ahmed Paşa, then the General-Commander of the Çatalca Army [Group] and uncle of Prince Sabahaddin, was implicated. First, it should be noted that at no time do the *Hâtıralar* mention, as does Ahmad, "... some officers of the Çatalca army, among whom was Abuk Ahmed Paşa ...". F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 126. Secondly, strictly in relation to this conspiracy alone, the *Hâtıralar* only mention his name and add that "... in spite of the reports I was receiving from my informants, at that time I did not believe this [i.e., his involvement with the Prince Sabahaddin Bey group]". Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 35. Thirdly, it should also be noted that Staff-Colonel Cemal Bey was holding the post of General Officer Commanding the Operations Base of the Çatalca Army [Group] and, apart from this, the tentacles of his İstanbul organization could surely have spotted "... some officers of the Çatalca army ...". Finally, Abuk Ahmed Paşa was "implicated", albeit tentatively, later in the year and was subsequently pensioned off.
- 43 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 597–602. The author was among those arrested and was sentenced to exile for life. Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 30–34.
For various declarations of the Government and of the Guardianship of İstanbul, dated 2 March onwards, see: A.B. Kuran, *op.cit.*, pp. 529–530; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 491–493.
In view of the swift and bold moves of Cemal Bey, it seemed plausible to the British Ambassador to explain the conspiracy to London as being manufactured by the "Committee Cabinet" "... as a handle for dealing with its *political adversaries*." *Lowther to Grey*, No.181, Conf., Constantinople, 3 March 1913, F.O. 371/1798/10822. (Emphasis mine).
- 44 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 30.
Cf., the opinion of the Mayor (*Mutasarrıf*) and also the Director of Police of

Beyoğlu District: T. Uzer, *Makedonya eşkiyalık tarihi ve son Osmanlı yönetimi*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.25. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1979; pp. 330–331.

- 45 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 31–34, for the details. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 491.
 - 46 Cf., for example: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 600; and H. Amca, *Nizamiye kapısı, ve Yarıda kalan ihtilal*, p. 185.
 - 47 See: R. Yaşar – H. Kabasakal, *Türk silahlı kuvvetleri tarihi: Osmanlı devri Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)*. IIIncü Cilt, 2nci Kısım, Garp ordusu Yunan cephesi harekâtı. T.C. Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih Yayınları Seri No.4. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1981; pp. 518–674, as the most authoritative source. Also, in general: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, *Balkan Harbi'nde Yanya Savunması ve Esat Paşa*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1984.
 - 48 For the text of the reply, see: *Bax-Ironside to Grey*, Tel.No.90, *en clair*, Sofia, 14 March 1913, *F.O.* 424/243/252. Also, for example, that of the Serbian Government: *Paget to Grey*, Tel.No.56, R., Belgrade, 14 March 1913, *F.O.* 424/243/273. Also see: *Bompard à Jonnart*, Tel.No.158, Péra, 16 mars 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VI, 3e Série, No.8, p. 13.
- For the immediate Ottoman official response, Said Halim Paşa wrote “*Très confidentiel*” to Tefik Paşa in London on 15 March:

“Il se confirme que les Etats balkaniques ont accepté la médiation sous certaines conditions. Si les conditions publiées par les journaux sont vraies, le Gouvernement Impérial se trouvera dans l'obligation de continuer la guerre étant donné qu'il ne pourrait conclure la paix sous ces conditions.”

L.B.A., Karton 512/1. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimsir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.661, p. 562.

Further, see: *ibid.*, Belge No.670, p. 568, on the Government's haste to settle the peace negotiations before the fall of Edirne and İşkodra.

- 49 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 206.
- By way of example, as late as 25 March, Said Halim Paşa was still complaining that:

“C'est encore parceque l'ambassadeur français n'avait pas télégraphiquement d'instructions à ce sujet que la démarche n'avait pu avoir lieu. Depuis de jours les Bulgares bombardent violemment lest positions d'Andrinople et se livrent à des attaques serrées d'infanterie pour s'emparer de la ville par la force.

Ce nouveau retard nous porte à croire que le Gouvernement français désire gagner du temps pour permettre aux Bulgares de réaliser leur but.”

L.B.A., Karton 512/1. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimsir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.676, pp. 573–574, p. 574.

- 50 It may well be that, in publicizing its views, the officer corps was trying to emphasise its political power in order that the Great Powers would recognize it as the effective parameter to be considered in their dealings with the Ottoman Empire. Indicative of this is a piece in the *Neue Freie Presse* of 17 March 1913, to the effect that a group of officers had, on the 16th, questioned Mahmud Şevket Paşa as to why nothing had been done to improve the Empire's position, and asked him to resign since “. . . they would not allow the interest of the fatherland to become a political football”. Quoted in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 205–206.

Air-Commodore Süer (Rtd.) also comments, on the basis of military archives, on the position of what he calls the “revolutionary young officers” and their desire for war: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, p. 310.

Halil Bey's memoirs provide quite separate, yet strongly supportive, evidence of the officers' desire for war: H. Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin anıları*. (Giriş) İ. Arar. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986. [Hereafter, H. Menteşe, *Anıları*]; pp. 176-177.

- 51 A Diplomatist [George Young], *Nationalism and war in the Near East*. (Ed.) Lord Courtney of Penwith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915; pp. 238-239.

Two telegrams from Vienna to the Grand Vezir may exemplify the Ottoman perception of this assertion. One was from the Minister of Finance, Cavid Bey, and the other from the Ambassador to Austria, ex-Grand Vezir Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa. Both telegrams had similar content. For both urged that “. . . however small, a military victory was essential . . .” in order to obtain a better bargaining position in the negotiations and “. . . thus to redeem [themselves] from the heavy peace conditions”. “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.7 (11 Şubat 1965). Entry for 20 March 1913.

- 52 For details of this unsuccessful offensive reconnaissance, see: Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *Balkan Harbinde Çatalca muharebesi*, pp. 67ff.; and, more recently, H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, pp. 307-309.

- 53 “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.9 (25 Şubat 1965). Entry for 30 March 1913.

Even as early as 21 March, Rifat Paşa, the Ottoman Ambassador to France, was advising that such was, in his opinion, the best course. *H.N.A.*, (Balkan Harbi), Karton 21/M/4. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.675, pp. 572-573.

- 54 See: Ş. Sükan, *Balkan Harbi*, II/3, p. 331; and H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, p. 321.

Early in the day of 31 March, when Mahmud Şevket Paşa passed through the streets of İstanbul, he noticed that vehicles were leaving the city laden with people who feared the collapse of the Çatalca defences. Later he received the report of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, who presented him with a very gloomy picture of the military situation. Ahmed İzzet Paşa estimated that the Balkan allies possessed 380,000 to 400,000 soldiers. Against this, the forces of the Empire in Thrace were now reduced to a mere 165,000. More importantly, against the 1,800 artillery pieces of the allies, the Ottomans had only 550 guns left. Under these conditions, the allies would be able to force the Ottomans at Çatalca and Bolayır and would even be able to land in Anatolia. Yet the reserves at İzmir were few. General morale in the army was not good. “A few days ago, in some battalions signs of panic had been observed.” “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.9 (25 Şubat 1965). Entry for 31 March 1913.

Cf. the comments of: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 149.

A reliable contemporary account of the siege is found in: [J.F.L.] Piarron de Mondesir, *Siège et prise d'Andrinople (novembre 1912-mars 1913)*. Paris: Librairie Chapelot, 1914. Also in the diaries of an Ottoman officer: H. Cemal, *Tekrar başımıza gelenler*. [2nd ed.]. İstanbul: Kastaş Aş Yayınları, 1991 [Originally published in 1916]; esp. pp. 98-219.

For the military details, two authoritative sources are: R. Yiğitgüden, *1912-1913 Balkan Harbinde Edirne kale muharebeleri*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1938-1939. 2 cilt; and Ş. Sükan, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 292-340.

- 55 See: *Lowther to Grey*, No.256, Constantinople, 31 March 1913, *F.O.* 424/244/114; and Enclosure: “Joint note addressed to Sublime Porte”, *ibid.*, *F.O.* 424/244/114/1.

According to the conditions of mediation, the frontier of the Empire in Europe

would be at the Enos-Midia (Enez-Midyé) line; the final decision on the question of the Aegean islands would be left to the Great Powers; the Empire would give up all claims to Crete; the Great Powers would not consider favourably any demand for war indemnity; from the time of the acceptance of these preliminaries, hostilities would cease.

Also see: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*. New York: Russell and Russell, 1938; pp. 326–327; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 299–309.

Also, in particular: Grey to Tewfik Pasha, Foreign Office, 14 April 1913, *F.O.* 424/244/363. Cf., Elliot to Grey, Tel.No.56, Conf., Athens, 15 April 1913, *F.O.* 424/244/373; and Tevfik Paşa à Said Halim Paşa, Tel.No.159, Chiffre, Londres, 22 avril 1913, *H.N.A.*, (Balkan Harbi), Karton 21/M/4.

- 56 “Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.9 (25 Şubat 1965). Entry for 31 March 1913.

For the Ottoman Government’s official acceptance of the mediation of the Great Powers, dated 1 April 1913, see: *H.N.A.*, (Balkan Harbi), Karton 21/M/4. Reproduced in full in: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, Belge No.684, p. 581. Also: Lowther to Grey, Tel.No.178, Constantinople, 1 April 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.775, p. 631; and Bompard à Pichon, Tel.No.191, Péra, 1 avril 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VI, 3e Série, No.147, p. 188.

It may be of some interest to note that the original, as both Bayur and Şimşir have observed, contains the signatures of the entire Mahmud Şevket Paşa Cabinet. However, despite the reply being officially communicated with such haste by Said Halim Paşa to the ambassadors of the Great Powers (i.e., Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia), two points come to mind. First, the Cabinet must clearly have been disquieted by the ramifications evident in the joint note, since the reply was prepared and presented without any delay. Secondly, and even more significantly, the signing of the reply by the whole Cabinet, whether or not they were able to comprehend the French text, leads me to speculate that the individual members were not un-anxious to hide behind the anonymity of Cabinet responsibility by dispersing it, conveniently, amongst them all. See: B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt 1, asterisked note to Belge No.684, p. 581. Cf. the comments of: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 304.

- 57 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 349.

- 58 İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım: genç subaylık yıllarım (1884–1918)*. (Hazırlayan) S. Selek. İstanbul: Burçak Yayınları, 1969; [Hereafter, İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*]; p. 117.

Cf. Türkgeldi’s comment that: “The fall of Edirne has caused a deep sorrow in the country.” A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*. 2nci basılış. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.15. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1951; p. 99. For example, see: Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, pp. 60–61, entries for 27 and 28 March 1913.

A long-term resident of İstanbul wrote in her diary for

“March 29th [1913]

The great event of this week has been the fall of Adrianople, a fine defence and a fine attack. The Turks take the loss of the town as a great blow, and yesterday was a sort of day of general mourning.”

M.A. Poynter, *When Turkey was Turkey: in and around Constantinople*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1921; p. 106.

And a foreign visitor who had been in İstanbul since 13 February set down his impressions:

“The grief and rage felt for the loss of Adrianople by all classes of the Muslim population was intense. The other territories might conceivably

become good riddance – they were mere dependencies; but this was Turkey proper – Muslim country. The loss of Macedonia and Albania did not rankle – there was no desire for vengeance in regard to that. But Adrianople was another matter. It must be regained at all costs. ‘Revenge for Adrianople’ was the general cry. Our house was behind none in patriotic fury. My Turkish teacher – gentle student that he was – and I vowed to volunteer for the reconquest of the Muslim fortress on the first occasion, meaning to march together side by side. Misket Hanum [Hanım] called down vengeance on the Powers of Europe. ‘Did they not solemnly declare at the beginning of the war that no one should gain any territory by the fighting? That was when they thought the Turks might win! Kyur [kör] olsunlar! (May they go blind!)’.

All this may seem like madness to the quiet reader.”

M. Pickthall, *With the Turks in wartime*. London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1914; pp. 44–45.

A rational explanation of the object of “Misket Hanum”’s wrath has been made by: A. Selâhattin, “Savaş sorumlulukları ve Türkiye”, pp. 45–50 in S.L. Meray, *Lozan’ın bir öncüsü: Prof. Ahmet Selâhattin Bey (1878–1920)*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.30. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1976. (Article originally published as “Harb mes’uliyetleri ve Türkiye” in *Vakit*, 30 Haziran 1335).

- 59 See esp. the best exposition: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964; pp. 337–346. Also, an earlier work: P. Safa, *Türk inkilâbına bakışlar*. 2nci basım. İstanbul: İnkilâp Kitabevi, [1958?]; (1nci basım: 1938); esp. pp. 27–67. Cf., H.Z. Ülken, *Türkiye’de çağdaş düşünce tarihi*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1979; pp. 195ff.
- 60 “A letter to John Farr and John Harris, Esqrs., sheriffs of the City of Bristol, on the affairs of America 1777”, pp. 1–42 in E. Burke, *The works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854–1857. 8 vols. Vol.II (1855), p. 31.
- 61 Z. Gökalp, “Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, muasırlaşmak”, *Türk yurdu*, III:11 (7 Mart) 1328–VI:26 (20 Mart) 1330. They were later published under the same title in book form, in several editions. The quotations used here are, unless otherwise indicated, taken from the English translations by Berkes, in: Z. Gökalp, *Turkish nationalism and western civilization: selected essays of Ziya Gökalp*. (Trans. and ed.) N. Berkes. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959. This book should be read along with its most illuminating review by F.A. Tansel in *Belleten*, XXIV:96 (Ekim) 1969, pp. 669–679.
- 62 See: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 409–411. Also cf., K.N. Duru, *Ziya Gökalp*. 2. basılış. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1965; pp. 42ff.; M.E. Erişirgil, *Bir fikir adamının romanı: Ziya Gökalp*. İstanbul: İnkilâp Kitabevi, 1951; pp. 75–78 and pp. 184–190; and T. Parla, *The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924*. Leiden: Brill, 1985; pp. 13–15. In addition: E.B. Şapolyo, *Ziya Gökalp, İttihadî Terakki ve Meşrutîyet tarihi*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: İnkilâp ve Aka, 1974; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, p. 203 and pp. 208–210.
- 63 N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 364.
- 64 Z. Gökalp, *Turkish nationalism and western civilization*, p. 72. (Emphasis mine).
- 65 K. Karpat, *An inquiry into the social foundations of nationalism in the Ottoman State: from social estates to classes, from millets to nations*. Research monograph:39. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1973; p. 110.

The Turkism, with all its variants, evoked by the Balkan War, finds vivid

exposition in the personal “political and literary portraits” of Yahya Kemal, especially those on “Ziya Gökalp” and “Halide Edib [Adivar] Hanım”: Yahya Kemal [Beyatlı], *Siyâsî ve edebî portreler*, pp. 11–24 and pp. 30–40 respectively. Further, as has been perceptively put in an authoritative source:

“The shock of this disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks.”

The rise of the Turks – the pan-Turanian movement. Peace handbook: confidential. Prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the [British] Foreign Office. No.96 c. & d. February, 1919; p. 19.

This, I suspect, is based on an earlier monograph., *Türkismus und Pantürkismus* (1915), written by Tekinalp and translated into English under the title, *The Turkish and pan-Turkish ideal*. [London: Admiralty War Staff-Intelligence Division, March 1917]. Particularly relevant are the chapters dealing with the genesis of Turkish nationalism before, during and after the Balkan War. The work is reproduced in full in: J.M. Landau, *Tekinalp, Turkish patriot, 1883–1961*. İstanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te İstanbul, 1984; pp. 103–152.

- 66 Z. Gökalp, *Turkish nationalism and western civilization: selected essays of Ziya Gökalp*, p. 74 and p. 75.
According to Sadiq:

“This approach seems to be the expression of a mind which without seeking to cease to be essentially Islamic tries to widen its bases and extend the limits of its horizon to nationalist ideology.”

M. Sadiq, “Ziya Gökalp – the making of an ideology”, *Cultura Turcica*, V-VII, 1968–1970, pp. 5–18, p. 12 and pp. 11–13 in general.

Also: M. Sadiq, “Religion and politics in Turkey (1908–1918)”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies, Muslim University, Aligarh*, 8/9, 1964/1965, pp. 19–30; and T. Parla, *The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924*, esp. pp. 25–26 and pp. 38–41. Further: Y. Sarııay, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin tarihi gelişimi ve Türk ocakları, 1912–1931*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1994; p. 171ff.

- 67 N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 374.
Cf., T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 310ff.

In a treatise dated 4 August 1911, Ömer Seyfeddin was quite impassioned in his support of *vatan* and the Turkish nation’s place within it. Reproduced in full in: A. Birinci, “‘Vatan! Yalnız Vatan’ hakkında birkaç söz”, *Tarih ve toplum*, 12:70 (Ekim) 1989, pp. 43–50, esp. pp. 44–50.

- 68 I borrow this term from Berkes. See: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, p. 401, where he defines these as

“[a] new type of reformer [who] arose immediately following the Revolution [1908] to criticize the traditional institutions and their educational effects”,

and discusses them under the heading of “Education” (*ibid.*, pp. 400–410). It should, however, be noted that such a reformer’s emphasis was upon the secular, pragmatic and modern role of civilian teaching and learning, as studied by Berkes. My own contention is that, in spite of differences in outlook (i.e., ex-officers, doctors, professional teachers, poets &c.), these and later specialized exponents (pedagogues) of new educational views were all in accord in the exaltation of the military tradition and the values attached to it. A spartan, rationalist thread may be discerned in their writings – a thread which

was also present in the expositions of their opponents, commonly designated "Islamists". The latter's stand against the contemporary, secular, educational methods and teaching conspicuously excluded the military schools.

In developing my ideas I have utilized, in addition to Berkes, works such as: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 374-498; H.Z. Ülken, *Türkiye'de çağdaş düşünce tarihi*, pp. 270ff., especially for the philosophical background; and Part "A" ("Öğretmenlik yolu ile eğitim [Education by teaching]"), pp. 55-92 in C. Kavçar, *II. Meşrutîyet devrinde edebiyat ve eğitim (1908-1923)*. Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Yayınları:41. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974.

- 69 If a single incident may serve as a representative example, let me draw on the memoirs of Halide Edib (Adivar). In recounting the birth of her second son, however unrelated it may appear to our present concern, she throws a domestic light in the impact even of a foreign war in eliciting the seemingly inherent instinct of "... almost total devotion to and faith in all things military", with which the society was imbued. As she remarks:

"When the second [son] was born, the victory of Admiral [Heihachiro] Togo in the Russo-Japanese War had stirred everybody's imagination so much that, like all the baby boys born in our district, he was also called Togo for a long time."

His given name was, in fact, Hikmetullah Togo. H.E. Adivar, *Mor salkımlı ev*. 2nci baskı. İstanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1967; p. 114.

The utilization of, especially, Ömer Seyfeddin's works for understanding this kind of sentiment is attempted in: G.W. Gawrych, "The culture and politics of violence in Turkish society, 1903-14", *Middle Eastern studies*, 22:3 (July) 1986, pp. 307-330.

70

"...
Mini mini omuzların
Taşıyacak yarın tüfek;
Tüfek değil, vatan yarın
O omuza yüklenecek.
Küçük asker, küçük asker!
Vatan senden gayret ister."

"Küçük asker", pp. 73-74 in S.K. Nigâr, *İnkılâp şairi Tevfik Fikret'in izleri*. İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1942; p. 74; and C. Kavçar, "Tevfik Fikret'in eğitimciliği ve 'Yeni Mektep'", *Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi dergisi*, 5:3-4, 1972, pp. 111-136.

On Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915) as a "Westernist" and a "Liberal": N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 302-304 and pp. 338-339; and, in general, M. Kaplan, *Tevfik Fikret: devir, şahsiyet, eser*. İstanbul: Bilmen Basımevi, 1971.

Further, regarding the military posture, there arose a vision of a united Turkish audience which made irony, in the sense of speaking by contradictions and paradox, a possible and indeed, after the defeats between 1911 and 1913, an obligatory mode of discourse. For example, the Ottomanist school of thought, still tinged with Islamist fervour and the concept of the Ottoman nation yet somewhat aware of the Muslim nationalist movements, seems also to have found the military posture attractive. Hence, an anonymous writer (or writers?) to *İctihad*, the organ of modernist Ottomanism, emphasised the principles which he saw as necessary for the "Deliverance of the Ottoman State". Note that the article, in two installments, appeared on 6 and 20 March 1913. Among other things, what the "Turks" (as the Ottomanist author chose to label them!) should do was this:

"Every Turk will hang two framed inscriptions in each room of his house; one will be . . . 'Islamic Union' [İttihad-ı İslâm], the other . . . 'Vengeance' [İntikam] . . . and these inscriptions will be hung in every place, such as streets, schools . . . and public squares. In every Turk's house . . . a 'Mavzer' rifle [i.e., Mauser, as any magazine rifle was then referred to], bullets [and] military dress will be present . . ."

In: "Pek uyanık bir uyku", *İçtihad*, 21 Şubat 1328, and 7 Mart 1329. Also quoted in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 441.

- 71 This commitment comes out clearly, for instance, in the memoirs of the *Başmabeyinci*, Lütfi Simavi Bey, who knew Mahmud Şevket Paşa well. Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında gördüklerim*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1340. 2 cilt.
- 72 Indeed, Gökâlp's attitude in this respect is forcefully expressed in a poem which he wrote in response to the allegation by one of his political adversaries, Ali Kemal Bey, ". . . the man who says I am not a Turk":

" . . .
Even had I been Kurd, Arab or Çerkes,
My first object would have been Turkish nationality!
For if the Turk is strong he can
Certainly save all nations professing Islam.

Whether I am a Turk or not, I am a friend of the Turk,
Whether you are a Turk or not, you are an enemy of the Turk!
For my object is to make the Turk live,
While yours is to kill all who are making him live.
. . ."

" . . .
Hatta ben olsaydım Kürd, Arap, Çerkes,
İlk gayem olurdu Türk milliyeti!
Çünkü Türk kuvvetli olursa mutlak
Kurtarır her İslâm olan milleti.

Türk olsam, olmasam ben Türk dostuyum,
Türk olsan, olmasan sen Türk düşmanı!
Çünkü benim gayem Türkü yaşamak,
Seninki öldürmek her yaşatanı!
. . ."

"Ali Kemal'e". Reproduced in full in: Z. Gökâlp, *Şiirler ve halk masalları*. (Araştıran ve hazırlayan) F.A. Tansel. 2. basım. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, II.Seri-Sa.18b. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1977; p. 278, and also the relevant Note on pp. 366-368, giving the literary history of the poem.

Cf. the comment of Berkes regarding Gökâlp, that

" . . . as in his sociological understanding of nation he rejected radicalism and even a common ethnic origin, he would not have ceased to preach modern Turkish nationalism even if he had been racially or ethnically a Kurd."

Z. Gökâlp, *Turkish nationalism and western civilization*, p. 314, N.9, where the social background to the poem is discussed and the translation of a couplet from it presented.

- 73 "Gökâlp's idealism was a reaction against Spencerianism and utilitarianism as well as against materialism. It was not, however, the product of a theory

of knowledge investigating the basis and nature of mind before it does so with regard to the nature of physical reality. It was rather an ideological premise to work out a moral philosophy upon which Turkish nationalism could be built. Hence, Gökalp gave to his philosophy the appellation of 'social idealism'. It was a spiritualistic as contrasted with the materialistic interpretation of history. It reduced reality, the physical as well as the social, to ideas; it rejected the individualistic philosophies of society and placed society, as a primordial and transcendental whole, above the individual. It suffered, however, from an internal strain due to its emphasis on the positivistic view of causation and the role of science in human conduct.

In spite of its serious defects as a system of philosophy, Gökalp's idealism exercised tremendous influence over Turkish thinking."

N. Berkes, "Renaissance in Turkey: Zia Gökalp and his school", Vol.II, pp. 1513-1523 in M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A history of Muslim philosophy*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966. 2 vols. Vol.II, pp. 1516-1517.

Also see: H.Z. Ülken, *Türkiye'de çağdaş düşünce tarihi*, esp. pp. 301-308 and pp. 426-427; and T. Parla, *The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*, pp. 50-59.

- 74 Cf., N. Berkes, "Ziya Gökalp: his contribution to Turkish nationalism", *Middle East Journal*, 8:4 (Autumn) 1954, pp. 375-390, esp. p. 383. Reproduced, as "Translator's introduction" in: Z. Gökalp, *Turkish nationalism and western civilization*, pp. 13-31. Also, in general: Z. Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün esasları*. Ankara: Matbuat ve İstihbarat Matbaası, 1339. For a reliable English translation, see: Z. Gökalp, *The principles of Turkism*. (Trans. and annot.) R. Devereux. Leiden: Brill, 1968.

- 75 Cf. an Arab author's generalization in relation to this:

"But the measures applied by the Young Turks in their years in power indicate their lack of sympathy for nationalism, particularly minority nationalism, and their partly unconscious identification of the interests of the empire with those of the Turks. The predominance within the Committee and the government of the more uncompromising military wing, which held these beliefs and others more extreme, increased as time went on at the expense of other more flexible civilian leaders."

R. Khalidi, "Arab nationalism in Syria: the formative years, 1908-1914", pp. 207-237 in W.W. Haddad and W. Ochsenswald (eds.), *Nationalism in a non-national state: the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977; p. 214.

Also see: E. Tauber, "Four Syrian manifestos after the Young Turk revolution", *Turcica*, XIX, 1987, pp. 195-213.

- 76 It appears that Mahmud Şevket Paşa put forward this version of his proposal for the first time at a Cabinet meeting on 2 March 1913 (17 Şubat 1328). ("Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.5 (28 Ocak 1965). Entry for 2 March 1913.

For an epistemological assessment of my original assertion, during the writing of my Ph.D. thesis, of the "Real Cause" of the Grand Vezir's invitation to a "prominent German general", see: M.N. Turfan, "Reporting him and his cause aright: Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Liman von Sanders Mission", *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI)*, 12 (juin-décembre) 1991, pp. 163-194, where I define the "Real Cause" as the one avowed by Mahmud Şevket Paşa when to do so entailed no adverse consequence to himself, and compare and contrast it with the "Most Significant Cause" - that cause most responsible, on the basis of analysis, for the intended result, regardless of what the actual result might be.

- 77 Details are found, for example, in: J.K. McGarity, *Foreign influence on the Ottoman-Turkish army, 1880-1918*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The American University, 1968; and, especially, in a more recent and reliable work: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: die preussisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei, 1835-1919*. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976.
- 78 G.W. Swanson, "War, technology and society in the Ottoman Empire from the reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913: Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission"; [Hereafter, G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*]; pp. 367-385 in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), *War, technology and society in the Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1975; p. 378.
- 79 *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.3, Konstantinopel, 2 Januar 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15435, pp. 193-194. General Eydoux was the head of the French Military Mission in Greece from its inception in February 1911. See: *ibid.*, *loc.cit.*
- 80 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt II: Trablusgarp be Balkan savaşları, Osmanlı Asyasının paylaşılması için anlaşmalar; Kısım 3: Paylaşmalar. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.14a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1951; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3]; p. 276.

As Bayur also makes clear, there does not seem to exist in the Ottoman archives any document which supports this contention (*ibid.*, *loc.cit.*). Such an absence may partially be explicable on two grounds. First, given the prevailing temper of the Kâmil Paşa Cabinet, "... among whose members incompatibility was evident"*, it is possible to believe that Noradounghian Efendi was conducting his talk with Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, of his own accord and did not feel it necessary to document it afterwards. Secondly, and I think rather more significantly, he may deliberately have wished to keep it quiet from the then Minister of War and later also Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Nâzım Paşa, in view of the latter's stand against the employment of foreign officers. For example, when Nâzım Paşa took office, the British Military Attaché expressed his doubt about even the continued employment of five German instructors remaining from the original 24 in the Ottoman service under von der Goltz. He reported that Nâzım Paşa was known for his opposition to the payment of large salaries to foreign instructors.** As for the German response to Nâzım Paşa's position, I quote, uncritically, from Swanson, who based his comments on evidence found in the Auswärtiges Amt Archiv (Bonn) [referred to as A.A.]:

"The German Ambassador to Turkey, Wangenheim, was worried. Nazım was unsympathetic and acted on several occasions in a curt, impolite manner which led the German ambassador and officers to assume that Nazım was hostile to the mission and that he might possibly be thinking of turning to another country . . . Reappraisal of Nazım indicated that he was critical of Germany for its attitude during the war with Italy and for its support of the C.U.P. But the Germanophobia of Nazım did not manifest itself directly in military affairs. As a soldier, Nazım was a nationalist who believed in the superiority of the Turkish soldier and saw no reason for having foreigners to train Ottoman troops. Therefore Wangenheim believed that Nazım was working towards reducing the number of German officers holding command over Turkish soldiers without contemplating the summoning of officers from other countries."***

* A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 77.

** *Tyrell to Marling*, Tel.No.64, Conf., Constantinople, 21 September 1912, F.O. 195/2430.

*** G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 380. For his evidence, see: *Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg*, No.282,

- Therapia, 28 August 1912, A.A. Turkei 142, Nr.A15123. Also see: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, esp. pp. 112–125, who produces more evidence, in a similar vein, from the German point of view.
- 81 “... weil sie erwägt, deutschen General als Oberkommandierenden im Frieden zu erbitten, hauptsächlich um die Armee ausserhalb der Politik zu stellen.”
- In: G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15435, p. 193, Note.
- Cf., Hüseyin Kâzım Kadri, *Balkanlardan Hicaz'a İmparatorluğun tasfiyesi: 10 Temmuz inkilâbı ve netayici*. (Sadeleştiren) K. Büyükcoşkun. İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 1992 (originally published in 1920); p. 38.
- 82 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 382. (Emphasis mine). The full report is found in: G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15435, p. 193 and p. 194, Notes.
- Here, I have deliberately quoted from Swanson's précis instead of directly from the report. In doing so, I hope to see the events in their proper perspective without exaggerating or neglecting one particular aspect. This will allow me to take a critical look at some of the prominent studies, including his own. The report is also quoted, nearly in full, with additional comments, in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3, pp. 277–278.
- 83 Cf., G. Schöllgen, “Dann müssen wir uns aber Mesopotamien sichern!’ Motive deutscher Türkenpolitik zur Zeit Wilhelms II. in zeitgenössischen Darstellungen”, *Saeculum*, 32:2, 1981, pp. 130–146. And see, in general: L. Rathmann, *Stossrichtung Nahost, 1914–1918: zur Expansionspolitik des deutschen Imperialismus im ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1963.
- 84 [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*. (Trans.) C. Reichmann. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1927; p. 3. Originally published as: Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre in der Türkei*. Berlin: Verlag von August Scherl GmbH, 1920.
- 85 See, for example: R.J. Kerner, “The mission of Liman von Sanders”, *Slavonic Review*, VI:16 (June) 1927, pp. 12–27; VI:17 (December) 1927, pp. 344–363; VI:18 (March) 1928, pp. 543–560; VII:19 (June) 1928, pp. 90–112; W. Hallgarten, “La portée politique et économique de la mission Liman von Sanders”, *Revue d'histoire de la Guerre Mondiale*, Treizième Année, 1935, pp. 17–31; and J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, esp. Chapter 5: Die “Liman-von-Sanders-Mission” bis zum türkischen Kriegseintritt, pp. 126–162. Also: H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey: a diplomatic history, 1913–1923*. 2nd ed. New York: Howard Fertig, 1966; Chapter 2/1: The Liman von Sanders Mission, pp. 39–47; and J. Lukaszewski, *Ze studiów nad imperializmem niemieckim: sprawa misji Gen. Limana von Sanders w Turcji*. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1955. Further, in documentary sources: “Liman von Sanders Mission, 1913–14”, in *B.D.*, Vol.X, Part 1 [Hereafter *B.D.*, X/1], Nos.376–474, pp. 338–423; “Mission Liman von Sanders”, in *D.D.F.*, Tome VIII, 3e Série; in “Table Méthodique”, pp. XXX–XXXIII, *ibid.*, Tome IX, 3e Série, as “Affaire Liman von Sanders”, p. XXI.
- 86 See, for example: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3, esp. Beşinci Bölüm: Alman Hey’et-i Islahiyye Askeriyesi Meselesi, pp. 276–306; and S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*. IIIncü Cilt, 6ncı Kısım, 1inci Kitap. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları Seri No.2. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1971; [Hereafter, S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1]; esp. İkinci Bölüm: Teşkilat. B: Askeri teşkilat. 8: 1913 yılı askeri teşkilatı ve Alman askeri ıslah heyeti, pp. 192–224.
- 87 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 199.
- The point is appreciated in a recent paper by Staff-Major Örsal: A. Örsal, “İkinci Meşrutiyet döneminde Osmanlı ordusunda görev yapan yabancı

- subayların Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın askeri yönetimi üzerindeki etkileri", pp. 341-359, in Dördüncü Askeri Tarihi Semineri, *Bildiriler*. Ankara: Gnkur. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1989; esp. p. 348.
- 88 Full details of "The Distribution of Forces" by the Regulation of 14 February 1913 are found in a document in the *Askerî Müze* (Military Museum), İstanbul, Belge No.5612. Also see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 200-219 and [Kuruluş -12, -13, -14, -15 and -16] provided between p. 200 and p. 201. Cf., C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*. Cilt I: Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun siyasi ve askeri hazırlıkları ve harbe girişi. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları Seri No.3. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1970; [Hereafter, C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, I]; pp. 163-165 and Kuruluş -1, provided between p. 168 and p. 169.
- 89 For details, see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 368-376. The first military dress regulations of the second Constitutional period, the *İrade-i Seniye*, are found in: B.V.A., Hazine Evrak, No.108, 5 Haziran 1325.
- 90 Further changes that affected the Service Dress and Uniform are explained and illustrated in detail in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 376-380, with colour plates provided between p. 376 and p. 377. Illustrations of Ottoman armed forces' uniforms on the eve of the First World War are provided in: D. Nicolle, *The Ottoman army, 1914-18*. London: Osprey Military, 1994.
- 91 Extensively quoted from a document: *von Lossow to Kriegsministerium*, Darbogaz, 2 April 1913, A.A., Turkei 203, Nr.A11098, in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 228. Also see Oberstleutnant von Lossow's report of 19 May 1913, reproduced in full in: B.F. Schulte, *Vor dem Kriegausbruch 1914: Deutschland, die Türkei und der Balkan*. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1980; pp. 133-139. Cf. S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 81; with a more personal observation in: C. Kutay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ve Hayber'de Türk Cengi*. İstanbul: Ercan Matbaası, 1962; p. 26.
- 92 See the remarks of Mehmed Nuri Bey in Chapter 3, N.174 of this work.
- 93 See pp. 304-307 of this Chapter.
- 94 Mehmed Nuri, *Birinci Fırka Erkân-ı Harbi Binbaşı: zabıt ve kumandan*. [İstanbul]: Tanin Matbaası, 1330. Reprinted as: *Zabıt ve kumandan: Nuri Conker*. Ankara: Doğuş Ltd. Şirketi Matbaası, 1959; p. 24. While a prisoner-of-war of the Bulgarian forces, Lieutenant H. Cemal Efendi recorded in his diary (11 May 1913) one of his fellow-officers as saying in a discussion:
- "Since we lost [part of] our motherland, sentiments of such extreme nationalism and patriotism have stirred in me. *İnşallah*, as soon as I get home I shall give my Turkishness and nationhood full rein."
- H. Cemal, *Tekrar başımıza gelenler*, p. 240.
- 95 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 195.
- 96 The "reorganization", distributed as "top secret" in February, was officially announced by an *İrade-i Seniye* on 11 December 1913. B.V.A., Hazine Evrak, No.122, 28 Teşrinisani 1329. Also see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 196, for the names and ranks of the 15 commanders.
- 97 *İrade-i Seniye*, 24 Kanunuevvel 1329 (7 January 1914). B.V.A., Hazine Evrak, No.172. Cf., *Mallet to Grey*, Tel.No.15, Constantinople, 8 January 1914, B.D., X/1, No.464, pp. 414-415.
- 98 Quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 146, apparently based on the information supplied by Rustow "... from a draft on the Young Turks ...", *ibid.*, p. 146, N.2.

For the figure, see: *İrade-i Seniye*, 24 Kanunuevvel 1329 (7 January 1914).

- 99 "Changes in military command", *Cunliffe-Owen to Mallet*, No.116, Conf., Constantinople, 12 January 1914, F.O. 195/2456/60. This report may also be used to complement the list of appointees of 10 December, as given in N.96 above, especially in view of the commanders of the four Army Inspectorates, although it misses those of the two Independent Divisions.
 - 100 Lieutenant-Colonel Enver Bey was promoted to Colonel on 15 December 1913 (2 Kanunuevvel 1329). Less than a month later, Colonel Enver Bey was once more promoted, to the rank of Brigadier-General, and was appointed Minister of War in the Said Halim Paşa Cabinet on the same day, 3 January 1914 (21 Kanunuevvel 1329) – not on 4 January as stated in "ENWER PASHA", Vol.II, pp. 698–702 in H.A.R. Gibb [et al.] (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. New ed. Leiden: Brill, and London: Luzac and Co., 1960 to date; [Hereafter, *E.I.*2]; p. 698. On 8 January 1914, Enver Paşa became Chief of the General Staff by a definitive appointment, in addition to his duties as Minister of War (not mentioned in "ENWER PASHA", *ibid.*). See: "Enver Paşa'nın resmî sicil özeti", Cilt III, pp. 693–694 in Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971–1972. 3 cilt. Also see: B.V.A., Hazine Evrak: Harbiye İstizan Defteri, No.2777.
- The circumstances surrounding the promotions and appointments of Enver Paşa will be considered later in this study. However, his "formative years" up to 1908 are summarized in: G.W. Swanson, "Enver Pasha: the formative years", *Middle Eastern studies*, 16:3 (October) 1980, pp. 192–199. According to his "official record (*resmî sicil*)", Enver Bey was born in 1295 (1879/80). Variant dates are offered by Aydemir (1297/98) and Hanioglu (1299) on the basis of different versions given by Enver Bey himself, neither of which I find acceptable nor can confirm. In any case, if correct, both would serve to establish Enver Bey as even younger at the time of these appointments. Ş.S. Aydemir, *op.cit.*, Cilt I, p. 178, p. 450 and p. 184 (facing); and M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, pp. 25–26 and p. 253.
- 101 For the records of *Seraskers* and *Harbiye Nazırı*s, see, for example: F. Çoker, "Serasker ve Harbiye Nazırları", *Hayat tarih mecmuası*, I:1 (Şubat) 1968, pp. 22–24. For the records of the Chiefs of the General Staff (*Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisleri*) since 15 August 1908, see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 261. The latter also provides information on their duration in office.
 - 102 Enver Bey had been, in the words of a contemporary foreign observer, despite "... the humble position which ... [he] really held in that expedition", one of the two

"... most important of ... [the Young Turk] leaders, not so much on account of their military capacity as on account of their tremendous popularity, not only with the soldiers, but also with nearly every section of the civilian population ... famous 'heroes of Liberty' [sing. *kahraman-ı Hürriyet*], as the Ottomans delight in calling them ..."

[Major, formerly Adjutant-Major, Niyazi Bey is the other officer mentioned.]

F. McCullagh, *The fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*. London: Methuen, 1910; Note on p. 162, and p. 161 respectively.

In assessing Envey Bey's position in the Action Army, McCullagh provides, in an Appendix, the "Ordre de Bataille of the Macedonian Army before Constantinople April 23/24", and comments that it

"... will be evident from a glance at the appendix, where it will be seen that his name is not even mentioned among the officers of the various detachments which captured Constantinople on April 24."

ibid., pp. 305–308 (Appendix) and Note on pp. 162–163 respectively. And he adds:

"As a matter of fact he held a subordinate post in the Taxim [Taksim; artillery barracks north of Pera] detachment, which was commanded by Major Mukhtar [Muhtar] Bey."

ibid., Note on p. 163.

However, on Saturday 24 April 1909 (11 Nisan 1325), during the occupation of Istanbul and ensuing operations, was killed

"... that gallant Musullman, Major Mukhtar Bey, commander of the Taxim detachment, whose death, about 10 A.M., left the famous Enver Bey in command."

ibid., p. 233.

For the sake of accuracy, it should be pointed out that Enver Bey, before assuming command of the Taksim Detachment, was in command of the units which were besieging Taşkışla (barracks north-east of Taksim barracks)* and, in this capacity, came strictly under the command of Brigadier-General Şevket Turgut Paşa, General Commanding the 2nd Combined Division of the Action Army. Şevket Turgut Paşa, on 24 April, was empowered to lead the 4th Column of the advancing Army. This Column comprised Taşkışla Detachment, Maçka (infantry barracks north-east of Taksim barracks) Detachment and Taksim Detachment. The first two Detachments were personally commanded by the Paşa while the last, as noted, was commanded by Major Muhtar Bey until he was killed in action. Since the order of the day of 23 April, issued at Halkalı (near İstanbul) Camp,** provided only the names of the commanders of the four Columns and Detachments which were to be deployed, it is then normal that Enver Bey's name was not mentioned there.

* I take this information from a careful account by another contemporary observer: Y. Nadi (Abaloğlu), *İhtilâl ve inkilâb-ı Osmani*. [İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Cihan, 1325; p. 210. Incidentally, on p. 14 Enver Bey is depicted as "the hero of permanent liberty [kahraman-ı daimi-i hürriyet]"; and also a most detailed "Ordre de bataille für die Nacht vom 10. zum 11. Nizan (23/24 April", in: K.-, "Die militär-politischen Ereignisse in Konstaninopel und die Operationen der Saloniker Armee im April 1909", *Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift*, II:8 (August) 1909, pp. 1181–1202, pp. 1191ff., esp. p. 1194, "Das Operations Korps wird Morgen den 11. Nizan Stamboul und Pera wie folgt besetzen". See the accurately assessed positions of Majors Muhtar and Enver Beys.

** F. McCullagh, *op.cit.*, pp. 306–308. He also produces a fairly accurate map in which the positions of the barracks and the forward march of the Detachments may be followed; *ibid.*, facing p. 215. Also cf., S. Akşin, *31 Mart olayı*. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970; pp. 195–200.

Among the various others, one simple piece of evidence may shed light on the popularity of Enver Bey with the soldiery. It will be remembered from the account given in Chapter 3, p. 153, that Enver Bey had been the Military Attaché in Berlin since January 1909. He seems to have left Berlin for İstanbul on 14 April via Selânik, where he joined the Action Army.*** According to the eye-witness account of Ali Şevki Bey, secretary of Tefvîk Paşa – which does not bear the hallmark of sympathy with the Action Army, when the author asked one of the Albanian soldiers of that Army if he was serving under

Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa, he received “. . . with a great swagger” the answer that the soldier neither knew nor cared about anyone except Enver and Niyazi Beys.****

*** Ali Cevad Bey, *İkinci Meşrutiyetin ilanı ve otuzbir Mart hadisesi: II. Abdülhamid'in son mabeyn başkatibi Ali Cevad Bey'in fezlekesi*. (Yayına hazırlayan) F.R. Unat. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. II.Seri-Sa.19. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1960; p. 184.

**** İ.H. Danişmend, *Sadrazam Tevfik Paşa'nın dosyasındaki resmî ve hususî vesikaları göre 31 Mart vakası*. İstanbul: İstanbul Kitabevi, 1961; pp. 206-207.

- 103 For the time being, it may suffice to quote the comments of the then Staff-Major İsmet Bey, an associate (he was Deputy-Chief, Training and Education Section [IIIrd Section], of the newly organized General Staff, as of January 1914) and personal friend of Enver Paşa, who provides one of the best assessments of “Enver Paşa's exalted virtues and defects”, under the said heading:

“Enver Paşa's becoming the Minister of War at his young age was not regarded as odd among the military [orduda], [but] was extremely well received . . . As the Minister of War, [he] immediately, with a clearing-up operation, undertook the reforming of the military. This initiative was really successful.

Enver Paşa, having done this clearing up, devoted all his strength to removing the military from partisan politics [. . . bütün gücünü orduya siyasetten ayırmaya hasretti].”

İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*, p. 219.

İnönü's comments, along similar lines, as told to Aydemir, Enver Paşa's biographer, appear in: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 433; and again, in an article written by himself in: İ. İnönü, “İstiklâl Savaşı ve Lozan”, *Belleten*, XXXVIII:149 (Ocak) 1974, pp. 1-30, p. 5.

- 104 M. Janowitz, *Military institutions and coercion in the developing nations*. (Expanded edition of *The military in the political development of new nations*, published in 1964.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977; p. 141 (p.65 in the 1964 ed.).

- 105 See my earlier remarks in Chapter 1, pp. 3-9, and Chapter 3, pp. 189-190 of this work. And cf. a recent theoretical treatment, as an example of the continuous tendency to employ the term “politics” in the narrow sense when dealing with the military as being “in politics”: E.A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in politics: military coups and governments*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977; see esp. pp. 141-147.

Practical examples along the same lines are abundant in the literature. See: M.N. Turfan, *The politics of military politics: political aspects of civil-military relations in the Ottoman Empire with special reference to the 'Young Turk' era*; pp. 9-33 and accompanying footnotes on pp. 299-315, for a thorough treatment.

Also, for a cross-section of some more recent works I have seen: N. Yurdsever, *Türkiye'de askerî darbe girişimleri (1960-1964)*. İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983; N. Mazıcı, *Türkiye'de askerî darbeler ve sivil rejime etkileri*. İstanbul: Gür Yayınları, 1989; and J. Brown, “The military and society: the Turkish case”, *Middle Eastern studies*, 25:3 (July) 1989, pp. 387-404. Even the more polemical works, lacking any methodology, remain within the same frame if thinking. For example: E. Toy, *Ordu ve politika: deneme*. İstanbul: Bil Kitap, Yayın, Dağıtım, 1989; H. Özdemir, *Rejim ve asker*. İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1989; and H. Özdemir, *Sivil cumhuriyet*. İstanbul: Boyut Yayınevi, 1991; A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*. Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1992.

106 A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 111.

107 See p. 301 and N.54 of this Chapter.

108 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.10 (4 Mart 1965). Entry for 1 April 1913.

On 2 April, Enver Bey confirmed this in his customary self-assertive manner, writing to his German woman friend:

"Vous avez peut-être lu dans les journaux quelque chose sur les derniers combats. Les Bulgares avaient commencé leur marche en avant. On nous a donné l'ordre de nous joindre aux troupes; et juste le jour où nous sommes arrivés les Bulgares avaient attaqué une position assez avancée dont ils réussirent de s'emparer. Mais ils restèrent devant la position principale. Nous réussîmes de les arrêter et le lendemain nous avons reconquis la position perdue."

M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 236.

109 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.10 (4 Mart 1965). Entry for 7 April 1913.

As late as 3 April, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was still worried, according to a report of the Austrian Ambassador, Pallavicini, as to whether the Balkan allies had answered the collective note of the Powers. The Grand *Vezir* appears to have confided in the Ambassador that the critical moment for the Ottoman capital would come when the Bulgarians moved up their heavy artillery. Ottoman forces had no similar weaponry available. Once the enemy guns arrived at Çatalca the resistance of the Ottoman forces would come to an end. Thus, the only solution lay in the hands of the Great Powers. The document is paraphrased and quoted in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 214.

Reasons for the Great Powers', and especially Russia's, anxiety to act jointly in favour of the cessation of hostilities are discussed in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 305-309. Cf., E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, p. 307.

In fact, it was not until 5 April 1913 that the Balkan allies' reply to the collective note was made known to the British Foreign Secretary. See: *Bax-Ironside to Grey*, Tel.No.123, *en clair*, Sophia, 5 April 1913, F.O. 424/244/127.

110 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 241. Also see: *ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

According to Helmreich: "There was cholera in the Bulgarian army and it was indeed extremely questionable if the Chatalja lines could be forced." E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913* pp. 307-308.

111 H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, p. 26.

In his British Academy's Raleigh Lecture (1931) on "The role of Bosnia in international politics (1875-1914)", R.W. Seton-Watson also used the term "fratricidal" in describing the turning of the Balkan alliance into a war. The lecture is found in pp. 262-293 in: L.S. Sutherland (ed.), *Studies in history: British Academy lectures*. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. see p. 290.

112 J.F.C. Fuller, *The decisive battles of the western world and their influence upon history*. (Ed.) J. Terraine. St. Albans: Paladin, 1970. 2 vols. Vol.2, p. 431.

113 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 246.

Cf., E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, p. 308.

In the assessment of the British Military Attaché in Bulgaria:

"... to the Bulgars it was maddening to think that while they were bearing the brunt of the campaign in Thrace and were besieging Adrianople, their allies were plotting to deprive them of the fruits of victory."

H.D. Napier, *The experiences of a Military Attaché in the Balkans*. London: Drane's, 1924; p. 9.

By contrast, the British Ambassador to Greece had a different perspective:

"The recent events in Nigrita have naturally embittered the feeling against the Bulgarians, and in irresponsible circles talk of war with Bulgaria, either now or in the near future, is freely indulged in."

Elliot to Grey, No.55, Athens, 19 March 1913, F.O. 424/243/471.

- 114 However, in addition to: A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, esp. pp. 240ff., the following memoirs and works were found particularly useful in my summary assessment of the Balkan rivalries: I.E. Gueshoff, *Le genèse de la guerre mondiale: la débâcle de l'alliance balkanique*. Berne: P. Haupt, 1919; I. Ionescu, *Some personal impressions*. New York: Stokes, 1920; and Nicholas, Prince of Greece, *My fifty years*. London: Hutchinson, 1927. Also: C. Nicolaides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankrieg, 1912-1913*. Wien: A. Hölder, 1914; C. Price, *Light on the Balkan darkness*. London: Simkin, Marshal, Hamilton, Kent, 1915; and A. Andreades, "The Macedonian question", *Nineteenth century*, LXXVII (February) 1915, pp. 352-361.

- 115 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, p. 308.

- 116 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 215. Also: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, pp. 377-378.

- 117 As Helmreich has put it:

"The terms of the agreement as put into writing was but a summary of an oral understanding and never had the formality of an armistice."

E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, p. 308.

Also cf. the statement by Bayur: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 308-309. For documentation, see, for example: *Lowther to Grey*, Tel.No.199, Constantinople, 17 April 1913, B.D., IX/2, No.857, p. 698; *Bompard à Pichon*, Tel.No.213, Péra, 15 avril 1913, D.D.F., Tome VI, 3e Série, No.306, p. 362; and *Bompard à Pichon*, Tel.No.217, Péra, 16 avril 1913, D.D.F., Tome VI, 3e Série, No.318, p. 371.

As for the military aspects of the developments which led to the initial suspension of hostilities, see: H. Rohde, *Meine Erlebnisse in Balkankrieg und kleine Skizzen aus dem türkischen Soldatenleben*. Charlottenburg: Baumann, 1914; pp. 129-137.

- 118 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.7 (11 Şubat 1965). Entry for 19 March 1913.

- 119 For Mahmud Şevket Paşa's further thoughts on the structure and character of alliances, see: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.7 (11 Şubat 1965). Entry for 19 March 1913. He had, almost three years earlier, already expressed his thoughts freely to the British Ambassador:

"Mahmoud Shevket has more than once said to me that all Turkey requires is a strong military force and with that her position is assured."

Lowther to Grey, No.521, Conf., Therapia, 30 July 1910, B.D., IX/1, No.161, pp. 180-183.

Further: A. Chéradame, "The new Turkish army and the balance of power in Europe", *The quarterly review*, 214:427 (April) 1911, pp. 454-472, esp. pp. 455-456.

Even an ardent contemporary critic, the famed poet Mehmed Âkif, scoffing at the destitute attitude of successive Ottoman Governments and their search for an alliance in the period between the Balkan and the First World Wars, could not remain immune to the idea that the power of a state was in direct proportion to its military might:

“ . . .

Your place is that of a beggar among the nations!
What joy is there, tell me, in this vagrant life of ours?
You go towards the North: a frigid welcome,
You resolve to the South: an openly cool reception!
'Mercy, Grey! Were there any help for us it should only be from you.
My dear Poincaré, we're finished. Help us, show some kindness!'
When you pleaded thus, they replied 'Let God help you!'
How can you manage politics by beggary, eh, you fool?
The blood of politics is wealth; its life, force.
The oppressor Europe knows only one right; that is might.
While the navy and army were moving forward in triumph
The ambassadors of the West were yearning to kiss their stirrups.
. . .”

[“ . . .

Dilenci mevki'i, milletlerin içinde yerin!
Ne zevki var, bana anlat bu ömr-i derbederin?
Şimâle doğru gidersin: Soğuk bir istikbâl,
Cenûba niyyet edersin: Açık bir istiskaal!
'Aman Grey! Bize senden olur olursa meded . . .
Kuzum Puankare! Bittik . . . İnâyet et, kerem et!'
Dedikçe sen, dediler karşıdan: 'İnâyet ola!'
Dilencilikle siyâset döner mi, hey budala?
Siyâsetin kanı: Servet; hayâtı: Satvettir;
Zebûn-küş Avrupa bir hak tanıır ki: Kuvvettir.
Donanma, ordu yürürken muzafferin ileri,
Üzengi öpmeye hasretti Garb'ın elçileri!
. . .”]

M. Âkif (Ersoy), “Fatih kürsüsünde”, *Safahat*, IV. Kitap, pp. 207–264 in: M.A. Ersoy, *Safahat*. (Neşre hazırlayan) M.E. Düzdağ. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1992; pp. 232–233 (poem originally composed and published in 1914).

On the reorganization of the Ottoman Navy, British assistance, especially after 1908, is succinctly explained in: “ED. NOTE” in *B.D.*, IX/1, p. 282; and, on a personal level, in: H.F. Woods, *Spunyarn: fortyseven years under the ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey*. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1924. 2 vols. Vol.2, pp. 11ff. Fuller treatment is given in, for example: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, esp. pp. 476ff.; and A. Büyüktuğrul, *Balkan Harbi tarihi*, Cilt VII, esp. pp. 12–31.

- 120 *Wangenheim an den Bethmann Hollweg*, Nr.125, Pera, 26 April 1913, *G.P.*, 38.Band, Nr.15439, pp. 196–201.

This report is also quoted extensively and analyzed in its wider setting by the historian, Bayur, who gives what is still the best commentary on the further thoughts of Mahmud Şevket Paşa and their implications for Ottoman foreign policies: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3, pp. 55–60. Also see: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, pp. 382–383.

- 121 A succinct examination of German foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the position of Wangenheim, before the First World War, is found in: F.G. Weber, *Eagles on the crescent: Germany, Austria and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance, 1914–1918*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970; esp. pp. 17–58. Cf., U. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968; esp. p. 320. A critical assessment of Trumpener sheds additional light on German policy: A. Pantev, “Some debatable problems about German-Turkish mutual relations”, *Etudes*

balkaniques, 7e année, 1971, No.1, pp. 111–114. However, cf., in view of the hitherto unpublished documents: B.F. Schulte, *Vom dem Kriegausbruch 1914, Deutschland, die Türkei und der Balkan*.

- 122 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 78–79; and its English version, Djemal Pasha, *Memoires of a Turkish statesman, 1913–1919*. New York: George H. Doran, 1922 (Reprint ed., 1973, by Arno Press used here); pp. 66–67.

It should particularly be noted that the translation of the quotation is mine, but I have used the published English version as a basis, correcting it as necessary for the sake of comparison if not accuracy. Secondly, it is to be remembered that Cemal Bey (Paşa) wrote his memoirs in 1919 (he was then in Europe), relying on a few fragments of documents but mostly on his own memory. In our case, no date is specified as to *when exactly* Mahmud Şevket Paşa spoke to him at the Sublime Porte. A clue is found at the end of the Grand Vezir's talk:

“ . . . Therefore, I am about to inquire of the Germans on what terms they would be prepared to provide us with such a mission. First of all, I would find it more suitable to let them inform [us] of the conditions of employment.”

Cemal Paşa, *op.cit.*, p. 79. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *op.cit.*, pp. 67–68.

It is only, therefore, in view of circumstantial evidence that I tentatively conclude that Mahmud Şevket Paşa must have talked to Cemal Bey one evening before 26 April 1913 – the date when the German Ambassador despatched his report Nr.15439. See N.120 of this Chapter.

For a good background on the first Military Mission from Germany, arriving in 1882–1883, see: K. Beydilli, “II. Abdülhamit devrinde gelen ilk Alman Askeri Heyeti hakkında”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi tarih dergisi*, Ord.Prof. İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı hâtıra sayısı, XXXII (Mart) 1979, pp. 481–493. And for an assessment of military missions generally from Germany: İ. Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman nüfuzu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983; pp. 71–86.

- 123 *Wangenheim an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.269, Konstantinopel, 17 Mai 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15303, pp. 33–35.

Furthermore, some days later, to the German Military Attaché, Mahmud Şevket Paşa

“ . . . emphasized that if the Kaiser were willing to agree to his request for a German general, it would be most desirable for the man to have had no acquaintance with events in Turkey. This would prevent the officer appointed from leaning too much on one of the Turkish officers known to him from earlier times. This had happened to von der Goltz, who had favoured a Turkish officer (not Şevket) to such an extent that dissatisfaction and dissention arose in the highest Ottoman military circles.”

Stremmel to Kriegsministerium, No.716, Konstantinopel, 26 May 1913, A.A., Türkei 139, Nr.A10886, in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket and the German military mission*, p. 384.

Swanson cites the above document in order to support his assertion as to why “ . . . Şevket acted deliberately when he passed over his former mentor [i.e., von der Goltz].” (*ibid.*, *loc.cit.*). However, this evidence seems to me to have a broader significance than merely the rejection of von der Goltz solely on the basis of his favouritism towards one officer and the ensuing, alleged, dissention that arose “ . . . in the highest Ottoman military circles”. I do not find Mahmud Şevket Paşa's reasoning, and Swanson's uncritical acceptance of it,

convincing. It touches only tangentially upon the problem of control, which I hold to be central to the question.

- 124 See pp. 294ff. of this Chapter. All the more so, if we establish that the after-dinner talk took place before 2 March – the date on which the Grand *Vezir* had asserted, for the first time, at a Cabinet meeting, that it was necessary to invite a “prominent German general”. Yet on the basis of available evidence it is not possible to ascertain that it did. Therefore, I cannot pursue further the thesis that the ratification, as it were, of the “matter” by the military preceded the governmental agreement.
- 125 According to the historian, Aktepe: “Mahmud Şevket Paşa could not bring himself to believe, one way or another, that Edirne could be recovered”. M. Aktepe, *Atatürk'ün Sofya Ateşeliğine kadar İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile olan münasebetleri ve bu hususla alakalı bir belge*, p. 291, N.70.
In addition to Aktepe's evidence, which is based upon Mahmud Şevket Paşa's own writings (i.e., *Not defteri*), further evidence indicates quite clearly that this was the case. On 2 April, the Paşa officially submitted his request to the Kaiser, to place at the Empire's disposal a Prussian officer who would be able to refortify İstanbul. See: Treutler, z.Z. in *Homburg v.d.H., an das Auswärtigen Amt*, Nr.7, Homburg, 2 April 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15436, p. 195. Such a request, with which the Germans had agreed to comply once the peace had been realized,* implies that the Grand *Vezir* had no intention of recapturing Edirne. Since the frontier would then be very close to İstanbul, he appears to have thought that by fortifying the city he would be able to support himself against those young officers who still nourished the hope of recovering Edirne. Cf., the comment of Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3, p. 280.
* Treutler, z.Z. in *Homburg v.d.H., an das Auswärtigen Amt*, Nr.13, Homburg, 4 April 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15437, p. 196; and Jagow an den Treutler, Nr.7, Berlin, 5 April 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15438, p. 196.
- 126 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 31. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 69.
- 127 Reform of the major social institutions – state, religion, family, education, economy – and the way in which the upholders of the major policies – “Westernization”, Islamization, Turkification – viewed the reforms needed in these institutions, are best surveyed in: N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*, pp. 367–410.
- 128 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 83–84. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 71.
For a comprehensive and critical look at the legal and ideological acts and policies of the Committee and successive Unionist Governments, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 295–313 and pp. 314–503. Also: B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1968; esp. pp. 227–238 and *passim*.; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 133–149, for the period until 1914.
- 129 Tanin, 13 Nisan 1329 (26 April 1913). Also quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 140. (Ahmad's translation used here).
- 130 For example, cf., E.D. Akarlı, “The state as a socio-cultural phenomenon in Turkey”, pp. 135–162 in E.D. Akarlı and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political participation in Turkey: historical background and present problems*. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975; esp. p. 138 and pp. 142–143.
On the ways of state control following 1908, I have not come across a work that deals adequately with the patterns of indoctrination. However, Mardin's “Center-periphery relations” is quite helpful for understanding the state (“center” in Mardin's terminology) as a power base and the evolution of some of its institutions – an evolution in which “. . . the old Ottoman motto of

preservation of 'religion and the state' . . . emerged refurbished in the Young Turk slogan of 'Union and Progress'." Ş.A. Mardin, "Center-periphery relations: a key to Turkish politics?", pp. 7-32 in *ibid.*, p. 21.

What I mean is that the question of how the 'motto' was 'refurbished' within the Ottoman state and society still awaits a fuller treatment, despite attempts by: F. Ahmad, "The state and intervention in Turkey", *Turcica*, XVI, 1984, pp. 51-64; and M. Heper, *The state tradition in Turkey*. Beverly: Eothen Press, 1985.

- 131 *Wangenheim an das Auswärtigen Amt*, Nr.269, Konstantinopel, 17 Mai 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15303, pp. 33-35. Cf., "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913.

The German Kaiser, too, tried to convince the Russian Minister of Finance and the President of the Council of Ministers, Kokowtsoff, regarding the military mission:

"At the present period, the instructors must have the necessary power to re-educate the Turkish officers, and to drag them out of the political mire in which they are so engrossed with politics as to forget the duties of their service."

The Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Sazanoff, Confidential Letter, 8-21 November 1913, No.781, pp. 676-677, in B. de Siebert, *Entente diplomacy and the world: matrix of the history of Europe*. (Ed.) G.A. Schreiner. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921.

Cf., *Delcassé à Pichon*, Tel.Nos.707, 708, Conf., Saint-Petersburg, 24 novembre 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VIII, 3e Série, No.521, p. 659.

- 132 M. Wight, *Power politics*. (Ed.) H. Bull and C. Holbraad. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978; p. 292.
- 133 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German military mission*, p. 383. I have not been able to see all the unpublished parts of the *Not defteri* on which Swanson bases his work and have therefore used Swanson's translation here. These unpublished parts were also utilized in his Indiana University thesis (1970): G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, see p. 232. Based on: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.19 (6 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 13 May 1913. Now available is the published, edited version of the diaries, which I use as a back-up if and where necessary: Mahmud Şevket Paşa, *Sadrazâm ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut Şevket Paşa'nın günlüğü*. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988; [Hereafter, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, *Günlük*]; p. 136.
- Apparently, according to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, on 17 May the ex-Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, also suggested that "... it would be a good thing to appoint İzzet Paşa to the Iraq General Inspectorate, thereby removing him from [his position as] head of the military". Mahmud Şevket Paşa adds, "I replied that I was of the same opinion". "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913.
- 134 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 232. Based on: "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913; and "Unpublished diary", entry for 17 May 1913. Cf., Mahmud Şevket Paşa, *Günlük*, pp. 139-142, probably p. 142, where, curiously, the unpublished part used by Swanson is still missing.
- 135 *Wangenheim an das Auswärtigen Amt*, Nr.282, Konstantinopel, 22 Mai 1913, G.P., 38.Band, Nr.15440, pp. 201-202. The report is quoted extensively in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German military mission*, p. 383; and in part in Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/3, pp. 282-283.

- 136 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.20 (13 Mayıs 1965). Entry for 17 May 1913. For Wangenheim's report of this talk, see p. 321 and N.131 of this Chapter.
- 137 According to the German Ambassador's report of 26 April, from which I have already quoted, Wangenheim appears to have thought that Mahmud Şevket Paşa's "... aim was for a German-influenced army which would then provide support for continued Young Turk rule -[... der jungtürkischen Herrschaft] ...". As for the benefit which would accrue to Germany, the Ambassador was even more explicit:

"The power which is in control of the army will always be the strongest one in Turkey. There cannot be an anti-German Government if the army is controlled by us [Die Macht, welche die Armee kontrolliert, wird in der Türkei immer die stärkste sein. Es wird keiner deutschfeindlichen Regierung möglich sein, sich am Ruder zu halten, wenn die Armee von uns kontrolliert ist]."

Wangenheim an den Bethman Hollweg, Nr.125, Pera, 26 April 1913, *G.P.*, Nr.15439, pp. 196–201. (Emphasis his).

For an examination of the implications involved in the whole issue of control, as raised here, see: M.N. Turfan, *Reporting him and his cause aright: Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Liman von Sanders mission*.

- 138 The thoughts of Ahmed İzzet Paşa are found in: Ahmet Izzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 157–158. Also cf., as reported by the British Military Attaché in İstanbul: Tyrrell to Mallet, No.41, Constantinople, 2 December 1913, *B.D.*, IX/1, Enclosure in No.391, pp. 349–351.
- 139 See again the letter of Ahmed İzzet Paşa to Mahmud Şevket Paşa, dated 22 February 1913, on p. 292 and N.18 of this Chapter.
- 140 Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 157. Cf., "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.27 (1 Temmuz 1965). Entry for 1 June 1913; and "Unpublished diary", entry for 1 June 1913. Quoted in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German military mission*, p. 384. Further: Mahmud Şevket Paşa, *Günlük*, pp. 178–179.
- 141 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German military mission*, p. 384.
- 142 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.27 (1 Temmuz 1965). Entry for 2 June 1913. Also: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German military mission*, p. 384.
- 143 "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.29 (15 Temmuz 1965). Entry for 6 June 1913; and "Unpublished diary", entry for 6 June 1913. Quoted in: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the German military mission*, p. 384.
- Following the Kaiser's decision, on 15 June, General Liman von Sanders, then the Commander of the 22nd Division in Kassel, was asked by the German Military Cabinet whether he was ready and willing to go to Turkey as chief of a German military mission.* He agreed. On 30 June 1913, the head of the German Military Cabinet officially informed the Chancellor that *General-leutnant* Liman von Sanders was available as the mission chief.**
- * [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*, pp. 1–2.
- ** *Lyncker an den Bethmann Hollweg, vertraulich*, Berlin, 30 Juni 1913, *G.P.*, 38.Band, Nr.15441, pp. 202–203. For further details, see: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer militärhilfe*, pp. 127ff.
- 144 As communicated to the Sultan in "The Protocol of the Cabinet of Ministers", dated 29 Mayıs 1329 (11 June 1913). The document is reproduced in full in: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 101–102. Also cf., *Lowther to Grey*, Tel.No.528, Conf., Pera, 13 June 1913, *F.O.* 371/1826/26816.
- 145 M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1894, where the *hatt-ı hümayun*, dated 6 Receb 1331 (29 Mayıs 1329), appointing Mehmed Said Halim Paşa, "definitively [asâleten]", is reproduced in full. Also: A.F. Türkgeldi,

Görüp işittiklerim, p. 101; and, in general, R.G. Okandan, "Pozitif amme hukukumuz bakımından 1912-1920 yıllarında vukubulan olaylar", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 19:3-4, 1954, pp. 592-615.

146 For example, consider the following two comments:

"Mehmed Said Halim Paşa . . . succeeded [Mahmud] Şevket Paşa. His Cabinet was distinctly Unionist."

F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 130; and

"The Cabinet which was formed for the first time by a Unionist was the Said Halim Paşa Cabinet."

S. Akşın, "İttihat ve Terakki üzerine", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XXVI:1 (Mart) 1971, pp. 153-182, p. 174.

Also cf. the remark in a popular work on modern Turkey:

"On 11 June Mahmud Şevket was assassinated and the C[ommittee]UP availed themselves of the opportunity . . . to lay an iron hand on the administration."

G. Lewis, *Modern Turkey*. 4th ed. London: Ernest Benn, 1974; p. 59.

And, for the continuation of this misperception in a more recent, scholarly work: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, p. 141; or a specialist work on the military and "politics" of the period: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, p. 180.

147 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 130. Cf.,

". . . the assassination of Mahmud Şevket on 11 June had given the C[ommittee]UP the excuse to abolish in effect all political opposition."

G. Dyer, *The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey, 1908-1918*, p. 131. Also:

"His [Mahmud Şevket Paşa's] murder, on 11 June 1913, provided them [the Committee] - in the author's designation] with the pretext for removing the last shreds of freedom and democracy."

B. Lewis, *The emergence of modern Turkey*, p. 225.

That this kind of opinion is widespread may be inferred from the similarity of the views expressed in more popular histories: İ.H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947-1972. 5 cilt. [Hereafter, İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*]. Cilt 4, pp. 402-406; and T.Y. Öztuna, *Türkiye tarihi*. İstanbul: Hayat Yayınları, 1964-1967. 12 cilt. Cilt 12, pp. 230-233.

148 For example, I refer in particular to a paper in which certain conclusions are drawn by the author from the evaluation of the "Ottoman social response to the [Balkan] war effort", based on British Committee of Imperial Defence survey data. One of these is that:

"We are informed of the satisfactory state of discipline; the lack of any marked increase in crime; the scant impact mobilization had on the professional class of civilians; and the generally positive response to mobilization orders. With regard to Ottoman and Muslim relations with the non-Muslim and alien, the impression from almost all the reports is that the Muslims showed *both tolerance and resignation* . . ."

G.W. Swanson, "A note on the Ottoman socio-economic structure and its response to the Balkan War of 1912", *Middle Eastern studies*, 14:1 (January) 1978, pp. 116-126, p. 124. (Emphasis mine).

- 149 See pp. 297–298 and N.32–33 of this Chapter. That Mahmud Şevket Paşa was never wholly committed to the Unionists but rather threw in his lot with “Talât Bey and his friends” mainly because that was where the “young officers’ [*ufak zabitan*]” allegiance lay, was perceived by Lütfi Fikri Bey, who considered his assassination a “tragic but exemplary end”: Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, p. 102, entry for 11 June 1913.
- 150 Details of the events of 11 June 1913 are to be found in the following works: A.F. Türkğeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 99–101; Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 47–50 (cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, pp. 34–36); M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 1880–1881; İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 403–404; and M. Ragıp, *İttihad ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*. İstanbul: Akşam Kütüphanesi, 1933; pp. 11–16 and pp. 44–46. These may be viewed against a comprehensive treatment given by: C. Kutay, “Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası”, Cilt I, pp. 136–263 in C. Kutay, *Örtülü tarihimiz*. İstanbul: Hilâl Matbaası, 1975. 2 cilt. Further, for a foreigner’s impressions on “The Eleventh of June”, see: M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, pp. 127–137. Cf., an assessment in the form of a political novel: Y.K. Karaosmanoğlu, *Hüküm gecesi*. (Hazırlayan) Atilla Özkırımlı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1987; esp. pp. 276ff. Speculation, though not well followed through, along the lines of various possible conspiracies, is made by: A.T. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet devrinde ordu ve siyaset*, pp. 177–180.
- 151 *Lowther to Grey*, Tel.No.277, Conf., Constantinople, 13 June 1913, *F.O.* 424/246/161. Cf., the comments of the French Ambassador to Germany: *Cambon à Pichon, Lettre particulière*, Berlin, 13 juin 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.115, pp. 120–123.
- 152 A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 603. Cf., Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, p. 103, entry for 12 June 1913.
- 153 G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 275–311; and C. Kutay, *Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası*, pp. 136–263. Cf. the comments of: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 137–141 and pp. 428–430.
- 154 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 129. Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 48–50, for the immediate measures taken after “. . . barely half an hour had passed since the murder”. *ibid.*, p. 49 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, pp. 35–36); and also the comment of a foreign observer:
- “As it was, after the first five minutes they [“the criminals” – in the author’s designation] never had the least chance of success against a great commander such as Jemal Bey.”
- M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, p. 149. Further: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 40ff. The novelist Refik Halid’s graphic description of Cemal Bey’s iron grip on the opposition is found in his memoirs: R.H. Karay, *Minelbab ilelmihrab*. İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1964; p. 43.
- 155 Indeed, young officers like Cemal Bey had the armed forces thoroughly in hand, and the promptness of their disposition suggests a realization that if their authority were once lost there would be a universal breakdown of order. For example, during Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s visit to Yeşilköy on 2 March to talk with Enver Bey, it was decided to remove some army units to İstanbul.* Four days later, *Neue Freie Presse* (6 March 1913) reported that four brigades (?) led by Enver Bey were situated near Hadımköy. A further 2,000 men were

concentrated north of the capital.** These forces appear to have come in handy, as Cemal Bey confirms:

"[Immediately after the assassination] I got in touch in the telephone with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, İzzet Paşa, in Hadımköy [and] informed him of the event. As every precaution had already been taken, I told him to stay calm and asked him temporarily to place at my disposal two cavalry regiments which were quartered in the Davud Paşa barracks, and [also] to draw up two infantry regiments from Hadımköy to Küçükçekmece or Halkalı, as a precautionary measure. He complied with my requests."***

But to this sequence, we might add the account of Eşref Sencer (Kuşçubaşı) Bey, commander of a raider detachment attached to the Xth Army Corps situated at the Çatalca front. In his memoirs, Eşref Sencer Bey relates, in detail, how Enver Bey (still Chief of Staff of the Xth Army Corps) hastily departed for İstanbul as soon as he heard the news of the assassination, and how he too, at the head of a hand-picked detachment, moved to the capital immediately to help restore order should it become necessary.****

On the day after the assassination, our foreign observer, Pickthall, was in the vicinity:

"Walking about the streets, I found them just as usual, except that the patrols were doubled, and that here and there at points of vantage troops were picketed."*****

* "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.5 (28 Ocak 1965). Entry for 2 March 1913. Also p. 299 and N.37 of this Chapter.

** Cited in G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 281.

*** Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 49 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 36).

**** Unpublished memoirs of Eşref Sencer Bey, relating to the assassination, subsequently edited and used extensively in: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*. İstanbul: Ercan Matbaası, 1957-1962. 20 cilt. Cilt 17, pp. 9982-9989, esp. pp. 9982-9983.

***** M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, p. 141.

156 On the Liberal opposition in general, their earlier counter-moves and the measures taken against them, see pp. 298-301 and N.36-46 of this Chapter.

157 Following Kuran (author of the account considered here and who was acting as a liaison among the various opposition groups – the Liberal opposition), it is possible to suggest, as implied in my earlier discussion (pp. 298-301 of this Chapter), that the concentration by the authorities on the arrests and banishments to Bodrum of Prince Sabahaddin Bey's followers may have allowed an extremist faction to form and develop its own plot: A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 601. Also cf. his earlier work: A.B. Kuran, *İnkılâp tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*, p. 324-327. Cf., the frank comments on the incompetence and impotence of the anti-Unionist elements: Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, pp. 122-123, entries for 9 and 10 July 1913.

158 As I have pointed out (see pp. 301-302 and N.55 of this Chapter), the Great Powers' peace preliminaries were jointly presented in İstanbul on 31 March. While the Ottoman Government immediately accepted the conditions for peace set by the ambassadors, the Balkan allies waited until 5 April to answer, though the joint statement had been presented in their capitals on 22 March. The Powers, in mid-April, submitted a second joint note. Again there was

delay, and it was on 20 May that the delegates reassembled in London and began to discuss the English-French draft.

"Despite the advice of all the Great Powers the peace delegates continued to delay about coming to an agreement. Bulgaria and Turkey were ready to sign; the others were not . . . [Finally] on May 27th [British Foreign Secretary] Grey, who was getting impatient over all the haggling, received all the chief delegates (except the Montenegrins) individually at the foreign office. In plain words he told each one that the powers wanted the peace preliminaries signed . . . If they did not intend to sign, they might just as well leave London. The ultimatum, 'sign or leave', had a salutary effect . . . and on May 30th, 1913, the preliminaries of peace were signed."

E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, pp. 327-331. The quotation is taken from pp. 329-331.

Cf., for example, *Grey to Cartwright*, No.116, Foreign Office, 26 May 1913, *F.O.* 424/245/473.

For a summary of the Treaty, see: E.C. Helmreich, *op.cit.*, p. 331. In addition, the Ottoman Government left the settlement of the Aegean islands and the Albanian boundaries to the Great Powers. The full text of the Treaty is found in: *B.D.*, IX/2, Appendix III, Protocole No.11, "Séance du 17 (30) mai 1913", pp. 1047-1051. Also see: The Minutes of the "Conférence de Saint-James (Londres)", *F.O.* 424/245/531. Further: H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, pp. 25-26, for the immediate implications of the Treaty. And cf., A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, pp. 248-249.

The "willingness" of the Ottoman Government to sign the Treaty is best analyzed in: Y.H.Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 309-314.

- 159 Quoted from the "Proceedings of the Court Martial", summarized mostly, and reproduced in part, in: C. Kutay, *Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası*, Cilt I, pp. 151-171, pp. 219-222 and pp. 225-240; see p. 227.

On Çerkes Kâzım Bey, information is found in: *ibid.*, *loc.cit.*; and G. Vardar, *İttihat ve Terakki içinde dönenler*. (Yazan) S.N. Tansu. İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1960; pp. 174-177. According to Swanson, whose assessment is based on the above work, "Çerkes Kâzım . . . had personal motivations for participating in the plot." G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 303. He was, in the words of Cemal Bey, ". . . the leader of the murderers". Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 51 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 38). Further, see: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1238-1239; M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 70-72; and Lütü Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, pp. 102-110, entries for 11-21 June 1913.

- 160 Quoted from the "Proceedings of the Court Martial", in: C. Kutay, *Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası*, Cilt I, p. 219 (the original page is reproduced in facsimile). Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 51-52 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 38); and M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 74ff.

- 161 Quoted from the "Proceedings of the Court Martial", in: C. Kutay, *Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası*, Cilt I, p. 233, where some information is also found on Topal Tefvik himself.

Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 48-49. (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 35). Also, a rather negative opinion of Topal Tefvik's calibre by Hasan Vasfı Bey, in: H. Amca, *Doğmayan hürriyet: bir devrin içyüzü 1908-1918*. 2. baskı. İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1989; pp. 25-26.

- 162 The declaration is reproduced in: Ziya Şakır [Soko], *Mahmut Şevket Paşa*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1944; p. 225. Cf.,

"Indeed, the overweening confidence of the conspirators – without the least foundation, as it proved – is, psychologically, the most curious feature of the whole affair. For example, they sent notice to the foreign embassies that there would be a change of government on such a day . . ."

M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, p. 146.

- 163 See: İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 404. Also, the almost complete list (totaling c.322 opponents plus about 200 others) in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 347–350. But cf., "La liste des Déportés", transmitted by "Communiqué par le gouverneur militaire de Constantinople . . ." included as a press cutting in: *Lowther to Grey*, No.547, Pera, 19 June 1913, *F.O.* 195/2451. Further: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 103; and A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, p. 603. Also see the comments of Cemal Bey on the arrests: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 49–50 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 36). Cf., Lütfi Fikri Bey's railings against the Unionists over the internal exile: Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, pp. 107–108, entry for 18 June 1913.
- 164 On *Damad Salih Paşa's* opposition, see p. 299 and N.38 of this Chapter. Also see: Ziya Şakir [Soko], *Mahmut Şevket Paşa*, esp. pp. 197–200. On his trial and conviction, information is obtained from the following: C. Kutay, *Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası*, Cilt I, pp. 164–165, p. 168 and pp. 241–245; A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 103–105; Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 53–56 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, pp. 39–42); and Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, p. 111, entry for 24 June 1913.
- 165 C. Kutay, *Bir siyasi cinayetin ibret mirası*, Cilt I, p. 163, quoting the comment of a well-known jurist, Ali Vasfi Bey; the initial list of the convicted is found on pp. 168–171; and some details of further convictions on p. 172. Also see: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 76–80. Cf., İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 404–405. Also: G.W. Swanson, *Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the defense of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 307–311; and, for a shorter version, F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 130.
Years later, while in exile, Talât Paşa was to charge that, owing to international political intrigue against the Unionists and all they stood for, ". . . the plan to assassinate Mahmud Şevket Paşa was prepared outside the country and accomplices found within". Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 799.
- 166 The document is reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 322–323.
To Danişmend, with his anti-Unionist bias, this move was in imitation of the "loi des suspects [17 September 1793]" of the French Revolution: İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, p. 405.
For the sheer extent of the subsequent regulation of political life by the Unionist Government over the next couple of years, see the documentary source in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 373–375.
- 167 The best evidence is found in: A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 100–101; and C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1226. Cf., the comments in: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 57 (Djemal Paşa, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 39).
- 168 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 318–319; and A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve millî mücadele*, pp. 603–604, which confirms Bayur without reservation. Whereas, see: T. Çavdar, *Talât Paşa: bir örgüt ustasının yaşam öyküsü*. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1984; p. 288. Cf. the following:
"But though the vacant posts were filled but slowly, I saw no signs of fear or weakness in the Government."
M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, p. 143. (Emphasis mine).
- 169 Entry in his diary for 29 Haziran 1329 (12 July 1913) in: Cavit Bey, "Hâtıraları",

Tanin, 28 Mayıs 1944, Sa.268, and 29 Mayıs 1944, Sa.269. This is entirely plausible in view of Ahmed İzzet Paşa's unwillingness to become Minister of War: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 150-151.

170 Note, in this connection, Dyer, who states that:

"Shortly after the Şarköy [Şarköy] affair Talat brought Fethi to Istanbul on 16 March 1913, and had him appointed to the Central Committee and the General Secretariat of the C[ommittee]UP. His motive almost certainly was to seek a counter-balance to the monster he had created by allowing Enver to lead the assault on the Sublime Porte, and to receive a measure of control over affairs for the civilian wing of the CUP, by supporting another young officer with a following of sorts. Fethi now resigned from the army . . ."

G. Dyer, *The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey, 1908-18*, p. 131.

I think Dyer is probably right about the case, of which the counter-balance aspect is stressed differently in an earlier study by Bayur: Y.H. Bayur, *Atatürk: hayatı ve eseri*, I - Doğumundan Samsun'a çıkışına kadar. Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1963; pp. 55-56. But I am sceptical as to Dyer's use of the term "allowing" for, as I have argued, Talât Bey was not, strictly speaking, in a position to allow or not to allow Enver Bey; he was only in the position, by allying himself with the young officers, of reaping the fruits along with them of Enver Bey's leading ". . . the assault of the Sublime Porte". Secondly, since Staff-Major Fethi Bey had to resign from active service in order to become a member of any political association (e.g., the Committee), Dyer's argument that Talât Bey was supporting another ". . . young officer with a following of sorts" is misleading. After his resignation, Fethi Bey, however "young", was no longer a serving officer but a retired officer with correspondingly no place in the chain of command - even though he had been the head of a raider detachment employed at the Çatalca front. He became a civilian or, rather, a Unionist politician. Hence, his being sought as a counter-balance to Enver Bey was bound to have a limited effect, as indeed Dyer subsequently admits:

"Though Talat secured a superficial success, it was of no use against the fact that the balance of power within [?] the CUP had swung strongly in favour of the young staff officers after the 1913 coup . . ."

G. Dyer, *op.cit.*, p. 131 and also p. 132.

Cf., the comments of Bayur, *op.cit.*, pp. 56-58.

Ali Fethi Bey's own comments on this issue shed little light. He gives the impression that if there were any counter-balancing, it would in his view be counter-balancing of the opposition: F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*, pp. 148-149.

171 *Elliot to Grey*, Tel.No.106, Athens, 30 June 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1095, p. 875. Further, the overall appreciation by Schurman: *The American Minister to Greece to the Secretary of State*, No.107 [Extract], American Legation, Athens, 10 July 1913, *F.R.U.S.*, 1913, pp. 78-81. Also see: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, p. 363, and also pp. 341-367 for "The rupture of the Balkan League"; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 394, and also pp. 385-399 for a general assessment of the political situation. Also cf., H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, pp. 27-31; and I.E. Gueshoff, *Le genèse de la guerre mondiale: la débâcle de l'alliance balkanique*, pp. 158ff.

172 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 252. The term "War of Coalition" is also designated by the author on p. 252.

- 173 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 271; and E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 381. Also: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 400ff. On the military aspects of the “Wars of Partition”, a work by Lt.Colonel Breveté Boucabeille is particularly useful: B.P.L. Boucabeille, *Le guerre interbalkanique: évènements militaires et politiques survenu dans la Peninsule des Balkans jusqu’en octobre 1913*. Paris: [n.pub.], 1913.
- 174 *Boppe à Pichon*, Tel.No.315, Thérapia, 6 juillet 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.295, p. 318. But cf. the comments of the British Chargé d’Affaires:
- “In spite of secrecy observed there is some reason to believe that Turkish force has already begun to move out from Tchatalja with the object of occupying Chorlu . . . up to the Enos-Midia line.”
- Marling to Grey*, No.321, Constantinople, 7 July 1913, *F.O.* 371/1834/30929. Lütfi Fikri Bey seems to have picked up a similar rumour, which pleased him as being advantageous to the Government’s domestic policy as well as a “divertissement” for the public: Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, p. 120, entry for 6 July 1913.
- 175 Cited in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 407. However, cf., F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 131.
- 176 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 400–401. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 407, which quotes, to the same effect, from the reports that the Porte sent to her ambassadors. In fact, the military preparations for this eventuality had been under way since as early as the beginning of June, with an eye to the inherent fragility of the Balkan alliances. H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 384–388.
- One more piece of evidence comes from Talât Bey himself who records receiving, on Friday 20 June 1913, a specially-delivered, highly confidential report from the Ottoman Ambassador in Berlin, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, indicating how the Government might utilize the opportunity of the impending rupture of the Balkan coalition, of which he had heard from very trusted sources, towards the recovery of Edirne. Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, p. 813.
- 177 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 380 and pp. 381–382. Also: A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 271. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 408–409.
- 178 Cited in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 412.
- Also see: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, p. 389, for the actual sequence of events surrounding the Cabinet resolution. Cf., *Marling to Grey*, Tel.No.334, Conf., Constantinople, 13 July 1913, *F.O.* 371/1834/32368; and F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 132.
- 179 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 132. Further:
- “Press in general urging strongly that advantage should be taken of present situation to improve on frontier agreed on in London, and even that attempt should be made to retake Adrianople.”
- Marling to Grey*, Tel.No.336, Conf., Constantinople, 14 July 1913, *F.O.* 371/1834/32474.
- The position of Ahmed İzzet Paşa vis-à-vis the military and the Cabinet can be observed from the documents reproduced in part in: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 389–390. Cf. the Paşa’s own account: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 151–153.
- 180 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 418, citing a report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 17 July 1913. Also: T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya’da millî mücadele*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VII.Seri-Sa.25a. Ankara: T.T.K.

Basımevi, 1955–1956. 2 cilt. Cilt I, p. 67; and H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 390–402, for the operational details.

- 181 According to Ali Fuad Bey, “Talât Bey prompted this move [Bu harekete Talât Bey önyak oldu].” A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 106.

Cf., “One morning in July . . .”, the day before he left İstanbul for England, Pickthall went to

“ . . . Stanboul [i.e., the City] in order to keep an appointment which a friend had kindly made for . . . [him] to see the Minister of the Interior at eleven o’clock [at the Sublime Porte] . . . [Pickthall narrates] He [Talât Bey] told me that the Turkish army was advancing on the Enos-Midia line, *no further*, and, after some general conversation on the subject of Bulgaria’s plight, I took my leave.”

M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, p. 213. (Emphasis mine).

Also cf., M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, esp. p. 135. All this is corroborated by the evidence given in: H. Mentеше, *Anıları*, pp. 163–164.

- 182 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 59. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 47.

- 183 The Government’s position is best followed in: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 402–404. Two supporting examples may be given here. On the very day on which the Ottoman Cabinet resolution was passed, 13 July, the British Ambassador to Bulgaria reported that “. . . the Turkish army is advancing slowly northward with the intention of retaking Adrianople”. He was making this report, he added, at the request of the Bulgarians in order

“ . . . to bring this to the notice of H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] with the view to their advising the Ottoman Government to confine themselves within the limits of the preliminary treaty signed at London.”

Further, a Minute relating to this despatch read:

“We might ask views of the Powers as to addressing the Porte, [A.N.] saying that to avoid further complications it seems reasonable to deprecate any advance beyond Enos-Midia line. [E.G.]”

Bax-Ironside to Grey, No.273, Sofia, 13 July 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1139, p. 907. Cf., the information in: H. Mentеше, *Anıları*, pp. 163–164.

As for the financial situation, Bayur states that the civil servants and officers had not been paid for the last three months. However, it should be noted that the Said Halim Paşa Government managed to obtain, on 10 July, the sum of 100,000 gold lira from the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt (*Düyun-u Umumiye*).* A further 100,000 gold lira were acquired on the 19th, to be followed by 500,000 on 8 August, making a total of 700,000 gold lira. Other sources included, for instance, in return for the extension of the Tobacco Régie’s concession, the sums of 300,000 gold lira on 20 July and 700,000 on 5 August. Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 416–417.

Among figures relating to the Ottoman Public Debt, that for July is given as 214,000 gold lira by Parvus Efendi in a contemporary article, reproduced in: Parvus Efendi, *Türkiye’nin mali tutsaklığı*. (Hazırlayan) M. Sencer. İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1977; p. 65. See pp. 55–67 for a general assessment and enumeration of the Ottoman debt. In addition, *Bax-Ironside to Grey*, No.273, Sofia, 13 July 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1139, p. 907; *Boppe à Pichon*, Tel.No.366, Thérapia, 21 juillet 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.437, p. 469; and, in this connection, *Bertie to Grey*, No.277, Conf., Paris, 29 May 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1016, pp. 823–824. Cf., A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, pp. 328–329, N.2.

Also, on the general settlement of the money question by Talât Bey with the Director-General of the Régie, M. Weil: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 58 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 46); and H. Menteşe, *op.cit.*, pp. 164–165.

Yet, despite the temporary relief afforded by this settlement, pay arrears were to continue – as attested by the British Military Attaché:

“... officers are suffering acutely from want of money. Their pay was three months in arrears on the 1st (14th) November, and that of the men five months.”

Tyrrell to Mallet, No.44, Constantinople, 6 December 1913, “Enclosure” in *Mallet to Grey*, No.1030, Constantinople, 24 December 19013, *F.O.* 421/286/247.

* On the Ottoman Public Debt see, for example: D.C. Blaisdell, *European financial control in the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929.

- 184 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 59; and cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 46. Also, for the same gist but with slightly different wording: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 163–164. Further: T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya’da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 68; and H. Süer, *Balkan Harbî*, II/2–2, pp. 402–404. Cf. Ahmed İzzet Paşa’s own defense: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 153.

- 185 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 59; and cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, pp. 45–46.

Also cf., A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 106, where the names of the other proponents and opponents of the policy of recovering Edirne are given. Also see: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 151–152. In addition: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p. 163. Further: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 136ff.

For example, on the attitude of Osman Nizami Paşa, see: *Grey to Paget*, No.34, Foreign Office, 24 May 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1006, pp. 817–818. Cf. the comments of a former Russian ambassador: A. Nekludoff, *Diplomatic reminiscences: before and during the World War, 1911–1917*. (Trans.) A. Paget. 2nd ed. London: John Murray, 1920; pp. 180–181.

- 186 *Granville to Grey*, Tel.No.111, Conf., Berlin, 16 July 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1148, p. 914. (Emphasis mine).

Apparently the German Ambassador to the Porte, Wangenheim, invited Ali Haydar Bey to the Embassy at Tarabya and told him, in no uncertain terms, to discourage particularly Enver and Talât Beys from attempting to recapture Edirne. A.H. Mithat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872–1946*. İstanbul: Mithat Akçit Yayını, 1946; pp. 250–251.

Just over a month before, on 10 June, Mahmud Şevket Paşa had indulged in speculation with the Austrian Ambassador, Pallavicini, about the outbreak of war among the Balkan allies that they both foresaw. When Pallavicini questioned Mahmud Şevket Paşa as to his policy in such an event,

“I said, ‘I personally would like to remain neutral, but I cannot restrain the army [ordu]. The army is of the opinion that in this war Turkey lost very much territory unfairly and was cheated by the Great Powers.’”

“Not defteri”, *Hayat*, Sa.31 (29 Temmuz 1965). Entry for 10 June 1913.

The general tenor of Enver Bey’s letters to his German woman friend, from 2 April through the Armistice to 7 July, vindicates Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s opinion: M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, pp. 236–245.

In reply to the Ottoman Government’s circular of 13th instance, asking for its ambassadors’ views regarding its stand over the resumption of the places

belonging to the Empire, the previously "hawkish" Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, Ambassador to Germany, gave, on the 15th, as his personal opinion, that

"... by crossing the Enos-Midia line we would be making a mistake. The German Government appears favourable towards us, yet is obliged to remain impartial."

Quoted in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2. p. 414. Cf., *ibid.*, p. 403 and p. 413.

Pickthall, having just visited Talât Bey (See N.181 above),

"... then went on to call upon another Minister [whose name is not given] ... When I said that I had just heard that the army was advancing to the Enos-Midia line he gave a shrug and hinted that the army, once in motion, would not easily be stopped, at any rate by orders from Istanbul."

M. Pickthall, *With the Turk in wartime*, p. 213.

- 187 Acting-Military Attaché Cooper to Marling, Constantinople, 25 July 1913; "Enclosure" in *Marling to Grey*, No.664, Conf., Constantinople, 26 July 1913, F.O. 371/1834/35300. (Emphasis mine).

In fact, see: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, p. 404, for the still hesitant Ottoman official position. Also see: *Buchanan to Grey*, Tel.No.268, St. Petersburg, 18 July 1913, B.D., IX/2, No.1160, and esp. "Minutes" and N.3, pp. 920-921. Cf., *Boppe à Pichon*, Tel.Nos.356, 357, *Thérapias*, 18 juillet 1913, D.D.F., Tome VII, 3e Série, No.415, pp. 449-450.

Such locations as Çerkezköy or the position of the Enos-Midia line, together with the other place-names, may best be observed in the maps and sketches provided in: T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt II, Harita I, Kroki 1 and Kroki 2 at the end of the volume; H. Süer, *op.cit.*, Kroki 50ff. at the end of the volume; and Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, Harita I, Harita II and Harita III facing p. 448, p. 464 and p. 480 respectively. Also see: *Map 7: Skeleton map of South East Europe*, scale 1-1,500,000 (showing historical boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula); and "Table (8) of treaties affecting Balkan boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula", in *Maps of the Balkan Peninsula*. Handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the [British] Foreign Office. Confidential, No.15, April, 1919.

- 188 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 325; also see pp. 319-331, where the economic effect of the Balkan War on the Ottoman Empire is examined with clarity.

Mahmud Şevket Paşa, at the end of May, estimated that 100,000 Ottoman soldiers were prisoners in Greece and Serbia and 60,000 in Bulgaria, while 40,000 remained in Albania. "Not defteri", *Hayat*, Sa.26 (24 Haziran 1965). Entry for 29 May 1913.

Cf., A Diplomatist, who noted:

"Dividing the War of Coalition into the two phases of a) the great field operations in Thrace and Macedonia, and b) the secondary siege operations of Tchataldja with Gallipoli, Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari, we find that in the first phase the whole Turkish line of defence, men and material, had been practically annihilated as a fighting factor, and two thirds of it destroyed as an economic factor. The entire destruction as a fighting force in the field of two eastern and western armies of Thrace, and of the two northern and southern armies of Macedonia, *the temporary loss of some 200,000 prisoners*, and the total loss by death or disablement, mostly from disease and desertion, of as many more, would have exhausted the fighting energies of most European States. But in the few weeks' armistice, during

the Conference of London, the army of Tchataldja was raised from the leavings of the Thracian armies and fresh Asiatic levies to a strength of some 150,000, while the army of Gallipoli, another new Asiatic force of over 50,000 men, was entrenched on the other bridge head leading from Asia. Within two months the two lost armies of Thrace had thus been reconstructed and re-equipped. Though the men were drawn from remoter and less warlike races . . . or from the less efficient ranks of the Turks, and though there was not quite so much modern machinery or equipment, yet this second line was almost as efficient as the first, and was far more effectively used."

A Diplomatist, *op.cit.*, pp. 326-327, N.2. (Emphasis mine).

According to a recent calculation, the Empire ". . . had lost 83 per-cent of its land and 69 per-cent of its people in Rumelia as a result of the two Balkan Wars". S.J. Shaw, "Ottoman population movements during the last years of the Empire, 1885-1914: some preliminary remarks", *Osmanlı araştırmaları*, I, 1980, pp. 191-205, p. 192.

189

". . .

Tuttu Garbi öç korkusu
Yürü! Yürü! Türk Ordusu!

Ey Avrupa, bu belâdan
Sen nereye kaçacaksın?
Bir İkinci Attila'dan
Çok gözyaşı saçacaksın.

". . ."

"Yeni Attila" appeared in *Halka doğru*, Sa.13, 4 Temmuz 1329 (17 July 1913). Reproduced in: Z. Gökalp, *Şiirler ve halk masalları*; (Araştıran ve hazırlayan) F.A. Tansel; pp. 62-64, pp. 63-64.

Significantly, according to Gökalp's footnote, the poem was ". . . written as a march for Türk Gücü", *ibid.*, p. 62. *Türk Gücü* (Turkish Strength) was a youth society which was attached to *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth)* and was founded on 14 March 1913 in İstanbul.

* See Chapter 3, N.186 of this work.

The earliest source of information to have appeared, to my knowledge, on *Türk Gücü* is: F.A. Tansel, "Türk Gücü Derneği", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi araştırma dergisi*, Ahmed Caferoğlu özel sayısı, I:10, 1979, pp. 1-18. Also, her later piece: F.A. Tansel, "Memleketimizde gençler için kurulan ilk dernekler, gazete ve dergiler (1913-1920)", *Belleten*, LI:199 (Nisan) 1987, pp. 281-304, esp. pp. 281-292. Further: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, pp. 458-459 and pp. 461-465, and *ibid.*, Cilt 3, pp. 296-297. A day later, the "liberal" Lütfi Fikri Bey was venting his anger against "Europe"'s view of the Ottoman desire to reclaim Edirne as "scandaleux". Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, p. 129, entry for 18 July 1913.

190 *Stancioff à Pichon*, Lettre, Paris, 16 juillet 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.380, and esp. "Annexe", pp. 422-423. For the precise military details, see: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, p. 408.

191 His "Minute", dated 17 July 1913, in: *Buchanan to Grey*, Tel.No.264, St. Petersburg, 16 July 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1152, p. 916.

For the precise military details of the position of the Bolayır Army and Çatalca Army [Group] behind the Enos-Midia line and the various unofficial forays across it by certain units of the Çatalca [Group]'s left flank as of 16 July, before being pulled back by the still cautious Ottoman Government and High Command, see: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2-2, pp. 404-405.

- 192 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 59. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 47.

The Note, communicated to the Great Powers through the Ottoman embassies, is reproduced in part in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 424; and, for example, in: "Anlage", dated "Berlin le 21 juillet 1913", *G.P.*, 35.Band, Nr.13560, pp. 184–185. Also see: Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, pp. 425–431, for the immediate negative responses of the Powers, as communicated to the Ottoman Government by its ambassadors in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg and Vienna. Cf., for example: *Cambon à Pichon*, Dépêche No.418, *Absolument secret*, Londres, 21 juillet 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.436, pp. 471–473; and "ED.NOTE" in *B.D.*, IX/2, p. 923.

- 193 A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 106.

"... [He] brought it one afternoon to the Palace on his own. [Then, Ali Fuad Bey continued.] I was on my way home by carriage when he turned me around and took me back with him to the Palace. Entering the royal presence, he managed to obtain the imperial permission [müsaade-i seniyye]. And I completed the official procedure and returned the protocol to him."

ibid., *loc.cit.*

On the details of the Government's prevarication from 17/18 July up to its decision on 20 July, the best source is: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 407–410.

- 194 M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 142–144.

However, Cemal Bey [Paşa], in his *Hâtıralar*, denied this, saying:

"... there was no sign of force or pressure ... I confined myself to giving my opinions on other colleagues' duties through expressing my friendly wishes and conversation of this kind, in a manner that would not annoy or be interpreted as unnecessary interference."

Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 59. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 47.

Still, T. Bıyıkkoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 68, uses the word "pressure" (*baskı*).

- 195 Noted by (Brigadier-General) Halil Sedes Paşa whose written observations on Ahmed İzzet Paşa appear in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, pp. 2021–2028; see p. 2025. For the circumstantial evidence: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 406–407. For Ahmed İzzet Paşa's own, more moderate, version of this telephone call, see: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 153.

The commander of a volunteer raider detachment, Eşref Sencer Bey, in his account of events, confirms two other telephone conversations by Enver Bey with Ahmed İzzet Paşa. See, for example, a fragment of his account reproduced in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1256; C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, pp. 10010ff.; and M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 140ff.

For the sake of historical accuracy, it should be noted that Eşref Sencer Bey had the honour of actually entering Edirne first, just before Enver Bey's official entry, on the morning of 22 July. See: H. Süer, *op.cit.*, pp. 418–419.

- 196 Details in: H. Süer, *Balkan Harbi*, II/2–2, pp. 416–419 and pp. 445–449. Cf., T. Bıyıkkoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 70, where 23 July is taken as the date of the effective occupation of Edirne. Further, *Panafieu à Pichon*, Tel.s.n., Sofia, 21 juillet 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.429, p. 463: "Andrinople a été réoccupé aujourd'hui par les turcs après combat peu important." Cf., Eşref Sencer Bey's detailed account in: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 17, pp. 10011–10014; and C. Bayar,

Ben de yazdım, Cilt 4, pp. 1267–1268. Further: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 425; and H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, p. 45 and N.45 on p. 390.

- 197 Cf., for example, the comments of the then Staff-Major İsmet Bey (First Section, Çatalca Headquarters): “The excitement and longing almost of a fresh campaign had penetrated the whole army.” İ. İnönü, *Hâtıralarım*, p. 119.

- 198 A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 106.

In fact, Lütfi Fikri Bey reckoned that the publicity in the press was deliberately delayed a day, until 23 July, in order to coincide with the anniversary of the restoration of the Constitution. Lütfi Fikri Bey, *Günlüğü*, pp. 130–131, entries for 22 and 23 July 1913. Cf., “Just at this moment even the smallest success was creating the greatest joy”. C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, p. 1268. Similar sentiments are found in: Talât Paşa, *Talât Paşa'nın hâtıraları*. 2. basılış. İstanbul: Bolayır Yayınevi, 1958; p. 17. As for the sentiments expressed across the Turkish world from Azerbaijan to Chinese Turkestan, see: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, p. 464 and N.17, and the sources there.

- 199 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 132.

- 200 A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 106.

Or, as a contemporary journalist put it:

“The sweeping defeat of Turkey in Macedonia had proved to all Turks that, in spite of the sop to their pride in regaining Edirne, something was wrong with their system. The air was full of self-criticism.”

A.E. Yalman, *Turkey in my time*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956; p. 32.

- 201 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 431ff.; and E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 401. Cf., T. Biyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 70.

- 202 F.R. Atay, *Zeytindağı*. İlaveli 3ncü tabı. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1943; pp. 24–25. According to an earlier assertion by Kâmil Paşa, the “fault” lay with the Powers:

“A fortnight ago, he had told . . . [a correspondent of *The Daily Mail* of London], ‘the Powers were warning the Balkan states that no territorial aggrandisement would be permitted them as a result of war. Yet now when we look to the Great Powers to stop the advance of the Bulgarians . . . we find that they have forgotten their intention to preserve the status quo. The only counsel they give us is to submit and accept the consequences of our defeat.’”

G.W. Price, *Extra-special correspondent*. London: George G. Harrap, 1957; p. 56.

For a French interpretation of Prince Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi's visit to Edirne, see: *Cambon à Pichon*, Tel.No.393, Berlin, 5 août 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.541, p. 582.

- 203 For example, in London the ambassadors, at one of their conferences, discussed in the 25 July sitting as the first matter, “. . . the question of bringing pressure to bear on Turkey”, according to the report of Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Britain; and he added:

“The following resolution was thereupon passed:

. . .

The Powers are unanimous in the opinion that it is essential to emphasize the necessity of the maintenance of the stipulation laid down in the Treaty of London and that the Turco-Bulgarian frontier should be a line stretching from Enos and ending in Midia.

On the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, the assembly is of opinion that the Powers, by a unanimous resolution, should remind the Ottoman Government to adhere to the terms of the Treaty of London and especially to the stipulation with regard to the Enos-Midia line . . .”

K.M. Lichnowsky, *Heading for the abyss: reminiscences*. (Trans.) S. Delmer. London: Constable, 1928; pp. 216–217.

Indeed cf., *Grey to Carnegie*, No.464, Foreign Office, 23 July 1913, *F.O.* 424/247/532; *Bertie to Grey*, Tel.No.101, Paris, 26 July 1913, *F.O.* 424/247/619; and *Grey to Rodd*, No.192, Foreign Office, 28 July 1913, *F.O.* 424/247/659.

204 *Wangenheim as das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.418, Konstaninopel, 28 Juli 1913, *G.P.*, 35.Band, Nr.13613, pp. 228–229; and *Jagow an den Lichnowsky*, Nr.400, Berlin, 2 August 1913, *G.P.* 36.Band, Erste Hälfte [Hereafter, 36.Band/1], Nr.13754, p. 3.

205 *Stamboul*, 4 August 1913. Quoted in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 132–133. (Ahmad's translation).

206 *Wangenheim as das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.418, Konstantinopel, 28 Juli 1913, *G.P.*, 35.Band, Nr.13613, pp. 228–229.

207 Grey to Bertie, 31 July 1913, *F.O.* 800/180 in: *Bertie papers*, *F.O.* 800/160–191.

Also see: *Cambon à Pichon*, “*Dépêche No.418*”, *Absolument secret*, Londres, 21 juillet 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.436, pp. 471–473. And cf., T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 70.

208 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 401; also see pp. 401–403, where these schemes are able summarized.

Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 442–450, where these schemes are retold with many a look from the Ottoman documents. Further: C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, *The mirage of power: British foreign policy, 1902–1922*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972. 3 vols. Vol.1, esp. pp. 117–118, on the Powers' “. . . bickering what to do about Turkey”. Also: R.J. Crampton, “The Balkans, 1909–1914”, pp. 256–270 in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), *British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; p. 265.

209 Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 443.

210 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 403. Cf., F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 133.

211 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 403, citing the published German (*G.P.*) and French (*D.D.F.*) documents.

Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 448; also pp. 448–450, where the text of the Ottoman memorandum, actually dated 5 August (not 6 August as implied in Helmreich, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*) and the individual responses of the Powers as communicated to the Ottoman ambassadors, especially in Paris, St. Petersburg and Vienna, are given. As to the Ottoman Government's answer, on 11 August, to the collective *démarche*, also see: Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, pp. 450–451.

212 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 133.

213 Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 448. The other main reason given by the Government was the fear of Bulgarian reprisals against the local populace. See: *ibid.*, *loc.cit.*

214 Cf. the comments of: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 451.

215 For the reports, see especially: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 448–452. On the other hand, as an example, it may be of some interest to note from a report by the German Ambassador to Britain to the Imperial

Chancellor, dated 8 August 1913 – the day after the presentation of the collective *démarche* at the Porte, that:

“The Minister [Sir Edward Grey] has let the Turks know that if they keep quiet in Adrianople and make no further advance on Bulgarian territory the question of the concessions to be granted to them in the evacuation of the town will be solved as favourably for them as possible.”

K.M. Lichnowsky, *Heading for the abyss*, pp. 264–265.

- 216 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 391.

Cf., for example, the comments of the then Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the lack of joint action by the Great Powers: S. Sazanov, *Fateful years, 1909–1916: the reminiscences of Serge Sazanov*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1928; esp. pp. 99–101; with *Buchanan to Grey*, No.253, St. Petersburg, 19 August 1913, *F.O. 424/248/416*.

- 217 A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 272.

Also cf. the opinion of a Bulgarian writer on the ending of the war as being “. . . a national catastrophe”. B. Boev, “Alexander Stambolijski – a remarkable son of the Bulgarian people”, *Etudes balkaniques*, 1979, No.2, pp. 3–16, esp. p. 9. In addition: S. Damjanov, “La France et la Bulgarie à l’époque des Guerres Balkaniques (1912–1913)”, *Etudes balkaniques*, 1971, No.2, pp. 18–46. Further: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 380–389. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 453–472. A convenient summary is found in: H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, pp. 31–33.

- 218 Cited in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 475. Yet the likelihood of the Powers being able to maintain anything like a united approach, in view of their own national interests, was steadily decreasing: R.J. Crampton, “The decline of the Concert of Europe in the Balkans, 1913–1914”, *The Slavonic and East European review*, LII:128, 1974, pp. 393–419, esp. pp. 415ff.

- 219 See pp. 347–348 and N.248 of this Chapter.

- 220 T. Biyıkloğlu, *Trakya’da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 73.

- 221 The details of the raid and its immediate military consequences are found in: T. Biyıkloğlu, *Trakya’da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, pp. 73–74. Biyıkloğlu also reproduces the “open order”, dated 15 August, of “Lieutenant-Colonel Enver” that whichever military units the *çetes* applied to should supply them with food and ammunition. *ibid.*, Cilt II, Vesika Sa.9, p. 23.

- 222 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 61. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesmen*, p. 49. Meanwhile, however, Ahmet İzzet Paşa’s timidity and caution continued unabated: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 154.

- 223 H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, p. 33.

Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 476–480, esp. p. 482. Also: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 405–406.

- 224 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 405, who also cites *Radowitz an das Auswärtige Amt*, Nr.306, Paris, 21 August 1913, *G.P.*, 36.Band/1, Nr.13793, pp. 39–40. Further see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 479–480.

- 225 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 405.

Cf., for example: *Boppe à Pichon*, Tel.No.394, Thérapia, 3 août 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.530, pp. 571–572; *Panafeü à Pichon*, Tel.No.270, Sofia, 5 août 1913, *D.D.F.*, Tome VII, 3e Série, No.544, p. 584; and N.2 in *D.D.F.*, Tome VIII, 3e Série, p. 97. Also see: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 63; and B. Samardžiev, “Great Britain and certain aspects of Turkish-Bulgarian political relations, 1899–1903”, *Etudes balkaniques*, 1983, No.3, pp. 19–39, esp. p. 36.

- 226 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 409. Cf., A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, p. 276.
- 227 Here, conclusions have been reached on the basis of my reading of: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 409ff.; A Diplomatist, *Nationalism and war in the Near East*, pp. 275–277; and Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 63–68. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, p. 490. Also: T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya’da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, pp. 83–85; A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, pp. 109–110; and B.N. Şimşir, *Ege sorunu: belgeler*, Cilt II, esp., for example, Belge Nos. 104 and 108, p. 106 and pp. 108–109 respectively.
- 228 E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, p. 410.
- 229 H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, p. 33. Also: E.C. Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, pp. 410ff. For details, with additional comments, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 486–490; and *ibid.*, II/4, pp. 540ff.
- 230 *Marling to Grey*, No.836, Constantinople, 2 October 1913, *B.D.*, IX/2, No.1259, pp. 1002–1004.

For Hogarth, in a contemporary contribution, the

“... recovery of eastern Thrace with Adrianople, the first European seat of the Osmanlis, had almost effaced the sense of Osmanli disgrace, and stood to the general credit of the Committee and the individual credit of its military leader, Enver Bey.”

D.G. Hogarth, “Turkey”, pp. 319–386 in N. Forbes, A.J. Toynbee, D. Mitrany and D.G. Hogarth, *The Balkans: a history of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915; pp. 371–372.

- 231 M. Sykes, *The Caliphs’ last heritage: a short history of the Turkish Empire*. London: Macmillan, 1915; p. 537.

It seems to me a sufficiently ‘weighty’ remark in view of the insights it offers, despite the opinion of his reviewer that:

“His contempt for the Young Turks and their precious panacea of Liberty ... is expressed in language which would carry more weight if it were less emphatic.”

The Times literary supplement, November 18, 1915, No.722, p. 411.

To my mind, Sir Mark’s comments should be read in the light of Kedourie’s assessment of him: E. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*. 2nd ed. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978; pp. 67–87.

- 232 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 141. Also: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler: 1859–1952*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları Basımevi, 1952; p. 193; T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 1, p. 30; and T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 234–236. For the 1909 separation of the Committee and its party, see Chapter 3, N.43 of this work. For an informative background, see: R.G. Okandan, “Âmme hukukumuzda Osmanlı devletinin inkirazına kadar parlamentarizm ve hususiyetleri”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi mecmuası*, 13:2, 1947, pp. 449–473.
- 233 G. Dyer, *The origins of the ‘Nationalist’ group of officers in Turkey, 1908–18*, p. 131. (Emphasis mine).

The new Political Programme and the Regulations of the Committee are reproduced in: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasi partiler*, pp. 214–218 and pp. 218–225 respectively. For details regarding the Programme and the Regulations, see: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 141–143; and S. Akşin, *İttihat ve Terakki üzerine*, esp. pp. 160–161 and p. 181.

- 234 Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 403. To one observer of the Ottoman-Turkish scene, Enver Bey was the “young

Alcibiades of Turkey". D. von Mikusch, *Mustapha Kemal: between Europe and Asia*. (Trans.) J. Linton. London: William Heinemann, 1931; p. 113. To another, he "... had come to regard himself as a Young Napoleon, a Man of Destiny, [and] ... had acquired merit by the reoccupation of Adrianople ... ". R. Graves, *Storm centres of the Near East: personal memoirs, 1879-1929*. London: Hutchinson, 1933 (1975 reprint of the N.Y. Ams Press edition used here); pp. 288-289. By his own account, on 2 August: "Je suis content comme une enfant, pas parce qu'on m'admire dans tout le monde islamique, mais pour mon propre contentement. Et pour avoir été le seul qui a pu sauter dans une nuit dans Edirne." M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, p. 249.

- 235 Cf. the authoritative comments of: T. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 89. Enver Bey himself wrote to his German woman friend on 23 July from Edirne, making my point in no uncertain terms:

"Dernièrement j'étais forcé de passer toute une nuit à expliquer une série de preuves au ministre ami et au grandvésir pour les convaincre qu'il faut agir. Enfin j'avais réussi, mais on ne me donne de liberté que jusqu'à la nouvelle frontière, au delà on avait de nouveau peur. Alors j'ai pris ces dernières décisions et j'ai dit que si les personnes qui sont chargées officiellement de gouverner n'ont pas le courage de faire marcher l'armée, je la ferai marcher sans ordre. Vous voyez, on voulait de nouveau me rendre coupable et militaire révolutionnaire!"

M.Ş. Hanioglu, *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, pp. 247-248.

- 236 M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 150-151.

- 237 F.R. Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk devri hâtraları*. İstanbul: Dünya Yayınları, [1958?]. 2 cilt. Cilt 1, p. 56.

To this day, unsubstantiated rival claims as to who was actually the first to enter Edirne have been put forward by almost everybody involved in the city's recovery. For example, Şefik Okday claims the honour for the Gelibolu Army Corps of the [Bölge] Allotted Army, to which his uncle, First-Lieutenant İsmail Hakkı Efendi, was aide-de-camp: Ş. Okday, *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete: Padişah Yaveri iki Sadrazam oğlu anlatıyor*. İstanbul: Sema Matbaacılık, 1988; p. 50.

- 238 Cf. the comments of: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 403.

- 239 C. Kutay, *Üç paşalar kavgası*. İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları Müessesesi, 1964; pp. 185-186. Cf., Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, pp. 403-404 and pp. 411-413. Also: G. Dyer, *The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey, 1908-18*, p. 132.

- 240 However, one reliable source would be: C. Kutay, *Üç paşalar kavgası*, p. 186, where the names are provided. Yet also see: "Enver Paşa'nın Harbiye Nazırlığında bilinmeyen hakikatler", *Tarih konuşuyor*, 1:2 (Mart) 1964, pp. 137-142, esp. pp. 137-138.

- 241 G. Dyer, *The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey, 1908-18*, p. 132.

The impact of the *Aşere-i Mübeşşere* is also assessed by: F. Okyar, *Fethi Okyar: üç devirde bir adam*, p. 201.

- 242 Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 156. Also: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 176-177.

- 243 For his own implication, see "Ahmed İzzet Paşa" in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1978. Cf., M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 177.

- 244 M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 154 and p. 175.

- 245 "Ahmed İzzet Paşa" in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1978;

- and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 156. Also: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 174. Details of the post-1908 Ottoman Military Orders of Merit and Medals are found in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 336-340. Also, Resim:1 (Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyalarının takılış şekilleri) and Resim:2 (Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyalarının topluca takılış şekli) thereof.
- 246 From the comments of (Brigadier-General) Halil Sedes Paşa on Ahmed İzzet Paşa, in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*, p. 2026.
- 247 "H. Sedes" in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*, p. 2026.
- 248 "Ahmed İzzet Paşa" in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadriazamlar*, p. 1978. Further: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 155.
- The *Tanin* reporter, Falih Rıfkı, returning from the Edirne area with the entourage of the heir apparent (see p. 339 of this Chapter), met Cemal Bey at Sirkeci Railway Station and, during conversation, was told by him in no uncertain terms : "We are going to save the military from İzzet Paşa too." F.R. Atay, *Zeytindağı*, p. 25.
- 249 H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, p. 180.
- Cf. the comments of Bayur accepting the validity of this record: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 317.
- 250 M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 176-177.
- 251 T. Bıyıkhoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 77, and related document in Cilt II, Vesika Sa.11, reproduced in full and in facsimile on pp. 24-27.
- For the most reliable information on the *Garbi Trakya Hükümeti*, see: *ibid.*, Cilt I, pp. 72-93, and related documents in Cilt II, Vesika Sa.11-22, reproduced in full and in facsimile on pp. 24-33.
- Cf., Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 61ff. Also see: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım*, Cilt 4, pp. 1276-1302, and related documents: Belge Sa.85,89 and 90, reproduced in full and in facsimile on p. 1368, p. 1379 and p. 1381 respectively. For the best background to date, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/2, pp. 472-482.
- A convenient source is: N. Gündâğ (hazırlayan), *1913 Garbi Trakya Hükümet-i Müstakilesi*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1987; esp. pp. 124ff.
- 252 T. Bıyıkhoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele*, Cilt I, p. 89.
- 253 Cf., M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 152ff.
- 254 Quoted in: C. Kutay, *Üç paşalar kavgası*, p. 190; where Eşref Sencer Bey's visit to Enver Bey in his house at Beşiktaş (in İstanbul) is given on pp. 190-192. Also see: *Enver Paşa'nın Harbiye Nazırlığında bilinmiyen hakikatler*, esp. pp. 139ff.
- Despite the variation in detail in the different accounts by participants all eager to claim credit for the invitation to Enver Bey and the manner in which it was offered, this assertion does seem to have been the consensus among those members of the officer corps occupying strategic positions in the capital. I derive my evidence also from the written account of one of those officers, the then Guardian of Üsküdar (*Üsküdar Muhafızı*), Staff-Major Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez) Bey, which is reproduced in full in: C. Kutay, *Türkiye istiklâl ve hürriyet mücadeleleri tarihi*, Cilt 18, pp. 10098-10101. For the original, see: Vak'anüvis, "Enver Paşa ordunun başına nasıl geçmişti?", *Tarih hazinesi*, Sa.9, Yıl 1 (1 Nisan) 1951, pp. 447-450. Virtually the same account appears in: F. Kandemir, "Enver Paşa nasıl Harbiye Nazırı oldu?", *Tarih konuşuyor*, 8:51 (Nisan) 1968, pp. 3646-3649. Supporting evidence from a well-known source is supplied by: A. Tugay, *İbret: Abdülhamid'e verilen jurnaller ve jurnalciler*. 2 cilt. Cilt 1: İstanbul: Okat Yayınevi, [n.d.]; Cilt 2, İstanbul: Yörük Yayınevi, 1962; Cilt 2: pp. 170-171 and *passim*.
- 255 The letter, reproduced in part, in: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, pp. 422-425, esp. pp. 422-424. Apparently, the Princedom

- of Albania was offered to Ahmed İzzet Paşa by the Grand Vezir, Talât and Halil Beys at the Bâb-ı Âli “. . . about the middle of November . . .”; despite several follow-up visits by various eminent Muslim Albanians, the Paşa preferred to remain in Ottoman service. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 158–159.
- 256 M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 156–159.
A number of commentators have used Ragıp’s account, though some with reservations. Cf., for example: C. Kutay, *Üç paşalar kavgası*, pp. 192–194; and A.B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda inkılâp hareketleri ve milli mücadele*, pp. 607–608; with Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, pp. 419–420.
- 257 See N.99 of this Chapter.
- 258 The letter, reproduced in part, in: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 417.
Circumstantial evidence puts the date of Enver Bey’s operation as 17 December 1913 (4 Kanun-u evvel 1329). For details, see: M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, pp. 160–166.
Naciye Sultan’s memoirs include her own, vivid recollection of her selection, in 1911, of the “*hürriyet kahramanı Enver Bey*” (p.30) from among the pictures of her various suitors, her engagement and marriage to him *in absentia*, while he was Military Attaché in Berlin. It was not until December 1913, at the İstanbul hospital where he was being treated for acute appendicitis on his return from Trablusgarb, that Enver Bey and his bride of two years met for the first time. The full nuptials, with all parties present, took place on 5 March 1914. Naciye Sultan, *Acı zamanlar: Enver Paşa’nın eşi Naciye Sultan’ın hatıraları*. (Yayına hazırlayan) O.G. Aşıroğlu. İstanbul: Burak Yayınevi, 1990; pp. 29–38.
- 259 M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi*, p. 167. Also: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, pp. 418–419. The number is given as three in: C. Kutay, *Üç paşalar kavgası*, p. 196.
- 260 The letter, reproduced in part, is in: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 426.
- 261 Reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 319.
- 262 A.F. Türkgeldi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 111.
- 263 “Ahmed İzzet Paşa” in: M.K. İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrazamlar*, p. 1978; and repeated in: Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, p. 312.
Also see p. 347, N.247 of this Chapter. Cf., Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 319.
- 264 [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*, p. 7.
Of course this account should be considered against the informative background on the Sultan provided by: H.Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve ötesi: son hatıralar*. [2nd ed.] İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1965; pp. 335–338. A short but incisive assessment of the Sultan is made by: T.Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye’de siyasal partiler*, Cilt 3, pp. 153–155.
- 265 Reproduced in full in: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 319.
- 266 See: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 320; where the *irade* is also reproduced in part.
- 267 “. . .
Sakın hakkım var deme,
Hak yok vazife vardır!

Hak milletin, şan onun
Gövde senin, can onun,

. . .
Ben, sen yokuz, biz varız.
. . .”

"Ahlak" first appeared in *Tanin*, [14 Kanunisani 1915] (14 January 1915). Reproduced in:

Z. Gökalp, *Şiirler ve halk masalları*; (araştıran ve hazırlayan) F.A. Tansel; p. 102. Also see: *ibid.*, pp. 341–342 (XXXII).

Cf. the comments of: H. Edib [Adivar], *Turkey faces west: a Turkish view of recent changes and their origin*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930; pp. 252–253; and also Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, II/4, p. 352. Further, see: U. Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish nationalism: the life and teachings of Ziya Gökalp*. London: Luzac and Co., 1950; p. 45 and pp. 123–124; together with, I think, a most valid criticism of Heyd's evaluation: T. Parla, *The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924*, esp. pp. 65–69.

268 " . . .

Ben askerim, o, üstümde kumandan,

Baş eğrim her emrine sormadan!

Gözlerimi kaparım!

Vazifemi yaparım!

. . . "

"Vazife" first appeared in *Tanin*, [15 Kanunisani 1915] (15 January 1915). Reproduced in:

Z. Gökalp, *Şiirler ve halk masalları*; (araştıran ve hazırlayan) F.A. Tansel; p. 103. Also see: *ibid.*, pp. 342–343 (XXXIII).

269 [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*, p. 7.

270 See N.97–98 and pp. 312ff. of this Chapter.

In addition: C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*. İnci Cilt: Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun siyasi ve askeri hazırlıkları ve Harbe girişi. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Resmî Yayınları, Seri No.3. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1970; [Hereafter, C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, I]; p. 175; and cf., [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*, p. 8.

A detailed list of 800 officers is provided in: Bâki [Vandemir], *Büyük Harpte Kafkas cephesi*. İstanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1933. 2 cilt. Cilt 1, p. 31, N.1.

271 Cf., for example: F.G. Weber, *Eagles on the crescent*, pp. 40–41.

272 [O.V.K.] Liman von Sanders, *Five years in Turkey*, p. 8.

Also see, for example: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, p. 133.

273 Reported interview in *Tanin*, 10 January 1914, and quoted, in part, in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 147. (Ahmad's translation).

Also see: "Enclosure" in British Military Attaché's despatch no. 4, which contains the translation of the leading article in *Tanin* of 10 January, "The Young Army", in addition to that of the account of the interview with "Young Turkey's young and amiable Minister of War, H.E. Enver Pasha". *Cunliffe-Owen to Mallet*, No.4, Constantinople, 19 January 1914, F.O. 195/2456/60. Further: Y. Sarımay, *Türk milliyetçiliğinin tarihî gelişimi ve Türk ocakları, 1912–1931*, p. 158 and N.42, on Enver Paşa's "para-military" *Gençlik Dernekleri* (Youth Societies) attached to the Ministry of War.

274 G. Dyer, *The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey, 1908–18*, p. 134.

This is, of course, consistent with the implication of Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 94 (Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 83). Cf. the comments of: A.F. Türkgeledi, *Görüp işittiklerim*, p. 111. Also: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, p. 220.

Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, during a visit he paid to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, appears to have expounded on the subject:

"His Excellency spoke of Enver Pasha as a young man full of ambition, who alone could have dared to dismiss by a stroke of the pen some hundreds of Turkish officers from active service. Izzet Pasha had shrunk from assuming responsibility for such a bold stroke, and Izzet had himself suggested Enver as being the only man capable of putting it into execution. Hilmi did not pretend to approve. He was too old for such desperate experiments. He had, however, great regard for Enver . . ."

Bunsen to Grey, No.14, Conf., Vienna, 12 January 1914, *B.D.*, X/1, No.202, pp. 188-189, p. 189.

Cf., the comments of Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, contained in his despatch to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding the German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

"Il considère Enver Pacha comme un homme jeune et ambitieux, qui tient à justifier sa reputation et qui pour y parvenir est capable des pires initiatives."

Cambon à Doumerque, Dépêche, No.23, Berlin, 19 janvier 1914, *D.D.F.*, Tome IX, 3e Série, No.112, pp. 131-132, p. 132.

- 275 I will take, as a symbolic example of this, the apparently personal initiative of Enver Paşa in establishing the classical Ottoman military band (*mehter takımı*), which provided the so-called *Janitscharenmusik*, down as far as the level of battalions of three-company strength. For the regulations relating to this, see: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 278-280.

- 276 Reproduced as "Enver Paşa'nın orduyu ıslahına dair beyannâmesi", in: C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, I (Ek-9), p. 271, and also see p. 176, where the original source is referred to as: *H.T.A.*: A.1/1, Dolap 10, Göz 22, Dosya 621.

Where they were not so animated, Enver Paşa took positive steps to encourage this "obedience" and "devotion", as when he framed and hung prominently in the anteroom of the Ministry of War a letter of recommendation from no less than the Minister of Justice requesting an easy posting for someone just entering the army. See: H.C. Yalçın, *Siyasal anılar*. (Baskıya hazırlayan) R. Mutluay. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1976; p. 203.

- 277 Cf., M.M. İşkora, *Harp Akademileri tarihçesi: 1846-1965*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1966-1968. 2 cilt. Cilt 1, pp. 197-198.

- 278 Köprülü Şerif, *Harb-i Umumi bidayetinde Üçüncü Ordu, Sarıkamış ihata manevrası ve meydan muharebesi*. İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1338 [Hereafter, Şerif, *Sarıkamış*].

- 279 Şerif, *Sarıkamış*, pp. 12-13.

Cf., J. Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des ottomanischen Reiches: Erinnerungen an die Türkei aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges*. Zürich: Amalthea-Verlag, 1928; p. 40.

- 280 For example, used also by his biographer: Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt III, pp. 48ff.

- 281 Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, pp. 161-162.

- 282 To quote but two examples:

From 30 June to 27 [28?] July 1918, Brigadier-General Mustafa Kemal Paşa, of late Commander of the VIIth Army, was in Karlsbad (now Karlovy Vary) for medical treatment and kept diaries during his stay. In one entry (14 July 1918) he touched upon the condition of the Ottoman military and the wars since 1911:

". . . As for the Balkan War, this was not just a loss in war for the Turkish Army, this was a disaster . . . [This was] the collapse of the old mentality

in Turkey . . . As a result of the [respite from the] loss of Turkish lands in Europe, a young officer, Enver, benefitted from this opportunity and became the chief of the Ottoman military as the Minister of War. His first positive and great deed was to rejuvenate the military."

A. İnan, "M. Kemal Atatürk'ün son devir Osmanlı ordusu ve savaşları hakkındaki yazıları: (Temmuz 1918)", pp. 809–813 in *VII. Türk Tarih Kurumu Kongresi: Ankara, 25–29 Eylül 1970; Kongreye sunulan bildiriler*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, IX.Seri-Sa.7a. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1972–1973. 2 cilt. Cilt II, p. 811.

Cf., A. Afetinan, *M. Kemal Atatürk'ün Karlsbad hatıraları*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XXIII.Seri-Sa.7. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1983; p. 57, where the wording, although not the sense, differs. Unfortunately, Prof. Afetinan nowhere provides the original text.

Secondly, another general, Lieutenant-General Ali Fuad (Cebesoy) Paşa, the first Nationalist (i.e., during the National Struggle, following the First World War) Ambassador to Soviet Russia (21 November 1920–2 June 1922), also reminisced about his friendship with Enver Paşa since 1903. "I got to know Enver Paşa at the Staff College", wrote Ali Fuad Paşa in his *Moscow memoirs*, and continued:

[He] worked very hard in reforming and organizing the Ottoman military which had emerged in ruins from the Balkan War, and increased its war potential."

A.F. Cebesoy, *Moskova hâtıraları*. İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955; pp. 173–174. The most apt illustration of these testimonies was, I think, provided by Halide Edib in the 1920s:

"I could cite many staff-officers, today in prominent positions, and very anti-Enverist, who admit that the reorganization of the Anatolian army of independence was possible only because of the sound basis that Enver had laid. His unflinching determination to organize a younger and more efficient staff, his absolute disregard of political considerations where promotion or punishment was concerned, are admitted by his opponents as well as his admirers."

Halide Edib, *Memoirs of Halide Edib*. London: John Murray, 1926; p. 346. It is significant, perhaps, in view of the author's later Republican bias, that this passage is missing from her Turkish version: H.E. Adıvar, *Mor salkımlı ev*, pp. 161ff.

- 283 This was quite evident to at least one contemporary: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 251–252. Cf., for example, F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 146–147 and pp. 163–164 and *passim*. But see Dyer's interpretation which I fully accept, apart from his terminology: G. Dyer, *The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey, 1908–1918*, p. 134.

The social aspect of this phenomenon, and not with any doctrinaire formulation, is, I think, best understood by General Erden: A.F. Erden, *İsmet İnönü*. İstanbul: Burhanettin Erenler Matbaası, 1952; esp. pp. 59–77. It is also the implication of General F. Belen in his: *20nci yüzyılda Osmanlı devleti*, p. 185; and, again, in his *Ordu ve politika*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1971; pp. 10ff.

- 284 I refer to the case of Staff-Major Mısırlı Aziz Ali Bey ('Aziz 'Ali al-Misri), whose arrest on 9 February 1914 is attested by a singular abundance of evidence in: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 71–76. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, pp. 60–64. And see, for the best available monograph on the subject: M. Khadduri, "'Aziz 'Ali Mısıri and the Arab nationalist movement", pp. 140–165 in A. Hourani (ed.), *St. Antony's papers, no. 17, Middle Eastern*

affairs, no. 4. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Further: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 138–140. But cf., E. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*, pp. 47–48.

Also instructive among the works in English were: G. Antonius, *The Arab awakening*. New York: Capricorn, 1965; pp. 116ff.; H. Saab, *The Arab federalists of the Ottoman Empire*. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958; pp. 234ff.; C.E. Dawn, "The rise of Arabism in Syria", pp. 148–179 in his *From Ottomanism to Arabism: essays on the origins of Arab nationalism*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973; and, in general, Z.N. Zeine, *The emergence of Arab nationalism, with a background study of Arab-Turkish relations in the Near East*. Rev.ed. Beirut: Khayats, 1966.

Since my particular interest is in trying to exemplify an explicit action of Enver Paşa, I have purposely refrained from going into detail on the more general problem of the so-called Arab Question and of Aziz Ali Bey's participation in the founding of secret Arab societies before the First World War. This problem goes back, in the final analysis, to the differing interpretations in the sources of his political activities. Even here, the difference lies not in the facts but in the colouring with which, for political reasons, the facts themselves are presented. Some scholars have wanted to construe, erroneously, the trial and expulsion from İstanbul of Aziz Ali Bey as an "Arab problem", and so have misunderstood the point discussed here. For it was not because Aziz Ali Bey was an Arab officer – in fact he was not, but in any case this is a matter virtually impossible to ascertain from official sources, even from the confidential Ottoman service list which gives no ethnic classification but only name, birthplace and patronymic – nor even, as has sometimes been suggested, because he may have been a rival to Enver Paşa, that his political activities were so severely punished. At a time when simply publication by members of the armed forces was being tightly regulated,* the very fact of Aziz Ali Bey's political activities (organizing societies, conspiring with foreign governments)** was intolerable. It is possible, however, that Enver Paşa, so sensitive in the area of extra-military activities by officers, sought to make an example of Aziz Ali Bey and was accordingly strict in his treatment of him.

A small point of fact has to be made in view of the inaccuracy prevailing in all the works I have so far managed to see. It is always accepted that Aziz Ali Efendi graduated from Staff-College "with distinction".*** The term "with distinction" (*mümtaz*) is, strictly speaking, correct. But it was a distinction of an inferior, rather than a superior, kind. Captain Aziz Ali Efendi was a graduate of the 56th class, 22 Kanunuevvel 1319 (4 January 1904), and the number of staff-officer candidates for that year was 35, of whom 10 graduated successfully. From the 55th class (23 Teşrinisani 1318), there had started a special category of those unable immediately to achieve the required standard but were classified *mümtaz* and might later become staff-officers after they had joined their units. Of the nine *mümtaz* of 1904 who did subsequently become staff-officers, Aziz Ali Efendi ranked seventh in order of merit.****

* *Zâbitan-ı askeriye tarafından vuku' bulacak neşriyat hakkında talimattır*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1329.

** See, for example, the comments of Khalidi on the basis of French documents: R. Khalidi, *Arab nationalism in Syria: the formative years, 1908–1914*, p. 230 and N.66 on p. 235. Cf., Mallet to Grey, No.193, Constantinople, 18 March 1914, *B.D.*, Vol.X, Part II [Hereafter, X/2], pp. 827–828; and further documents, "V, Aziz Bey and the Arab movement, 1914" in *ibid.*, pp. 832–838.

*** Cf., for example, M. Khadduri, *op.cit.*, p. 147; and repeated in his: *Arab contemporaries: the role of personalities in politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1973; p. 9; and well as in: E. Be'eri, *Army officers in Arab politics and society*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1970; p. 41.

**** The relevant information is drawn from: M.M. İşkora, *Harp Akademileri tarihçesi: 1846-1965*, Cilt 1, pp. 32-33, p. 199 and p. 203.

285 A.F. Erden, *İsmet İnönü*, p. 59.

Cf., the supporting assertion, in a virtually identical vein, of: F. Okyar, *Üç devirde bir adam*, p. 5. According to Kutay, the Triumvirate used also, in those days, to be known as the *Ekânim-i Selâse* (Holy Trinity): C. Kutay, *Üç paşalar kavgası*, p. 13.

In the eyes of a contemporary journalist:

"In 1914, the air was heavy with Enver; it was bright with him, it was overcast with him . . . I even felt that Talât Bey, in whose private secretariat I was working and who seemed to me so very powerful, remained in his [Enver's] shadow."

F.R. Atay, *Zeytindağı*, pp. 28-29.

286 Of these, two examples – the comments of the United States' Ambassador, Morgenthau, and of the historian, Danişmend – may be cited: H. Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's story*. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1918; pp. 32-40; and İ.H. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, 4, pp. 408-409.

287 Cf., S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 224; and H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 251-252. Also, the considered opinion of Colonel-General Hans von Seeckt, in: F. von Rabenau, *Hans von Seeckt – aus meinem Leben*. Leipzig: D. Hafe & Koehler, 1938-1940. 2 Band. Band 2, pp. 97-102 (dated 14 September 1918). However, cf. his report of 4 November 1918, reproduced in: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, pp. 257-271, esp. pp. 258-262, bearing in mind that the comments were written at the end of a lost war and a splintered alliance, with all the connotations which that involved.

But, when those bounds of voluntary restraint were exceeded, then Enver Paşa had no hesitation in taking prompt action, as in the instance of his closure of the Unionist newspaper, *Tanin*, for publishing even insignificant military news and, more importantly, for its editor's refusal to disclose his source. See: H.C. Yalçın, *Siyasal anılar*, p. 203.

288 As is clear from the admissions of Staff-Major Kâzım Karabekir, then Chief of the Intelligence Section (İnd Section) of the newly-organized General Staff, in, for example: K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimizin esasları*. İstanbul: Sinan Matbaası Neşriyat Evi, 1933-[1951]; pp. 19-29. Also, in general, cf. K. Karabekir, *Cihan Harbinde neden girdik, nasıl girdik, nasıl idare ettik?* İstanbul: Tecelli Basımevi, 1937. 2 cilt.

289 I rely on the *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, where Cavid Bey's own contributions to the problem are accurately and profitably assessed: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*. Cilt III: 1914-1918 Genel Savaş; Kısım 1: Savaşın başından 1914-1915 kışına kadar. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, VIII.Seri-Sa.14c. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1953; [Hereafter, Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, III/1]; pp. 181ff. Cf. M. Ragıp, *İttihat ve Terakki esrar perdesi*, pp. 224-225. Further: E. Jackh, *The rising crescent: Turkey yesterday, today and tomorrow*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944; p. 140, where a reproduced report from the German Military Attaché (3 October 1914) reveals how this state of affairs was to continue despite increasing financial straits. As for these, two perceptive reports may be cited: *Grey to Mallet*, Private, London, 9 February 1914, *B.D.*, X/1, No.240, p. 224; and *Mallet to Grey*, Private, Pera, 10 March 1914, *B.D.*, X/1, No.257, pp. 238-239.

290 Computing officers' salaries and benefits and making the pay-scale meaningful in the Ottoman context are not easy. However, it was attempted by General

Karatamu on the basis of *Ordu emirnâmeleri* and *Düstur*, and supplemented by his own personal observations, in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 351-358. And a list of salaries for the year 1913/14 is supplied in: V. Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun iktisadî şartları hakkında bir tetkik*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1970; pp. 220-221.

- 291 "Ordu emirnâmesi", 1 Mart 1330 (14 March 1914), No.1, p. 12. Cited in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 450.

- 292 "Ordu emirnâmesi", 15 Kanunuevvel 1331 (28 December 1915), No.22, p. 378. Cited in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 450, where the text of the oath is given.

Perhaps two pieces of evidence by the British Ambassador on the Unionists' control of the imperial family allude to the same point. See, in: F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 149-150 and N.1 on p. 150.

- 293 On this, cf. the observations of General Altay in: F. Altay, *10 yıl savaş (1912-1922) ve sonrası*. İstanbul: İnsel Yayınları, 1970; pp. 59-60 and esp. pp. 75-80. A prominent civilian's view, that of Yahya Kemal, strengthening the general validity of my statement, is set out in: Y. Kemal, *Siyâsî ve edebî portreler*. İstanbul: Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü, 1968; pp. 59-61.

Perhaps I may append the comments of the famed author of epics, Tepedelenlioglu, who, characteristically, comes out with this perceptive remark:

"Following Enver's Ministry . . . the civilian administration had even lost the ability to be the jerry-built shop-window of the military's power, and even the Committee of Union and Progress . . . was brought into line."

N.N. Tepedelenlioglu, *Ordu ve politika*. İstanbul: Bedir Yayınları, 1967; p. 218.

Cf. "I have described Enver Pasha so completely [wrote the Director of the Army Department in the Ottoman War Ministry, Colonel Kannengiesser] because he was both before and during the war militarily the leading personality, and because in a certain sense he had imprinted the seal of his personality on the army . . . [I]t was easy to believe him the youthful master or dictator of the Empire."

H. Kannengiesser, *The campaign in Gallipoli*. (Trans.) C.J.P. Ball. London: Hutchinson, [1928]; p. 47.

- 294 See: "Enver Paşa'nın Orduyu Islahına Dair Beyannâmesi", p. 271 in: C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, I (Ek-9).

It appears that his sentiment was not unreciprocated. According to General Erden, one of the speakers at a meeting in Sultan Ahmed Square eulogized Enver Paşa as "Enver who clasps the banner of Islâm in his intrepid hand". A.F. Erden, *İsmet İnönü*, p. 62. And no less than Sir Louis Mallet, the British Ambassador, commented that ". . . his name is prominent in Moslem world". *Mallet to Grey*, Tel.No.9, Constantinople, 6 January 1914, *F.O.*, 424/251/16.

- 295 S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, pp. 220-224, pp. 236-240, pp. 256-259, pp. 266ff., pp. 287-291, pp. 293-294, pp. 326-329, pp. 446ff. and pp. 473ff. and *passim*; and C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, I, pp. 162-171, pp. 175-181 and pp. 186-195; are very important for, especially, the military aspects of the reforms.

- 296 This conclusion, of course, conforms with General Karatamu's interpretation of the defeat. See: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6-1, p. 398. I would like to quote here a passage from the *Diary (Ruznâme)* of Ömer Seyfeddin of short-story fame, one of the founders of and regular contributors to the Selânik literary review, *Genç kalemler (Young pens)* who, as a young officer, fought in the Balkan War before being taken prisoner-of-war by the Greek forces in January 1913. The *Diary*, written with his customary inimitable style, provides, I think, one of the best insights into the human aspects of

war, while throwing light on the forces of the opposing states and, especially, on the efficiency of the Greek war effort and officers. Ömer Seyfeddin, in a particularly moving entry, reminds the reader of a truism that is often forgotten: that men not only make wars but may lose them even when they possess sufficient material strength:

“17 Teşrinievvel [27 October 1912]

. . . Has it ever occurred to my mind to leave by means of escape these places [i.e., Rumelia] where I used, as a new graduate [of the War College] eight years ago, to travel about?

Alas, since we are no soldiers, since we do not possess the perspicacity and discipline necessary for soldiering, since we do not have an ideal, a sense of motherland [nor], finally, a language”.

“Ruznâme”, pp. 57–132 in Ö. Seyfettin, *Bütün eserleri, 8: Falaka*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971; pp. 66–67.

- 297 Concerning the detailed view laid down to explain the aims and methods of the new drill, I refer to a very informative publication: *Zâbitan talimâhları talimatnâmesi*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1329. The same source constitutes the base of Karatamu's exposition in: S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, pp. 398–401.

- 298 This is quite clear from one of the drastic changes that took place in the administration of the military schools. The War Colleges, which had been within the domain of the General Inspectorate of Education and Instruction,* were attached, with further centralization in mind, to the newly-established General Directorate of the Military Schools under the directorship of a German officer, *Oberstleutnant* Back von Erlich, who also became the Commandant of the Infantry War College in Pangaltı, İstanbul. In fact, as General Karatamu has noted,** all the military schools then came under the inspection and supervision of the German Military Mission.

* Cf., p. 166 of Chapter 3.

** S. Karatamu, *Türk silâhlı kuvvetleri tarihi*, III/6–1, pp. 422ff. Further: C. Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk harbi*, I, pp. 178–179; and (Ek-10) “İslah Heyeti Başkanlığı teftiş ve denetimi altında bulunan eğitim kurumları ve bunların bağlı bulundukları makamlar”, p. 272; and esp. (Ek-10A) “Alman İslah Heyeti şeması”, pp. 273–274.

- 299 B.W. Tuchman, *August 1914*. London: Constable, 1962; p. 139.

For two inside views of the Unionist perception, see: Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 109ff.; cf. Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, pp. 97ff.; and H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 182–187.

To quote a Turkish writer:

“The psychology of this attitude can best be explained by . . . referring to Lord Salisbury's words on Turkey at the Berlin Conference. ‘We have backed the wrong horse’, he said. Her defeat in the Balkans had convinced European diplomats that Turkey was no longer any use as a military power . . . The diplomats practically laid bets on the peoples of the Near East, as they would back horses at a race. Turkey was an unpromising animal, she hadn't the look of a winner – why should they back the wrong horse?”

H. Edib, *Turkey faces west: a Turkish view of recent changes and their origin*, pp. 139–140.

An attempt to answer the question is made by: A. Cunningham, “The wrong horse? A study of Anglo-Turkish relations before the First World War”, pp. 56–76 in A. Hourani (ed.), *St. Antony's papers, no. 17, Middle Eastern affairs, no. 4*.

Also see his revised version: A. Cunningham, "The wrong horse? Anglo-Ottoman relations before the First World War", Vol.2, pp. 226-248 in A. Cunningham, *Eastern questions in the nineteenth century: collected essays*. (Ed.) E. Ingram. London: Frank Cass, 1993. 2 vols. Cf. the comments of: H. Bayur, *XX. yüzyılda Türklüğün tarih ve acun siyaseti üzerindeki etkileri*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.24. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1974; pp. 77-81.

- 300 F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 151; and again reiterated in F. Ahmad, "The late Ottoman Empire", pp. 5-30 in M. Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984; esp. pp. 12-15.

This over-used but under-explained concept is best assessed in an overlooked paper by Akçura as early as 1928: Akçuraoğlu Yusuf (Akçura), "Osmanlı Devleti Umumi Harbte bitaraf kalabilir miydi?", *Türk Tarih Encümeni mecmuası*, 19:96 (Haziran) 1928, pp. 1-29.

- 301 This comes out clearly in a chapter of: Z.V. Togan, *Tarihte usul*. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları:1. İstanbul: İbrahim Horoz Basımevi, 1950; 7: İslâm Şarkında tarih telâkkileri, esp. pp. 170-179. Also see the points made by: H.Z. Ülken, *Türkiye'de çağdaş düşünce tarihi*, p. 23 and N.15. As for specific Ottoman minds, this pessimism and sense of helplessness is clearly reflected in, for example, the considered opinions of the Grand Vezirs, Said and Kâmil Paşas, in three reports during the 1880s, quoted in part in: S. Deringil, "Some comments on the concept of legitimacy in the foreign policy of Abdulhamid II", pp. 97-102 in S. Kunalalp (ed.), *Studies on Ottoman diplomatic history I*. İstanbul: Isis Press, 1987; p. 101.

- 302 In the economic sense, cf. the point made by Ergil that:

"... when, after the summer of 1913, another Young Turk request to raise customs dues and for alterations in the capitulatory regime was turned down by the Europeans, Young Turk Liberalism turned into statism and the polite solicitations to European powers for economic favours were rejected in favour of a diplomatic struggle ..."

D. Ergil, "A reassessment: the Young Turks, their politics and anti-colonial struggle", *Balkan studies*, 16:2, 1975, pp. 26-72, p. 55.

It is in this context that one must read: D. Ergil and R.I. Rhodes, "Western capitalism and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire", *Economy and history*, 18:1 (January) 1975, pp. 41-60.

The fundamental limitations to economic independence have been emphasised in: F. Ahmad, "Vanguard of a nascent bourgeoisie: the social and economic policy of the Young Turks, 1908-1918", pp. 329-350 in O. Okyar and H. İnalçık (eds.), *Türkiye'nin sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi (1071-1920): "Birinci Uluslararası Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi Kongresi" tebliğleri, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Ankara, July 11-13, 1977*. Ankara: Meteksan, 1980.

The economic awakening by the Young Turks towards economic nationalism has been extensively studied in: Z. Toprak, *Türkiye'de 'Milli İktisat' (1908-1918)*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982; and also emphasised in: T. Akgür, *Türkiye ve Batı: iktisadi etkileşim ve siyasi yansıma, 1789-1989*. Ankara: Verso Yayınları, 1990; pp. 118ff.

- 303 B. Tuchman., *August 1914*, p. 140.

Also see: H. Menteşe, *Anıları*, pp. 187-205. Cf., J. Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: the road to war", *Middle Eastern studies*, 12:1 (January) 1976, pp. 3-44, esp. p. 38. Further: J. Heller, *British policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*. London: Frank Cass, 1983; esp. pp. 133-134, pp. 137-140 and p. 163; and M. Kent, "Asiatic Turkey,

1914–1916”, pp. 436–451 in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), *British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey*.

- 304 Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, p. 109. Cf., Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish statesman*, p. 97.

This argument seems to have escaped Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/4, pp. 504–508. But cf., F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 151; and the more detailed study by: İ. Tekeli, “İttihat ve Terakki döneminde dış dünya ve uygulanan dış politika”, *Toplum ve bilim*, 28 (Kış) 1985, pp. 111–130.

The basic concept underlying the Young Turks’ attitude was, of course, that put forward by Cemal Paşa. It is significant, therefore, that the theoretical statement of the policy formulation on which the Unionists relied appears in its axiomatic form only in his *Hâtıralar*. I quote the relevant passage:

“... Union and Progress had appreciated that, after the Balkan War, in order to assure Turkey’s being redeemed from internal and external difficulties, her gaining strength and her re-acquiring her true place internationally, instead of the passive policy which had been followed up to now, an active policy should be substituted.”

Cemal Paşa, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*; and cf., Djemal Pasha, *op.cit.*, *loc.cit.*

In fact, I have noticed that the rejection of the passivity induced by the Khaldunian philosophy of history (p.362 and N.301 of this Chapter) found its first public expression as early as 1909 in an article by Ziya Gökalp: “Bir devlet nasıl gençleşir”, *Peyman*, Sa.8, 3 Ağustos 1325; reproduced in full in: S. Beysanoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp’in ilk yazı hayatı, 1894–1909*. İstanbul: Şehir Matbaası, 1956; pp. 121–122.

- 305 Of interest are the remarks of Weber on the Said Halim Paşa Government’s policies in Albania. I adduce them as an illuminating example relevant to my argument. When, in the beginning of 1914, Ottoman and Austrian interests clashed over Albania, the Ottoman Ambassador, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, judging from *Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv*; Vienna documents:

“... not only refused to yield but trumpeted his country’s policy in Albania as Austria’s only hope for her own security in the Balkan Peninsula. When [Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold, Count von] Berchtold asserted that Turkey’s aggressive posture would set off the formation of another Balkan League, Hilmi retorted that Austria had better look to the movements of Montenegro and Serbia, who were negotiating a union and intended forcibly to rectify their frontiers to Austria’s disadvantage. This disclosure caught Berchtold off guard, and he could only thank the Turk and instruct [Austrian Ambassador to the Porte] Pallavicini to track down the source of news.

The performance of the Turks [Weber then adds] was extraordinary. With an army lamed in the Balkan Wars and an economy mortgaged to the European bankers, they still had the temerity to challenge one of the great powers and entertain a reasonable hope of getting away with it.”

F.G. Weber, *Eagles on the crescent*, p. 46.

- 306 H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, p. 59; and *ibid.*, pp. 47–60, where the economic and political preliminaries to the “Partition of the Ottoman Empire” are ably studied.

In general, for a longer and equally reliable treatment of the “Partition”, see: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkılâbı tarihi*, II/3, esp. pp. 1–17 and pp. 333–466. In addition, Bayur provides a convenient summary on pp. 466–479.

A realistic assessment of the Powers, expressed “privately” by Sir Louis Mallet, the British Ambassador, was that:

"The situation is a difficult one here. All the Powers including ourselves, are trying hard to get what they can out of Turkey. They all profess to wish the maintenance of Turkey's integrity but no one ever thinks of this in practice."

Mallet to Grey, Private, Pera, 17 December 1913, *B.D.*, X/1, No.174, pp. 158–159, p. 158.

Indeed, cf. H.S.W. Corrigan, "German-Turkish relations and the outbreak of war in 1914: a re-assessment", *Past and present*, 36 (April) 1967, pp. 144–152, see esp. p. 152; and a better one: I. Geiss, *War and empire in the twentieth century*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1983; esp. Part I.

- 307 See: B.V.A., Hazine Evrak: Harbiye İrade Defteri, Sa.45, p. 1464, 11 Ramazan 1332 (21 Temmuz 1330) (i.e., the *irade* of 3 August 1914). Also see: "Enver Paşa'nın resmî sicil özeti", p. 694 in Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt III; and B.V.A., Hazine Evrak: Harbiye İstizan Defteri, p. 2777.
- 308 Ş.S. Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, Cilt II, p. 487.

- 309 It was the day when Enver Paşa gave his oft-quoted written instruction to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Fleet, the German Admiral Souchon, explicitly ordering him to "Attack the Russian fleet at a time that you find suitable". Souchon duly did attack the Russian fleet and shell, in the early hours of the 29th, the Russian Black Sea littoral, thus precipitating the formal Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire (2 November 1914).

The document is reproduced in full in: A.İ. Sabis, *Harb hâtralarım*. 2 cilt. Cilt 1, İstanbul: İnkilâb Kitabevi, 1943; Cilt 2, Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1951; Cilt 2, p. 40; and studied within the context of the Empire's drifting into the War by: Y.H. Bayur, *Türk inkilâbı tarihi*, III/1, esp. pp. 194ff.; and also by Y.T. Kurat, "How Turkey drifted into World War I", pp. 291–315 in K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (eds.), *Studies in international history: essays presented to W. Norton Medlicott*. London: Longman, 1967; esp. pp. 312ff; and, with the additional *Harp Tarihi Arşivi* documents, by: C. Akbay, *Birinci Harbinde Türk harbi*, I, pp. 61ff.

Notably, Brigadier Akbay's account contains reports of the Ottoman Military Attaché in Berlin, Staff-Major Hasan Cemil Bey, which throw additional light on the increased German pressure, following the crucial Marne reverse, on the Empire to enter the War: *ibid.*, pp. 70–73.

Hasan Cemil Bey's relevant reminiscences are found in: H.C. Çambel, *Makaleler, hâtralar*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, XVI.Seri-Sa.5. Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1964; pp. 114–120.

Virtually all the non-Turkish sources are studied extensively by Trumpener, which makes the individual citations redundant here: U. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918*, pp. 21ff. An earlier but still reliable account is, of course: H.N. Howard, *The partition of Turkey*, pp. 106ff., which includes all the non-Turkish sources available to date. One of the more recent, reliable and short accounts, based on German sources, is found in: J.L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, pp. 161ff. The significance of the Black Sea venture is also assessed, especially with the help of Austrian documents, by: F.G. Weber, *Eagles on the crescent*, pp. 68ff.

Irony in the hands of the historian, as in the summation of events themselves over a historical period, is often a tool that cuts nearer the bone of truth than condemnation. But in view of the present analysis, one does not need to be an ironist nor is it ironical to find a Cabinet decision, reached unanimously on that very day of 25 October, resolving ". . . to beware utterly of circumstances which would give opportunity to war".* In spite of this clear resolution, to find Enver Paşa ordering the Fleet to attack and, moreover, issuing the order before the Cabinet meeting, as our circumstantial evidence suggests,** was the latest

example I can call to mind of his dominance over the politics of the state, as I have argued in the foregoing pages. But it is ironical that, in this particular instance, "our officer could *not* analyze political facts devoid of any illusory vocabulary". Certainly, everyone concerned recognized that "he" was in the strongest position to deal with the facts. I give one example:

"It must be remembered [reported the British Ambassador just over a month before the fatal order] that so long as the army is mobilised and so long as Minister of War is generalissimo, Cabinet is not in a position to enforce its will and must temporise to some extent."***

Cabinet did temporize to a great extent. And the "generalissimo" dealt with political facts as "he wished them to exist". For this reason alone, in my view, Enver Paşa, for all his patriotic intentions, was guilty of perhaps the most unpardonable sin – that of being an anachronism. This may be the wisdom of hindsight, but unless I see evidence to the contrary it seems certain that Enver Paşa genuinely believed that Germany was going to win the War and he wanted his country on the winning side.****

* Cemal Paşa, *Hâtıralar*, pp. 147–149, esp. p. 149.

** Cf., U. Trumpener, *op.cit.*, p. 54, N.79 and N.80; and also Y.H. Bayur, *op.cit.*, pp. 232–233.

*** *Mallet to Grey*, Tel.No.801, Conf. part., Constantinople, 17 September 1914, F.O. 371/2138/50719. Also see: *Mallet to Grey*, Tel.No.809, Conf., Constantinople, 19 September 1914, F.O. 371/438/51064.

**** In the considered opinion of Midhat Şükrü Bey, Enver Paşa's "... greatest mistake was his belief that Germany was going to win the war". M.Ş. Bleda, *İmparatorluğun çöküşü*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979; p. 106.

As the long-resident "legal dragoman" to the British Embassy in İstanbul was succinctly to express it in his diary entry for 1 November 1914, "Turkey's fate was in the hands of young soldiers . . . persuaded that Germany would win the war." T. Waugh, *Turkey yesterday, to-day and to-morrow*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1930; p. 155.

For a recent, reliable, general reassessment of the Ottoman "road to war", see: F. Ahmad, "Ottoman armed neutrality and intervention, August–November 1914", pp. 41–69 in S. Kuneralp (ed.), *Studies on Ottoman diplomatic history IV*. Yet cf., Talât Paşa, *Gurbet hatıraları*, Cilt 2, pp. 857–925.

310 To Yalman,

"Enver's relations with the Germans became so close . . . that the Germans started to call Turkey 'Enverland'. You could see 'Enverland' stamped even on boxes of ammunition sent to the Turkish Army."

A.E. Yalman, *Turkey in my time*, p. 53.

Also: F.R. Atay, *Zeytindağı*, p. 107. Cf., H.C. Çambel, *Makaleler; hâtıralar*, p. 136.

And it appears Enver Paşa made his mark even on Ottoman postage stamps, in that an "... unissued stamp of 1917 . . . shows . . . Enver Paşa with Kaiser Wilhelm on the battlefield". D.M. Reid, "The symbolism of postage stamps: a source for the historian", *Journal of contemporary history*, 19:2 (April) 1984, pp. 223–249, p. 235.

Epilogue

Continuity of the military seal from Empire to nation-state

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War (*Harb-i Umumî*) provides a fitting termination to the span included in this study. But it does not allow for discerning or, in fact, properly concluding the retrospective conception, the period, of social (i.e., societal) continuity.¹ The dominant constituent of this continuity, the living military tradition – that acknowledged and conscious arbiter – negates, from the analytical point of view, change from one Turkish state into another and forms, from the theoretical point of view, the historical unity of the Turks, most notably the Muslim Turks, despite the geographical diversity of the states they founded. From this standpoint, the living military tradition obviates study of the change, say, to the Turkish Republic, just on account of the change, for this is not problematical. What is, however, is the underlying social continuity and habit as a means of preserving it. Thus, the continuity of the impressment of the military seal – as an integrant of the military tradition -for example, requires explanation. It does so because it had to be impressed anew on the conduct of the affairs of each Turkish state, and on

the organization at the highest level of their administrations, often in each generation or, sometimes, by the same generation from one state to the next – by Sebük-tegin on the Gaznavîs, and by Kutb'ud-din Aybeg on the Sultanate of Delhi; or by Osman Gazi from Selçuk to Ottoman, and by Gazi Mustafa Kemal from Ottoman to Republic.

This conclusion suggests an important theoretical consideration: the new military seal has not simply replaced the old but has descended from it; that to regard the impressment of a new military seal as if it were an *abiogenesis* in the case of each Turkish state is a gratuitous assumption, resting upon no studied evidence, explaining nothing. Moreover, such a view ignores the fact that in each polity where there is a distinct social order, the military seal retains the character of the old or contemporaneous; the differences are enough to constitute it as the new military seal, the likeness is enough to suggest that it has descended from the old. Here, our problem would be to ascertain how, to adopt the familiar Darwinian terminology, decent with modification arises. How, in other words, has the Ottoman military seal been transmitted during the transformation from the Empire to the Republic so as to make the new military seal different from the old but like the old? And what, indeed, was the visible indication of the new military seal so as to label it new?

The questions, in reality, are not wholly separable. Nor were the men who affixed the seal on to the new Turkish state, namely the Republic of Turkey, themselves newcomers. Similarly, the new polity emerged within the framework of the old, although there were definable changes in its structure – changes which were cumulative until the essentially different structure was arrived at. This process involved general factors of a formative kind as well as others of a purely incidental character. If I attribute a decisive importance in the whole development to the military factor, I must yet admit that this factor was quite ineradicable in Turkish culture. After the destruction of the Empire, it represented a formative institution whose primary aim, by definition, was the building up of social unity rather than the maintenance of any special form of such unity. Herein lies the significance of the discussion of the military tradition which I have attempted in the second Part. Surveying the Ottoman centuries as a whole, it became clear that the military was the product of the Ottoman society and gave, reciprocally, a characteristic outlook to every form of Ottoman social attitudes. I was able, accordingly, to follow through this basic view of the military in the third Part, while examining the political aspects of civil-military relations during the Young Turk era. True,

the military could not entirely transcend its society; for example, a subjective attitude on the part of the military mind determined the varying level of intensity of its emergent Turkish nationalist ideology at the end of empire, and the shape and subtlety of that mind's awareness was conditioned by the level of evolution it had reached. At all levels of evolution the military tradition has not just been a tradition in the sense that it can be isolated as a separate entity from all sections of society. On the contrary, it has at all times revealed itself in the present analysis as a visible force, not only implicit in the formulations of culture but, at times of challenge, explicitly and moreover aggressively assertive. The military tradition did not change like the state of which it was a key institution; it constituted the commanding pattern of society – a pattern from which the social mould is made for casting national history. It therefore gave to the culture a characteristic distortion which was, in essence, a fixed consciousness. And the fixed consciousness of the military was, above all, a political consciousness. At best, political consciousness reflected the belief that the reins of government (*zımm-ı idare*) tended constantly to be surrendered into the hands of those who proved to be the best riders, that governance so surrendered was morally valid and that the reins were not to be tightly drawn against abstract obstacles but were to be thrown to other riders in due course, with paternalist care and protection.

The final military, political and economic collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of the fragmentation of the Central Powers in the War loosed forces of change which displaced the locus of power in society and the attitudes towards authority upon which the governmental arrangement had hitherto depended for its stability. With a reality so conceived, in its outward manifestations and its final effects the Ottoman collapse would seem to have been primarily a military event. No doubt it was so in that it had military repercussions, significantly, in the forcible divorcing of the military from its accepted role as the ultimate arbiter of political activity. To continue to use our metaphor, the *zımm-ı idare* passed from the hands of Enver Paşa into those of, say, General Sir G.F. Milne, "Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea and Allied Forces in Asia Minor" – to name but one of the Entente commanders who were empowered to interpret and to enforce the Armistice terms toward the total dismemberment of the Empire (or rather, what remained of it), whether by collusion or by coercion, by occupation or by invasion, directly or by their Greek and Armenian proxies.

In essence, starting from the middle of November 1918, the Entente commanders overturned the superstructure which past

history had promoted; more especially, they subverted the belief in the omnipotence of the military, lately under the aegis of Enver Paşa. While there can be no question but that this proliferation of conflict was vitally significant for the future, for the time being the victors had simply substituted one political ruling group for another – more uncompromising in its conception, without the binding of a moral claim, to a marked degree maintained by dissimilar will and force, but in many ways as authoritarian in its character. This kind of conclusion the historians have all too seldom brought to our attention; yet I say it is a valid conclusion. But this is not enough. What matters more for us is that the first, formal occupation of İstanbul (13 November 1918) by Allied armada, was the last critical stage in the dismemberment of the Empire. The Allies, in breaking down the social continuity, had certainly effected an inherent and, indeed, potential antagonism in the society. Then, this meant only one thing: that an artificial gap had opened up between the superstructure (military) and the infrastructure (society); nevertheless, society, under the prevailing influence of its dominant constituent – the living military tradition – could not consciously allow the military to atrophy, to lapse into desuetude. Nor would the officers, with a heightened awareness of their past and a clearer insight into motives set in motion long ago and which still controlled them, let themselves be permanently dislodged from the position they had occupied in the social order. From the beginning of 1919, at first sight, these two impetuses could be observed operating intimately in such a way that neither might be regarded as predominant. And neither of them could escape the immediate decision that then confronted both man and will, one way or another: namely, whether he would devote his resources to regaining the position he had held or would yield to the almost all-pervading forces he himself had unwittingly kindled. The first choice entailed a fight to the finish, for armed aggression required armed resistance – a reaction for which no other force in the Ottoman realm but the military could provide any effective initiative. What this involved, fundamentally, was the transferal, yet again, of the *zimam-ı idare* from the hands of their current holders back to those of that force which had always and now indeed would once more provide effective initiative; this could only be the military. And in this way alone, certain in the belief in their own indispensability to the life of the nation, could the officers develop their own social capacity to the full, making their voice heard in the discussion of what they considered to be the problem of national liberation. They had been moulded, especially, by the events of the Balkan War and the First World War and acted, by experience or

by conviction or both, on the basis of the belief that the rights of a nation are fought for, not granted. They mostly believed this postulate to be central to the conduct, more precisely to the perception, of national liberation. For national liberation to succeed, therefore, the military had to be indivisibly loyal to it. And to be loyal, it had to be resolute. From the perspective of the officers, then, the very outcome and, more importantly, the aftermath of the liberation depended upon the military acting as the arbiter. Its quality, as before, was attributed to both men and *matériel*, but first and foremost to men.

If this is how we should discern the gist of the *Millî Mücadele* (National Struggle), as the Turks called it, the social continuity that carries on reflecting the living military tradition seems fully ascertained; for there was a reason then for officers to be cast in the same ideological outlook, namely Anatolian Turkish nationalism. Still, there was more vigorous growth of independent initiative and conscious attempts to make those hanging back conform to it. The two notions of national liberation and armed resistance were an exclusive and sublime prerogative assigned to the military. In his valedictory message delivered in October 1922, in writing, to the “Armies of the Western Front”, “Major-General İsmet” Paşa expressed them thus:

“... the Armies of the Western Front are the great achievement of our nation. The salvation of our motherland until now has been ensured by them. But in future, the securing of the existence of the motherland will truly be dependent on them [Fakat asıl âtiyen temin-i mevcudiyeti onlarla kaim olacaktır]. The High Command of the Armies of the Western Front which has adopted this subtle point as the guide for conduct constitutes the foundation of our motherland.”²

When the two notions of national liberation and armed resistance had been recognized and defined as something inherent in the military's nature, the officers took action. They sought to extend their authority over those elements of the civilian élites who already supported them, or were inclined to do so; and they sought to exert their power through the imposition of their will over the disinclination or outright disapprobation of those other, demoralized, even collaborationist, elements. That they should engage in such conscious political acts was overwhelmingly due to the fact that what were then generally called nationalist officers, as opposed to their former imperialist selves, saw their lives as being spent in the service of the “nation”, combining a nation-state concept; it was to the nation that the military was fundamentally responsible. And the responsibility of decision-making had to be borne on the nation's

behalf, if necessary in spite of the existing state under nominally independent but effectively puppet “Armistice [İstanbul] Governments”. It seems to have been mainly for such reasons that the military gained ascendancy. And the chief stimulus for such ascendancy, the motive of national interest merged with corporate interest, had been effected willingly, sometimes unwittingly, even hopelessly. In any connection, nationalism was a simple, given phenomenon – the starting point of patriotic political action, not the end result of unconscious policy. What followed was that the military endeavoured to support its own authority with the principle of nationalism. This, I maintain, is the root from which their freedom of action was developed and deliberately confined to the sphere of armed force in order that it might challenge the Allied forces’ supremacy in the realm.

The process by which the implementation of challenge to the victors of the Great War was attempted by the vanquished Turks comprises the problem of the National Struggle, and three-and-a-half years were spent in disentangling it. Enver Paşa, with the message that:

“On account of the separate armistice, the form which my motherland will be taking is a clear sign that I will not be able to be of use in the near future in these lands . . . [and so] I am departing for Kafkasya [Caucasia] where I hope I will be contributing something in a useful manner”³

had left; but there still remained a number of candidates, belonging to the same generation, who could fill his position. Notwithstanding the objective differences, differences of principle in the mode in which the approaching political revolution was conceived and, no less, differences of personalities, they all seem to have had a common purpose: to grasp the *zimam-ı idare* at all costs. When the opposing side would not let them go, it became imperative to obtain them by coercion, not through conciliation. With the rise of coercion in Anatolia, the claim of İstanbul to legitimacy waned and the ground abandoned by the “Imperialists” was reclaimed by the “Nationalists”. In the mean duration of the armed resistance, this progress imposed increasing sacrifices on the people on behalf of those candidates who could realize their aspirations and from whose liberation the military derived a mutual benefit; and the achievement of this progress, therefore, was the convergence of interests of those Ottoman *paşas* and the people. Neither side wanted to live under alien occupation, neither had a disinterested motive nor could one succeed without the help of the other. This convergence of interests, in my opinion, reached its peak on

5 August 1921 – the day the Grand National Assembly (*Büyük Millet Meclisi*) voted unanimously for its President, former Ottoman Brigadier-General Mustafa Kemal Paşa, to become the Commander-in-Chief (*Başkumandan*) so that:

“Regarding the augmentation of the moral and material strength of the armed forces to its maximum and, still more, the consolidation of their leadership and administration, [he] is authorized, in the name of the Assembly, in act, to make use of the powers of the Grand National Assembly concerning these [matters] [. . . Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin buna müteallik salâhiyetini Meclis namına fiilen istimalle mezundur.]”⁴

“According to this article, the orders I would give would be law”;⁵ this is how Mustafa Kemal Paşa put it. And, in fact, they were law and had the force of law. They extended from the requisitioning of one apiece of underclothing, pair of socks and *çarıks* (rawhide sandals) from every dwelling “in the motherland [vatanda]” to the setting up of Independence Tribunals (*İstaklâl Mahkemeleri*) initially in the districts of Kastamonu, Samsun, Konya, Eskişehir and Ankara. Mustafa Kemal Paşa had now achieved a degree of power never possessed by Enver Paşa. The very existence of this power, Weberian *Macht*, actually meant in no uncertain sense that power was power over others. It was identifiable with all the force and authority that the Ankara Government could muster. Power was interpreted exclusively as the only effective available means for getting what the Nationalists wanted by preventing the Allies from getting what they wanted, because the motive of domination had become an obsession in Anatolia. The appointment, by intensifying antagonisms and passions, produced new combinations in politics and a newer horizon: the momentum of the *zımm-ı idare* passed from the hands of the Allied commanders back into those of, this time, Mustafa Kemal Paşa. On 7 October 1921, in a “Memorandum by the [British] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs”:

“. . . One thing seem[ed] clear . . . , namely that, in spite of some hostile symptoms, the national movement, with Mustapha Kemal either as dictator or figurehead, ha[d] a real hold on Asia Minor.”⁶

It was a hold which Field-Marshal (*Müşir-Gazî*) Mustafa Kemal Paşa (as he was promoted after his victory at the Battle of Sakarya, 23 August-13 September 1921) would not willingly loosen after it had received a military, political and indeed popular sanction. Even those bewildered intellectuals who, three years earlier, had looked forward to a mandate from the United States as a judicious expedient and last resort, now adopted revolution. Only then did

the civilian intellectuals become much aware of the military's explicit doctrine of total war as the effective vehicle for the right of armed resistance towards liberation, and therefore for the necessity of participation by the masses. The blending of these sanguinary sentiments with revolution was a novelty. It served to increase resistance and lent credence to the conviction that an absolutist conception of warfare would best be adopted by the most authoritarian personality.

Here, we need not speak at length about the inception and the conduct of the War of Independence (*İstiklâl Harbî*), as it has come to be known, at its various theatres (*Anadolu muharebeleri*). Nor is it necessary for our purpose to assess the part played in it either by the ideas and acts perpetuated to vindicate yet another war to the war-weary, disaffected and profoundly depressed population, or by the person of Mustafa Kemal. The country which in 1918 seemed to be dying, if not already dead, first defied the victors of the "Great War" and then won almost everything it demanded at the Lausanne Conference table in 1923. All in all, however, one point cannot be emphasised enough: its success was due to sheer warfare, for the strategic element, the factor of the military, must be treated as an organic part of the whole episode, including the diplomatic manoeuvring. To put it succinctly, had it not been for the nationalist officers there would have been no Turkish nation-state. This proposition may easily be overlooked unless a corollary of it is brought into account. The factor of the military did not blindly interrupt the life of the society from outside; it only reacted when its grip on that society had been interrupted by alien militaries. The process of the former succeeding the latter impinged upon an irreducible chain of known effects and circumstances which culminated in the establishment of a nation-state by the former. While the military acted as the commander of the revolution, it remained throughout itself under the command of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. He alone provided what Berkes calls the "nucleus of leadership" as the "factor of great importance"⁷ towards the birth of a revolutionary régime, the Republic (29 October 1923). "Republic" was also the name of the new military seal, impressed anew by a member of Enver Paşa's generation. And the most visible indication of the new military seal was its being "Republican".

We saw that career experiences and military indoctrination at all levels since about 1900 had resulted in much broader perspectives than had been the tradition. Though the consequences may be open to some dispute, it is possible to detect certain definitive effects of these. It may well have been that, in general, these experiences had the effect of making the officer corps more critical of and

more negative toward civilians – politicians and bureaucrats alike. In particular, however, prevailing patterns of belief in the military were those of official Ottoman nationalism surviving as a sort of outer-coating to conceal what was gradually hardening into Turkish nationalism underneath, constitutionalism in the sense that the officers were the Guardians of the Constitution (*Nigâhban-ı Meşrutîyet*) and, under Enver Paşa, overt disciplinarianism.

“Guardians of the Constitution” was the most recognizable symbol of the Young Turks’ régime – a symbol which served to ritualize the political process to the extent of crystallization. The political indoctrination, therefore, was designed to condition the officer corps through developing such forms as the result of thinking of themselves as the Guardians of the Constitution. From this standpoint, what was at issue after the establishment of the nation-state was a most important shift in the conception of political change which would again weld the officer corps into ideological unity. Just as there was a coalition of the military with the other social groups, such as partisans, at the institutional level during the National Struggle, so too did the progenitors of the nation-state place great emphasis on the unanimity of Turkish nationalist sentiments within the renascent officer corps and selected newcomers; they also made sure that the nationalist enthusiasm of the civilian activists fused with that of the soldiers. Thus, the affinity between the basic modes of thought and the mode of military organization constituted intrinsic politicization, and the two patterns of extrinsic politicization – namely, recruitment, promotion and discharge first; indoctrination and education second – attuned the military to the most fundamental preoccupations of the revolutionary culture.

The foregoing argument is indispensable if we are to see the new military seal in these terms: the Ottoman military, acting in the political ruling group role under the direction of Enver Paşa and after the intermission under that of Mustafa Kemal Paşa, transformed itself into acting in the pressure group role – the lowest form of conscious political acts, exerting influence on government institutions mainly for its own advantage. The transformation was carried out from above, but with mutual consent and in parallel with the reduction of the “actors”, retaining only the most reliable members of the “company” and recruiting new members from the nation. The emergent officer corps appeared as a completely homogeneous and disciplined force. Dominated by the clear, new but ever-existing seal of military tradition, the officer corps was metamorphosed from a purely gun-barrel élite into a sacrosanct élite – seemingly subordinated to civilian authority but

providing the actual power base, thus retaining, nay, jealously watching its own latent autonomy of action from the commanding heights. It is, however, supremely significant that the military at once opted for a political label which, of all the contemporary views, was closest to it; all the more so, for this was the most commensurate with the perception of the macrocosm of the state – in fact, a republic.

Indeed, the inclusion of the concept “Republic” and its corollary, the “Armed Forces of the Republic [*Cumhuriyet Orduları*]” – used for the first time on 15 February 1924 by the President of that Republic himself, significantly, in a speech made to the Military High Command – clearly established the officer as the defender also of the concept of the “Turkish homeland [*Türk yurdu*]”. Above all, these two concepts were embraced by that of duty throughout the officers’ careers. Here, the crucial point is that the officers thereafter became honour- and even oath-bound to adhere to the régime; and the military, established on the lines of the Armed Forces of the Régime, thus made the officers the Guardians of the Republic (*Nigâhban-ı Cumhuriyet*) – as they might be labelled.

Here I argue that such, like their predecessors, legitimized the politics of the military’s politics – politics which were enshrined in the regular officer’s Oath of Service, laid down in the Armed Forces Internal Service Law (*Ordu Dahilî Hizmet Kanunu*) of 10 June 1935 (No.2771). It required him for the first time, explicitly, in Article 35, to:

“... take the oath on my honour that I will, in peace, in war, on land, at sea and in the air, always and everywhere serve my nation and my Republic unswervingly and devotedly and obey the laws and regulations and my superiors [... her zaman ver her yerde milletime ve cumhuriyetime doğruluk ve muhabbetle hizmet ve kanunlara ve nizamlara ve âmirlerime itaat edeceğimi ...], and hold dearer than my life the honour of the military and the Turkish banner, and will, if necessary, on behalf of the motherland, Republic and duty, joyfully sacrifice my life.”⁸

This was his vocation, a sense of which was evident in the first clause of Article 34 of the said Law:

“The duty of the military is to look after and protect the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic [... Türk Cumhuriyetini kollamak ve korumaktır] which has been determined [as such] in the Constitution.”⁹

This was also his task in both the strictly military sense and in the more crystallized sense of a calling. The “looking after” and “protecting” of the “Turkish Republic” was his distinct and overriding

concern: a kind a “duty” which, to say the least, was conceptually nebulous. At one level, the duty meant instant and unquestioned obedience “. . . always and everywhere . . . to the laws and regulations and . . . superiors . . .”. And obedience was secured, starting from as early as 27 October 1923 when a Special Commission (*Heyet-i Mahsusa*) was set in motion in Bursa, by the various means of implicit and explicit as well as a number of specific controls together with repeated legal and sufficient normative restraints. At another level, most probably at a higher one, the duty was “. . . loyalty to the Republic [*Cumhuriyet sadakat*]”.¹⁰ The potential and indeed ineluctable problems, epitomizing the inconsistency seemingly inherent in the resolution of these two concepts of duty should not debar us from an assertion on the Turkish military’s place in politics; as it did not debar, but rather positively permitted, the Republican military from asserting its place, namely to intervene when the officers deemed it necessary “. . . to look after and protect” “the homeland” or “the Republic” or both – the objects with which they wholly identified themselves.

If I wanted sufficient self-assertion I need say no more; but then I should be out in my analysis if I failed to give due place also to a more recent and highly visible example of the Turkish military’s assertion of their place in politics. As I did in the Prologue, once again I should let the military speak for themselves, better still, this time let their chief spokesman, General (*Orgeneral*) Kenan Evren as the “Head of State, Chairman of the National Security Council, [and] Chief of the General Staff”, have his say. As he wrote:

“The Turkish Armed Forces intervened on 12 September 1980 to take over the administration of the country in accordance with its Internal Service Act which assigns to them the responsibility of ‘safeguarding and protecting the Turkish Republic’ . . . Whenever the Turkish Armed Forces have been faced with the necessity of ‘safeguarding the Turkish Republic’ they have undertaken this task unhesitatingly and for the sole purpose of preserving the . . . integrity of the country.”¹¹

Were I to observe properly the military mind with its perceptions, think similarly with its faculties and then judge fairly by its canons, I would no doubt find the nebulous concept of duty not at all nebulous. That duty is “in every trait of instinct, in the inmost marrow” of General Evren and his ilk; it is politics. And it is at this point that we draw to a close.

For even if much still remains to be said on the details, and that would require a separate study, the themes I have emphasised in this book seem adequate for our present purpose, which has

been to demonstrate, through a representative example, that no military institution remains outside "politics". The Ottoman imperial and, by projection, the Turkish national militaries have never been out of politics. But both have at times been pushed or voluntarily stood back (and in the case of the Turkish national military stood back for a considerable period) from day-to-day, or partisan, politics – the governmental policy-making activity itself. As is well known, the Turkish national military refrained, or was obliged to refrain, from playing the interventionist role until 1960. Nor, in view of the control of the military's conscious political acts, did the military fully indulge in what I have already called the conjunctive role – the lowest level at which I hold a military to exceed its immediate sphere of professional reference in governmental policy-making activity. All told, the political stance of the two military institutions, imperial and national, has always been formulated and indeed legalized, then legitimized, as *Nigâhban-ı Meşrutiyet* or possibly, with an eye to semantics, *Nigâhban-ı Cumhuriyet*. The point I wish to stress is that while the passage from one to the other indicates the continuity, it is the change of label that shows the loyalty (*sadakat*). And loyalty, to my mind, is the concept most fundamental to institutional politics, whether military, bureaucratic or judicial – the three key institutions. As for the present study of military politics, it is loyalty which ultimately determines the political aspects of civil-military relations, in that the object of that loyalty identifies the characteristic bent of a military.

To the loyal military, the cause of that loyalty is objective; the cause serves more than the individual officer's self-interest or the military's corporate interest so long as the cause is, in both cases, not abstract. Thus, the interests of the officer corps extend beyond simply their own interests to juxtapose with the interests of the people whom they are pledged to serve and uphold. In other words, the officer corps' interests must be social, strictly confined to the interests of the society from which they emanate and to which they feel they belong – that is, involving a social unity. So conceived, loyalty becomes not only a guide to the life of the people of that society but, more importantly, it facilitates social unity; it becomes the will to manifest a moral unity in the life of mere mortal soldiers. Hence, loyalty is the ground of the officers' moral activity, governing their disposition to identify their object of loyalty and remain loyal to it. And whatever the object, from a monarchy to a republic – on a broad constitutional basis – within the body politic of a given social order, so long as a military institution pledges loyalty to and through its symbols, remains loyal and, most important of all, feels

loyal, that institution cannot even begin to be said to be outside politics. Yet, conversely, this very device may be the most successful means of keeping the military, and other key institutions, detached from day-to-day “party” politics while retaining its latent autonomy of action at a higher level. Nor should it be ignored that identification with the object – that is, the manner of government – is in itself a political formula which is given a partisan colouring by virtue of the nature of that régime.

Just so, in my own example, by continuously remaining loyal to one régime or another, did the military of both the Empire and the Republic, like any other military, remain in politics continuously.

Notes

- 1 However, prompted by the present study, I have propounded a new doctrine of continuity which should also be applied to Turkish historiography: M.N. Turfan, “On historical continuity in national history”, *Journal of human sciences*, VI:1, 1987, pp. 139–149.
- 2 Document dated 28 Teşrinievvel 1338 (28 October 1922). Reproduced in facsimile in: *Harp tarihi vesikaları dergisi*, 58 (Aralık) 1966, Vesika No.1339; from H.T.A., Dolap:30, Göz:3, Dosya Sa:22, Klasör Sa:1737.
- 3 The letter is reproduced in full in: C. Bayar, *Ben de yazdım: millî mücadeleye gidiş*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965–1972. 8 cilt. Cilt 1, p. 126. His date of departure, as 2/3 November 1918, and relevant material are found in: M. Yamauchi, *The green crescent under the red star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922*. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991; p. 9.
- 4 “Madde 2” of “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Hazretlerine Başkumandanlık Tevcihi Hakkında Kanun”, in: *T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi* [T.B.M.M. Z.C.], Cilt 12, I.Devre, 62.İçtima, 5.8.1337, 3.Celse, p. 18 and pp. 19–21. Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaası, 1958. Also see: F.R. Unat, “Mustafa Kemal Paşa’nın Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Orduları Başkumandanlığına tayini ve kendilerine Müşürlük Rütbesiyle Gazilik ünvanının verilmesi hakkında bazı vesikalar”, *Tarih vesikaları*, II:8 (Ağustos) 1942, pp. 81–100. Further, an additional document, reproduced in full and in facsimile, in: M.F. Kırzioğlu, “Atatürk’e ait bilinmeyen yedi vesika”, *Türk kültürü*, XIV:164 (Haziran) 1976, pp. 468–486, Belge Sa.V, p. 478, and p. 484 for the facsimile.
- 5 K. Atatürk, *Nutuk*. İstanbul: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, [1950–1959]. 3 cilt. Cilt 2, p. 613.
- 6 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs”. From Lord Curzon, 7 October 1921. *F.O.* 371/6533. Six days earlier, a “Memorandum by the [British] Secretary of State for War” assessed the “Position of Mustapha Kemal” along similar lines, and added:

“... Mustapha Kemal is in such a strong military position, that there appears to be no reason why he should moderate his political demands, in the event of peace negotiations being re-opened.”*

This memorandum, however, had a blunt "conclusion":

"... it is the opinion of the General Staff that the Greek Army is not capable of enforcing a decision upon the Turkish Nationalist ...".**

* "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War". The situation in Anatolia, 1 October 1921. From Cabinet Office, no. C.P. 3434. F.O. 371/6533.

** *ibid.*. Hence, the "Despatch by [Lieut.-]General [Sir C.H.] Harrington, ["C-in-C The British Forces in Turkey"] on the British occupation in Turkey November 1920 to evacuation in 1923", commented, in Para.5: "We were able, during the winter of 1920 and spring of 1921, to deal with the situation in Constantinople, but as the Kemalist army grew in strength and organization, it was evident to me that the foundation was being laid at Angora of a weapon which was intended to drive the Greek Army out of Anatolia and force the Allies to evacuate Constantinople."

Harrington to Secretary of State for War, G.H.Q., Constantinople, 20 October 1923, W.O. 32/5743.

And in a book published three years later, none other than George Young, of "Diplomatist" fame, was to point out the "unexpected factor" in the comfortable Versailles settlement:

"Under Moustapha Kemal, the Turkish nation revived, with an irresistible insurgence that overturned the whole structure of our Near-Eastern diplomacy. It was unexpected; but it might have been foreseen."

G. Young, *Constantinople*. London: Methuen and Co., 1926; pp. 286-287.

For a concise overview and assessment of the "national movement" led by Mustafa Kemal, see: M.N. Turfan, "Turkey: the building of a modern state", pp. 10-31 in *Blue guide Turkey*. 2nd ed. London: A & C Black, 1995; esp. pp. 11-17.

7 N. Berkes, *The development of secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964; p. 435.

8 The Law, No.2771 – promulgated on 18 June 1935, is reproduced in full in: F. Çoker (hazırlayan), *Askerî kanun ve nizamlarımız*. İstanbul: [T.C. M.M.V. Dz.Kuv.Kumd.] Deniz Basımevi, 1959. 3 cilt. [Hereafter, F. Çoker, *Askerî kanun*]. Cilt II, pp. 1-13, p. 5.

For further legal details, see: S. Kirişoğlu – M. Kabasakaloğlu, *En son değişikliklere göre, notlu – izahlı, Ordu Dahilî Hizmet Kanun ve Talimatnamesi ve ilgili mevzuat*. Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959. [Hereafter, S. Kirişoğlu – M. Kabasakaloğlu, *Ordu Dahilî Hizmet*]; pp. 21-100, pp. 58-59. Later developments are studied in: M. Erdoğan, "Silahlı kuvvetlerin Türk anayasa düzeni içindeki yeri", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi dergisi*, XLV:1-4 (Ocak-Aralık) 1990, pp. 309-334.

9 F. Çoker, *Askerî kanun*, Cilt II, pp. 1-13, p. 5. Also see: S. Kirişoğlu – M. Kabasakaloğlu, *Ordu Dahilî Hizmet*, pp. 21-100, p. 58.

In this connection, a discussion of what I term the principle of military preoccupation may be found in: M.N. Turfan, " 'Looking after and protecting the Republic': the legitimization of the military's authority in Turkey", *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI)*, 5 (janvier) 1988, pp. 53-71, esp. pp. 64-68.

10 In Article 36, 2nd Clause, in: F. Çoker, *Askerî kanun*, Cilt II, pp. 1-13, p. 5. In fact, the word "Cumhuriyet [Republic]" occurs no less than four times in the course of Articles 34, 35 and 36.

Also see: S. Kirişoğlu – M. Kabasakaloğlu, *Ordu Dahilî Hizmet*, pp. 21-100, p. 58-59.

- 11 The General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: before and after*. Ankara: Ogun Kardeşler Printing House, 1982; Preface, pp. IX-X.
For General Evren's legal justification, see the "Türk Silâhlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Kanunu", Kanun No: 211, Kabul Tarih: 4.1.1961, in: İ. Polatcan, *Notlu - açıklamalı - içtihatlı Türk Silâhlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Kanunu ve Yönetmeliği, Askeri Ceza Kanunu, Disiplin Mahkemeleri Kanunu*. İstanbul: Arpaz Matbaacılık Tesisleri, 1984; pp. 11-109, p. 57. Cf., the learned comments of *Hâkim Albay* (lit., Judge Colonel) Saçlıoğlu, then a member of the Military Supreme Court of Appeal: N. Saçlıoğlu, "Siyaset ve asker", *Askerî adalet dergisi*, 38 (Nisan) 1966, pp. 3-7.

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Index

Note numbers are indicated in *italic* after the relevant chapters and can be found on the following pages:

Prologue: iii-iv
Chapter 2: 69-129
Preamble [to Part III]: 137-41
Chapter 3: 213-84
Chapter 4: 363-428
Epilogue: 441-3

Abaza Mehmed Paşa, 39
Abdülaziz (1861-76), 60-1
 notes, Ch. 2: 218, 232
Abdülhamid I (1774-89), 46, 49
Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), 62-8,
 144-9, 160-3, 168
 notes
 Ch. 2: 225-7, 249
 Preamble: 2
 Ch. 3: 1, 5, 13, 31, 51, 75, 99, 107
Abdullah Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 3: 235
Abdülmecid (1839-61), 56-7
 notes, Ch. 2: 213
Abuk Ahmed Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 4: 42
Action Army, 135, 159-63, 166, 314
 notes
 Preamble: 10, 12
 Ch. 3: 87-8, 91, 201
 Ch. 4: 102
Adana Incident (1909), 167
Adrianople *see* Edirne
Aegean Islands, 205, 211-12
 notes
 Ch. 3: 257, 268
 Ch. 4: 8, 55, 158
ahis, 16
 notes, Ch. 2: 8, 13
Ahmed (d.1513), 31
 notes, Ch. 2: 92
Ahmed I (1603-17), 37
Ahmed III (1703-30), 46
 notes, Ch. 2: 147, 162
Ahmed Bedevi (Kuran) Bey, 175,
 298-9, 328
Ahmed İzzet (Furğaç) Paşa
 notes
 Ch. 3: 2, 20, 25, 84, 109, 142, 148,
 222, 234, 239, 60, 285, 287

 Ch. 4: 7, 11-12, 30, 54, 128, 133,
 155, 169, 179, 188, 95, 255, 274
Balkan War, 288-9, 317, 333
Chief of the General Staff, 164, 173
control of military, 292, 346-8
Deputy Commander-in-Chief, 211-12
Edirne, 297, 301-2, 334, 336
Enver Paşa, 358
Liman von Sanders Mission, 323,
 325-6
Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 288-9, 292,
 325-6
 officer corps, 288-9, 292, 347, 353
 resignation as Minister of War,
 348-50, 352-3
Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Gazi*, 183-4, 186,
 190, 194, 197
 notes
 Ch. 3: 25, 123, 204, 209, 212, 228,
 230, 235, 239-40
 Ch. 4: 1
Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 2: 158
Ahmed Reşid Bey, 199
 notes, Ch. 3: 276
Ahmed Rıza Bey, 135, 166, 169
 notes, Ch. 3: 22, 84, 164
Ahmed Samim Bey, 171
Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, 159, 205
 notes
 Ch. 3: 97
 Ch. 4: 8
Akçuraoğlu Yusuf (Akçura) Bey
 notes
 Ch. 2: 235
 Ch. 3: 186
 Ch. 4: 300
Akkoyunlu State, 30
alaylıs, 65, 134, 156-62, 165, 292
 notes

- Preamble: 5
 Ch. 3: 20, 68–70, 73–4, 84, 89, 113, 188
- Albania/Albanians, 35, 351
notes
 Ch. 3: 15, 20, 132–3, 254, 257
 Ch. 4: 58, 158, 255, 305
- insurrections
notes, Ch. 3: 189–90, 211
 (1910), 167–71
 (1912), 179–80, 186
- Âlemdâr Mustafa of Rusçuk, 52
- Algeria, *notes*, Ch. 2: 195
- Ali Paşa, 58
notes, Ch. 2: 213
- Ali (Çetinkaya) Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 3: 161
- Ali Cevad Bey
notes
 Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 1, 15
- Ali Fethi Bey, 153, 178, 201, 290–1, 295–6, 345
notes
 Ch. 3: 161, 262
 Ch. 4: 15, 18, 170
- Ali Fuad (Cebesoy) Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 4: 282
- Ali Fuad (Türkgeldi) Bey, 207, 210, 212, 315, 337
notes
 Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 56, 239, 246, 275
- Ali Haydar Bey
notes
 Ch. 3: 63, 224, 260–1
 Ch. 4: 186
- Ali Kabûli Bey, *notes*, Preamble: 9
- Ali Rıza Paşa, 153, 166
notes
 Preamble: 8–9
 Ch. 3: 15, 25, 50, 84
- Amcazâde Hüseyin Paşa, 46
- Anatolia/Anatolians, 9, 26, 32, 158
notes
 Ch. 2: 8–9, 19, 38, 52, 87, 110–11, 122, 167, 169, 171, 205, 244
 Ch. 3: 8, 186
 Ch. 4: 24, 54
 Epilogue, 6
- Anatolian soldiers, 158, 344
- âyan, 47, 51–2
- famine, 66
- insurrections, 25–6, 30–1, 36–7, 39–40
- local dynasties, 25, 32
- Osman I's principality, 16–17
- provincial power, 38–9
- social disintegration (16th century), 34–6
- strikes, 148
- Turkish National Struggle, 434–5
- Turkish nationalism, 433
- yeniçeris, 26, 38–9
- Ankara, 435
notes, Epilogue, 6
 battle of (1402), 25
notes, Ch. 2: 53
- Arab provinces/Arabs, 52, 167, 173
notes, Ch. 3: 20, 132, 186
- Arif Hikmet Paşa, 153
- Armenians, 167, 431
- armies
 Ist Army, 163, 314
notes, Ch. 3: 103
- IInd Army, 65–7, 135, 153, 160, 163, 180, 314
notes
 Ch. 2: 249
 Preamble: 10–11
 Ch. 3: 20, 89, 103, 194
- IIIRD Army i, 65–7, 135, 154, 161
notes
 Ch. 2: 249
 Preamble: 9–10
 Ch. 3: 55, 89, 91, 103
- IVth Army, *notes*, Ch. 3: 89
- Vth Army, 65
notes, Ch. 3: 89
- VIth Army, *notes*, Ch. 3: 89, 201
- VIIth Army
notes
 Ch. 3: 89
 Ch. 4: 282
- Xth Army Corps, 201, 294–7
notes, Ch. 4: 15, 30, 155
- officers *see* Officer corps; Saviour Officers; Young officers
- see also* Action Army; Bolayır “Allotted” Army; Bolayır Army Corps; Çatalca Army [Group]; Hassa Ordusu; Mediterranean [Çanakkale] Straits “Allotted” Army Corps
- Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye, 53, 55
notes, Ch. 2: 197, 200

- Askerî*, 20–1, 23, 29, 33, 36, 40–1
notes
 Ch. 2: 19, 23, 118, 122, 138
 Ch. 3: 80
- Aşere-i Mübeşşere*, 346, 348, 350, 352
- Austria, 34, 44–6, 49, 148, 288, 342–3, 362
notes
 Ch. 2: 104, 106, 110, 151, 153, 157, 165, 197
 Ch. 3: 30, 254
 Ch. 4: 109, 186, 305
- âyan*, 37, 47–53, 56
notes, Ch. 2: 167, 169–75, 188
- Azerbaijan, 30–1
notes, Ch. 4: 198
- Aziz Bey, 178
- Aziz Ali (al-Misri) Bey
notes
 Ch. 3: 161
 Ch. 4: 284
- Azmi Bey, 298
notes, Ch. 4: 1, 34
- Bab-ı Âli Baskını* see Raid on the Sublime Porte
- baba'is*, 16
notes, Ch. 2: 8
- Baghdad, 39
notes
 Ch. 2: 232
 Ch. 3: 201
- Bala Hatun, *notes*, Ch. 2: 13
- Balkan War (1912–13), 322, 327, 346, 348, 361–2, 432
notes
 Ch. 3: 28, 132, 186, 222, 229–70, 287
 Ch. 4: 5–24, 31–4, 48–58, 107–19, 148, 158, 174–230, 282, 296, 299, 304–5
- first phase, 194–201, 211
- peace negotiations, 201–9, 212, 297–8, 329, 339–44
- recognition of services, 353–4, 356
- resumption of hostilities, 288–94
- second phase, 316–17, 332–4
- see also Edirne; Enos-Midia line; Şarköy-Bolayır offensive
- Balkans, 17, 23, 27, 61, 194–6, 199, 293, 316, 321
notes
 Ch. 2: 33, 220
 Ch. 3: 28, 186
- Baphaion, battle of (1302), 17–18
- Basri Efendi, 68
notes, Ch. 2: 251
- Bayezid I (1389–1402), 25
notes, Ch. 2: 49, 52–3
- Bayezid II (1481–1512), 29–31
notes, Ch. 2: 15, 80, 84, 86
- Bedreddin Efendi, Seyh, 26
- bektaşis*, *notes*, Ch. 2: 13
- Belgium, *notes*, Ch. 2: 197
- Berlin, 55, 153, 173
notes, Ch. 2: 158
 4: 102, 176, 192, 258, 274, 309
- Congress of (1878)
notes
 Ch. 3: 28
 Ch. 4: 299
- beys, 19–21, 23–5
notes, Ch. 2: 5, 25, 53, 55
- Bolayır
 “Allotted” Army, 336–7
notes, Ch. 4: 191
- Army Corps, 295
- Bosna (Bosnia), 35, 61, 148, 362
notes, Ch. 2: 165
- Boşnak Hüsrev Paşa, 39
- Bulgaria/Bulgarians, 12
notes
 Ch. 3: 50, 230, 233, 239, 242, 246, 248, 254, 256–7
 Ch. 4: 8, 15, 24, 49, 108, 110, 113, 158, 181, 183, 202–3, 215
- Balkan War, 196–7, 288–90, 301, 316–17, 332–4
- Edirne, 206, 209, 294, 297–8, 316, 336–7, 340
- independence, 148
- peace negotiations, 200–3, 327, 340, 342–4
- uprisings, 61
- Bursa, 27, 151, 439
notes, Ch. 3: 23, 25, 248
- Byzantine Empire, 12, 16
notes, Ch. 2: 33, 55, 167
- Cabinet, 60
notes
 Ch. 2: 227
- Preamble: 3
- Ch. 3: 10, 12–13, 15, 126, 140, 168, 190, 199, 202, 205, 211, 228, 233, 249, 262, 265, 275, 287

- Ch. 4: 1, 8, 32, 43, 56, 76, 80, 100, 124, 146, 178–9, 183, 309
- Balkan War peace negotiations, 197–8, 200, 203–4, 206–8, 297, 302
- Edirne, 297, 327, 333, 336, 340–1
- Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, 184, 186–7, 190–1, 195, 291
- Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, 134, 160
- Kâmil Paşa, 145–7, 160, 197–8, 200, 203–4, 328
- Liman von Sanders Mission, 323
- Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 212, 287–8, 290–1, 297, 302, 323, 327
- Minister of War, 164, 173
- Said Paşa, 182–3
- Said Halim Paşa, 331, 333, 336, 340, 346, 351
- see also Grand Council
- Cairo, 65, 298–9
- Caliph/Caliphate, 62
- notes, Ch. 2: 14, 143, 147, 227
- Carlowitz, Treaty of (1699), 45
- Cavid Bey, 167, 188, 192, 332–3, 360
- notes
- Ch. 3: 13, 15, 141, 211, 216
- Ch. 4: 51
- Cavid Paşa, 169–70
- Celâl (Bayar) Bey, 199–200
- celâlis, 36–7
- notes, Ch. 2: 122
- Cem (d.1495), 29
- notes, Ch. 2: 80, 83–4
- Cemal Bey, 347, 354, 359, 362
- notes
- Ch. 3: 13
- Ch. 4: 1, 34, 41–3, 122, 154–5, 194, 248, 304
- Çatalca front, 201
- deals with anti-Unionist conspiracy, 298–300
- Edirne, 336
- Liman von Sanders Mission, 319–23
- Mahmud Şevket Paşa assassination, 328–32
- Cemaleddin Efendi, *Şeyhülislâm*, 187, 195, 206
- notes, Ch. 3: 235
- Cemil (Topuzlu) Paşa, notes, Ch. 3: 15, 234–5
- Central Asia, 20
- notes, Ch. 2: 52
- Central Powers, 431
- Cevad (Çobanlı) Bey, 166
- Cevad Paşa, notes, Ch. 3: 73
- Chamber of Deputies, 163, 166, 294
- notes
- Preamble: 5
- Ch. 3: 46, 84, 89, 93, 131, 141, 149
- Albanian insurrection (1910), 168–9
- Committee of Union and Progress, 150, 152–5, 176–8
- general election, 176–8
- officer corps, 153–5
- Saviour Officers, 185
- 31st March Incident, 135, 160–1
- Christendom/Christians, 16–17, 23, 26, 44–5, 50, 58–9, 62, 67
- Christian minorities, Ottoman, 26, 58–9, 63–4, 66, 152
- notes, Ch. 2: 19, 167, 211, 213
- Cihanşah b. Kara Yusuf Bey (1437–67), 29
- Committee of National Defence, 289
- notes, Ch. 4: 14
- Committee of Union and Progress
- notes
- Prologue: 1
- Ch. 2: 242
- Ch. 3: 5, 7–8, 13, 19, 21–2, 31, 33, 38–40, 42–5, 48, 50, 55, 59–60, 62–3, 80, 86, 88–9, 99, 101, 123, 147, 154, 166, 168, 171, 174–5, 183, 186, 188, 190, 194, 201–29, 237, 246, 248, 260, 283
- Ch. 4: 1, 8, 14, 18, 37–9, 75, 80, 128, 146–7, 149, 156–7, 165, 170, 292–3, 304
- Albanian insurrections (1910) and (1912), 168–70, 179–80
- anti-Unionists, 151–2, 156–62, 171–2, 175, 177, 179–87, 192, 208, 298–301, 318, 326–31
- see also *alaylis*; İslâm/Islamic; Kâmil Paşa; Nâzım Paşa; Saviour Officers; İstanbul
- Balkan War, 197–201, 288–9, 294, 297–8
- Central Committee
- ii, 147, 149, 193, 303, 345, 359
- Congresses
- i–iii, 148–9, 193, 345
- dependence on the military, 147, 150, 152, 155–6, 177–82, 188, 203–4, 212, 286–7, 294–7, 300, 326–32, 341, 345, 348–50, 354, 359

- Enver Paşa, 345, 354, 357, 359
 general elections
 (1908), 151–2
 (1912), 177–8
 government relations, 145–50,
 152–6, 166–7, 176–8, 188
 hegemony, 321, 326–9, 331, 344,
 359, 362–3
 İstanbul by-election, 176
 military reform, 165–6
 nationalism, 199, 303–4
 New Clique, 172–3
 ousted from power, 182–4, 186, 300
 political party, 345
 Raid on the Sublime Porte, 203–4,
 208–10, 212
 restoration of the Constitution, 68,
 144
 Selânik, 192
 war in Trablusgarb, 175, 193
 Constantinople *see* İstanbul
 Constitution (1876), 60, 62, 66, 68
 notes
 Ch. 2: 132, 223, 225, 227
 Ch. 3: 10, 51, 97, 168
 restoration (1908), 67–8, 133–4,
 143–7, 157, 160, 164, 185, 189,
 195
 notes
 Ch. 2: 249
 Ch. 3: 8, 10, 13, 37, 51, 123
 Ch. 4: 198
 Council for Military Affairs, 60, 164,
 182–3, 358
 Council of Ministers *see* Cabinet
 coup d'état (1876), 59
 Crete, 44, 148, 329
 notes
 Ch. 3: 257
 Ch. 4: 55
 Crimean War (1854–56), 57
 Crusades, 25, 27
 Cyprus, 33, 209
 notes, Ch. 2: 110

 Çaldıran, battle of (1514), 32
 Çandarlı family, 27
 notes, Ch. 2: 60, 66
 Çandarlı Halil Paşa, 27–8
 notes, Ch. 2: 61, 66, 72
 Çatalca, 161, 197, 200–1, 210, 290–1,
 297, 301, 316, 323, 325
 notes
 Ch. 3: 241, 250, 256, 262, 275,
 287–8
 Ch. 4: 15, 54, 110, 155, 170, 174,
 188
 armistice (1912), 200, 288–9
 Army [Group], 336–7
 notes, Ch. 4: 42, 191
 Çelebi Bayezid (d.1561), *notes*, Ch. 2:
 110
 Çelebi Mehmed I (1413–21), 26–7
 notes, Ch. 2: 55
 Çelebi Musa (d.1413), 26
 notes, Ch. 2: 55
 Çerkes Kâzım Bey, 329–30
 notes, Ch. 4: 159
 Çürüksulu Mahmud Paşa, 297
 notes, Ch. 4: 1

 Dar-ı Sura-ı Askerî *see* Council for
 Military Affairs
 Delhi Sultanate, 430
 derebey *see* âyan
 Derviş Vahdetî, 159
 notes, Ch. 3: 77, 80
 devşirme, 25, 29, 31, 35–6, 38, 40–1
 notes, Ch. 2: 40, 50, 85, 110, 122
 DNA, 4, 10
 Dükakinzâde Ahmed Paşa, *notes*,
 Ch. 2: 95
 Dûlkâdir, 32

 Ede Balî, Seyh, *notes*, Ch. 2: 13
 Edhem Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 3: 25, 84, 161
 Edirne, 51
 notes
 Ch. 2: 15, 105
 Preamble: 11
 Ch. 3: 20, 88, 93, 248, 256–7, 260,
 263, 265, 268
 Ch. 4: 8, 24, 31–4, 49, 58, 113,
 125, 176, 179, 183, 185–6, 189,
 195–6, 200, 215, 234–5, 237,
 248
 IIInd Army, 65, 135
 Balkan War, 201–2, 290, 293, 317,
 320
 Balkan War peace negotiations,
 202–7, 293–4, 297–8, 327, 329,
 340–5
 Incidents
 (1703), *notes*, Ch. 2: 162
 (1806), 51
 loss of (March, 1913), 301–3, 312,
 314, 316, 327, 339

- Raid on the Sublime Porte, 205, 209, 211–12
 recovery of (July, 1913), 334–40, 342
 Egypt, 30–2, 64
notes, Ch. 2: 188
- Emin Bülend (Serdaroğlu) Efendi, 199
- Emir Süleyman, *notes*, Ch. 2: 55
- Emir Timur (1336–1405), 25
notes, Ch. 2: 52
- emlâk*, 30
notes, Ch. 2: 81
- Enos-Midia line, 334–6, 344
notes, Ch. 4: 55, 174, 181, 183, 191, 203
- Enver Bey (later Paşa), 153, 201, 434
notes
 Ch. 3: 63, 161, 205, 226, 260–2, 274, 278, 287
 Ch. 4: 1, 4, 7, 19, 30, 37, 100, 102–3, 108, 155, 170, 186, 195, 230, 234–5, 254, 258, 274–5, 282, 284–5, 287, 293–4, 309–10
- Balkan War, 288, 291, 295–6
 control of military, 313–16, 335, 346–8, 351, 354–62, 356, 359
- Edirne recovery, 335–7, 343
- Minister of War and Chief of General Staff, 313–16, 350–4
- officer corps ascendancy ii, 293, 295–6, 299, 313–16, 332, 345–62
- political ruling group ii, 358–61, 431–2, 435–7
- Raid on the Sublime Porte, 204, 208–12
- war in Trabluşgarb, 178
- Erkân-ı Harb*, 63, 66, 68, 156, 166
notes
 Ch. 2: 231, 251
 Ch. 3: 4, 68, 122–3, 132, 160, 284, 298
- Eşref Sencer Bey, 350
notes, Ch. 4: 155, 195, 254
- Europe/Europeans, 55, 67, 158
notes
 Ch. 2: 153, 200, 212–13, 225, 248
 Ch. 3: 33, 80, 230, 249
 Ch. 4: 119, 189, 299, 302
- Balkan War, 202, 335, 337, 341–2, 344
- Christian minorities, 66
- Ottomans move into, 23–4
- reforms imposed, 61
- as rivals, 22, 45, 50
- warfare with, 36, 44, 61
- Evren, General Kenan, 439
- Eydoux, General, 309, 324
notes, Ch. 4: 79
- Fahrettin (Altay) Bey, 136
- Fahri Paşa, 295–6
notes, Ch. 4: 15, 18
- Falih Rıfki (Atay) Bey, 339
notes, Ch. 4: 248
- Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, 44
- Fehim Paşa, 151
notes, Ch. 3: 37
- Ferid Paşa, 147
notes, Ch. 3: 24, 205
- Feyzullah Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 2: 162
- France/French, 57, 64, 202, 309, 324, 343
notes
 Ch. 2: 195, 197, 222
 Ch. 3: 159, 194
 Ch. 4: 34, 79
- Fuad Paşa, 58
notes, Ch. 2: 213
- Fuad (Bulca) Bey, *notes*, Ch. 3: 161
- Galip Bey, 161
- Gallipoli see Gelibolu
- gaza/gazi*, 16–17, 19–21, 23–4, 26–7, 29, 32, 44, 53, 193
notes
 Ch. 2: 5, 7, 13, 46, 151
 Ch. 3: 226
- Gazi Evrenos Bey, 25
notes, Ch. 2: 46
- Gaznavi state, 430
- Gedik Ahmed Paşa, 29
notes, Ch. 2: 72
- Gelibolu, 201, 290–1, 294, 296
- Genç Kalemler*, *notes*, Ch. 3: 186
- general elections
 (1908), 151–2
notes, Ch. 3: 45, 60
 (1912), 177
notes, Ch. 3: 174–6
- General National Assembly see Parliament
- General Staff, 164–5, 191, 194–5, 311–12, 319, 347
notes
 Ch. 3: 233
 Ch. 4: 103
- Geneva, 68

- Germany/Germans, 202, 289, 297,
308–10, 318–26, 335, 353,
362–3
notes
Ch. 3: 109, 159, 258
Ch. 4: 24, 80, 121–2, 125, 137,
309–10
- Ghaznavid state *see* Gaznavî state
- Gıyasuddin Mesud II, Selçuk (1284–97,
1302–18), 17
notes, Ch. 2: 12
- Goltz, Colmar Freiherr von der, 65
notes
Ch. 3: 109
Ch. 4: 80, 123
- Gökalp Ziya (Gökalp) Bey, 303–6, 331,
335, 354–5
notes
Ch. 3: 186
Ch. 4: 65, 72–3, 189
- Grand Council (January, 1913), 206–7,
211
notes, Ch. 3: 260
Ch. 4: 8
- Grand National Assembly (Ankara),
435
notes, Ch. 3: 161
- Great Britain/British, 12, 64, 183, 318
notes
Ch. 2: 195, 197, 222
Ch. 3: 48, 255, 263
Ch. 4: 8, 19, 43, 80
Balkan War, 334–5, 339, 341
Crimean War, 57
Kâmil Paşa collaboration, 299
reforms imposed, 61, 66
Turkish War of Independence, 435
World War I: 362
- Great Powers, 62, 330
notes, Ch. 2: 230, 240
Ch. 3: 243, 257, 263, 265, 268,
287
Ch. 4: 8, 50, 55–6, 58, 109, 158,
186, 192, 202–3, 306
Balkan peace negotiations, 200–8,
212, 288, 293–4, 301–2, 339–44
Balkan War, 198, 333–4, 336–7
Christian minorities, 64, 148
Liman von Sanders Mission, 310
World War I:, 362–3
- Greece/Greeks, 12
notes
Ch. 2: 195
Ch. 3: 230, 233, 239, 246, 254–5
Ch. 4: 24, 79, 296
Epilogue, 6
Allied occupation of Anatolia, 431
Balkan War, 196, 301, 317, 332–3,
344
French military mission, 309, 324
union with Crete, 148
war (1896–7), 64
- Grey, Sir Edward, 202, 206
notes
Ch. 3: 255, 258
Ch. 4: 32, 119, 158, 203, 215
- Guardians of the Constitution *see*
Military, “Guardians of the
Constitution [*Mesrutîyet*]”
- Guardians of the Republic *see* Military,
“Guardians of the Republic”
- Hacı Âdil Bey, 177, 288, 297
notes
Ch. 3: 260
Ch. 4: 1
- Hâfız Ahmed Paşa, 39
- Hâfız Hakkı Bey, 153
notes, Ch. 3: 13, 50
- Hakkı Bey (Chief Public Prosecutor),
207
- Hakkı Bey (Minister of Education), 147
notes, Ch. 3: 45
- Hakkı Efendi, 330–1
- Hakkı Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 4: 32
- Halaskârân Zabitan see* Saviour
Officers
- Halid Ziya (Uşaklıgil) Bey, 185
notes Ch. 3: 209
- Halide Edib (Adıvar)
notes
Ch. 3: 186
Ch. 4: 65, 69, 282, 299
- Halil Bey, 185, 294, 348–9, 352
notes
Ch. 3: 147, 210
Ch. 4: 24, 255
- Halil Hamid Paşa, 46
- Halil (Kut) Bey, 178
notes, Ch. 3: 161
Ch. 4: 1
- Halil (Menteşe) Bey, 177
- Halimi Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 2: 166
- Hapsburg Empire, 34
- Hasan Bey, 169
- Hasan Cemil Bey, *notes*, Ch. 4: 309
- Hasan Fehmi Bey (later Paşa), 159
notes, Ch. 3: 53, 86

- Hasan Halife Ağa, 39
- Hassa Ordusu, 134–5, 146, 150, 157–8
notes
 Preamble: 5, 8
 Ch. 3: 19–20, 25, 72, 84, 89, 103, 201
see also armies, Ist Army
- Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (1839), 56–7
- Hayri Bey, *notes*, Ch. 4: 1
- Hejaz, 32
- Hersek (Herzegovina), 61, 148
notes, Ch. 2: 165
- High Military Command, 65, 164, 197–200
notes, Ch. 4: 15
- Hizb-i Cedid *see* Committee of Union and Progress, New Clique
- Hukuk-u Umumiye, *notes*, Ch. 3: 27
- Hungary, 35, 37, 44
notes, Ch. 2: 83, 140
- Hurşid Paşa, 161, 183, 294–6
notes
 Preamble: 2
 Ch. 4: 15, 18
- Hünkâr İskeleyi, Treaty of (1833),
notes, Ch. 2: 195
- Hürriyet ve İtalâf Fırkası *see* Liberal Union
- Hüseyin Bey, *notes*, Ch. 3: 13
- Hüseyin Paşa, 53
- Hüseyin Avni Paşa, 61
notes, Ch. 2: 218
- Hüseyin Cahid Bey, 153, 321
notes, Ch. 3: 13, 46
- Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, 134, 154–5, 157, 163–5, 167
notes
 Preamble: 3, 9
 Ch. 3: 45, 53, 58, 63, 104, 125, 205, 211
 Ch. 4: 51, 274, 305
- Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa, 135, 153–4
notes
 Preamble: 12
 Ch. 4: 102
- Hüsrev Paşa, 56
notes, Ch. 2: 199
- Ibn Khaldun, 362
- Ilkhanid Empire *see* İlhanlı Empire
- Imperial Rescript (1839) *see* Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (1856) *see* Islâhat Fermanı
- Iran, 30–2, 34–5, 39–40, 46
notes, Ch. 2: 52, 115
- Iraq, 12
notes, Ch. 4: 133
- Islâhat Fermanı (1856), 58
notes, Ch. 2: 212
- Italy/Italians, 173–5, 178, 193
notes
 Ch. 3: 126, 151, 153, 157–60, 183, 230, 233
 Ch. 4: 14, 80
- İbrahim I (1640–8), 43
notes, Ch. 2: 120, 147
- İbrahim Bey, 328
- İbrahim Hakkı Paşa, 167, 174
notes, Ch. 3: 126, 154
- İbrahim Hilmi Paşa, 51
- İhtilâl (as “revolution”) *notes*, Ch. 2: 200
- İlhanlı Empire, 17
notes, Ch. 2: 52
- İlmiye, 20, 38, 159
notes, Ch. 2: 19
 Ch. 3: 80
- İshak Paşa, 29
notes, Ch. 2: 72, 85
- İskender Paşa, 32
- İslâm/Islamic, 12, 19
notes
 Ch. 2: 8, 13–14, 87, 213
 Ch. 3: 80
 Ch. 4: 68, 70, 294
- anti-Unionist opposition, 148, 158
- askerî, 20
- Caliphate, 62
- gaza, 16, 19, 29, 31–2
- heterodox movements, 26, 30–2
- orthodox Sunnî, 26, 30, 32, 50
- rationalist basis, 59
- legitimation of ruler’s authority, 17–18, 40
see also personality principle
- taklid, 50
- Turkish-Islamic nationalism, 303–4
- vs. “secular Christendom, 50
see also Society of Muhammad; Volkan
- İsmail (Canbulat) Efendi, *notes*,
 Preamble: 9
- İsmail Fazıl Paşa, 166
- İsmail Hakkı Bey, 168
- İsmail Kemal Bey, 169–70
- İsmail Mahir Paşa, 151
notes, Ch. 3: 37

- İsmail Safavî (1502-24), 30-2
 İsmet (İnönü) Efendi (later Bey/Paşa),
 162, 433
notes
 Ch. 3: 20, 288
 Ch. 4: 103, 197
- İstanbul
notes
 Ch. 2: 66, 84, 104, 197, 225, 232
 Preamble: 9, 12
 Ch. 3: 19-21, 55, 91, 93, 109, 122,
 149, 161, 166, 186, 191, 201,
 208, 244, 263
 Ch. 4: 1, 30, 34, 37, 42-3, 54, 58,
 102, 125, 155, 158, 170, 181,
 189
 Epilogue, 6
 Allied occupation (1918), 432, 434
 anti-Unionists, 180, 192, 298
 âyan, 51-2
 Balkan War, 197, 200-1, 205, 295-8,
 316-17, 336, 343
 by-election (1911), 176
 Congress of the Committee of Union
 and Progress see Committee of
 Union and Progress, Congresses
 conquest (1453), 27, 29
 Court-Martial, 174
 Enver Bey, 295-8, 351, 353
 gaza against İsmail Safavî, 32
 Guardian of see Cemal Bey
 navy, 154
 popular unrest, 148, 151, 173, 177,
 298
 restoration of the Constitution, 67,
 143-5
 Saviour Officers, 179, 187-8, 210
 staff-officers, 65, 295-7, 301
 31st March Incident, 134-6, 160-1,
 314
 Treaty of (1913), 344
 Unionist pressure, 145-6, 150,
 153-4
 yeniçeris, 28, 31, 33, 39
 İstiklâl Harbiye see Turkish War of
 Independence
 İttihad-i Muhammedî Cemiyeti see
 Society of Muhammad
 İttihad-i Osmanî Cemiyeti see Ottoman
 Union Society
 İzmit, 31, 161
- Kabakçı Mustafa Mutiny (1807), 51
notes, Ch. 2: 182
- kalemiye, 20, 25, 38
notes, Ch. 2: 19
- Kâmil Paşa
notes
 Ch. 3: 12, 14-15, 24-5, 27, 45-6,
 48, 50-1, 55, 62, 201, 205, 242,
 246, 262, 275
 Ch. 4: 4, 8, 24, 80, 202, 301
 anti-Unionists, 147, 149, 153, 155,
 199-200, 208, 299
 Balkan War, 197-200, 203, 206-7,
 211, 339
 Cabinet, 145-7, 154, 160, 197-8,
 200, 203-4, 328
 Great Britain collaboration, 299
 navy, 154-5
 officer corps, 154-5, 198, 208, 286
 Raid on the Sublime Porte, 203,
 208-11, 328
 Saviour Officers, 183
 kapıkulus, 23-4, 27, 33-7, 40, 45-6,
 54, 356
notes, Ch. 2: 34, 49-50, 107,
 113, 147, 150, 153, 162, 167,
 200
- Karakoyunlu state, 29
- Karamani Mehmed Paşa, 28-9
notes, Ch. 2: 72
- Karayazıcı Abdülhalim, 37
- Kâzım Ağa, 328
- Kemal (Şenkil) Bey, *notes*, Ch. 3: 201,
 212
- Kemalpaşazâde, Şeyhülislâm, *notes*,
 Ch. 2: 98
- Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa, 43
notes, Ch. 2: 120
- Kızılbaş, 30-1
notes, Ch. 2: 87
- Koçi Bey, Mustafa, 36, 38
- Konya, 136
- Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, 43
notes, Ch. 2: 149
- Korkud (d.1513), *notes*, Ch. 2: 92
- Köroğlu, *notes*, Ch. 2: 122
- kul system, 23-31, 35, 37-8, 40-2, 44,
 46-7, 54
notes, Ch. 2: 5, 29, 50, 53, 61, 72,
 84-5, 95, 120, 131, 137, 170, 200
- Kuleli Incident (1859), *notes*, Ch. 2:
 213
- Kutb'ud-din Aybeg, Delhi Sultanate
 (d.1210), 430
- Küçük Kaynarca, Treaty of (1774), 46
- Kütahya, *notes*, Ch. 2: 104

- Lala Şahin Paşa, 25
notes, Ch. 2: 45
- Lausanne Peace Conference (1923), 436
- levendat*, 35
notes, Ch. 2: 117
- Liberal Union
 (*Hürriyet ve İtalâf Fırkası*, 1991-), 175-7
notes
 Ch. 3: 162, 166, 188, 191, 376
 Ch. 4: 37
 (*Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası*), 151, 160
notes, Ch. 3: 139
- Libya *see* Trablusgarb
- Liman von Sanders Mission, 308-13, 318-26, 353-5, 357-8, 361
notes, Ch. 4: 76, 80, 122-4, 131, 143
- London, 173, 200, 202-3, 206
notes
 Ch. 3: 166, 265
 Ch. 4: 192
 Peace Conference (1912), 202-4, 329, 333-4, 341, 344
notes
 Ch. 3: 257
 Ch. 4: 158, 179, 183, 188, 203
- Lüleburgaz, battle of (1912), 197-8
notes, Ch. 3: 241-2
- Lütfi Fikri Bey, 170
notes, Ch. 4: 37, 39, 149, 174, 189
- Lütfi Simavi Bey, 183
notes, Ch. 4: 71
- Macedonia, 65-8, 167, 171, 196, 202, 312, 317, 332
notes
 Ch. 2: 238
 Ch. 3: 6, 35, 55, 60, 175, 224, 230, 254
 Ch. 4: 58, 200
- Mahmud II (1808-39), 52-6, 58
notes, Ch. 2: 188-9, 197, 199
- Mahmud Paşa, 28
notes, Ch. 2: 15, 72
- Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, 150, 157, 326, 342
notes
 Preamble: 8-9
 Ch. 3: 20, 25, 205, 242
 Ch. 4: 176
- Mahmud Şevket Paşa
notes
 Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 55, 88, 91-2, 97, 103, 111, 126-7, 140, 143, 148, 190, 194, 196, 239, 260, 283, 287
 Ch. 4: 1, 4-5, 8, 15, 17-18, 24, 31, 34, 37, 50-1, 54, 56, 71, 76, 109, 119-20, 122-5, 133, 137, 146-7, 149, 155, 165, 186
- Ahmed İzzet Paşa, 288-9, 292, 325-6
- Albanian Insurrections, 2
 (1910), 169-71
 (1912), 180
 assassination, 326, 328-32
- Balkan War, 212, 288-98, 301-2, 316-17
- Cabinet, 212, 287-8, 290-1, 297, 302, 323, 327
 control of military's political activities, 180-1, 307-10, 313-14, 318-26
 dominates Government, 165, 172
 Grand Vezir (1913), 211-12, 287
 Liman von Sanders Mission, 308-10, 313, 318-26
 Minister of War (1909-12), 167, 174, 182
 Ottomanism, 306
 pro-military stance, 167, 171-2
 Raid on the Sublime Porte, 211-12
 suppression of opposition, 173, 299-300
 31st March Incident, 135, 160-1, 163
 Young officers, 288-98, 327
- Mamluks, 30-2
notes, Ch. 2: 188
- Manastir, 67, 180, 187, 189, 210
notes
 Ch. 2: 245
 Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 123
- Manyasizâde Refik Bey, *notes*, Ch. 3: 45, 53
- Meclis-i Ayan* *see* Senate
- Meclis-i Mebusan* *see* Chamber of Deputies
- Meclis-i Vükela* *see* Cabinet
- Mediterranean [Çanakkale] Straits
 "Allotted" Army Corps, 290, 294
notes, Ch. 4: 15
- Mehmed II (1444-6, 1451-81), 25, 27-30
notes, Ch. 2: 15, 61-2, 72, 80-1, 200
- Mehmed III (1595-1603), 34, 37
notes, Ch. 2: 109

- Mehmed IV (1648–87), 43, 45
notes, Ch. 2: 147, 151
- Mehmed V, Mehmed Reşad (1909–18), 162, 183, 211, 353
notes, Ch. 3: 209, 215, 234, 275
- Mehmed Âkif (Ersoy), 151
notes, Ch. 4: 119
- Mehmed Ali Bey, 177
- Mehmed Ali Paşa, 296
- Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt, 56
notes, Ch. 2: 187, 195
- Mehmed Ata'ullah, 51
- Mehmed Hadi Paşa, 191
notes, Ch. 3: 222, 233
- Mehmed Nihad Bey, 197–8
notes, Ch. 3: 237
- Mehmed Nuri (Conker) Bey, 312
notes
 Ch.3: 161
- mekteplis*, 156–7, 160, 165, 292
notes
 Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 20, 68, 73, 89–90, 113
- Merc-i Dâbik, battle of (1516), 32
- Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 44
notes, Ch. 2: 151
- Midhat Paşa, 62–3
notes
 Ch. 2: 223, 225
 Ch. 3: 63
- Mihal Gazi, *notes*, Ch. 2: 25
- Military
 discipline, 157, 194–7, 292, 357–8, 437
notes
 Ch. 2: 101, 166, 176
 Ch. 3: 75, 84, 237
 Ch. 4: 276, 284
- education, 54–6, 60, 63, 164–6, 191, 313, 319, 324–5
notes
 Ch. 2: 197–8, 231–2, 238
 Ch. 3: 50, 120
 Ch. 4: 68, 131, 298
- “Guardians of the Constitution [Meşrutîyet], 167, 181, 437, 440
notes, Ch. 3: 20, 93, 194–5
see also Military, self-image
- “Guardians of the Republic”, 438–40
see also Military, self-image
- insurrections, 27, 29, 31, 38–9, 44–5, 51, 60–1, 66, 134–5, 150
notes
 Ch. 2: 162, 182, 218, 239, 242
- Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 55
- “key political institution”, 3–8, 22, 47, 62, 69, 136, 167, 305, 431, 440–1
- politics
 “above/outside politics” i–iii, 3, 176, 181, 189, 285, 309, 314–15, 323, 326, 358, 362, 440
notes
 Ch. 3: 193
 Ch. 4: 81, 103, 105, 284
- conscious political acts, 11, 134, 137, 147, 155, 162, 181, 184, 190–1, 212, 286, 351, 433, 437, 440
- control, 5, 11, 33, 43, 61
notes
 Ch. 2: 99, 135, 160, 228
 Ch. 3: 10, 265
 Ch. 4: 123, 137, 170
- Ahmed İzzet Paşa, 292, 346–8
- Balkan War, 195, 292, 335
- education, 166
- Enver Bey (later Paşa), 313–16, 335, 346–8, 351, 354–62, 356, 359
- explicit controls, 182, 190–1, 308, 313, 324, 347, 356, 359, 439
- implicit controls, 190–1, 308, 359, 439
- legal controls, 180–1, 193, 292, 308, 346, 351, 359, 439
- Liman von Sanders Mission, 307–8, 211–6, 307, 310, 313
- Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 180–1, 307–8, 310, 313, 321–6
- normative controls, 292, 308, 439
- Restoration of the Constitution, 68
- Saviour Officers, 180–1, 186, 190, 210
- specific controls, 181, 190, 308, 439
- Turkish Republic, 439–40
- loyalty, 8, 195, 208, 308
notes, Ch. 4: 276
- Enver Paşa, 357, 360
- Oath of Service, 68, 146–7, 190–1, 438–9
- personality principle, 18
- Sultan, 68, 146–7, 164, 360
- yeniçeris*, 31, 33, 41

- Young Ottomans, 64
 Young Turks, 66
 partisan political activities, 133–4,
 162, 176, 210, 287, 440–1
notes
 Ch. 3: 50, 194, 235
 Ch. 4: 30, 103
 Balkan War, 195–6
 Goltz, Freiherr von der, 65
 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 180–1,
 287, 307–8, 320
 Saviour Officers, 180–1, 183–4,
 189–91
 politicization, 11, 64–6, 68, 133–4,
 286–7, 437
notes
 Ch. 2: 234
 Ch. 3: 237
 Ch. 4: 131
 extrinsic, 196, 304, 437
 intrinsic, 162, 190, 192, 196,
 326, 358, 437
 roles, 10, 54, 134, 136, 285–6, 326
 conjunctive, 155, 195, 440
 interventionist, 65–6, 68, 143,
 160, 208, 212, 286, 306, 440
notes, Ch. 2: 218, 249
 political ruling group, 143, 162,
 176, 213, 285–6, 291, 301,
 306, 312, 315, 332, 338, 348,
 354–7, 359, 431–2, 437
 pressure group, 437
 stimuli, 11, 212, 326, 434
 corporate interest, 178, 434, 440
 individual self-interest, 178, 184,
 300, 440
 national interest, 434, 440
 purges, 182
 (1908), 157
notes, Ch. 3: 25
 (1909), 165
notes, Ch. 3: 115
 (1913–14), 312, 347–9, 355–7
 reform, 40, 45–6, 50, 53–60, 63,
 164–5, 309–13, 319, 322–5, 356–7,
 360–1
notes
 Ch. 2: 86, 161–2, 178–9, 188–9,
 197, 207, 230–3
 Ch. 3: 109
 Ch. 4: 103, 282, 298
 seal, 15, 21–3, 38, 45, 49, 51, 54,
 65, 68–9, 314–15, 327, 429–30,
 436–7
notes, Ch. 2: 237
 self-image, 157, 292, 357
 guarantor of security and order,
 171, 176
 institutionalization, 54–6, 60
 superiority over civilian élites, 134,
 136–7, 163–4, 189, 337
 supremacy, 178, 213, 298, 329,
 338, 340–1, 345, 349, 431–3
 tradition, 9–10, 21–2, 69, 131, 134,
 147, 167, 213, 315, 338, 429–30,
 429–33, 437–9
notes
 Ch. 2: 27
 Ch. 3: 68
 units *see* armies
see also armies; navy
 Military Council *see* Council for
 Military Affairs
 Military High Command *see* High
 Military Command
millets, 58, 65, 143, 168, 304
notes, Ch. 3: 131–2
Millî Mücadele *see* Turkish National
 Struggle
 Milne, General Sir G.F. 431
 Ministry of War, 60, 164
notes
 Ch. 2: 217, 228, 233
 Ch. 3: 15, 55, 70, 201, 212
 Ch. 4: 293
 education, 166
 Enver Bey (later Paşa), 295, 352–3,
 357
 Liman von Sanders Mission, 319,
 353, 357
 military autonomy, 60, 173
 Nâzım Paşa, 153, 182–4, 186–8, 191,
 195, 197
 reform, 164, 311, 346
 Sadık Bey, 173
Seraskeriate, 53, 60
notes, Ch. 2: 228, 233
 minorities *see* *millets*
 Mohàcs, battle of (1687), 45
notes, Ch. 2: 100
 Moldavia, 30
 Moltke, Helmuth von, 55, 65
notes
 Ch. 2: 230, 233, 239, 254
 Ch. 4: 158, 305
 Mondros (Mudros) Armistice (1919),
 136

- Montenegro/Montenegrins, 61, 194, 196, 317
- Morea, 29
- Motherland
and Liberty Society, 65
Society, 65
- Muhtar Bey, 135
notes
Preamble: 11
Ch. 4: 102
- Murad I (1362–89), 24–5
notes, Ch. 2: 38
- Murad II (1421–44), 27
notes, Ch. 2: 58
- Murad III (1574–95), 34–5
notes, Ch. 2: 105
- Murad IV (1623–40), 36, 39–40, 43
- Murad V (1876), 61
notes, Ch. 2: 219
- Murad Paşa, 37
- Mustafa I (1617–18, 1622–3), 38
- Mustafa II (1695–1703), 46
notes, Ch. 2: 157, 162
- Mustafa III (1757–74), *notes*, Ch. 2: 166
- Mustafa IV (1807–8), 51
notes, Ch. 2: 182
- Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Bey (later Paşa) i–iii, 136, 201, 290–1, 295–6, 430, 435–7
notes
Preamble: 13
Ch. 3: 161
Ch. 4: 15, 18, 28, 282
Epilogue: 6
- Mustafa Rahmi (Evranos), *notes*, Ch. 3: 13
- Mustafa Reşid Paşa, 57
notes
Ch. 2: 206
Ch. 3: 258
- Müfid Bey, 170
- Mümtaz Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 3: 161
- Naciye Sultan, 350–2
notes, Ch. 258
- Nâfiz Efendi (later Bey), 210, 300
notes, Ch. 3: 190
- Nail Bey, 173
- Naîmâ, Mustafa (historian), 37
- Namik Kemal, 59
notes, Ch. 2: 215
- National Security Council (Turkish Republic), 439
- nationalism, 304
- Islamic, *notes*, Ch. 2: 227
- militaristic, 199, 287, 304–7, 312, 321, 331, 335–9, 345–6, 354–5
notes
Ch. 3: 247–8
Ch. 4: 68–70, 94, 268
- Ottoman millets, 64, 304–5
notes
Ch. 3: 132
Ch. 4: 284
- Turkish, 199, 321
notes
Ch. 2: 235
Ch. 3: 40, 132, 186, 247–8
Ch. 4: 65–7, 72–3, 75, 80, 94
Epilogue: 6
- Edirne, 335, 337–9
- Gökalp, Ziya, 303–6, 331, 335
- Young officers, 64–5, 168, 179, 312, 331, 335, 431, 433, 436–7
- Navarino, battle of (1827), *notes*, Ch. 2: 195
- navy, 55, 135–6, 145, 153–5, 164, 297, 318, 360
notes
Ch. 2: 1, 86, 178, 211
Ch. 3: 10, 51, 191, 205, 236, 256
Ch. 4: 15, 119
- Nâzım Paşa
notes
Ch. 3: 51, 56, 60, 201, 212, 224, 234, 242, 262, 278, 287
Ch. 4: 7, 80
- anti-Unionist stance, 193, 312
- assassination, 210–11, 328–9
- Balkan War, 200, 206
- interpellation, 186–7
- Minister of War, 153, 182–4, 186–8, 191, 195, 197
- officer corps, 210–11
- Raid on the Sublime Porte, 210–11
- Saviour Officers, 186–8, 191, 210, 312
- Necib Draga Bey, 169
- Necib Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 3: 13
- Neşet Paşa, 178
notes Ch. 3: 161, 183
- Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Paşa, 46
- New Order *see* Nizam-ı Cedid
- Nezib, battle of (1839), 56
- Nicopolis (Niğbolu), battle of (1396), 25
- Nihad Bey, 166
- Niyazi Bey, 67
notes, Ch. 4: 102

- nizam*, 18, 20, 37, 51, 303, 327
notes, Ch. 2: 199–200
- Nizam-ı Cedid*, 49–52, 55
notes, Ch. 2: 179
- Noradounghian, Gabriel, Efendi,
 202–3, 205, 207–8, 309
notes
 Ch. 3: 256, 258
 Ch. 4: 8, 80
- Nuri Paşa, 145
- officer corps ii, 9
notes
 Ch. 2: 1
 Ch. 3: 55, 237
 Ch. 4: 39, 50, 131, 254
- Ahmed İzzet Paşa, 288–9, 292, 347, 353
- anti-Unionist opposition, 300–1
- Balkan War, 288–98
- Chamber of Deputies, 153–5
- Committee of Union and progress,
 156, 174–5, 177, 185, 189–90,
 192–4, 286
- creation, 55
- discipline, 194–7
- Edirne, 203, 337
- education, 166
- Enver Bey (later Paşa) ii, 293, 295–6,
 299, 313–16, 332, 345–62
- intellectual elite, 59–60
- İstanbul by-election, 177
- Kâmil Paşa, 154–5, 198, 208, 286
- Liman von Sanders Mission, 308,
 310–12, 322–6
- Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 167, 171,
 288–98, 307, 320, 332–7
- Nâzım Paşa, 210–11
- politicization, 65, 133, 137, 143,
 163–4, 166–7, 177–9, 182, 188–90,
 193–5, 285, 300–1, 304, 313–15,
 332–8, 341, 436–8, 440
- Raid on the Sublime Porte, 208–13
- reform, 164–6, 311–12
- Turkish National Struggle, 433
- Turkish nationalism, 304, 307
- war in Trablusgarb, 174–5
see also Military; Military, politics,
 politicization; Saviour Officers;
 Young officers
- Oğuz Turks, *notes*, Ch. 2: 5
- Ohri, 67
notes, Ch. 2: 245
- Orhan I Bey (1326–62), 23
- Osman I Gazi (d.1326), 15–19, 21, 23,
 430
notes, Ch. 2: 5, 12–14, 25
- Osman II (1618–22), 38
notes, Ch. 2: 131
- Osman Ağa, 32
- Osman Bey, 209
- Osman Nizami Paşa, 334
- Osman Senai Bey, *notes*, Ch. 2: 230
- Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti* *see*
 Committee of Union and Progress
- Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası* *see* Ottoman
 Liberty Society
- Ottoman
 Liberty Society, 65
 Progress and Union Society, 65
 Union Society, 67
- Ottomanism, 59, 168, 170–1, 179, 193,
 304–7
notes
 Ch. 3: 40, 132
 Ch. 4: 70
- Ömer Naci Bey, 209
notes, Ch. 3: 273
- Pact of Alliance *see* *Sened-i İttifak*
- Pan-Slavism, 61
notes, Ch. 2: 220
- Paris, 65, 68, 153, 173, 298
notes
 Ch. 3: 21, 161
 Ch. 4: 192, 211
- Parliament, 62, 134, 152, 165–8, 172,
 174, 176–8, 180, 184–7
notes
 Ch. 2: 223, 225, 249
 Ch. 3: 62, 89, 99, 103, 157, 168,
 190, 211, 215
- Paşsarowitz, Treaty of (1718), 46
- People's Party (Ahali Fırkası), 171
- personality principle, 18–19, 39, 42
notes, Ch. 2: 15, 98, 227
- Poincaré, Raymond, *notes*, Ch. 4: 119
- Poland, 38
notes, Ch. 2: 131
- Prussia/Prussian, 61, 65
notes, Ch. 2: 197
- Raid on the Sublime Porte (1913),
 204–13, 286–7, 295, 298, 312,
 327, 331–2, 334
notes
 Ch. 3: 260–88

- Ch. 4: 1, 7–8, 15, 170
 Edirne, 205, 209, 211–12
 Enver Bey, 204, 208–12
 Kâmil Paşa, 203, 208–11, 328
 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 211–12
 Nâzım Paşa, 210–11
 officer corps, 208–13
 Talât Bey, 209, 211
 Young officers, 328–9
 Rami Mehmed Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 2: 162
reaya, 20, 35–6, 40–1, 48
notes, Ch. 2: 19, 43, 110, 117, 120, 122, 138, 169
 Receb Paşa, 145–6
notes, Ch. 3: 15, 20
 reins of government *see zimam-ı idare*
 Resne, 67
 Reval rapprochement (1908), 66
notes, Ch. 2: 240
 Reyhaniyya, battle of (1517), 32
 Rifât Paşa, 342
notes, Ch. 4: 53
 Rıza Paşa, 57
notes, Ch. 2: 206
 Rıza Paşa, Marshall, 145
notes, Ch. 3: 125
 Rıza Nur, 172
notes, Ch. 3: 188
 Romania, 317, 333, 342
notes, Ch. 3: 254
 Rome, *notes*, Ch. 4: 192
 Rum Mehmed Paşa, 28
notes, Ch. 2: 72
 Rumelia, 25–6, 51–2, 61, 64, 66, 139, 148, 298, 339
notes
 Ch. 2: 19, 33, 37, 45, 55, 61, 167, 172, 195, 205, 238
 Ch. 3: 186, 201
 Ch. 4: 188, 296
 Russia, 46, 49, 52, 57, 62, 66, 202, 342, 362–3
notes
 Ch. 2: 158, 165–6, 195, 225
 Ch. 3: 159, 254
 Ch. 4: 109, 282, 309
 Rüşdü Bey, 168
 Sabahaddin Bey, Prince, 175, 299–301, 330
notes
 Ch. 3: 195, 208
 Ch. 4: 37, 42, 157
 Sabih Bey, 285
notes, Ch. 4: 28
Sadâ-i Millet, 171
 Sadık Bey, 173
notes, Ch. 3: 147, 188, 191
 Said Paşa, 145, 174, 176, 182–4
notes
 Ch. 3: 12, 154, 156, 189, 199, 202
 Ch. 4: 301
 Said Halim Paşa (Mehmed), 326, 329, 331–2, 340, 342, 351
notes, Ch. 4: 1, 48–9, 56, 100, 146, 183, 255, 305
 St. James's Conference *see* London, Peace Conference
 St. Petersburg, *notes*, Ch. 4: 192, 211
 Sakarya, battle of (1921), 435
 Salih Paşa, 160, 164
notes, Ch. 3: 20, 93
 Salih Paşa, *Damad*, 299, 330
 Sanders, O.V.K. Liman von *see* Liman von Sanders Mission
 Sarı Mehmed Paşa, 46
 Satvet Lütfi (Tozan) Bey, *notes*, Ch. 4: 37
 Saviour Officers, 179–92, 210, 312
notes, Ch. 3: 201, 203, 207–9, 212
 Savov, General, 288, 332
 Sebük-tegin, Gaznavî (977–97), 430
sekbân, 28, 35–7, 39
notes, Ch. 2: 68, 117
 Selânik, i–ii, 65, 135, 145–50, 173, 188–9, 192, 317
notes
 Preamble: 9
 Ch. 3: 19, 37, 79, 103, 219, 246, 254
 Selânik Congresses
 1st (1908), 148–9
notes, Ch. 3: 31
 2nd (1909) i–ii
 Selânikî (historian), 35
notes, Ch. 2: 104
 Selçuk state, 9, 15–17, 430
notes, Ch. 2: 8, 167
 Selim I (1512–20), 31–2
notes, Ch. 2: 97
 Selim II (1566–74), 33–4
notes, Ch. 2: 104–5
 Selim III (1789–07), 49–51, 53
notes, Ch. 2: 147, 178, 182
 Selim Mehmed Paşa, 53
 Senate, 161, 163, 207
Sened-i İttifak (1808), 52, 56
notes, Ch. 2: 186

Seraskeriate see Ministry of War,
Seraskeriate

Serbesti, 159

notes, Ch. 3: 86, 94

Serbia/Serbs, 12, 52, 61, 196, 202,
301, 316–17, 332–3

notes

Ch. 2: 195

Ch. 3: 230, 233, 239, 254–5

Ch. 4: 305

Seyfeddin, Ömer, *notes*, Ch. 4: 296

seyfiye, 20–1, 23, 25, 37, 47

notes, Ch. 2: 9

sipahis, 24–6, 30–1, 34, 36–7

notes, Ch. 2: 34, 43, 110–11, 122,
147

Sivas

notes

Preamble: 13

Ch. 3: 20

Siyavuş Paşa, 45

Society of Muhammad, 158–9

notes, Ch. 3: 77, 80, 84

Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, 35–6

notes, Ch. 2: 104, 114

Staff College see *Erkân-ı Harb*

staff-officers, 63, 65–6, 68, 346

notes

Ch. 2: 230

Ch. 4: 170, 284

Sublime Porte raid see Raid on the

Sublime Porte (1913)

succession struggles, 25–7, 29, 31, 38

notes, Ch. 2: 55, 80, 82–4, 91, 104,
132

Supreme Military Council, 164–5,

182–3

notes, Ch. 3: 201–2, 235

Süleyman I (1520–1566), 33–4, 45, 49

notes, Ch. 2: 104, 157

Süleyman II (1687–1691), 45

Süleyman Ağa, *notes*, Ch. 2: 131

Süleyman Paşa, 452

Süleyman Paşa (War College), *notes*,

Ch. 2: 218

Süleyman Askerî Bey, 350

Süleyman Tevfik Bey

notes

Preamble: 9

Ch. 3: 86

Sykes, Sir Mark, 344

Syria, 12, 30, 32

notes, Ch. 2: 232

Szigetvár, siege of (1566), *notes*, Ch. 2:
104

Şânizade Ata'ullah, *notes*, Ch. 2: 200

Şarköy-Bolayır offensive, 291, 293–4

notes, Ch. 4: 15, 17–18, 170

Şehabeddin Paşa, 27

notes, Ch. 2: 61

Şemseddin Efendi, 144

Şemsi Paşa, 67

notes, Ch. 2: 244

Şeref Bey, *notes*, Ch. 3: 248

Şeriat, 32, 42, 53, 59, 134–5, 160

notes

Ch. 2: 63, 98, 147, 182, 227

Preamble: 5

Ch. 3: 80, 89

Şerif Bey, 357–8

Şerif Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 3: 194

Şevket Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 3: 73

Şevket Turgut Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 4: 102

Şükrü Bey, 288, 297

Şükrü (Tezer) Efendi, *notes*, Ch. 3: 246

Tabaniyassı Mehmed Paşa, *notes*,

Ch. 2: 135

Tacizâde Cafer Çelebi, 32

Talât Bey, 50

notes

Ch. 2: 240

Ch. 3: 13–15, 18, 50, 86, 147, 211,
260, 262, 274–5, 287

Ch. 4: 1, 18, 24, 31, 133, 149, 165,
170, 176, 181, 183, 186, 193,
255, 285

Ahmet İzzet Paşa, 348–50

Albanian insurrection (1910), 169–70

anti-Unionist opposition, 300

coup d'état, 204

Edirne, 294, 336, 340

Enver Paşa, 359

Kâmil Paşa, 153

Minister of the Interior, 167, 173

Raid on the Sublime Porte, 209, 211

Young officers, 332–4, 352, 359

Tanin, 153, 339, 353

notes

Ch. 3: 161

Ch. 4: 34, 248, 287

Tanzimat (1839–76), 56, 58

notes, Ch. 2: 202

Tatar Osman Paşa, 67

Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, *notes*, Ch. 2: 187

Tercüman, *notes*, Ch. 3: 86

- Tevfik Paşa, 183
notes
 Ch. 3: 159, 203, 258
 Ch. 4: 48, 102
- Tevfik Fikret, 305–6
- 31 March Incident (1909), 134–6,
 159–61, 163, 165–7, 210, 261,
 314
notes, Ch. 3: 62, 87, 160
- Thrace, 197, 200–1, 301, 317, 329,
 343, 350
notes
 Ch. 3: 260
 Ch. 4: 54, 113, 188, 230
- timar*, 25–6, 30, 34, 36–7, 47–8
notes, Ch. 2: 34, 43, 81, 111, 122,
 179
- Topal Tevfik, 330
- Trablusgarb i, 145, 173–5, 194, 358
notes
 Ch. 3: 151, 153, 158–9, 161, 205,
 230, 233
 Ch. 4: 258
- Trained Victorious Soldiers of
 Muhammad *see* *Asâkir-i*
Mansûre-i Muhammediye
- Triple Alliance, 318
- Triple Entente, 318, 431
- tufekçi*, 34
notes, Ch. 2: 106, 117
- Tuman Bey (1516–17), 31
- Tunisia, 64
- Turkish
 Hearth *see* *Türk Ocağı*
 Homeland Society *see* *Türk Yurdu*
Cemiyeti
 National Struggle, 433–4, 437
 Republic/Turkey, 12, 15, 438
notes
 Ch. 2: 27, 251
 Epilogue: 10
 loyalty, 438–9, 441
 military, 3, 9, 133–4, 441
 seal, 21–2, 69, 429–30, 436,
 438–9
 tradition, 9–10, 69, 429–30,
 438–9
 Oath of Service, military, 68,
 146–7, 190–1, 438–9
 Society *see* *Türk Derneği*
 Strength *see* *Türk Gücü*
 War of Independence, 435–6
 Turkism *see* Nationalism, Turkish
 Turko-Mongols, 16, 20
notes, Ch. 2: 8
- Tursun Beg (historian), 42
notes, Ch. 2: 15
- Türk*
Derneği, *notes*, Ch. 3: 186
Gücü, *notes*, Ch. 4: 189
Ocağı
notes
 Ch. 3: 186
 Ch. 4: 189
- Türk Yurdu, *notes*, Ch. 3: 186
- Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti*, *notes*, Ch. 3: 186
- uç beylik*, 16–17, 21, 25
notes, Ch. 2: 5, 9, 12–13, 24–5
- ulema*
notes, Ch. 2: 80–1, 147, 182, 188,
 226–8
 anti-Unionist opposition, 158
askerî, 20
 Candarlı Halil Paşa, 27
 power-base, 53
 provincial élite, 37
 legitimization of ruler's authority, 62
 31st March Incident, 134
yenîçeris, 27, 33, 39–40, 43, 45, 51
- Unionists *see* Committee of Union and
 Progress
- United States of America, 435
- Vahdettin Efendi, Prince, 299
notes, Ch. 4: 38
- vakıf*, 30
notes, Ch. 2: 81
- Vambéry, Armimius, *notes*, Ch. 3: 249
- Vatan Cemiyeti* *see* Motherland Society
- Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti* *see*
 Motherland and Liberty Society
- Vehip (Kaç) Bey, 166, 191
notes, Ch. 3: 123, 223
- Venice, 46
- Vienna, 44, 153, 204
notes
 Ch. 2: 100, 158
 Ch. 3: 254, 256, 259
 Ch. 4: 192, 211, 274
- Volkan*, 158–9
notes, Ch. 3: 77, 80, 84, 86
- von der Goltz, Colmar Freiherr *see*
 Goltz, Colmar Freiherr von der
- von Moltke, Helmuth, *see* Moltke,
 Helmuth von
- von Wangeheim, Baron *see*
 Wangenheim, Baron von

- Wahhabis, 52
- Wangenheim, Baron von, 309–10, 313, 318–19, 321, 323–5, 340
notes, Ch. 4: 80, 121–2, 137, 186
- War College *see* *Erkân-i Harb*
- Wilhelm II, Kaiser (1888–1918), 65
notes, Ch. 4: 310
- World War I (1914–18), 429, 431–2, 434, 436
notes, Ch. 4: 119
- Allies, 432, 434–5
notes: Epilogue: 6
- Yahyâ Efendi, 39
- Yahya Kemal
notes
 Ch. 3: 273
 Ch. 4: 65, 293
- Yakub Cemil Bey, 210
- Yemen, 173
notes, Ch. 3: 20, 89, 148, 222, 239, 260, 288
- Yeni Edirne, *notes*, Ch. 3: 248
- yenîçeris, 24–34, 36–47, 51–5, 57, 356
notes, Ch. 2: 1, 40, 58, 69, 80–1, 84, 86, 100, 104, 106, 109, 131, 145, 147, 154, 160, 162, 166, 182, 188–9, 197, 199
- Young officers
notes
 Ch. 3: 19, 68, 262
 Ch. 4: 15, 17–18, 50, 125, 149, 170
- Ahmed İzzet Paşa, 292, 336, 346–50, 352–3
- Balkan War, 288–92, 340
- Committee of Union and Progress i, 204
- Edirne, 334–6
- Enver Paşa, 346, 348, 350, 352–6
- intellectual élite, 65
- Liman von Sanders Mission, 323, 326
- Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 288–98, 294–7, 314, 320, 326–7
- politicization, 292–3, 323, 326–9, 331–2, 334, 338–41, 345–50, 354
- Raid on the Sublime Porte, 328–9
- Restoration of the Constitution, 68
- Talât Bay, 334, 348–50, 352
- Turkish nationalism, 305, 307
- war in Trablusgarb, 175
see also Military; Military, Politics; officer corps; Saviour Officers
- Young Ottomans, 59, 64
notes, Ch. 3: 5
- Young Turks, 8–9, 64, 69, 134, 212, 430, 437
notes
 Ch. 2: 248–9
 Ch. 3: 5, 19, 38, 68, 79, 101, 132, 151, 153, 159, 163–4, 212, 262
 Ch. 4: 75, 102, 130, 137, 231, 302, 304
 dependence on the military, 68, 326, 331, 345, 359
 Restoration of the Constitution, 66–8, 180
 suppress opposition, 326, 321
 Turkish nationalism, 306–7
- Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi, Prince, 339
notes, Ch. 4: 202
- Yusuf Şatvan Bey, 178
- Zaganos Paşa, 27
notes, Ch. 2: 61
- Zeki Bey (later Paşa), 196
notes, Ch. 3: 237, 262
- zimam-ı idare, 431–2, 434–5
- Ziyaeddin Efendi, 134 ??